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ABSTRACT 
Indigenous areas in Taiwan were a ‘special administrative region’ during the Japanese 
colonial period (1895-1945). The Japanese police controlled the primary aspects of everyday life 
of indigenous people. Some policies concerning indigenous people have been continued in the 
post-colonial regimes of Han Chinese until now. Protected areas (PAs) have been established 
since the 1980s by central government when Taiwan was still under the martial law. National 
parks are typical protected area with rigorous conservation restrictions. Some protected areas 
actually overlapped with the traditional domains of indigenous people. Community conservation 
is a participatory protected area and has emerged around the 1990s. It is seen as a reform of 
fortress protected areas such as parks because it integrates both objectives of conservation and 
development. The rolling back of the state and empowerment of the local community are assumed 
to be the features of such a reformed policy. Community conservation has become popular among 
indigenous communities of Taiwan since 2000. 
This study aims to look at the interactions between state authorities and local indigenous 
people in PAs. Two Truku villages in east Taiwan were selected as case studies, as one is in 
Taroko National Park while the other conducted a community conservation project in the 2000s. 
Qualitative methods were employed for data collection. Drawing from the theory of political 
ecology, a framework is constructed drawing together human territoriality, resistance, and social 
impacts. This analysis framework was employed to examine the acts of state agencies and local 
Truku people, and social repercussions in the Truku examples in the context of PAs. Research 
results showed that the establishment of PAs and conservation policy implementations in PAs by 
state agencies were acts of internal territorialisation. Such a spatial classification restricted the 
locals’ exploitation of natural resources according to the imposed regulations. Through the control 
enforcement by state agencies and judicial authorities, conflicts between the local indigenous 
people and state agencies have happened. Even the co-management arrangement of the Park and 
the planning of scenic areas for local development revealed the domination of power by the 
government. These restrictions resulted in unpleasant social impacts such as difficulties of 
cultural practices and livelihood selections as well as the undermining social capital in the local 
indigenous communities. Accordingly, the local Truku people mobilised resistance to the 
conservation interventions via individual everyday practices and collective protests. Their 
resistance aimed to express their sustenance demands and ethnic claims. Differences between 
covert and overt resistance depended on the degree of empowerment. Through the process of 
empowerment, local protesters gained more information and political dynamics for their 
collective action, open resistance. 
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I primarily contend that the establishment of PAs and conservation policy 
implementations by governmental agencies, whether through parks or community conservation, 
are acts of internal territoriality. Territorialisation of the state tends to result in resistance by the 
local indigenous residents due to the negative social impacts as a result of conservation 
interventions. This argument also interprets the unexpected consequence, resistance of the local 
indigenous people, of PA policies in Taiwan. To avoid the undesired outcome of policy 
implementation and social cost, it is necessary to build trust between them. A participatory project 
which confers genuine power and accords with local norms may be feasible. Decentralised power 
could be the first step of a breakthrough. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Research background 
1.1.1 Interactions between two primary actors in protected areas (PAs) 
The establishment of protected areas is seen as the main strategy of biodiversity 
conservation (Norgrove and Hulme, 2006; Borrini-Feyerabend, Kothari and Oviedo, 2004; 
Adams, 2004). Stemming from the western tradition, protected area establishment aims 
to protect biodiversity and prevent ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (Hardin, 1968) from 
overuse of natural resources with population growth. According to this popularly cited 
work, he suggests nationalisation of the common property as an approach to avoid such a 
disaster for common good. State authorities have been a primary actor in protected area 
establishment, in particular in the developing world, because they possess the powers over 
administration, law-making and jurisdiction. In protected areas, it is common to restrict 
resource access by conservation laws and behaviour control through law enforcement. 
However, these restrictions potentially affect the life of local people, especially those 
indigenous populations depending on local resources. Locals’ livelihoods such as land use 
for agriculture and cultural practices such as hunting and gathering are limited because of 
conservation implementation. Nature conservation for the public interest actually relies 
on the costs of local people through resource restriction and others. Local people as the 
other vital actors within protected area management are comparably disadvantaged for 
they are expected to passively accept conservation policy implementation. These 
powerless actors actually can react to policy implementation and the more powerful actors 
by individual and collective actions. David Easton’s political system (1957), for example, 
notes that the feedback of decisions or policies made by a political system shapes people’s 
demands and the support for a political system. Applying this idea to the conservation 
case, the feedback refers to the acts of affected people towards conservation policies made 
by state authorities. The feedback of protected area policy implementation by the locals 
will shape new demands of and support for conservation policy-makers. James Scott’s 
‘weapons of the weak’ (1985) shows the everyday resisting actions of tenant farmers toward 
landlords and wealthy farmers in the green revolution in Malaysia. These ‘criminal 
behaviours’ such as theft and slander by the powerless farmers were understood as hidden 
resistance against social change --- intervention of capitalism in the form of agricultural 
revolution. In this regard, the locals as the disadvantaged actors regarding protected area 
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management possibly use their weapons to fight for their rights. The interactions between 
the state authorities and local people are significant for conservation policy because the 
locals can resist policy implementations of protected areas and cause unexpected 
consequences of conservation policy. It is only possible to interpret local peoples’ 
resistance to conservation policy by understanding their views and the socioeconomic 
context of the local community.  
1.1.2 Social dimension of nature conservation 
Mascia et al (2003) have noted that social science studies play a vital role in nature 
conservation. Furthermore, conservation decisions are greatly influenced by social and 
political process (Wilshusen et al, 2003; Ban et al, 2013). In this regard, the interactions 
between the state authorities and local indigenous people are useful for debates of nature 
conservation. Given the existence of injustices of conservation, international law and 
organisations such as the International Unit for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) have 
recognised the rights of indigenous communities in protected areas (Colchester, 2004). 
Taking the World Parks Congress in 2003 as an example, the consensus document of the 
Congress declared a new paradigm that protected areas should include the interests of the 
affected people in protected areas. The Accord of the Congress also honoured the nature 
conservation efforts made by indigenous peoples (ibid). The General Assembly of the 
United Nations announced the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007 and through this 
aimed to ensure the interests of indigenous peoples in the world. Taiwan is a non-member 
of the UN due to certain specific political factors in 1970s1, but important questions remain 
as to whether the Government of Taiwan guarantees the rights of indigenous people in 
protected areas in accordance with these international norms. I intend to historically trace 
the relationship between the state and indigenous communities via policies of indigenous 
peoples in different political regimes of Taiwan. The historical examination helps to 
explain some similarities and differences of the interactions, which is a necessary starting 
point for understanding the state as well as the local indigenous people.  
                                                     
1The Republic of China (ROC) was established in the Mainland China in 1912 and has moved to Taiwan 
area since December 1949 when the ruling party (Kuomintang) eventually lost to the Chinese 
Communist Party during the Chinese Civil War. Mainland China area has been governed by the People’s 
Republic of China of Chinese Communist Party since then. The ROC Government claimed that Taiwan 
area under the rule of   ROC Government is a free area of China. The United Nations Assembly 
Resolution 2758 in October 1971 recognised the People’s Republic of China as the only legal 
representative of China to the United Nations to replace the place of the Republic of China (Taiwan). 
Knowing the proposal and the possible outcome of recognition, the ROC Government announced its 
withdrawal from the United Nations before the vote of the Resolution. Therefore, ROC Taiwan has not 
been in the UN since October 1971.     
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Different political regimes have applied various policies to indigenous residents of 
Taiwan. In this study I want to reveal the development of the relationship between 
indigenous people and the state at different stages about one hundred years ago when 
indigenous peoples of Taiwan completely surrendered to the Japanese colonial authorities. 
This starting point is important because it reflects the moment that indigenous 
populations in Taiwan contacted the modern state for the first time. Before the Japanese 
colonial regime, indigenous groups in Taiwan, in particular those in the mountains, were 
not really under the rule of any mainstream regime. They then were greatly influenced by 
the state policies of different political regimes and the mainstream society. 
1.1.3 The important debates concerning this study 
This thesis situates itself within the field of political ecology. A further discussion 
of the field is provided in chapter two, and it is important to state at the outset that there 
are a number of differing approaches to political ecology research. The approach taken in 
this thesis, informed by the works of Peluso and Vandergeest (2001) and Holmes (2014), is 
to search for understanding of ecological conflicts in PAs by considering the political 
history of protected area establishment by state authorities and the locals’ resisting 
responses. This study emphasises control and conservation of the approach to 
environmental politics in the field of political ecology. This approach has been taken 
because state authorities are usually powerful enough to show their hegemony concerning 
carrying out nature conservation projects. However, the locals’ natural resource 
management to some degree has proved more efficient than external interventions 
(Gibson, Williams, and Ostrom, 2005; Hayes, 2006). Conservation interventions such as 
PAs by state authorities restrict the locals’ resource use and are a means of control. These 
conflict with locals’ sustenance, and cultural practices and potentially elicit unintended 
consequences which possibly result in the failure of conservation efforts. The lens of 
political ecology examines not only the domination of the state authorities, but the 
environmental justice of conservation. Locals take actions in response to the changes from 
conservation in order to politically present and secure themselves. Thus a political ecology 
approach appropriately interprets the political communications between state authorities 
and the local indigenes. This study is of value to the theory of political ecology by looking 
at the social and political processes of nature conservation in a conventional strict park 
and in a participatory community conservation project. Two types of PAs represent the 
paradigm shift of conservation policy within decades. Comparison of two examples 
highlights the similarity of environmental politics in the social and political process.  
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Debates about the balance between conservation and development have been an 
important element within political ecology. Core questions for political ecology 
approaches to conservation and development debates have included uneven power 
relationships and social costs between stakeholders. The political interactions between the 
acts of state authorities and local indigenous people affect nature conservation as well as 
local communities. The state represents the public to safeguard biodiversity conservation 
while the locals secure their rights over development. The political processes between the 
two parties shape conservation policy, local economic development, and social change. 
This thesis aims to contribute to these broader debates by political process between 
primary stakeholders.  
This critical engagement with conservation and development debates through a 
political ecology perspective has important implications for environmental policy, both 
within Taiwan and more widely. The key policy questions raised by the thesis are how 
conservation policies were implemented by state agencies, and what the conservation 
policy effects were on the local indigenous communities. These questions attempt to 
explore conservation policy implementations within PAs in indigenous regions in Taiwan 
since national parks were established three decades ago. The exploration is vital within 
Taiwan because no park has been established in indigenous regions since the creation of 
Shei-Pa Park in 1992. At least three park plans have been rejected by the local indigenous 
people and other indigenous organisations. Nature conservation policy for the common 
good has been unexpectedly denied by disadvantaged groups. The political results of 
rejection seemed to show that the establishment of Pas is not their option. The failure of 
conservation policy like this is worthy of study. Moreover, with the paradigm shift of 
international conservation to embrace local people and people-centred conservation 
(Brown, 2003), the central government has legislated the co-management rules in the park 
system in 2009. Did the new participatory institutions improve the state-society 
relationship regarding park management? This study also attempts to examine the co-
management policy implementations in indigenous regions. For the broader world, the 
environmental conflicts with respect to PA management are evident, in particular those 
locals relying on resources for livelihood. In the political system model of Easton (1957), 
policy is the output of a political system influenced by people’s support and demand. 
People’s perception and action to policy are the feedback of policy which shapes people’s 
support and demands. In this way, the conflicts from PA administrations can be seen as 
the feedback of nature conservation policy. These conflicts possibly modify new policy-
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making in a political system. Yet if the unexpected policy conflicts can be avoided, political 
costs can also be reduced. Understanding environmental conflicts is the prerequisite of 
avoiding the unexpected result of struggle. Thus, the locals’ views are of value to the 
understanding of conflicts. The social and political interactions between two primary 
actors in PAs in this study contribute to the debate of conservation and development and 
public policy by the lens of political ecology.   
 
1.2Research aim and questions 
1.2.1 Research aim 
Based on the changes of international conservation and the political environment 
of Taiwan, this thesis aims to look at the interactions between the government authorities 
and local indigenous dwellers in PAs. This social dimension of conservation reveals not 
just the governance of indigenous communities and natural resources by the state, but 
also the social justice and indigenous development of the local people. Moreover, this 
study also contributes to environmental policy through the empirical case study of 
indigenous groups in two types of PAs.  
1.2.2 Research questions 
The further objective focuses on the acts of two primary actors---the state agencies 
and the local Truku people in Taroko National Park and a community conservation project 
respectively. These include how the Park and the community conservation project were 
created, how conservation policies are implemented in the Park, how conservation effort 
was made in a community, what the locals’ perceptions of conservation are, what were the 
social effects on the locals, and what the responses of the local indigenous residents to 
these protected areas. These social interplays in PAs construct the hegemony of the state 
and the resistance of indigenous people through the lens of political ecology. 
This thesis is designed to investigate three paramount questions in two Truku 
villages that are located in two differing types of protected areas (Taroko National Park 
and a community conservation initiative).  
Q1. What were the policies and policy implementations of governmental 
agencies in Taroko National Park and a community conservation initiative? 
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Q2. What were the local Trukus’ responses/actions to these conservation 
policies and policy implementations in PAs? 
Q3. What social impacts from conservation occurred in the two Truku 
villages? 
These questions follow a simple linear logic that how ‘a political system’ (Easton, 
1957) operates for decision making and then how the decision or policy is implemented in 
the local environment. These appear to be ‘top-down’ processes dominated by the 
governmental authorities or the elite. Later I explore the effects of the decision in the local 
villages of indigenous people. The local indigenous dwellers’ consciousness of 
conservation decisions, as well as their responses to the decision, acts and the dominant 
class are equally important ‘bottom-up’ aspects of these processes. The feedback created 
by local people’s actions shapes the political system for a new decision. My discussion of 
interplays between the primary actors in a conservation context interprets the policy 
implementations and the reply of local indigenous people.  
The first question is concerned with the acts of exercising power and decision 
making, in particular the role of governmental agencies. It looks at the performance of the 
state in order to detect the unjust domination on conservation by the powerful state 
authorities. Accordingly, the scheme of local participation is a significant indicator in this 
question. In the two protected areas, a park and a community conservation project, I 
address a few sub-questions to comprehend the acts of state authorities: 
Q1.1 How were protected areas created? Was there any local participation when 
PAs were established? How was conservation policy implemented in the local 
community? 
Q1.2 What are the processes of decision-making in protected areas? Who are the 
decision-makers? What was the foundation of decision or policy in protected 
areas? 
Q1.3 Were there any mechanisms for people’s participation in these decisions? To 
what degree and by which means do local people participate in the management of 
PAs? 
The second question studies the perception and the response of the local 
indigenous residents to nature conservation. This inquiry focuses on the local indigenous 
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dwellers. It is of importance as it relates to the autonomy of the local indigenous residents 
and their local development. Their responses potentially alter the decision or policy of 
conservation. Some questions are addressed to grasp the attitudes of local people in 
protected areas: 
Q2.1 How do local people think about conservation institutions and conservation 
implementations in PAs? What do they think about the local development of PAs?  
Q2.2 To what extent are traditional practices still performed within the villages? 
Why do they continue to perform these under the pressure of conservation? 
Q2.3 What did the locals do in response to the conservation mechanism in PAs? 
Why did they take these actions? 
The third question scrutinises the influence and social impact resulting from the 
exercise of power. This question aims to witness the effects of conservation in the local 
indigenous community, especially on the use of natural resources. The issues of effects on 
livelihoods and traditional practices are examined closely through the follow questions: 
Q3.1 What was the social change or social influence from conservation institutions 
or conservation implementations in the local community? To what extent do the 
local indigenous people depend on the use of natural resources for livelihoods? 
How are traditional practices affected by conservation in PAs? 
Q3.2 Is there any compensation from the authorities of protected areas? Is there 
any feedback scheme? 
Q3.3 In additional to the restraint of access to natural resources, is there any impact 
caused by the PAs’ conservation institutions on the village? How were these 
impacts perceived by local people? 
These inquiries are put into practice in the field work in two indigenous villages 
and in the multiple governmental agencies in order to reach the research aim and 
objectives. 
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1.3 State authorities and indigenous peoples in Taiwan 
1.3.1 Current governmental organisations in the Republic of China (in Taiwan) 
 The Constitution of ROC is the foundation of the establishment of administrative 
government of ROC because ROC is a nation based on the rule of law. The principle of 
‘rule of law’ affects the ROC government’s administration as well as every resident in 
Taiwan area. The state organisation of the ROC in Taiwan is broadly constituted of central 
government and local government (see Chart 1.1 and 1.2). The Amendment of ROC 
Constitution regulates that the president with vice president is directly elected by the 
populace of the ROC in the free area (Taiwan area). The five bodies of the Executive Yuan, 
the Legislative Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and the Control Yuan and 
the Presidential Office constitute the central government of ROC. The local government 
is established by provincial and municipal governments with their elected councils.  
Chart 1.1 The organisations of central government in ROC Taiwan 
 
The president with vice-president serves a term of four years. The president is the 
head of the State, supreme commander of military forces and represents ROC in foreign 
relations. He/she has the power of declaring regulations and martial law with approval of 
the Legislative Yuan, appointing officials, and issuing emergency decrees by the resolution 
of the Executive Yuan Council.  
The Executive Yuan is the highest administrative organ of the state. The president 
of the Executive Yuan is nominated and appointed by the president of the ROC, with the 
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consent of the Legislative Yuan. There are different departments administrating diverse 
affairs of every aspect of life such as education, natural resources, and indigenous 
development. The Executive Yuan is the highest decision-maker of important policies and 
establishes the principles of policy implementation. These policies and practical principles 
play an important role in policy implementation at the local level. The Executive Yuan is 
responsible to the Legislative Yuan for presenting statements of administrative policies 
with reports on administration.  
The Legislative Yuan is the highest legislative organ of the state, and its members 
are elected by the people. These legislators exercise the legislative power such as passing 
regulations to reserve natural resources and to protect the interests of indigenous peoples 
on behalf of people. There are 113 members serving terms of four years in the Legislative 
Yuan since 2008 owing to a reform. They also have the power to decide by resolution upon 
vital bills proposed by the Executive Yuan, and other important affairs of the state.    
The Judicial Yuan is the highest judicial organ of the state, and in charge of civil, 
criminal and administrative cases. There are 15 Grand Justices (two as the president and 
the vice-president of the Judicial Yuan) responsible for the interpretation of the 
Constitution, laws and orders of ROC. The law courts of multiple grades are established 
under the Judicial Yuan, the judges in courts hold the office for life, above partisanship, 
and hold trials independently in accordance of the laws, free from any interference.   
The Examination Yuan is the highest examination organ of the state, and has 
charge of the matters of public servants such as employment and retirement.  
The Control Yuan is the highest control organ of the state, and exercise the powers 
of impeachment, censure and auditing.  
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Chart 1.2 The organisations of local government in ROC Taiwan 
The local administrative organs are under the Executive Yuan, so the local 
government always implements the policies made by the central government. Local 
government contains provinces and municipalities according to the Local Government 
Act. A province is constituted of counties and cities, while a municipality is subdivided 
into districts. A county or city is subdivided into towns/county cities. These governmental 
agencies are all self-governing bodies except provincial government because it has been a 
branch of the Executive Yuan in accordance with the Amendment of Constitution of ROC 
since 1998. The provincial government has been a detached agency of the Executive Yuan 
since then. In the free area of ROC, there are currently six municipalities, Taipei, New 
Taipei, Taoyuan, Taichung, Tainan, and Kaohsiung, and two provinces, Taiwan and Fujian. 
Local governmental agencies have their corresponding councils possessing the legislative 
power. The heads of these governmental agencies, and the members of councils on 
multiple levels are directly elected by the citizens.  
This study focuses on the interactions between the state agencies and the local 
indigenous people by examining two Truku examples associated with Taroko National 
Park and community conservation supported by the local county government. Therefore, 
the state agencies related with this study contain nature protection agencies (conservation 
system in the Council of Agriculture at the central level, and park system in the 
Construction and Planning Agency, Ministry of Interior at the central level) which make 
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conservation policies, justice agencies (the National Police Agency, Ministry of Interior at 
the central level) which implement policies in practice, and indigenous agencies (the 
Council of Indigenous Peoples at the central level) in the Executive Yuan. Moreover, the 
executor system in the Ministry of Justice (at the central level), Executive Yuan, 
responsible for investigation, and the law court system in the Judicial Yuan making judicial 
judgement are closely associated with the law enforcement. These agencies on the central 
level to represent the state and the public interest. At the local level, conservation agency 
and agency of indigenous affairs in Hualien county government, and Siou-Lin Township 
Office are closely relevant to this study. 
The following sections review the modern political regimes governing Taiwan at 
different phases and their policies regarding indigenous groups to explore the interactions 
between the state and indigenous people in Taiwan.  
1.3.2 Colonial period of Japanese regime (1895-1945) 
The colonial Japanese government employed the police to govern indigenous 
people in almost all primary aspects of the daily life of indigenous groups after the 
conquering battles in the indigenous regions. For example, the policemen set rules for 
transactions2 between the Han Chinese and the mountainous indigenous people. The 
Japanese policemen were seen as teachers in the primary school in the tribes. The 
dictatorship by the police forced indigenous residents to be obedient people and this 
enabled the more efficient exploitation of natural resources in indigenous regions by the 
Japanese colonial regime. The policy of relocation implemented by the police after the 
1920s (It was more active after the ‘Wushe Rebellion’ in 1930) separated indigenous 
families and compelled indigenous residents in the mountains to move to the hill areas 
closer to the plains where Han Chinese lived. The authorities attempted to change 
indigenous lifestyles based on hunting and swidden agriculture to the sedentary 
production of paddy rice. Authorities of the Taiwan state in the colonial period used 
violence to conquer indigenous people in the highlands and controlled them in everyday 
life. The policy of resettlement attempted to monitor them and to alter their traditional 
practices through livelihood shifts.  
                                                     
2 Indigenous groups were minority groups and Han Chinese were the majority people in Taiwan. They 
were located in different areas and sometimes made deals with each other before the Japanese colonial 
era. During the colonial period, The Japanese police regulated the transactions in order to manipulate 
the economy of indigenous groups.   
  12 
1.3.3 Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party, KMT) regime (1945-2014) 
After World War Two, Taiwan returned to the Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist 
Party, KMT) regime of Han Chinese in 1945. Later in 1949, this regime established the 
central government in Taiwan because they were defeated in the civil war in Mainland 
China. The KMT policies regarding indigenous people largely continued the Japanese 
colonial regime’s. The policy of the reserved land for indigenous people, for example, was 
the Japanese planning for indigenous lifestyle in forestry areas3. It greatly limited the living 
space of indigenous groups owing to the natural resource exploitation by the colonial 
regime. Ignoring the unjust planning for indigenous populations, the KMT government 
adopted it as the land policy of indigenous groups in Taiwan (Yen and Chen, 2012). 
Moreover, after governing Taiwan for a long time, the KMT regime developed 
conservation regulations such as the National Park Law and the Wildlife Conservation Act 
that restricted local people’s access to natural resources because resource restriction is the 
commonly used strategy for conservation authorities. Yet the Council of Indigenous 
Peoples at central government was established to fight for rights of indigenous groups in 
1996. The Additional Articles of the Constitution formulated in 1994 have expressed the 
ethnic pluralism in Taiwan and the idea of respecting indigenous groups. 
1.3.4 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) regime (2000-2008) 
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the election to rule Taiwan for its 
first time in 2000. Some progress in policy regarding indigenous peoples was made. 
President Chen announced that the state of Taiwan should establish a ‘New Partnership’ 
with indigenous communities. The ‘Basic Law of Indigenous Peoples’ was passed in 2005 
to safeguard the rights of indigenous peoples, and ensure that other legislations that 
conflict with the new Basic Law should be amended (Unfortunately, many conflicting 
regulations were still in negotiations or not revised).  
These political regimes governing Taiwan are seen as external regimes for 
indigenous groups. The subjectivity of indigenous communities seems to be lost when 
looking at the governance and policies regarding indigenous peoples in different 
                                                     
3 The Japanese colonial regime in Taiwan nationalised the forestry land of Taiwan. Later the regime 
zoned some nationalised forestry land only for indigenous groups. It was the prototype of reserved land 
for indigenous peoples. The zoning in the colonial era actually restricted the living area of indigenous 
groups (Yen and Chen, 2012).   
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governments despite the improvements in their condition. These were confirmed by 
reviewing the social movement of indigenous people of Taiwan since the 1980s. 
1.3.5 Indigenous populations of Taiwan and the Truku group 
There are currently over half million indigenous people of sixteen groups in 
Taiwan, constituting of 2.36% of the whole population in Taiwan according to the latest 
statistics of Department of Household Registration in June, 2017. Approximately 58% of 
indigenous people older than fifteen years old lived in the indigenous regions in 2014. It 
indicates that nearly 60% of indigenous populations live in the rural areas and mountain 
areas as the satellite map of Taiwan (Figure 1.1) and the distribution map of Taiwanese 
indigenous peoples (Figure 1.2) show. The settlements of the recognised 16 indigenous 
groups (see Figure 1.2) are located in mountain areas (the dark green part of Figure 1.1). 
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Figure 1.1 A satellite map of Taiwan 
Source: Google map (access:20171210) 
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Figure 1.2 Distribution of indigenous groups in Taiwan 
Source: Indigenous Ministry Committee 
(http://aboriginal.pct.org.tw/distributed.htm access:20160510) 
 
Among these older than 15 years old, 23.73% of them have a college degree (Council 
of Indigenous Peoples, 2017). In the same year, the percentage of people with higher 
education and older than fifteen years old in Taiwan is 43.6. The education level among 
indigenous groups is generally much lower than it is in the Han Chinese community. It is 
greatly associated with employment. The employment rate among the indigenous 
populations with college or higher education is the highest in the light of the same report 
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of CIP (ibid.). Over one-third of indigenous people depend on the construction industry 
(16.15%) and manufacturing (14.76%). Only 10.77% of them work in the primary sector of 
economic activities. Those relying on agriculture and fishery have seasonal free time and 
they usually search for temporary labouring jobs during the period. A new trend is that 
10.80% of surveyed indigenous populations work in catering with accommodation 
industry. This is probably because of tourism development in indigenous regions. In this 
report, most young people work in the catering and accommodation industries, majority 
middle-aged populations work in the fields of construction and manufacturing. Senior 
people usually rely on farming and fishing related jobs in the countryside. The 
unemployment rate of indigenous people in March 2017 was 4.06%, which was a little 
higher than the rate (3.78%)of the whole nation (ibid.).  
To sum up, there are 16 recognised indigenous groups in Taiwan. These indigenous 
residents make up 2.36% of the population of Taiwan. Approximately 60% of them live in 
rural areas. Their education level is lower than the average, which affects the employment. 
Over 30% of indigenous people depend on construction and manufacturing industries 
while about just one-tenth of them live by agriculture and fisheries. The new emerging 
tourism development in the indigenous regions also offers 10.80% people’s livelihood. 
Different age groups depend on different industries. Younger generations depend on 
tourism-related jobs, while middle-aged people mostly work in the secondary sector of 
economic activities, and the senior workers rely on the primary sector. The unemployment 
among indigenous community is a little higher than the average rate in Taiwan, which 
indicates the employment problem is improving (Council of Indigenous Peoples, 2017). 
The Truku group is one of 16 officially recognised indigenous groups in Taiwan. 
There are currently 30,963 Truku people according to the survey in April, 2017 (Council of 
Indigenous Peoples, 2017). The majority of them live in the three towns (Siou-Lin, Wan-
Rung, and Zhuo-Xi) of Hualien County. This group became a recognised independent 
group in 2004. They traditionally lived by agriculture in the highlands and hunting 
practices, believed in ancestry spirits, and established a customary system based on the 
faith in ancestry spirit, Gaya, as social norms. The adult Truku had to tattoo their faces, 
which depended on how many human heads the male hunted, and how beautiful the 
female weaved. Their ancestors could recognise these tattoo-faced people when they 
passed away. They developed their hunting rules which was connected to the Gaya norms. 
This patrilineal society moved from central highland to east area of Taiwan about three or 
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four centuries ago due to hunting demands and expanding populations (Liao, 1984). Their 
single family based communities in the eastern highlands were small and dispersed.  
In 1914, the Japanese colonial regime in Taiwan attacked the Truku and conquered 
them. They have been dominated by modern states since then. The Japanese strategically 
plundered their traditional living lands and forestry resources by relocation policy and 
forestry policy. Then the Han Chinese regimes created the reserved lands for indigenous 
people which were based on the foundation of the forestry policy of the Japanese. During 
the Japanese colonial period, many Truku people converted to Christianity because of the 
effort of a Truku female missionary and her colleagues. Christian churches have become a 
new Truku identity since the Japanese period. The Presbyterian Church established the 
Truku presbytery in 1960, which was the first one among all indigenous groups of Taiwan. 
This Christian denomination later eagerly promoted the Truku as an independent group. 
However, different Christian denominations frequently elicited the ideological conflicts 
among the Truku (Chiu, 2004). In 1986, Taroko National Park was built by the Han 
Chinese K.M.T. government for nature conservation and recreation in the traditional 
domain of the Truku people. Their resource access in the Park has been restricted since 
the establishment of the Park. Later in the rule of Han Chinese D.P.P. government, the 
Truku was recognised as an independent group. Being a proactive indigenous tribe in 
politics, the next step for the Truku is to practise autonomy.  
Integrating the 2017 report and my fieldwork experience, most Truku people living 
in the villages are seniors, and students. These senior Truku depend on agriculture and 
temporary labouring jobs. Young and mid-aged adults usually work as labours in 
construction and manufacturing industries in urban areas and visit their family irregularly. 
Tourism has become a new income source for a few Truku residents. Nowadays, very few 
Truku rely on hunting or other traditional craft-makings for livelihood. Yet some young 
people follow experienced hunters to learn how to hunt wildlife as cultural practices. 
Because of the employment of foreign labourers in the 1990s, some Truku people have 
returned home. A few of these unemployed engage in hunting for income. Truku people 
are financially and educationally disadvantaged in Taiwan. More and more Truku villages 
and residents are involving in tourism-related businesses. 
The two Truku villages in this project, F village and T village are typical indigenous 
villages in terms of livelihood and population structure. High unemployment is prevalent 
in both cases. In addition to low education (Lin and Chang, 2011), Tai (2007) points out 
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that the restriction of PAs also contributes to high unemployment in Truku villages. 
Because there are vast forest fields in the Truku villages (e.g. F village area is 685km2 and 
T village area is 288km2. The residential areas are concentrated in the foothills in both 
villages.) and the Truku traditionally rely on natural resources in the forests, some 
contemporary Truku residents are supposed to work in the forest (e.g. herb collectors, 
mushroom growers, farmers, hunters, and loggers). However, the establishment of PAs in 
the two case villages limits the livelihood selections on natural resources in the forests. 
The majority of adults in both villages are actually on temporary contracts working as 
labourers in the cities or nearby villages. Just a few people rely on public employment, 
agriculture, and small businesses. Moreover, my fieldwork experience showed that there 
were more seniors and school children than young and mid-aged adults living in the 
villages. There are approximately 2200 residents in F village and 1500 residents in T village 
respectively, but the real voters were lower than registered voters according to the 
elections of village heads in 2010 1nd 2014. In addition, an observation in the fieldwork was 
that church goers were seniors, and school children. More ladies than men lived in the 
two villages to work as housewives for care. Many male adults were responsible for the 
primary family income working outside the villages. The current population structure was 
greatly connected to livelihood selection in the Truku villages. The condition revealed 
some serious problems in everyday life of the Truku communities, which is seen as the 
influence of long-term interactions between the state and the Truku people in this study.        
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
There are seven chapters in this thesis. Chapter one has provided a brief 
background to the core themes of this study. The research aim is based on these debates 
to look at the political interactions between state authorities and local indigenous 
communities in protected areas. In order to realise this aim, three questions about the acts 
of state agencies, those of local indigenous people, and the social consequences for the 
local Truku communities are studied. Chapter two begins with the theoretical lens of 
political ecology which embraces the issues between the natural environment and human 
society. The discussion justifies why the adoption of political ecology is appropriate for 
this study examining the social and political process between state agencies and local 
indigenes regarding protected area management. This topic pays attention to the political 
dimension of political ecology by exploring how political processes influence nature 
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conservation policies. Then, I employ three main conceptions: territoriality, social impact 
and resistance, attempting to construct a theoretical framework to examine two 
indigenous cases in Taiwan. Moreover, two types of protected areas, fortress parks and 
participatory community conservation initiatives, are introduced to understand the 
paradigm shift of international conservation and to grasp the practical problems that have 
occurred in protected areas. Finally, the role indigenous populations play in nature 
conservation is presented to show that global indigenous populations possess potential 
contributions to conservation.    
Chapter three outlines how this research was conducted. The employment of a 
qualitative approach with multiple methods is justified. I pay more attention to interviews 
for they offered the majority of the data collected. The positionality in my fieldwork is 
presented to show how I got access to my informants and the reliability of the data. In 
addition, the characteristics of two Truku cases helps to explain why I selected them as 
case studies. In the last section, I delineate some practical experiences with indigenous 
groups in the field work, especially the ethical issues which are significant for indigenous 
studies. 
Chapter four, context of nature conservation and indigenous development in 
Taiwan, is designed to offer a more detailed background of the interactions between 
modern states and indigenous populations within about a hundred years. Different 
political regimes adopted different policies to deal with the affairs of indigenous peoples. 
First, attention is drawn to the Japanese colonial power and its violent ways of 
administering indigenous people in order to take advantage of resources in indigenous 
regions. The successive Chinese regimes considered indigenous groups as ‘undeveloped’ 
communities and gave help to improve their life. Second, attention is paid to the 
contemporary conservation system. The nature conservation system was originally 
devised under the authoritative regime. The contemporary national park system was 
initially established in the 1980s when Taiwan was under martial law. Rigorous protection 
within park boundaries is a vital feature of these national parks. On the contrary, the 
participatory community conservation idea was seen as an alternative to these barricaded 
parks. Decentralised power and local participation constitute these micro-conservation 
initiatives. In Taiwan, this idea emerged in the early 1990s and has become popular in the 
21st century. Community conservation integrating biodiversity conservation and economic 
development has been very welcome among indigenous groups. These background details 
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build up the potential legacies of contemporary interactive communications between the 
government agencies and local indigenous people.  
Following the background, chapter five looks at the case of Truku village ‘F’4in 
Taroko National Park. First, the establishment of this park with its park plan, which was 
then subsequently reviewed three times, confirms the long-term neglect of the local Truku 
group by park authorities, although the rights of local Truku were gradually recognised in 
the second and third park plan reviews. The early reactions of Truku residents to this early 
neglect, and the strict restrictions of park authorities and park police, included resentment 
and overt protests organised by local politicians. With the development of new regulations 
about indigenous rights such as the Basic Law of Indigenous Peoples, new participatory 
park schemes have been built. I therefore, second, scrutinised these comparably new 
schemes of local participation. I identify the evident domination of the park authorities in 
the most important joint scheme. In addition, the role of the legal system in conservation 
is investigated through the judgments associated with wildlife conservation of the district 
court (a total of 146 verdicts were examined). The attitude of the judicial system indicates 
the final judgement of conservation violation by indigenous people. The analysis of 
practical conservation measures in the park stresses that conservation, rather than local 
development of indigenous peoples, is seen as the first priority in the park. In response to 
the tolerant attitude of state authorities regarding park management and conservation law 
enforcement, the local Truku people used some tactics to continue their everyday 
practices of exploiting resources and simultaneously to avoid confrontation and conflict 
in the park, which can be regarded as hidden resistance to conservation. Truku covert 
resistance showed they were unsatisfied with park domination and restrictions on 
resource access. Local participation schemes were tokenism for the Truku due to the low 
degree of participation in practice. In this case, the control of multiple state authorities in 
the park elicited the resistance of local indigenous people.      
Community conservation is usually regarded as an alternative to the ‘fortress 
conservation’ model expressed within parks (Wilshusen et al, 2003). Chapter six outlines 
a case of community conservation in Truku village ‘T’ to probe how conservation policies 
of local government were being implemented in the local community. The local 
governmental agencies and the local elite cooperatively guided the conservation with 
                                                     
4 Village names have been removed to protect the anonymity of villagers and individual respondents 
who might otherwise be identifiable. 
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development project at the beginning because the agencies and locals focused on local 
demands of development. Local leaders convinced residents and carried out the 
community conservation project for two years. However, some controversies resulting 
from the conservation initiatives were brewing among the local populace. Tourism 
development in the village followed from the end of a conservation ban. With the 
development of the local tourism industry, more complaints about pollution and the 
distribution of benefits from development were spreading in the case village. The industry 
was dominated by external travel agencies, because local Truku were poor and there was 
a lack of specific regulations regarding visitor and tour guide management. Thus the local 
government decided to promote a ‘Natural Cultural Ecology Scenic Area’ and passed new 
rules about the scenic area. These acts of local state agencies were questioned by many 
Truku residents. They took a series of collective actions to protest the establishment and 
promotion of the scenic area. Open resistance had been going on for a few years since 2010. 
The Truku protesters organised themselves to point out the controversies relating to 
conservation implementation and development planning within the community 
conservation project. They also appealed to the county head and an indigenous legislator 
for help and petitioned for the cancellation of the scenic area plan. Finally, the overt 
resistance suspended the policy planning of local state agencies because there was no 
consensus among community residents in a negotiation conference held by a legislator. In 
this case village, Truku people explicitly resisted community conservation with tourism 
development supported by the local government. The evolution of the community 
conservation initiative revealed the heterogeneity of a local indigenous community. When 
local government ignored the complex of power relationships at the community level and 
strongly guided a policy without full local participation, the local residents’ feedback to 
the policy should reshape their support and demands as Easton’s political system model 
suggests.  
The final conclusion in chapter seven discusses the primary argument of the thesis 
based on the theoretical framework in chapter two and embodied in the two indigenous 
cases. That is, in the context of protected areas, the territorial acts of the state agencies 
possibly cause the resistance of indigenous people primarily because of social impacts 
from conservation on local communities. From stronghold national parks to decentralised 
community conservation initiatives, conservation policies were opposed by the local 
indigenous people. Comparative analysis has found that these local communities suffered 
from conservation implementations such as restrictions to resource access which affected 
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their cultural practices and livelihoods. In addition, social cohesion was undermined 
because conservation interventions caused problems such as elite capture and power 
struggles. As for the locals’ response to conservation, this thesis found the difference 
between covert and overt resistance was the degree of empowerment. The empowerment 
process was evident within examples of open resistance. Two types of resistance seemed 
to be adopted alternatively by the locals. This study finally addresses suggestions in terms 
of conservation policy according to two indigenous examples.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
This study explores the broad social dimension of conservation illustrated by West, 
Igoe and Brockington (2006). Paying attention to the social/ political interactions between 
the state agencies and the local indigenous people, I use two village examples of Truku 
people in two types of PA to examine their political processes containing the acts of state 
agencies and local indigenes, and the social effects from conservation policies on the local 
Truku communities. These interactions embody the conservation policy-makings and the 
consequence of implementation of conservation policies in indigenous regions.  
The literature of political ecology embraces the issues between environment and 
human society, in particular how human actions affect the natural environment. 
Environmental degradation and resource access or control potentially result from those 
complicated human decisions. The establishment of PAs for resource protection is 
evidently a restriction on resource access and an influence on human behaviours. I am 
concerned with the political processes among primary actors to deal with a dilemma of 
conservation and development in PAs from the perspective of political ecology. I argue 
that those social elements such as the administrative acts of state authorities and collective 
actions of the local residents may interplay to contribute to decision making about 
conservation policies which affect the environment. In this study I focus on the political 
part in political ecology to indicate that these social and political factors are important for 
nature conservation. Moreover, the social/ political interactions can be improved by 
human actions. This chapter aims firstly to establish a theoretical framework by 
connecting notions in the literature of political ecology in order to examine two empirical 
cases of Truku people in two PAs in eastern Taiwan. Secondly, I introduce the paradigm 
shift of PA management to show the trend of international conservation. Thirdly, the role 
indigenous populations play in nature conservation is also explored to understand their 
potential contribution to environmental conservation. 
This chapter begins with the theory of political ecology because it deals with the 
social and political processes of environmental issues. Interactions between the natural 
environment and human society are interpreted by the combined term ‘political ecology’. 
This discipline emphasises human impacts on ecological systems. Bryant and Bailey (1997) 
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examine the actions of key actors to understand environmental change in some developing 
countries. I adopt this view to analyse interactions among main actors in protected area 
management. Social practices and political actions possibly affect the environment by 
establishing institutions. The politics of political ecology becomes the primary argument 
in the literature of political ecology so that Vayda and Walters (1999) comment that 
authors of political ecology have placed too much importance on political actions. 
However, they recognise political factors are often causes of environmental change. 
Political elements such as power relations among various actors on conservation 
interventions indeed influence decision making of environmental policies and local 
development. Four traditional themes of political ecology literature are presented to link 
to the topic I explore. Political ecology offers critical insights into the political processes 
and social impacts when studies pay attention to the interactions between main actors in 
PAs. In addition, Wilshusen (2003) focuses on power as a significant social component to 
regulate political acts, and how it is constructed in conservation practices. Therefore, I 
conclude here that power relationships in political processes should be seen as influential 
factors when protected area management is considered.  
Under the umbrella of political ecology and discussion of power, in the second 
section of this chapter I adopt some concepts about manifestation of PA policies and 
responses of the locals living in or adjacent to PAs in order to examine some key ideas in 
political ecology. The first idea is human territoriality defined by Sack (1986). He argues 
that human territoriality can be regarded as a spatial strategy of manipulating people and 
resources. This view not merely helps to understand that territoriality is socially 
constructed (Sack, 1986), but also indicates why acts of territoriality easily arouse 
opposition. His territoriality is the basis of power which plays a significant factor in the 
restraint of locals’ access to resources for the reason of nature conservation. Ribot and 
Peluso’s broad definition of access (2003) is employed to highlight the territorialisation 
acts of governmental agencies. They extend access from ‘the right to benefit from things’ 
to ‘the ability to benefit from things’ so that power relationships could be considered in 
debate (ibid.). Theory of access forms the second idea. These two ideas applying to 
conservation implementations shape social impacts on the locals. Combining the control 
feature of territorialisation and political power relations of access, we can imagine that 
once such actions of territoriality are imposed on the local community, potential 
resistances will be exercised as responses to a coercive policy of territoriality. Resistance is 
the third concept I employ to look at the response of locals to conservation in PAs. 
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Practices of covert resistance in everyday life (Scott, 1985) and overt protests show as Scott 
argues the ‘weapons of the weak’ when there are limited options for the local residents of 
PAs. I intend to scrutinise these resistances as responses by the locals, especially in the 
context of conservation policy or PAs. Various resistances such as collective political 
protests and hidden sabotage practices in everyday life show the locals’ values. I argue that 
the establishment of PAs by governmental agencies is an act of territoriality. Such a 
territorialisation of the state results in resistances of indigenous locals who are the 
neighbours of PAs. I also see these resistances as a failure of policy implementation. Scott 
(1998) notes certain necessary elements resulting in failures of social engineering in last 
century. These components are in relation to attitude of bureaucracy when dealing with 
social policies. His views are employed to review the performances of governmental 
agencies in this study and to understand the unanticipated consequences (resistances) of 
policies of PAs.  
In the third section I examine the paradigm shift of PA management. That is, the 
mainstream PA from fortress national parks to the initiatives of community-based 
conservation. Parks are the typical type of regulated PAs meanwhile community-based 
conservation initiatives are local participatory PAs. Located at two opposing extremes of 
the spectrum of PAs, the latter is usually seen as a policy change to the ineffectiveness of 
the former. This paradigm shift has happened during previous decades (Colchester, 2004). 
I am concerned with why the shift occurred and the practices of community conservation 
projects.  
The fourth section looks at the role indigenous community plays in nature 
conservation. With the change of conservation paradigm from exclusionary to inclusive, 
indigenous people are in general recognised as important actors in conservation. Their 
local knowledge is regarded as a contribution to conservation.    
Lastly I conclude that a framework based on political ecology literature 
appropriately connects to my research. Such a perspective suitably interprets interactions 
between the local indigenous residents and the governmental agencies in the context of 
PAs of Taiwan. I contest that territorialisation of the government by means of establishing 
PAs potentially causes resistances of the local indigenous people. 
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2.2 Political ecology as a lens to examine political processes 
Political ecology is a significant area of thinking about environment and 
development in social science (Peet and Watts, 1996). This term can be traced to the 1970s 
to be used to combine practical land ownership and political economy factors in social 
theory (Wolf, 1972) as well as to be a reply to what were then new findings on how the 
physical environment was affected by politics (Cockburn and Ridgeway, 1979 cited from 
Peet and Watts, 1996). With subsequent additions from historical, anthropological and 
geographical scholars, political ecology pays attention to the links between political 
economy and ecology (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987). Work in this field emphasises that 
one has to take contexts of history, politics and economy into consideration when studying 
land use. Historical tracking not merely interprets events in the past but offers a point of 
reference to comprehend present conditions (Blaikie, 1995 cited from Wilshusen, 2003; 
Bryant, 1992). A search for the context in which environmental change (or conflict) 
emerges through attention to historical background, political processes and 
socioeconomic circumstances is seen as a highlight of political ecology research.  
From a broad view to examine the operation of the general political system by 
Easton (1967), to some degree such a contextual tracking on a specific topic can be seen as 
the inputs of a dynamic political system. That is, these historical factors and the 
socioeconomic environment facilitate the formation of specific demands and then 
influence the political system. Decisions or policies are the outputs engendered by a 
political system which affect people in the environment. Responses of those affected 
toward these authoritative decisions can be converted to feedbacks to constitute inputs. 
Here I adopt Easton’s primitive pattern to firstly look at these interactions between various 
actors to frame production of decision making of policies of PAs. Secondly, what impacts 
may be imposed on specific people and finally, how the reactions of influenced people to 
policies mould demands of inputs.  
It is necessary to briefly introduce this frequently cited model. The model (see 
Figure 2.1) is a dynamic circle constructed by inputs, a political system, outputs and 
feedbacks in environment. Inputs consisting of demands and supports are provided to 
make the circle operate persistently. The political system accounts for transforming inputs 
into outputs which are authoritative decisions such as policies. Some actors within a 
political system may respond to these decisions, which form feedback to generate new 
demands of inputs. This loop model implies that people’s response to policies does shape 
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a dynamic political system. Easton notes that if a political system does not adapt to these 
demands of inputs, the dynamic circle stops and it possibly collapses (Easton, 1957). For 
instance, if decisions from the political system do not induce support of members or do 
not reflect demands, people’s collective resistance as feedbacks should renew demands to 
mould new decisions. The political system needs to accumulate support in order to sustain 
its long term existence. A successful strategy should be a negotiation of adopting new 
demands to renew decisions. Moreover, the conversion of demands to decisions occurs in 
the process of a political system which may not be transparent. Interactions between 
interest groups, the government and others produce binding decisions affecting people. 
When the decisions are concerned with conservation in PAs, the processes represent the 
political part of political ecology. Such decisions cause impacts on people and the 
environment. Theories of political ecology offer ways to explore not just the political 
processes and interactions in the system, but also the processes and outputs leading to 
feedback and feedback forming new demands.  
 
Figure 2.1 The political system 
Source: Easter (1957) 
As I position this thesis to explore the relationship between the state and local 
indigenous people in the context of PAs, interactions in the political processes among 
players epitomise their relationship. Environmental policies are authoritative decisions 
enacted through the operation of a political system. Drawing on Easton’s model of a 
general political system, I emphasise the latter sphere that outputs of policies affect 
people, and these people’s responses to decisions as feedback generate new demands 
shaping policies. In addition, there are also debates about how the previous environmental 
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policies were generated and why the replies of people to environmental decisions were so 
called ‘unexpected consequences’ of policies. After grasping this broad view of a political 
system by Easton, I return to discuss more notions of political ecology in order to probe 
details of policies of PAs and the local people.  
2.2.1 Politics of political ecology literature 
This section emphasises the political area of political ecology literature, in 
particular how social elements affecting the environment are explored in political ecology 
studies. For instance, national conservation policy may aim to save endangered species by 
the establishment of PAs. It is a policy intervention in the environment by the state. I could 
examine some social dimensions of this environmental topic in order to find out the social 
influence on the physical environment. Does the policy really protect the species from 
extinction? How is the protected species exploited by people? How is the policy 
implemented in the protected area? These questions explore human acts on the 
environment and the interactions between society and environment. The social dimension 
should not be ignored when studying environmental issues.  
Political ecology accounts usually contain three premises according to Bryant and 
Bailey (1997). The first is that various actors bear uneven gains and expenses through 
environmental change; the second is that existing social and economic injustice is 
increased or weakened with the inequality associated with environmental change; and 
third is that dynamic power relations among actors shape these political outcomes. These 
assumptions reveal that not just interactions among diverse actors matter but inequality 
and power relationships would be the main themes of political ecology studies. Wilshusen 
(2003) notes that studying power is key to learning about resource governance and access. 
Yet it requires a clear combination of notions to examine its operation. He therefore 
explores three viewpoints of power in the political ecology literature and constructs a 
framework of power. Marxian political economy firstly pays attention to social structure 
such as market forces and the state which result in environmental degradation. This view 
provides a materialist insight of the political economic environment. The second track of 
power analysis focuses on actors and their actions (e.g. Bryant and Bailey, 1997). This type 
of analysis is action-oriented. Thirdly, a post-structuralism perspective shows that nature 
is socially constructed and understood by analysing practices and discourses of 
biodiversity conservation (Escobar, 1996). This dimension of political ecology stresses that 
how people comprehend a conception affects power relationships. Power is constructed 
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by all actors and their understandings. These three aspects of power study in political 
ecological treatises function as a political environment, political acts and emblematic 
meanings. (Wilshusen, 2003).  
The former two views are relevant to material aspects of power while the latter 
reflects the symbolic perspective of power. Both these perspectives frame analysis of power 
dynamics of political ecology (Wilshusen, 2003). For instance, a materialist may observe a 
specific incident where the park police captured an indigenous hunter with an 
‘endangered species’- a dead deer, when patrolling in the park at night. The symbolic views 
further interpret that power dynamics of this event come from regulations of conservation, 
traditional norms of indigenous groups, local knowledge and other forces. The symbolic 
realm of these institutions legitimates the actions of the police as well as the huntsman.  I 
intend to pay attention to power in the interactive actions between the locals and the state. 
Moreover, the power relations within the local examples will also be examined. 
2.2.2 Four traditional themes of political ecology 
Robbins (2004) notes four themes in political ecology which represent four 
concerns of society-environment interactions. The first thesis of degradation and 
marginalisation aims to explain why and how the environment changes; the second focus 
on environmental conflicts intends to explain who can get access to environmental 
resources and the reasons for this; the third thesis of conservation and control explains 
why conservation fails and how political/economic exclusion occurs, and the fourth thesis 
of environmental identity and social movements explores where social upheaval around 
environmental concerns emerges, who joins the movement and how it takes place. My 
study is situated in the context of PAs in indigenous regions. Specifically, conservation 
policies were implemented and the local Truku groups were excluded from decision 
making, resource access and sustenance. Since the coercive power of the state 
implemented conservation, the local indigenous people who passively received policies 
took collective and individual actions of explicit and implicit resistance in order to express 
their indignation and claims. In summary, my subject is undoubtedly close to the core 
concerns of political ecology. In addition to the theme of conservation and control, the 
threads of social movement and environmental conflicts connect to complex cases of my 
research. These three themes of political ecology are briefly introduced in the following 
paragraphs.  
 
  30 
Theme of conservation and control 
In the application of the thesis of conservation and control, Robbins describes a 
general argument of this category: 
“…control of resources and landscapes has been wrested from local producers or 
producer groups through the implementation of efforts to preserve “sustainability,” 
“community,” or “nature.” In the process, officials and global interests seeking to preserve 
the “environment” have disabled local systems of livelihood, production, and socio-political 
organisation. Related work in this area has further demonstrated that where local 
production practices have historically been productive and relatively benign, they have been 
characterised as unsustainable by state authorities or other players in the struggle to control 
resources.” (Robbins, 2004, pp. 149-150) 
He finds four theoretical foundations underpinning such an argument (ibid.). First 
is an outlook that sees conservation as a form of hegemony that manipulates the governed 
via social technologies and institutions; second is the preference of the local people to 
manage resources through their own traditions rather than through the intervention of 
the state; third is that the conservation imagination is based on a non-existing ideal that 
wilderness is there without human disturbance; fourth, that conservation implemented 
within specific geographic territories is necessarily inconsistent with ecological and social 
realities. The four philosophical basics are offered to interpret writings of conservation 
and control theme in political ecology. These views indicate the negligence of policies of 
environmental conservation, the bias of the state or conservation organisations as well as 
the unexpected outcomes of policies. The local people are usually considered as 
sustainable users of natural resources by the authors of this strand of political ecology. 
Antagonistic interactions and political processes between the state authorities or 
conservation organisations and the local residents are emphasised for analysis in that 
these offer evidence to point out problems of policy implementation.  
Theme of environmental conflict 
Theses of environmental conflict accentuate political conflicts of environmental 
problems among various actors due to increasing scarcity of resources. Interventions of 
conservation and development policy concurrently ‘ecologise’ those long lasting and 
current struggles between communities according to a general argument of environmental 
conflicts (Robbins, 2004). Political ecologists pay attention to the institutional 
configuration of environmental resources and explore which groups benefit while which 
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groups lose. Such distributions usually activate conflicts among different groups. If 
interventions of environmental conservation influence institutional configurations, the 
conflicts stemming from resource distribution are seen as hidden costs of conservation. In 
addition, postcolonial views contest that development planning and environmental 
management tend to be in line with some groups’ fictitious expectation, especially that 
developmental projects always echo the imagination and views of planners. For instance, 
the local users such as an indigenous community are regarded as a group with a shared 
homogeneous interest by planners. In fact, different interest groups in one community do 
exist. The ignorance of such a fact may result in more frictions between groups when 
development plans are conducted (ibid.). Interactions among diverse actors here reveal a 
form of negotiations. Institutional arrangements according to negotiations suggest the 
power relations among these actors. Power struggles in different issues may strengthen 
due to environmental interventions of state agents. Moreover, domination of the state and 
of mainstream groups within society on developmental projects tends to affect the 
subjectivity of the local people. This theme helps uncover the unequal relationship in 
terms of resource access when state agencies intervene in the local communities through 
conservation policy. Moreover, existing conflicts within the local communities could be 
more serious by ecological intervention of conservation. New conflicts may happen when 
the local resources are managed by external groups such as governmental agencies and 
private firms. I will pay attention to those unpleasant impacts resulting from conservation 
policy in the local community and explore the response of the local indigenous residents 
to these social impacts and to policy interventions.  
Theme of environmental identity and social movement 
In the category of environmental identity and social movement, a common 
argument stresses that local groups take political actions due to changes of environmental 
management institutions and environmental quality (Robbins, 2004). Degradation and 
marginalisation are key to this theme. Environmental degradation jeopardises the 
livelihood of some people and they thus take collective actions based on an identity 
constructed around their livelihood. Modern development methods and practices could 
also affect some people carrying out traditional practices. Social actions can be mobilised 
in order to protect their livelihood operation. Contemporary peasant studies show that 
when ways of livelihoods are violated or challenged through the introduction of new 
technology and new institutions, divided groups may cooperate to take collective actions 
of resistance (e.g. Vandergeest, 2003). In addition, postcolonial perspectives see livelihood 
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movements as an attempt to address assertions of marginal communities (e.g. Rangan, 
2000). Political ecology studies of environmental movements promote local interests and 
question dominant views of environmental change. This theme in political ecology 
stresses that social movements of marginal communities are closely related to livelihoods. 
The introduction of new technology, institutions or development practices possibly results 
in local upheaval and complaint. Local protesters’ claim is based on their values which are 
different from the views and acts of mainstream actors in terms of environmental change. 
The theme of political ecology work is reflected in this study when I ask questions about 
the social impact of conservation interventions and the response of the locals to 
conservation interventions. Social actions may be the step the locals take when their 
livelihood is threatened or other negative impacts happen due to conservation 
interference. 
These three political ecology treatises reveal that conservation and development 
interventions by the state are regarded as hegemonic acts. In contrast to this, the value of 
local claims and traditional ways of resource exploitation are highlighted. PAs creations 
separate their geographic space and social connections. Conflicts over environmental 
issues between actors could stem from original power struggles within a region. Power 
relationships between various actors predict institutional configurations of resource 
management. Marginalisation and livelihood challenges lead to collective resistance by 
local people. In addition, postcolonial views critically remind us that planners’ 
imaginations of developmental subjects and their demands tend to be distorted through 
a mainstream bias. Such a tendency potentially causes environmental conflicts through 
misconceptions. All these philosophic basics underpin perspectives of political ecology to 
examine topics of conservation and development. These themes of political ecology are 
offered to raise the research questions of this study. The role and acts of the state agencies 
are considered when a conservation decision is made because it is probably a hegemonic 
act which is based on unequal resource distribution and damage bearing. I therefore 
explore the decision making of PAs in order to understand the nature of conservation 
interventions conducted by the state agencies. Environmental conflicts imply 
controversies on natural resource access among actors. Original conflicts between the 
locals may accelerate and be ecologised due to external conservation interventions. In this 
regard, to analyse social impacts from environmental policy implementation in the local 
communities it is necessary. These impacts, in particular the negative impacts, potentially 
deteriorate the quality of everyday life in the local indigenous community and elicit locals’ 
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complaints. The negative perceptions more or less facilitate the mobilisation of social 
actions of resistance to environmental policy. Protesting movements are seen as the 
response to conservation policy, which are mobilised by the locals. The governmental 
authorities and the local protesters both have to pay for such an unexpected outcome of 
policy---protesting collective action. The reason why resistances happen may derive from 
the different opinions about local development between the locals and the policy makers. 
In this study, I ask questions about what resisting actions the local indigenous people take 
and why they take such an action with high cost.  
The theory of political ecology suggests that political processes affect nature 
environment and environmental change (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). Exploring the political 
processes, actors involved and social influence of environmental policies is necessary for 
good governance. Moreover, political ecology ‘attempts to do two things at once: critically 
explaining what is wrong with dominant accounts of environmental change, while at the 
same time exploring alternatives, adaptions, and creative human action in the face of 
mismanagement and exploitation’ (Robbins, 2004, p.12). The dominant approaches to the 
environment such as PA establishment and regulatory arrangements are usually favoured 
by state authorities. Yet the local residents or marginal populations such as indigenous 
groups may unfairly bear social costs when the approaches are implemented. They thus 
take a different view of these powerful methods. The views of the locals not only show 
their values and identity which motivate their collective actions, but offer some 
alternatives or amendments to dominant approaches. This study concerns the relationship 
and interactions between the state agencies and the local indigenous people within PAs. 
The lens of political ecology offers insightful ideas such as the dominant role of the state, 
social impacts of conflict, and protesting actions of the locals. These ideas construct an 
essential interactional foundation between the local indigenous people and the state 
authorities. This study employs political ecology as the analysis tool to examine the 
controlling policies of PAs supported by the state agencies, and to understand local 
indigenous people’s sentiments of actions. Following the principle of political ecology, the 
conceptions in next sections are used to interpret the acts of the state agencies and local 
indigenous people.   
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2.3 Territoriality and resistance 
In this section, I intend to introduce three linked ideas that contribute to the 
explanatory framework of this thesis. This framework helps structure research questions 
and interpret the interactions between the state agencies and the local indigenous people 
in PAs. The first concept is territoriality which is according to Sack socially constructed 
and seen as a spatial strategy to manipulate people and resources. Its tendencies are 
applied to probe acts of the state. These characteristics see political strategies as a means 
of control. The second conception is access which is explained as ‘the ability to derive 
benefits from things’ (Ribot and Peluso, 2003, p.153). This idea makes clear the conflicts 
between governmental authorities and the local people in PAs. The local residents in a 
protected area are usually the financially and ethnically disadvantaged groups such as 
peasants and indigenous communities. Conserving natural resources in the areas by the 
governmental agencies alters their local exploitation for sustenance and cultural practices. 
Such a tension may lead to resistance of the local groups due to social impacts from the 
establishment of PAs. The third concept, resistance, is generally categorised into two types 
- overt resistance and covert resistance. Covert resistance is considered as everyday 
resistances in Scott’s works (1985, 1990) that is widespread in the life of the subordinated 
community via various ways. I pay attention to its political implications which should not 
be neglected. The other kind of explicit resistance is embodied by several specific actions 
such as political protests and petitions. I would argue that the governmental acts of 
territorialisation restrain access to resources, which is regarded as a social impact by the 
locals. Therefore, resistances are the responses to the acts by the local residents because 
of the social impacts. In the following sections, I offer these three concepts and their 
relevant arguments. 
 
2.3.1 Spatial interpretation of social power 
Many discussions of territoriality come from studies of animal behaviours by 
biologists. They may see territoriality of human society as a kind of animal instinct. 
Nevertheless, Sack (1986) does not consider human territoriality as aggressive nor a 
natural instinct, but as the foundation of power. He suggests territorialisation in human 
society should be seen as ‘a spatial strategy to affect, influence, or control resources and 
people, by controlling area’ (ibid: p.1) because once a place is territorialised, it indicates a 
management authority of this area. He defines human territoriality as ‘the attempt by an 
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individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by 
delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area’ (ibid: p.19). According to his 
interpretation, political purposes such as governing residents and resources in such a 
territory are evident, and acts of territorialisation are motivated by political ambitions.  
Sack further clarifies some vital principles of human territoriality. I select part of 
these features relevant to the establishment of PAs. First, a territory needs effort to be built 
and sustained, for its goal is to manipulate people’s behaviours within the boundaries by 
means of controlling access (ibid: p.19). Without manipulation in an area, a territory does 
not exist. This clarification implies that a territory is not only a specific zone distinguished 
from other areas, but also that territoriality is socially constructed rather than occurring 
naturally. This clarification indicates that maintaining a territory implies costs to keep 
control, and so establishing institutions may be necessary. In this thesis, PAs such as parks 
need administrative authorities, patrolling groups and the police to implement resource 
conservation policies which restrict people’s access to natural resources and prevent 
poaching within PAs. Anyone violating the rules of parks should be sent to the justice 
system. The judges in the court decide cases according to legislation. These state agencies 
represent public power to conduct control in the protected territory. What these agencies 
do to maintain the territory and how the local users of natural resources respond to the 
restrictions and institutions is of interest. Second, in a territorialised area, practices of 
moulding people’s behaviours and relationships aim to exercise control which can contain 
or exclude depending upon the manipulator. The person or group controlling a territory 
does not necessarily stay in this geographical zone since a wall or a boundary marker 
functions for this. This means that a controller may be far from his territory. For instance, 
decision makers influencing PAs such as scholars and officials do not usually live in the 
PAs. Third, control is a primary rationale within a territory, which marks different extents 
of access to people, resources and relationships in specific area compared to other areas 
(ibid: p.20). It is possible for a territory to return to a non-territorial area. Sack notes that 
if the restraints of a territory are always broken, it is possible to cancel the geographical 
restraint. This explanation offers a significant implication that a territorial intervention 
could be withdrawn if the controlled people successfully resist restrictions placed upon 
them. The control of access to things or resources in a bounded place may be changed 
because of other considerations. For instance, hunting is allowed in a wildlife reserve. 
Fourth, the boundaries of a territory are changeable according to negotiations or other 
schemes. It tells us that it is possible for some forces to affect the decision of a territory 
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manipulator on boundary issues. Different territories may be territorial on various levels. 
This may rely upon different contexts and controllers. This interpretation reflects various 
degrees of strictness of a territory. There are diverse types of PAs stipulating various 
degrees of access to resources. Many methods are used to announce territoriality. For 
example, a certificate confirms land right by legal authorities while traditional norms note 
taboos in a remote zone of a lake. However, Sack thinks that if the announcement is not 
clear or recognisable, it is not clear whether an act of territorialisation is being exerted or 
not. He also admits that in practice a definite explanation may have blurred borders (ibid). 
This indicates the practical implementation of territoriality may meet difficulties despite 
its definition being unambiguous.  
Three significant features of human territoriality stemming from its definition are 
stressed by Sack (ibid) in order to reveal the philosophy and vital consequences of 
territoriality. First, he points out that territoriality should contain a geographic 
classification. Second, different forms of communication such as boundary signs of a 
territory are easy for people to understand. The last is manipulation of access to things or 
specific zones in a territory, which affects the behaviours of people in an area. Take PAs as 
an example; to establish a park requires the geographic scope to be shown by a map in the 
park plan. This park is distinguished from other areas around it. A park’s boundaries can 
be a way of communication. That is, to tell people that some things are different within 
this area. Implementing conservation regulations by the park police such as restraint of 
access to natural resources in a park is always based on park legislation, with control being 
central to the nature of a park. PAs such as parks are therefore typical territories, and their 
construction by the state is an act of internal territoriality. 
All these interpretations reconfirm that human territoriality is a socially 
constructed action for it is a strategy in human society. It affects people controlling the 
geographic areas and those who are manipulated. Their interactions are an important 
perspective to examine power relationships in a territory. Being a strategy of the state to 
control and influence people, such an examination in a territory offers not just 
implementation of territoriality, but also reveals whether this strategy is sustainable or 
not. In addition to the above three bases of territoriality, Sack develops another seven 
associated potentialities of territoriality for use in practice (ibid). 
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2.3.2 Tendencies of territoriality 
Three tendencies of territoriality from Sack’s definition shown in the previous 
section. Sack uses one term to summarise each tendency. The first three are classification 
(of geographic areas), (easy to) communicate and enforce (manipulation). The fourth one 
is that territoriality is viewed as a way to reify power. Intangible power relationships are 
embodied through the act of territoriality. Fifth, the relationship between the controller 
and the controlled is displaced by territoriality. It means that one may mistakenly take for 
granted that territory is the agent exercising the control. The sixth one interrelates to the 
fifth and first one that classification in terms of area causes relationships to become 
impersonal. People’s linking to others changes due to place. Seventh, explanation of acts 
of territoriality may be complex so that it is difficult to expose all controlling activities. 
People could see these as a view that ‘things need space to exist’ (ibid p33). Eighth, a 
territory becomes a spatial container for events occurring within it, such that these 
activities share the same spatial features of a specific territory. Ninth, the human act of 
territorialisation has created ‘the idea of a socially emptiable place’ (ibid p33). For instance, 
national parks created in the 19th century in USA were regarded as the wilderness without 
human disturbance, despite the fact that American Indians had lived in these spaces for a 
long time. Finally, territoriality engenders more territoriality and shapes more 
relationships. This inclination refers to the observation that social events and geographical 
territory can expand each other and accordingly more controlled territories are produced.  
These features are interrelated and may interplay with each other to form various 
combinations. The primary message summarised from these inclinations of human 
territoriality is that the exercise of human power in spatial areas potentially leads to the 
weakness of personal relationships, displacing this through the emphasis on space. 
Manipulation exertion in an area is easily taken for granted. Its risky implication with 
respect to politics is that human territoriality may rationalise domination of the authority 
in control of the territory. Here in light of Sack’s definition of human territoriality, it is 
viewed as a means of social manipulation in an area. It possibly duplicates inequality or 
enhances oppression in a society.  
2.3.3 Theory of access, stressing power relations 
The most evident restraint made by human territoriality is access to resources in a 
territory. To understand meanings of access helps to explore the impacts caused by human 
territoriality. Ribot and Peluso (2003, p. 153) explain access as ‘the ability to benefit from 
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things—including material objects, persons, institutions, and symbols.’ Their definition 
extends the original meaning of access to be ‘the right to benefit from things’ in property 
literature in order to include debates on more social relationships than property alone. 
These social relationships can facilitate or restrain people in meeting their interests from 
resources through mechanisms and processes. Behind these relationships are interplays of 
power relations. People’s ability to gain benefits from resources depends on these powers 
existing in the social and political-economic contexts. As they note, analysis of access 
provides an understanding why some people can gain prioritised advantages from 
resources, as well as to examine whether they possess rights to do so. 
Their analysis of access (2003) tends to see ‘ability’ as ‘power’ in two levels. Power 
firstly refers to the ability to influence others’ thoughts and behaviours as in Lukes’ (2004) 
first dimension of power. Secondly, power is based on the social relationship of people. 
The concept of access accordingly implies all the ways through which people can gain 
interest from resources. Property generally accepts certain socially recognised rights and 
claims, which may be supported by legislation or traditional customs. Rights are contained 
by the ability because they are only part of all means to benefit from things.  
Ribot and Peluso (2003) develop a theoretical framework of access which can be 
used to scrutinise specific conflicts of resource access. The main structure of the 
framework consists of various degrees of access to technology, capital, markets, labour, 
knowledge, authority, identity, and social relations which actors possess. They argue that 
access analysis supplies the combination of various ways, relationships and courses which 
allow different players to get benefits from resources. Their argument inspires the 
exploration of diverse power relationships behind resource exploitation. Coincidentally, 
Peluso and Lund (2011) agree that conflicts over land actually should be conflicts over 
‘power and property right’ (Thompson, 1975 cited from Peluso and Lund, 2011).  
2.3.4 Resistance of the weak groups 
This section attempts to explore the protests of subordinate communities, in 
particular the resistance to conservation in order to grasp the political implications of 
resistance and the potential influence on conservation policy.  
This study pays attention to examine responses of the local indigenous people to 
policies of PAs. Resistance as a response to policies indicates that local communities are 
unsatisfied with these outcomes of the political system or the implementation of policies. 
These resisting people are affected by these political results, nevertheless, they are never 
 39 
 
policy makers. They are in a subordinate class, expressing their complaints and 
resentments to the superordinate class. Scott (1985) broadly defines resistance of the 
subordinate class as: 
‘…any act(s) by member(s) of a subordinate class that is or are intended either 
to mitigate or deny claims (for example, rent, taxes, prestige), made on that class by 
superordinate classes (for example, landlords, large farmers, the state) or to advance 
its own claims (for example, work, land, charity, respect) vis-à-vis those 
superordinate classes’ (Scott, 1985, p.290). 
The definition extensively contains different types of opposition between the 
dominant group and the subordinate group including individual behaviour and collective 
action, material type and symbolic form, unsuccessful and successful actions (Holmes, 
2007). Applying this explanation to the context of conservation, the subordinate 
community is the locals who experience the oppression of conservation in PAs. The 
dominant group whom the local people resist is the state or conservation organisations 
who regulate and implement the conservation. According to the definition, the local 
residents attempt to alleviate or refuse the restraints of conservation legislation and 
implementation by the state in PAs. The locals may propel their assertions of rights against 
the state agencies. Scott (1985) has argued that oppression and resistance are in constant 
flux by paying attention to the small-scale but predominant everyday resistances in a 
Malaysian village. Scott was curious aa to why the peasants did not revolt when the green 
revolution was introduced in rural Malaysia. The introduction of new agricultural 
technology led to high unemployment in the agricultural regions. He found that the 
everyday forms of resistance rather than open rebellion were exerted in the agricultural 
regions.  
A few elements analysed in Scott’s case village are seen as restraints of explicit 
resistance (Scott, 1985) and the protests of the subordinate group become a covert pattern 
which was embodied in daily life. These factors were taken into consideration and 
everyday techniques were favoured by the affected farmers over explicit insurgency 
(Holmes, 2007). The first is the angst of oppression (actual, remembered or anticipated). 
The worry of the protesting people allowed them to adopt covert moves such as small-
scale theft. The second factor is the non-uniformity of the peasantry group, which 
undermines their collective action of resistance. Some farmers were the relatives of the 
elite and the voices and interest of the subordinate class were various. Moreover, the 
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individual demands of surviving on daily level also repress the possibility of open 
insurrection. The opportunity cost of explicit revolution was too high to be taken for these 
peasants in rural Malaysia. Similar components may oppress the locals and prompt them 
to use implicit ways to resist to conservation.  
Holmes (2007) reviews resistance to conservation in various cases, mostly in the 
context of PAs, in order to help conservation practitioners to comprehend diverse forms 
of resistance and the political implications rather than misinterpret resistance and take 
inappropriate measures. This ‘disobedient knowledge’ (Igoe, Sullivan, & Brockington, 
2010) of resistance to ‘top-down’ conservation by the locals just express the voice of the 
locals (Holmes, 2014).  
 
2.4 Paradigm Shift of International Conservation 
The aim of this section is to explore the changing paradigm of international 
conservation and why the shift occurred by reviewing the history of international nature 
conservation. Further, I probe into the features and practical difficulties of the new 
paradigm. The intention is to analyse these attempts not just to understand the trend of 
international conservation and the implications of the paradigm shift, but also to 
recognise the practical barriers of conservation projects. Making conservation efforts to 
maintain biodiversity can be seen as a process of responding to the resource demands of 
people in order to avoid ‘the tragedy of the commons’ proposed by Hardin (1957). The 
following paragraphs first outline the conventional paradigm of nature conservation. 
Second, the paradigm shifts and the reasons for change are described, and third the 
connotations of the new paradigm are explored. Finally, the realistic difficulties of the new 
popular model of conservation are introduced.  
2.4.1 Early exclusionary approach of conservation 
The history of nature conservation in the West shows that conservation 
implementation is deeply political. This is especially so in the establishment of protected 
areas because of practical political considerations behind nature conservation policies 
(Adams and Hutton, 2007). Early conservation practices exclude local people from 
protected areas. Adams and Hutton (2007) argue that the development of scientific 
knowledge (Scott, 1998), and processes of rationalisation (Murphy, 1994) underpinned the 
control of nature by state bureaucracies. Their review of conservation finds that through 
 41 
 
these practices nature was seen as a set of differently categorised and calculated resources. 
The idea of the separation between nature and human society was manifested by the 
division of wild land and cultivated/ inhabited land (Adams and Hutton, 2007). People 
were not part of nature so protected areas for nature conservation should avoid the 
involvement of humans. Yellowstone, the first national park in the world, was created in 
the late 19th century to preserve a version of ‘pristine nature’ without human disturbance. 
To do so, it was thought that people living within the park boundaries should be resettled. 
This park model greatly guided the conservation practices in the 20th century (ibid). Due 
to the rigid restriction of access to natural resource in protected areas such as parks 
established in the colonial period or authoritarian rule, local people tended to associate 
parks with autocratic political power (Wilshusen et al, 2003).      
The establishment of protected areas grew swiftly after World War Two (Adams 
and Hutton, 2009), in particular in African countries (Neumann, 2002). International 
organisations such as the IUCN and the United Nations advocated conservation actions in 
the 1950s and 60s. The IUCN categorised different types of protected areas and has refined 
the classification frequently (Ravenel and Redford, 2005). The first two categories of 
protected areas containing parks are eminently exclusive. Many Latin American regions 
and other developing countries employed the park model and global protected areas 
doubled in the 1970s. The growing protected areas doubled again between the fourth 
(1993) and fifth (2004) World Parks Congress. The park model was the mainstream of 
conservation practices in the 20th century until the 1970s. 
Social impacts of protected areas creation were widely identified in the 1970s. 
Adams and Hutton (2007) note that certain economic activities were allowed in the buffer 
zone of UNESCO’s ‘biosphere reserve’. The relocation of people in protected areas was 
recognised as a potential problem in the 1970s. Colchester (2004) remarks that the IUCN 
General Assembly passed the Kinshasa Resolution in 1975 to protect the traditional 
lifestyle of indigenous people and call for the ban of resettlement of people in protected 
areas.  
A few authors point out that the paradigm shift of conservation from an 
exclusionary to an inclusionary model occurred by the 1980s (e.g. Hulme and Murphree, 
1999; Wilshusen et al, 2003). The community-based projects with a people-oriented 
approach have prevailed within disputes over international conservation since the 1980s. 
McNeely (1984) indicate the Third World Parks Congress in 1982 paid much attention to 
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the issue of local people in context of protected areas. For example, McNeely (1984) uses 
the term ‘new reality’ to describe the socio-economic needs of human society and believes 
that protected areas were adapting to these new realities. The Fourth and Fifth Congress 
continued to debate the issue of local people. A few indigenous people participated in the 
Fifth Congress declared the ‘Durban Accord’ to show a new conservation approach to PA, 
which equitably combines conservation goals and the interests of affected people.  
2.4.2 The rise of community-based natural resource management and practice 
Parks were an exclusive strategy to strictly implement conservation. The conflicts 
may occur as outlined in the previous section, and local people were almost inevitably the 
losers. Some commentators may support these measures to save the degraded 
environmental resources, but in this study, the powerful acts of parks are seen to imply 
injustice. An alternative inclusive strategy has been accepted as the mainstream approach 
through a series of international conferences on the environment (Colchester, 2004). Here 
I focus on the participatory strategy, community conservation, to examine its principles 
and problems. 
Since the 1980s, a range of new conservation approaches and practices have been 
promoted around the world, including integrated conservation and development projects 
(ICDPs), community based conservation (CBC), community based natural resource 
management (CBNRM), and wildlife utilization  (Brown, 2003). The emergence of these 
initiatives revealed three tendencies in thinking and practice of conservation arena 
according to Hulme and Murphree (1999). These comprise the conservation activities 
shifting from a state-centric to a local society level; the conceptualization of conservation 
moving away from preservation to sustainable development, with a combination of 
conservation and development goals; and natural resource management informed by 
neoliberal economic thinking (Hulme & Murphree, 1999). The trends implied a changing 
managerial paradigm of PAs which takes local residents’ needs into consideration when 
pursuing biodiversity conservation, and which needs to place part of the responsibility for 
conservation at community level. 
Adams and Hulme (2001) use ‘community conservation (CC)’ to name such a kind 
of ‘conservation narrative’. They note that the notion means conservation practice cannot 
and should not be pursued against the interests and wishes of local people and these 
relatively new initiatives have become dominant in global conservation policy, especially 
in the developing areas (Adams & Hulme, 2001). It is difficult to accurately define 
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‘community conservation’/ ‘community based conservation’ because of the broad 
meanings of community and conservation. The term comprises diverse conservation 
activities implemented at local levels around the globe. However, the core concept of CBC 
lies in the coexistence of people and nature (Western & Wright, 1994), and natural 
resource management by, for and with local communities (Murphree, 1994). In the 
community conservation narrative, people living adjacent PAs are regarded as ‘partners’ 
who participate in conservation and share the economic benefits that are yielded by 
species, and ensure that PAs to contribute local sustainable livelihoods (Adams & Hulme, 
2001). It seems that community conservation strategy is seen as an alluring panacea to 
solve the long term conflicts between PAs and local communities. Nevertheless, what are 
the challenges in theoretical principle and while carrying out such integrated strategy at 
community levels? Is it an effective means to combine both objectives of biological 
conservation and economic development of local communities?  
Challenges in the principle of community based conservation are addressed firstly 
in the following paragraphs. It is also necessary to distinguish such projects from other 
similar initiatives in order to understand the nature of community conservation. 
Challenges of community conservation   
Community based conservation is used as an important symbol to represent the 
paradigm shift to people-centred conservation. Brown (2003) suggests three essential 
changes in such people-centred conservation approaches in order to achieve the dual goals 
of conservation and development. The first challenge concerns the need for more plural 
interpretations as well as understandings of knowledge and values toward conservation. 
For example, traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) expresses ways of knowing based on 
local daily practice of natural resource use by indigenous people (Berkes, et al., 2000). 
Their perspectives and knowledge of conservation have usually been embedded in their 
cultural customs and can become viable parts of management strategies. According to 
Berkes et al (2000), these traditional systems also possess certain similarities of adaptive 
management that can adapt to the changes of uncertainty and unpredictability (Berkes, et 
al., 2000).  
The second challenge is to adopt appropriate inclusionary processes to recognize 
such plural knowledge, value and interests of various stakeholders. This challenge needs 
to take action to associate conservation and development. Brown (2003) stresses 
deliberative ways to respect diverse actors in different positions and use particular 
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techniques to make better decisions in practice such as working with small groups of 
people or accommodating the broadest extent of possible interests.  
The third challenge lies in establishing adaptable, integrated and dynamic 
institutions to deal with complicated natural environment and human development. 
Institutions are regarded as rules that regulate people’s behaviours. ‘Institutional fit’ here 
describes ‘conservation institutions trying to improve the integration of human needs with 
biodiversity’ (Brown, 2003, p. 90). Such creative institutions need to match up 
organizations and space across scales and have to link local needs with international 
interests rather than merely limiting people’s behaviours. Being adjustable helps such new 
institutions to meet both needs for biodiversity conservation and economic development. 
The three challenges and proposed solutions from Brown not only provide specific 
directions of successful and meaningful people-centred conservation, but also point out 
the plural and hybrid nature of community conservation. These challenges are useful to 
evaluate practical participatory community and co-management arrangements with local 
communities.  
Issues of empirical field studies 
The empirical results of implementing community based conservation projects 
reflect multitudinous lessons that people can learn from case studies in various regions in 
the world, particularly in developing countries. Here, I list much greater concerns based 
on social science arguments rather than ecological views due to the stress of CBC relevant 
literature and my orientation of research. The analyses of such pragmatic programs lie in 
institutions and political power, participation, attitude of local residents, and the 
distribution of benefits. Moreover, external changing environments play a vital role in 
affecting the communities where community conservation projects are running. 
Institutions and power relationships 
The first key issue that I would like pose according to empirical studies on 
community conservation is the establishment of institutions and their associated power 
relations. After their examination of the concept of ‘community’ in community 
conservation literature, Agrawal and Gibson (1999) suggest that research analysis of 
community conservation should focus on multiple stakeholders with their various 
interests and relevant institutions rather than the communities in order to get more 
meaningful information. They argue that the adoption of such a political approach is 
because the assumption of community in resource management is that it exhibits 
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‘homogeneous social structure, shared norms and small unit in space’ (Agrawal and Gibson, 
1999, p. 630) which do not coincide with the actual situations of empirical settings (Gibson 
& Koontz, 1998), while the political description can portray the real communities (Agrawal 
& Gibson, 1999). Similarly, the importance of institutional arrangements is also stressed 
by Gibson and Koontz (1998) after analysing two communities with many similar physical 
features in India to govern their forest resources. In spite of these conditions, the two 
communities developed different institutions to support their values and this in turn 
resulted in different outcomes. Institutions are not only the reflection of given values, but 
also transform values and shape the preference of a community. Therefore, paying more 
attention to institutions linking with values of local residents helps to understand the 
processes and effects of resource management at community level (Gibson & Koontz, 
1998).  
Institutions play a primary role in my analysis of research about contemporary 
indigenous hunting of Truku people. The focus is put on institutional interplays between 
wildlife conservation policy, indigenous development policy, and hunting norms of Truku 
people that shape current hunting practices. Institutions also attract much attention 
within community conservation studies in order to understand the sustainable 
development of common pool property such as wildlife, fishery and forestry. No matter 
what kind of institutions, the processes of building institutions are associated with power 
relations and politics.  
True participation of the locals? 
Local participation is regarded as a significant means for protected area 
management to minimize the conflicts among diverse stakeholders of common pool 
resource appreciation and to promote the sustainable development of resource utilization 
such as wildlife use (Mbaiwa, 2005). The establishment of cooperation and partnership 
between the PAs' administration and their local communities is useful to facilitate the 
adaptation of traditional values to a modern environment and schemes of resource 
management. Such an idea of partnership, namely local participation, benefits both local 
and wildlife management authorities in livelihoods improvement and biodiversity 
conservation (ibid.)  
In practice, Platteau (2004) discusses the seriousness of elite capture at a local 
level, especially within the popular model of community based development projects. One 
small group of an association in West Africa handled and controlled the external funding 
  46 
and led to a highly unfair profit distribution. The primary leader also tampered with the 
accounting documents and took much more individual benefits for granted. The 
livelihoods of the poor did not improve (Platteau, 2004). The elite capture problem 
confines the participation of community conservation projects to specific groups of 
villagers, hence reinforcing conflicts among community leaders and undermining social 
capital. The necessary collective action in the local conservation initiatives cannot be 
reached, let alone the success of dual objectives of community conservation (Tai, 2007).  
Research shows that one of the dissatisfactions with community conservation 
comes from the insufficient opportunities for local communities to participate in the 
process of decision making. Community conservation project systems in Zambia 
contained many issues local inhabitants were concerned with to enhance local 
participation such as the loan to run small enterprises and increased access to education. 
But women received very few opportunities to be involved in development initiatives in 
community conservation in Zambia (Wainwright & Wehrmeyer, 1998).  
From a macro view, wildlife conservation policy in Taiwan is made by a few experts 
including scholars and officials in the office. Accordingly, opinions of many other 
stakeholders are excluded and this results in complaints as well as conflicts in practice, 
especially around cultural practices carried out within indigenous areas. Participatory 
approaches have become popular in conservation since the 1980s, replacing the previous 
separate strategy from the locals. Thus, measures towards participation should be taken 
by conservation authorities to improve the relationship between the state and indigenous 
people. Accordingly, in this thesis, I will explore indigenous peoples’ cooperative 
experiences with public sectors, particularly the authorities of PAs. However, some 
empirical evidence shows that specific groups such as the poor and women at a local level 
are often neglected by community conservation programs. The problem of elite capture 
within communities exacerbates the exclusionary status quo. These divergent variables 
that affect the empirical participation at community level become what I examined in my 
field work sites. 
Attitudes of the locals toward conservation and interest distribution 
There is no doubt that the local communities are the key component of community 
conservation projects, and that the attitudes of the communities may play a vital role of 
the success of community conservation (Masozera, Alavalapati, Jacobson, & Shrestha, 
2006; Moswete, Thapa, & Child, 2011). According to Holmes (2003), community attitudes 
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towards conservation reviewed within numerous studies in general indicate that positive 
attitudes comes from the benefits or services provided by the authorities of PAs, while 
negative attitudes form because the inaccessibility of resources such as wildlife and land, 
and the conflicts with wildlife and the staff of PAs respectively (Holmes, 2003). The 
attitude investigation conducted by Musumali, Larsen and Kaltenborn (2007) 
demonstrates that the residents living adjacent to national parks in Zambia and Botswana 
respectively hold negative views towards relevant institutions and wildlife authorities after 
two decades of implementation of CBNRM programs. They therefore declare the impasse 
of such community conservation initiatives in these two countries since CBNRM fails to 
fulfil its intention to empower the local communities (Musumali, Larsen, & Kaltenborn, 
2007). The main reasons lie in the incongruence between what the communities perceive 
and expect about the function and aim of natural resource institutions and those of 
conservation authorities. Their empirical findings reveal that the communities are passive 
within such wildlife management schemes and their roles seem merely functional with 
limited opportunities to make decisions. Natural resource management and all activities 
are principally controlled or policed by the wildlife authorities in the two countries and 
thus easily lead to recurrent tensions (Musumali, et al., 2007). On the contrary, one SWOT 
analysis of three key stakeholders including the state agency, local communities and an 
environmental organization on community conservation management in a Rwandan 
forest reserve shows that the positive attitude of the representatives of local inhabitants 
outweighs the negative one (Masozera, et al., 2006). The leading factor is the additional 
increase of income from community conservation and the simultaneous decrease of 
poverty in the communities. That is, local people perceive that community forestry 
conservation indeed results in the improvement of livelihoods.  
In addition to economic benefits derived from community conservation, Mbaiwa 
and Stronza (2011) connect positive local attitudes with conservation objective as well. 
They depict the changing attitudes of local residents towards community conservation 
projects--- CBNRM in the Okavango Delta, Botswana (Mbaiwa & Stronza, 2011). The 
CBNRM projects aim to improve both conservation and tourism development and result 
in transferring effect to the positive attitudes towards community conservation. The 
results from qualitative and quantitative analysis reveal that attitude changes were shaped 
not only by direct economic benefits but also from cooperation between the government 
and local communities in natural resource management and collective action within 
communities in CBNRM development initiatives. Co-management mechanisms and 
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collective action can strengthen social capital in the communities and simultaneously 
create a sense of ownership over natural resources. Accordingly, the positive attitudes 
towards conservation and tourism are enhanced (ibid.).  
Since tourism is often seen as a tool to help local development in community 
conservation projects, the distribution of benefits and relevant challenges brought by 
tourism should not be neglected. Ecotourism in rural areas can indeed provide 
employment opportunities and additional revenue that facilitate local improvement of 
livelihoods. However, unequal distribution of the benefits from the tourism industry could 
result in marginalization of community. In Namibia, community conservation intends to 
alleviate poverty and promote wildlife conservation and thus attracts international donor 
funding. Community ecotourism enterprise plays the most important role in development 
objectives. After examining two cases managed under community conservation 
approaches, Hoole (2009) finds that ecotourism systems in participatory communities are 
always controlled by external private enterprise partners and government. The local elites 
within communities also capture the majority of benefits (Hoole, 2009). Such imbalance 
at local levels may silence the voice of the community and make the community lose its 
position within management institutions(Blaikie, 2006; Hoole, 2009). Furthermore, a 
Nepalese case on community conservation indicates that women and the poor did not 
share the benefits derived from ecotourism development, and their less supportive 
attitudes to the project indicated their excluded position (Mehta & Kellert, 1998). Some 
undesirable changes to lifestyle and cultural tradition of local communities could also be 
brought by tourism (Mehta & Kellert, 1998). Complaints about limited employment 
opportunities, opaque processes of decision-making, and hiring of family members and 
residents from other communities were found in South Africa (King, 2007). Various 
interest groups within the communities responded to such conservation initiatives in 
different ways, and King (2007) notes that this differentiation was driven by factors 
including variation in material access to natural resource and recreation opportunities. 
Songorwa’s study in African reveals that the traditional hunters expressed their opposition 
to conservation programs because of limited direct benefits meanwhile the farmers’ camp 
opposes it due to insufficient compensation (Songorwa, 1999).  
Attitudes of local communities generally depend upon the benefits they receive 
and the relationship between the steward authorities of PAs and the local inhabitants. The 
positive attitude can facilitate the success of community conservation or PAs directly. 
Applying this perspective to my research program, I intend to investigate the attitude of 
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indigenous residents who live adjacent to Truku National Park in order to understand the 
interaction and relationship between the administration and the locals. This may indicate 
the probability of future cooperation or conflict. Further, the factors that affect their 
attitude could be explored and discussed to help better management the National Park. 
Similarly, the attitude of the other villagers who possess national forest within the village 
can reflect their relationship with the Forestry Bureau. The locals’ attitude toward state 
agencies is an indicator to evaluate the interactions between them. 
 
2.5 Indigenous Populations in Nature Conservation 
Indigenous people play an important role in nature conservation because they may 
retain traditional knowledge or local knowledge connecting to their environment. Mistry’s 
definition of indigenous knowledge points out that it is context-specific, transferred orally 
or by demonstration, adjusted to the surroundings, built in communal norms, and is 
naturally implanted in people’s lives (Mistry, 2009). Furthermore, recent studies show that 
indigenous land use practices contribute to the control of deforestation and carbon 
dioxide emission (Mistry and Berardi, 2016). Ford et al (2015) indicates that indigenous 
knowledge increases adaptive capacity when facing climate change in Arctic areas. 
Conservationists and state authorities had for a long time neglected the contribution of 
indigenous knowledge in respect of nature conservation. Local indigenous people living 
in or near protected areas were seen as destroyers of natural environment because they 
relied on local resources. The mainstream idea of separation of nature and people resulted 
in the resettlement within early fortress protected areas. With the understanding of social 
impacts in the local communities close to protected areas, and the function of locals in 
ecological system, local indigenous people and their environmental knowledge were 
gradually recognised. The role of indigenous people in conservation is closely associated 
with the evolution of protected areas of international conservation. The mainstreamed 
idea of indigenous populations in conservation has changed from destroyers to guardians 
of nature as the paradigm of protected areas changes. Before exploring indigenous groups 
in different types of protected areas, it is necessary to understand the idea of conservation 
in indigenous cultures. 
For indigenous populations, there may not a conception of ‘conservation’ in their 
values. According to his experience, Alcorn (1993, p. 435) notes that this word can be 
interpreted as ‘respecting Nature,’ ‘taking care of things,’ or ‘doing things right.’ It is seen 
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as ‘part of making a living’ by indigenous community (ibid, p. 435). In indigenous people’s 
cultural practices, for example, there may be taboo systems such as forbidden species and 
holy zone embedded in hunting activities, which reduces the frequency and range of a 
hunting trip. The shared value and practices in indigenous culture is the empirical 
manifestation of nature conservation (e.g. Tai et al, 2011). 
2.5.1 Indigenous people from early fortress parks to community conservation 
When people-free protected areas such as parks are employed by conservation 
authorities, indigenous/ forest/ local people are usually excluded from accessing resources 
within protected areas. Furthermore, some locals are forcefully displaced due to the 
thinking of the separation between people and nature. There have been works 
documenting the conflicts between PAs and indigenous/local people around the world 
(e.g. Neuman’s work in Africa (1998); Poirier and Ostergren’s work in Australia, Russia and 
US (2002); Smarden and Faust’s work in Mexico (2006); Nicholas’ work in Malaysia 
(2005)). These clashes with PA management seem to show that indigenous people are the 
destroyers of natural environment. However, the debates of environmental injustice and 
other political-economic forces behind these clarify the roots of environmental 
degradation. Indigenous people are a vital part of ecological system. Local interests and 
sustainable use are adopted to form participatory conservation or co-management 
arrangements in the fortress PAs. 
Conflicts and local costs have ensured the failure of exclusionary PAs. 
Coordination with local indigenous people is a new approach to conservation. 
Local/traditional knowledge of indigenous populations is recognised as treasure to nature 
conservation and global environmental change. Indigenous participation in community 
conservation and other types of protected areas potentially reach both objectives of 
conservation and local development.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter employs the lens of political ecology to examine the interaction 
between state agencies and local people in PAs. By employing notions of human 
territoriality, access, social impact and resistance, a critical view is established to indicate 
that the state’s territorial acts through the establishment of PAs and conservation policy 
implementation usually restricts the locals’ access to natural resources. Such a restraint 
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affects the locals’ livelihood selections, traditional practices and causes other social 
impacts on the local communities. The local residents may take implicit and explicit 
resistance as responses to the state’s acts of territoriality. Adopting the perspective of 
political ecology in this thesis implies that I stress to deliberately examine the nature of 
conservation policy and the influence of policy implementation on the local community 
regarding environmental topics. Literature review of political ecology also offers the 
insight that historical tracking of political process and socioeconomic context are critical 
to current environmental conflicts. Moreover, the review of the paradigm shifts of 
international conservation implies that social impacts from conservation on locals were 
commonly recognised. These recognised impacts contributed to the new paradigm, 
community-based conservation. Simultaneously, the local indigenous populations were 
gradually seen as important actors in nature conservation. However, is the idea of 
participatory community conservation a win-win strategy which avoids the hegemony 
problems in the fortress parks and integrates both objectives of conservation and 
development? The existing studies indicate that the success of community conservation is 
affected by various variables. This study takes two indigenous examples in a park and a 
community conservation initiative respectively to examine this framework of political 
ecology in practice. Before testing the framework, the next chapter outlines of how I 
carried out this PhD project in field work and how I analysed the empirical data.  
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter two analysed the critical views of political ecology in order to construct 
the theoretical framework for this research, combining theories of human territoriality, 
resistance and social impacts regarding PAs. I argue that the territorial acts of the state 
that create PAs and implement conservation policies could have a social impact, which 
stimulates the resistance of the locals. This contention is explored through the analysis of 
two Truku examples in eastern Taiwan. Three research questions concerning the acts of 
state agencies and the local Truku, and social effects on the local Truku communities are 
investigated in Hualien of East Taiwan.  
In this chapter there are three sections outlining the methodology of this project. 
I firstly set out the two main approaches to data collection and why I employed them to 
conduct this study (sections 3.2 and 3.3). Two Truku villages are briefly introduced here to 
strengthen the approach choice. Secondly, I introduce the adopted methods and how I 
applied these to this study, focusing on the interview sampling and my positionality in the 
field work (sections 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6).  Finally, I am concerned with ethical issues and how 
I analysed the data (sections 3.7 and 3.8). 
 
3.2 Qualitative approach rather than quantitative approach 
I employed a qualitative approach because of the nature of this research, which is 
to understand the relationship and interactions between state agencies and the local 
indigenous groups in PAs. The relationship and interactions are closely associated with 
traditional practices of natural resource management of neighbouring indigenous people 
in PAs. Their practices in PAs are seen as illegal acts in light of the modern conservation 
regulations of the Han Chinese government. The justification of a qualitative approach 
relies on the search of the contexts of PA creation, policy implementations and local 
people’s perceptions of conservation policy implementations in PAs. Therefore, 
descriptive data is more appropriate for the analysis of the social relationships in which 
this research is interested. Below I present three detailed considerations about the reasons 
behind employing a qualitative research approach and methods. 
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The first consideration is the controversial nature of the issues related to this study. 
The core of this controversy should be clarified through interpretive-descriptive research. 
The aim of this study on specific relationship and interactions between the two primary 
actors in PAs are connected to some controversial issues such as contemporary indigenous 
hunting practices in the national park, power relations between the two sides, and social 
impacts resulting from the policy of PAs. These issues are of importance since they greatly 
shape these interactions in PAs. However, exploring these issues required sufficient data 
to find the core of the controversial issues. Further, the interactions between the two 
actors need to be interpreted carefully/ in detail. Qualitative methods are appropriate 
tools for the collection of rich descriptive data, especially when the core of controversies 
are unclear. Accordingly, I had to collect abundant descriptive data to understand the core 
of relevant disputes connecting to this topic. Qualitative methods were appropriate for 
this study.    
The second reason for employing qualitative approach in this research, is that this 
topic needs the participation of key persons rather than random respondents. As Flick 
(2008) notes, qualitative research emphasises the understanding of processes of social 
phenomena. In this research aiming to look at specific interactions, so the staff dealing 
with matters about the local indigenous residents in PA authorities are supposed to offer 
much more information than an engineering technician. An example of the latter would 
be the ability of an old permanent indigenous resident who could tell more stories than a 
young person with higher education working in another city. Key persons’ data is more 
important than others’ ideas for this research, since they are aware of what constitutes the 
real interactions between two parts analysed in this thesis. Through interviewing key 
persons, in addition to participant observation, the picture of the specific relationship in 
the context of PAs was captured. The employment of these qualitative methods for data 
collection helped to reveal rich meanings and unheard voices. The topic of this research is 
relevant to the everyday life of local people in/neighbouring PAs, however, only a few key 
persons are familiar with the specific inter-communications between the governmental 
authorities and the locals. The dialogues with these key persons enhance the knowledge 
of the social dimension of conservation via the use of qualitative methods. Therefore, this 
study requires the detailed representations of key persons rather than the summarised 
characterisation of all people in PAs. 
Thirdly, some representative events and institutions are of value for this research 
topic, such as the significant experiences and governmental schemes that potentially affect 
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the relationship between the two sides. The data collection of these events and institutions 
is explorative, which requires qualitative methods rather than a quantitative survey. The 
participation schemes for the local population in parks was investigated using methods 
such as document analysis and interviews. These interactions between the state agencies 
and the local indigenous residents revealed their awareness and attitude; the implications 
of these incidents and institutions can be developed and enhanced from the deeply 
descriptive materials of qualitative methods. Moreover, the perception of indigenous 
residents about policies of PAs is more appropriately interpreted via interactive 
experiences rather than the pre-set categories used frequently in quantitative 
questionnaires. For instance, telling personal experiences about protesting in PAs by the 
local inhabitants reveals stronger negative perceptions and is more meaningful than 
ticking the selection box of ‘very bad’ within a questionnaire. It is here that qualitative 
methods are appropriate for researchers when exploring a new topic or there is very 
limited information about a topic. Qualitative methods are useful collecting materials 
regarding specific events and institutions for further interpretations (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2008).  
Fourth, qualitative researchers prefer to study inquiries in the natural settings 
rather than through artificial experiment (Hammersley 1992, Silverman 2011), especially 
what and how the natural occurrences impact a phenomenon. My research explores the 
actual interactions between the state and the local indigenous people in two types of PAs. 
Furthermore, I analyse the effect of these interactions and the implications. These happen 
in a natural setting rather than an experiment where the experimenter can control certain 
elements.  
Conducting field study in natural settings for naturally-occurring data confirmed 
the preference of qualitative approach since it did not indicate that the data is ‘out there’ 
objectively because the topic aimed to examine the interactive experiences perceived and 
interpreted by people. Moreover, it neither connotes that events in the field site can be 
observed or collected objectively by qualitative researchers because researchers' 
involvement of studying and interpreting is subjective itself (Stake, 1995). Asa researcher, 
I should reflect my position when explaining and interpreting data so that a reader may 
understand the degree to which I influence the data and contexts. Here I stress the natural 
occurrences gathered by a qualitative researcher are totally different from the responses 
in an experiment that tries to keep several variables under control. 
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Finally, doing research in the field sites indicates that the researcher is 
approaching those social actors along with their points of view in the social world by 
adopting in-depth methods such as interviews and observations. The 'insider' position 
which qualitative investigators take is appropriate to examine directly specific issues in a 
particular case in a dynamic world (Denzin and Lincoln, 2008). In this research, I not only 
observe events happening in the two indigenous villages in order to catch their value in 
everyday life but also interview locals to explore their views. The face-to-face data 
collection in this study means that adopting a qualitative approach is appropriate.  
 
3.3 Applying case study 
Stake (1995) categorises qualitative case study research into three types: intrinsic, 
instrumental and collective. I use case studies in order to understand social relationships 
and phenomena, namely, the relationship between the state authorities and the local 
indigenous people in PAs, as well as the social impact of PA policy on the local 
communities. Case studies are employed to get insights into the research objectives as an 
instrumental consideration. The reasons behind the selection of the Truku group as a case 
study and two villages as field sites, are based on their uniqueness and on three concerns 
which are outlined in the following sections. 
3.3.1 Why select the Truku group as my case? 
I argue that the selection of the Truku group as case study is appropriate for this 
research based on three foundations. These include that firstly the Truku people are a 
proactive group regarding politics (Tsai and Simon, 2011); secondly that the Truku 
community has had a rich experience in contact with dominant political regimes for over 
one hundred years; and thirdly, the traditional territory of Truku people is mostly included 
in the boundary of PAs. These unique features make the relationship between the local 
Truku people and state agencies in PAs particularly suitable for investigation. 
In relation to Truku’s proactive role in politics, they have actively engaged in the 
Name Rectification Campaign and the autonomy movement of indigenous people in 
Taiwan since 1996 (Wang, 2008). The Campaign aimed to claim that they were an 
independent tribe rather than a sub-tribe of the Atayal tribe. Wang (2008) notes that at 
the beginning of the campaign there were a series of conferences held by several local 
organisations and the Presbyterian Church arguing that it was necessary for the Truku 
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community to have a new name different from the Atayal group. In order for the 
construction of their cultural connotation and a new group name, these elite activists in 
the organisations justified their nature as a different community. In addition to differences 
of some objective conditions such as language and custom, Truku leaders claimed that 
subjective elements of their identity, such as the dignity to be a group was also significant. 
Activists of this Campaign took advantage of the political opportunity in the election of 
the Hualien County Head in 2003. They successfully gained the support of these 
candidates of county head. These candidates recognised the Truku as a new group. One 
of the Truku activists thought that this Campaign actively connected to politics and make 
use of politics (ibid). In 2004, the central government ratified that the Truku were an 
independent tribe among the indigenous peoples of Taiwan. The success of the Campaign 
was associated with the political stance of the government in power that Taiwan is a 
nation-state of ethnic diversity (Simon, 2007, Wang, 2008). The process of the Campaign 
indicates that the Truku community proactively promoted their ethnic identity among 
residents in order to claim they were an independent tribe. These activists also took 
advantage of political opportunities to highlight their claims. Through the efforts of 
collective action by the local Presbyterian churches, three Township Offices and a few 
local aboriginal organisations, Truku people were approved as a separate ethnic group and 
increased their political resource.  
After the success of the Name Rectification Campaign to become an independent 
tribe recognised by the state, these leading activists started to draft a Truku autonomy 
statute and other actions for the establishment of an autonomous region. The similar 
pattern to the Champaign was used to promote Truku self-governing. In the village 
meetings, the activist team explained the financial matters of the Truku autonomous 
region. The promotion team intended to create the Region in 2006. Simon (2007) notes 
that the planning of an autonomous region actually attempted to establish a political 
nationality (Simon, 2007). The Conference of Truku Autonomy was held in 2005. The 
Truku autonomy draft was sent to the Legislature at a central level in 2010. The autonomy 
preparatory offices were created in two Truku Township Offices in 2011. Although an 
autonomous region has not yet been established, these actions have justified Truku 
people’s willingness and determination to seek their autonomy, which is a project of 
national identity. Their proactive role in politics is appropriate for the debate of 
relationship between them and the Taiwanese state. 
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The second concern is that Truku people have experience in interactions with 
external political regimes since the colonial Japanese government included their region 
into their governance by violence. Truku people used to live on the highlands relying on 
swidden agriculture and hunting. They established their separate kingdom through many 
single-family based communities. Before Japanese rule, the Truku region was out of the 
reach of the governance of the Chinese Qing Empire. The Chinese regime saw Truku 
people as barbarians due to their unusual practice of head-hunting. In principle, the 
Chinese government restrained Han Chinese people’s contact with indigenous people. The 
sporadic trades between Chinese and Truku people primarily depended on interpreters. 
Some fortifications such as the ‘Barrier Defence Lines’ in the hills were created in order to 
reduce the disturbance of indigenous people and protect Chinese residents. The Qing 
government did not extend its governance to the Truku region. The Japanese colonial 
government gained Taiwan after the Sino-Japanese War. Indigenous regions were 
regarded as a ‘special administration region’. The Japanese Authorities conquered Truku 
people by violence in 1914 and governed them via the police system. The police managed 
everyday life of Truku community such as education and industry transactions in order to 
control these ‘savages’. Relocation policy was used in the Truku region for the convenience 
of police governance. At the latter Japanese period, the assimilation policy was 
implemented in the indigenous regions. During the colonial period of 50 years, the 
Japanese government adopted violence to govern the Truku people. Truku community 
experienced the comprehensive domination of the external regime. 
Taiwan was returned to the Chinese KMT government after World War Two. The 
KMT government later established the central government in Taiwan when the regime 
lost the civil war. Because of the application of martial law in Taiwan after 1949, the KMT 
government ruled Taiwan in a dictatorial way. In general, the KMT regime continued the 
policy legacy about indigenous people during the Japanese colonial period such as 
reserved land for indigenous people and ethnic categories. The central government 
created Taroko National Park on the traditional domain of Truku people in 1986 and the 
National Park Law was implemented on the Truku region. The martial law of Taiwan was 
lifted in 1987. The Additional Articles of Constitution in 1992 reveal the principle of 
cultural pluralism in Taiwan and establish the status of indigenous people as well as their 
political participation. The Council of Indigenous Peoples was established in the central 
government to make policy of indigenous peoples, to safeguard the interest of indigenous 
people, and to deal with the affairs of indigenous people. The Truku tribe was recognised 
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by the central government in 2004 when the DPP government was in power. The Basic 
Law of Indigenous Peoples was passed in 2005 in order to ensure the sustenance and 
development of indigenous peoples. The environment of political participation had 
improved when Truku people sought their self-governance by political actions as 
mentioned earlier. The Truku group has had rich experience of contact with these external 
regimes for over one hundred years ago so were an appropriate case for the exploration of 
interactions with the state agencies. 
The third consideration of seeing the Truku tribe as a case study is because part of 
their traditional domain had been demarcated in the Taroko National Park and national 
forest where conservation legislation is implemented. The KMT authoritarian regime 
continued the Japanese policy of nationalisation of forests while the reserved lands for 
indigenous people were reduced. National Park Law was developed in the 1970s and the 
central government has established parks since the 1980s. Taroko National Park 
Authorities bought some lands of Truku people and it was built on the nationalised forest 
area. The Park was actually still utilised by the local Truku residents. The local Truku 
inhabitants never took part in the decision-making process of the establishment of the 
Park and the conservation regulations. However, these local people have their access to 
forest lands restrained by the Park Headquarters, the Law and the Park Police, which is 
unjust. The nationalisation of forests during the colonial period aimed to ease the 
exploitation of natural resources, which ignored the lifestyle of indigenous people. 
Following the policy legacy indicates that the unfairness continues. In the Truku region, 
the spacious traditional domains are nationalised and their traditional practices such as 
hunting are suppressed by the conservation legislation and state agencies. Therefore, the 
Truku case is appropriately employed to probe the interactions between the locals and the 
governmental agencies. 
3.3.2 Why the two Truku villages as field sites 
Siou-lin Township is where most Truku people live in modern administrative 
regions. I have selected two Truku villages: F Village and T Village in this township, 
Hualien County as my field sites5 to explore the relationship with interactions between 
Truku people and the state agencies in PAs because of the following two reasons.  
                                                     
5 Two villages were anonymised. The information of two field sites shown here was only limited so 
people should not recognise them. Figure 3.1 just indicates the location of east Taiwan.   
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First, the majority of areas of the two villages are within the territory of PAs. The 
majority areas of F village are in the boundary of the Park (see the location of the Park in 
Figure 3.1). There are great amounts of distribution of forests in the two villages. The 
forestry area in T village is national forest which is managed by the Forestry Bureau. In F 
village, the Park Authorities, Park Police and conservation regulations affect the everyday 
life of local Truku residents. Meanwhile, the Forestry Agencies, the Conservation Police 
and conservation regulations shape the Truku life in T village. This village was an officially 
recognised case of community conservation in Hualien County. The national parks are 
regarded as the typical PAs with ‘fortress’ restraints while community conservation is seen 
as an alternative approach to replace the conventional PAs. In this regard, the two villages 
respectively represent two types of PAs. Natural resource management, for example, may 
be differently interpreted by local indigenous residents and state authorities of PAs. The 
two villages are appropriate as case studies because they are located in two kinds of PAs. 
Interactions between the local Truku and two state authorities may vary. 
The second consideration to justify the appropriateness of the two Truku villages 
as case studies is that some traditional practices such as hunting and trapping exist in the 
two villages. On the one hand, these ‘illegal’ behaviours of hunting in PAs are seen as a 
touchstone to explore how conservation regulations have been implemented in PAs. It is 
associated with policy implementation by state agencies. On the other hand, hunting 
practices are a vital custom for the Truku. Hunting represents the bravery of Truku men. 
Hunting game plays an important role in the Truku social life. Tai et al (2011) note that the 
contemporary Truku people are still active in hunting. Truku huntsmen usually take 
advantage of existing roads to access mountains for hunting. In the two field sites, there 
are not only extensive forest areas but the current roads along with streams uphill to high 
mountainous areas, which are convenient for hunting activities. Hunting practices by the 
local Truku huntsmen are based on culture, sustenance and livelihood (Tai, Jhuang and 
Lin, 2011), which explains the attitude of the Truku towards conservation implementations 
in PAs as well as providing clues as to social costs due to conservation implementations in 
PAs. In this regard, hunting is related with the everyday life and values of the Truku. 
Therefore, hunting practices in the two villages are closely connected to this study 
exploring the interactions and relationship between the state and the local Truku people 
in PAs.    
I argue that selecting the two Truku sites are appropriate because of their 
geographical positions in PAs and the frequent traditional practices there. These 
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potentially offer the information of conservation policy implementation by state agencies 
as well as of local people’s attitudes towards conservation and the Truku values.   
 
Figure 3.1 The map of east Taiwan 
 
3.4 Document collection 
The purpose of gathering documents in this research is to comprehend 
contemporary indigenous hunting practices, and the relationship between indigenous 
people and the government. According to Hodder (2003), records are official whilst 
documents are more personal and less formal, thus, documents need to be interpreted 
contextually. Records usually refer to official power and access may be hampered by 
regulations because of confidentiality and anonymity. However, thanks to 'The Freedom 
of Government Information Law' in Taiwan, I could collect certain records relevant to the 
topic via online database of website of public sectors.  
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First, I assembled regulations are associated with indigenous hunting because it 
relates to wildlife conservation in PAs, livelihood selections of indigenous development, 
and cultural practices of indigenous people. This controversial issue in PAs potentially 
shows the practical interactions between state agencies and local indigenous residents. 
These regulations to some degree reveal the acts of conservation policy implementation. 
The Ministry of Justice provides a law and regulation database for the public to search and 
study. I searched 16 regulations related to this topic (see Table 3.1). Besides primary laws, 
I also collected sub-laws often regarded as enforcement rules for law-executors such as the 
police. Histories of these regulations and their processes of amendment allowed me to 
grasp the attitudes of the government and the mainstream society. The information was 
downloaded from the legal system of legislature.  
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Category Primary Regulation Sub-laws 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wildlife Conservation 
The Wildlife Conservation Act Enforcement Rules of the 
Wildlife Conservation Act 
 The Incentive Rules of Banning 
or Exposing Violation Cases of 
Wildlife Conservation Act 
 The Wildlife Management Rules 
of Indigenous People for 
Traditional Culture and Ritual 
Needs 
The Forestry Act The Enforcement Rules for the 
Forestry Act 
 Forestry Protection Rules 
 Regulations Governing 
Management, Operation And 
Coordination of Forests Located 
within National Parks Or 
Designated Scenic Areas 
The National Park Law The Enforcement Rules for 
National Park Law 
 The Working Rules of Taroko 
National Park Administration 
 Organisational Rules of 
National Park Police, National 
Police Agency, Ministry of the 
Interior 
 
 
Indigenous 
Development 
The Indigenous Peoples Basic 
Law 
 
Regulations on Development 
and Management of the Lands 
Reserved for Indigenous People 
 
Regulations on Development 
and Management of the Lands 
Reserved for Indigenous People 
 
 
Indigenous Culture 
Protection Act for the 
traditional intellectual 
creations of indigenous peoples 
 
Table 3.1   The regulations relating to indigenous hunting in Taiwan 
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The second section of document collection relied on documents gathered in the 
two field sites. These contained a development project plan in T Village. In the park case, 
I collected the Taroko National Plan with its reviews, some projects supported by the park, 
and meeting records on participation schemes of the Taroko National Park 
Administration. The development project of the scenic area in village T was supported by 
the county government but rejected by many villagers. Reviewing the project and 
comparing with interviews can help understanding of the locals’ collective action of 
resistance. I also collected the documents of their demands and news related to their 
protests. The information allowed me to analyse the political interactions between the 
local government and the Truku residents in T village. In addition, the park plan and its 
three reviews offered the official views of the local Truku community at different times. 
The meeting records of the Taroko National Park provided this study with the opportunity 
to look at the views of strict protected area administration on co-management of natural 
resources. The evolution of different participation schemes established by various 
directors revealed interactions between the national protected area and local indigenous 
residents. All the documents with their meanings facilitated the analytical development 
of this study.  
Third, in order to understand the legal processing of infringing regulations relating 
to wildlife conservation, I gathered the verdicts of violations of Wildlife Conservation Act 
and National Park Law in Hualien District Court. I took advantage of the Law and 
Regulations Retrieving System belonging to The Judicial Yuan. The verdicts of district 
courts collected in the system start from 2000 and are updated daily. I downloaded 155 
adjudications relating to Wildlife Conservation Act and National Park Law in Hualien 
District Court during the period of 13 years (January 2000 to March 2013). Analysis of this 
section was triangulated with the perceptions of the state towards violators of 
conservation regulations, especially those indigenous violators. Also the judgment is the 
final and most important stage of enforcing the regulations because the majority of these 
indigenous violators do not appeal the decision.  
Document collection was significant because I did not attend certain acts of the 
state and events in the field sites. Through analysing the written and video documents I 
found out the political processes and views of actors. The analysis of documents helps 
produce a more holistic perspective. 
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3.5 Participant observation 
Observing as part of fieldwork implies that the researcher becomes a tool to receive 
various messages via all senses (Neuman 2006). This is the foundational constitution of 
my field research; besides observing the everyday life in the two indigenous villages in 
order to catch the indigenous views, I attended several specific events (see Table 3.2) to 
understand their modern cultural phenomena and attitude of collective actions. This 
method was often carried out together with informal short conversations to comprehend 
the views of indigenous people. After observations, I took field notes and recorded 
reflections that were used during the analysis.  
I had the opportunity to conduct participant observation during the fieldwork 
period, primarily due to invitations from indigenous informants. Before the observations, 
I established relationships with those informants attending events that allowed me be to 
familiar with the contemporary indigenous society within the Truku community. I played 
a dual role, from being a complete participant to a total observer (Gold, 1958). At times, I 
approached the former whilst sometimes was close to the latter depending upon different 
occasions. That is, my role on undertaking observations was like the participant-as-
observer and observer-as-participant (Gold, 1958). I attended the majority of these events 
just like other attendees, thus my attendance as a researcher should not have altered the 
behaviour of other attendees and their activities.  
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Episode observed Place Access source Entry objective 
Sunday services and 
Christmas 
celebrations 
Presbyterian 
churches in F 
Village 
Visit the pastors 
voluntarily 
1.to explore the influence of 
Christianity on Truku 
community 
2.to establish trust 
relationship with indigenous 
Christian hunters 
Ritual performance of 
witch doctor 
A workshop in 
F Village 
Invitation of one 
informant 
To observe the modern 
practice of traditional faith 
Wedding banquet 
(open-bar type) 
Activity centre 
in F Village 
Invitation of one 
informant 
To observe modern wedding 
in indigenous village 
Meeting for removal 
of chairman of tribal 
meeting 
Activity centre 
in T Village 
Inform of one 
informant 
1. to observe the degree of 
collective action of villagers 
2. to observe how conflicts to 
be solved 
Coordination 
meeting of one 
development 
planning  
Activity centre 
in T Village 
Inform of some 
informants 
1. to observe the degree of 
collective action of villagers 
2. to observe how conflicts to 
be solved 
Informal lunch 
discussion of 
indigenous officials 
working in CIP 
A tea shop near 
CIP in Taipei 
Invitation of one 
official in CIP 
To explore the views of urban 
indigenous officials on 
indigenous issues 
Table 3.2 The specific incidents the author observed on fieldwork 
 
3.6 Conduct of In-depth interviews 
An interview is the interaction between interviewer and informant(s) by dialogue 
and the interactive process yields significance of knowledge (Mishler 1986,Neuman 2006).  
3.6.1 The joint process of qualitative interview 
In this study, it became evident that interviews were the processes of interviewer 
and respondent jointly constructing meanings on specific issues (Mishler 1986). There 
were two layers to establish this idea in this study.  
First, I used semi-structured interviews so I could cover my concerns while 
simultaneously covering interviewees’ own interests. The primary reason why I adopted 
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this method is that I wanted to capture not only my respondents' views in relation to my 
topic at various levels, but also the complexity behind their interactions and 
considerations behind their actions in order to establish the meanings of protected area 
policy implementation in indigenous regions of Taiwan. Therefore, I prepared open-ended 
questions that covered the acts of governmental authorities and local indigenous people 
and social impacts on local communities in advance. I also expected that my informants 
might talk about other issues while I conducted interviews. These might show their 
concerns in their everyday life or others. 
Different inquiries from various informants were addressed. For example, when 
interviewing officials who undertook wildlife conservation policies in local governmental 
agencies, I asked questions about the implementation of conservation affairs that may 
pose stress on indigenous hunters and the conflicts between conservation regulations and 
the hunting culture of indigenous people. Their responses sometimes stretched into 
reserved land policy of indigenous people and forestry management in addition to 
enforcing wildlife conservation regulations. Based on their responses, I then intervened 
with new follow-up questions searching for deeper meanings and influences of other 
policies. The dialogue process was always interactive allowing both sides to propose their 
interests. This is the first layer of my argument that interviews are jointly constructed by 
interviewer and respondents.  
The second layer lies in what Mishler (1986) emphasized as the interactive 
understanding of questions and responses during interview process. Through continuous 
conversation of explaining questions and answers, the interviewer and the informant may 
achieve their agreement forming the meanings of the interview. In my case, while 
interviewing Truku people about their informal norm system, Gaya, in modern society, I 
discovered that this term indicates different meanings for different Truku interviewees. 
Some Truku people, for example, expressed the Gaya as prohibitions, and told me what 
people cannot do. For others, the Gaya referred to the teachings of ancestors, so modern 
people can see it as traditional legacies. These suggest that when using this Truku term 
(Gaya) in interviews, I had to make sure how they interpreted it and proposed several 
follow-up inquiries to understand their responses. Therefore, the meanings of our dialogue 
were created via repeated questions and explanations in a joint manner. 
Qualitative interviews played an important role in my research since I explored the 
interactions between two main actors and the social impacts on the local communities via 
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this method. This topic stressed the political process of interactions between two primary 
stakeholders and the effects of the process. Different informants in governmental agencies 
and Truku villagers were interviewed to gain a picture of interactions between the state 
agencies and local Truku people in Taroko Park and the community conservation example.  
During my fieldwork period, interviews were conducted in three stages. First, I 
visited officials and implementers of wildlife conservation and indigenous land policy 
within the local government - Hualien County Government - in order to comprehend the 
outline of implementation of conservation and development policies at county level. Later, 
I focused on the two Truku villages to interview Truku leaders, some hunters and residents 
to capture the relationship and conflicts between local Truku inhabitants and diverse 
governments in a broad sense. Their personal experience of hunting practices, the values 
of the Truku community, perceptions of diverse conservation institutions, and actions 
taken were what I explored at this stage. Finally, after collecting many views from local 
indigenous people, I brought these ideas to interview officials in central and local 
government in order to look for practical solutions.  
Each interview experience was unique, due to different interviewees participating, 
issues discussed, place, and time. I usually conducted interviews after meeting several 
times or after several communications in advance to build rapport and trust, which are 
factors that increase validity to qualitative research (Arksey and Knight 1999). Introducing 
myself as a research student in the United Kingdom was the first step while visiting 
interviewees, and then I informed them of the purpose of my research project including 
basic information such as topic, aim, objectives, and advantages with disadvantages to 
invite their participation. I also stressed my ethical approach to using their names, which 
will be confidential to others and anonymous while writing. Gaining consent for joining 
this study and audiotaping were necessary before interviews. I obtained a total of 34 
consent forms of three broad categories: public sector, indigenous elite, and indigenous 
hunter. Interviews were always undertaken in the participants’ offices and houses for 
convenience and security, and so they could feel easy and express their thoughts freely 
(Arksey and Knight 1999). As for those policemen who were afraid that their views might 
be described as official opinion, I tried to have conversations in their office to explore their 
attitude toward indigenous hunting and personal experience of enforcing conservation 
regulations without recording the conversations. After these conversations, I reflected and 
took notes for analysis. I did not record informal interviews, conversations, and telephone 
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conversation because of inconvenience, but I usually adopted field notes to fill in the 
missing details. 
3.6.2 Key Informant Interview 
I have listed my interviewees in a table as Appendix 1, which categorizes 
interviewees into three types, including people in the governmental agencies on multiple 
levels, indigenous elites at local level and indigenous hunters in both villages, who were 
key informants of this study. Since I wanted to explore the territoriality of the state, 
resistance of Truku residents and indigenous development in park and community 
conservation contexts, it was evident that firstly wildlife conservation policies and 
indigenous development policies in the two examples needed to be examined. A good 
method for achieving the latter was to talk to policy-makers and implementers who may 
offer considerations taken into account by them and some difficulties while implementing 
these policies. Therefore, I interviewed officials in the government at multiple levels and 
police officers in different stations. Secondly, indigenous leaders and elders in the local 
villages may provide their views of these policies and interactions between the public 
sector and locals and their values. Besides, indigenous hunters and residents can share 
their experience, perceptions of conservation institutions and the actions they took to 
respond to these conservation implementations. 
Here I attempt to justify the interview classifications in detail, for interviews 
greatly contributed to this study regarding methodology and research findings. The first 
group was those public servants working in governmental agencies. They were responsible 
for the affairs associated with nature conservation and indigenous people in public sector. 
Their statements to some degree should express the position of the government, and the 
attitude toward their tasks. Therefore, I considered their narratives as the basis of acts of 
governmental agencies. Interviewees of this sort were usually Han Chinese officials except 
a few in the Council of Indigenous Peoples of the Executive Yuan, county government, and 
the indigenous township office. I explored the decision making of policies, policy 
implementations, communicating schemes with local people, and attitudes toward 
cultural practices of indigenous groups in protected areas in light of the research 
questions. These officials were the persons in charge of conservation matters, indigenous 
matters in the central and local governmental agencies.  
In the field work, I interviewed officials in the Council of Indigenous Peoples of the 
Executive Yuan, Taroko National Park Headquarters of the Interior Ministry, Agricultural 
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Department and Indigenous Peoples Department of Hualien Government, and 
Agricultural Tourism Section and Indigenous Administration Section of Siou-Lin 
Township Office. An official of the Forestry Bureau changed his mind when I arrived at his 
office, so we just had short conversation. After the talk, he concluded that I did not really 
understand indigenous people because his impression of indigenous groups was different 
from what he was hearing from me6. I also rang another official in the branch of the 
Forestry Bureau, she just expressed her respect for the traditional practices such as hunting 
activities of indigenous community. For those in the Council of Indigenous Peoples, the 
questions focused on the policy decision-making process, and the negotiations with other 
departments in terms of policies about indigenous peoples. The interview questions for 
those in the county government were the practical challenges on their tasks such as 
hunting applications and the autonomy of indigenous peoples. As for those working in the 
township office, the interviews paid attention to the actual projects in the two field sites 
and the difficulties they faced in their jobs.   
The second group of interviewees contained a clerk of the higher court and the 
police who were responsible for law enforcement and other conservation services. There 
were at least three different parts of the police system associated with this study:  national 
park police, forestry conservation police and local administrative police. They were wary 
of conducting ‘formal interviews’ but wanted to take advantage of ‘informal conversations’ 
to explain their views of law enforcement. Basically, these informants performed their 
tasks according to the legislation. I interviewed and discussed with them more informally 
in order to investigate their attitudes to indigenous people’s using of natural resources in 
protected areas and to the implementation of conservation policy, and their viewpoints of 
nature conservation legislation as well as indigenous rights. The policemen’s views were 
important for indigenous practices of natural resource management in protected areas 
because they might contact indigenous ‘poachers’ face-to-face. A clerk’s views to some 
degree indicated the position of judicial staff in the court system. 
In practice, the district court responded to me on the phone that I had to offer an 
official document for interview, so that the staff could accept or reject the interview. I did 
                                                     
6His past work experience at the county level and his colleagues in indigenous regions showed that 
indigenous people have been included in the market focusing on economic interest only rather than 
keeping traditional conservation values in cultural practices as I told him. In his opinion, contemporary 
indigenous hunting, for example, had been a selection for making a living. Indigenous hunters didn’t 
obey traditional rules nor share the game with family members. Yet what I experienced in some 
indigenous villages was different from his views.    
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not belong to any official agency, so I could not issue an official document. It seemed to 
be difficult for me to interview the staff of the court system. Yet in the second field work 
period in 2014, I happened to contact a friend working as a clerk in the higher court and 
he promised to be interviewed in his apartment. The interview centred on the new ‘courts 
for indigenous people’ and the legislation regarding indigenous groups, in particular those 
associated with natural resource management by indigenous community. Concerning the 
conversations with the police, the questions focused on their law enforcement and their 
attitude toward indigenous practices. These policemen included the park police, 
conservation police and administrative police in the two Truku villages. Half of these 
policemen were indigenous, and their attitude toward practices of Truku residents was 
more tolerant despite their own observations that indigenous policemen tended to arrest 
indigenous hunters. Han Chinese policemen preferred to express their respect towards 
indigenous ways of resource governance on misdemeanours such as picking fuel woods, 
but regarded hunting activities as a serious crime. Conservation police told me that they 
could change the shifts if they were going to work in their hometown. The administrative 
policemen usually ignored the ‘illegal hunting’ of Truku hunters because they frequently 
contacted the locals and cooperated with local vigilantes. However, if they got a report of 
poaching, they had to take actions. In principle, reverence was used in the police system 
and the conservation law enforcement was tolerant nowadays.         
The third group of interviewees was the local Truku people living in or 
neighbouring protected areas. They were main actors in this study. Their opinions of 
conservation policies and conservation implementations showed part of the social and 
political interactions in protected areas. These interactions examined whether biodiversity 
conservation and social justice could be combined. I interviewed three groups of Truku 
people including Christian leaders and elders, local leaders, and residents and hunters. 
Christian leaders and elders were selected because some were greatly involved in the 
Truku language dictionary and the interpretations of Truku traditions in many rituals. 
Those local leaders I interviewed were opinion leaders in the local communities and they 
did participate in local affairs. The local residents might offer different views of local affairs 
from the leaders on the same thing. Their opinions might convey the voice of some 
residents. Truku hunters to some degree were the practitioners of Truku customs, and 
their practices were controversial in terms of nature conservation.  
In the field work, I interviewed Truku pastors and elders on questions of Truku 
ways of resource governance, differences between Truku practices and conservation of 
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protected areas, and attitudes toward conservation institutions such as parks and the 
police system. I also asked them about socioeconomic changes in the communities coming 
from conservation interventions. The interview questions for the local leaders focused on 
the actual interactions with governmental agencies such as conservation policy 
implementations and the protesting response of local people, especially the authorities of 
protected areas. These leaders revealed their perceptions of different conservation 
institutions and the social effects of conservation policy. The Truku huntsmen and 
residents were interviewed about their hunting knowledge and its customary values, and 
their perceptions of conservation institutions and conservation implementation.  
This study aims to critically examine the interactions between governmental 
authorities and the local indigenous people in protected areas. By interviews or dialogues 
with governmental officials, police officers, a clerk in the higher court, indigenous leaders, 
hunters and residents as the primary part of data collection, the acts of governmental 
agencies, responses of indigenous people, and social effects in the local communities were 
explored. I selected these informants because they were the nature and indigenous case 
officers in the public sector, law enforcement officers, indigenous opinion leaders, 
indigenous resource users, and local people affected by conservation implementations. 
They represented important parts of the political system as described in section 2.2 
(drawing on Easton,1957). Together the three groups allowed me to understand elements 
of decision-making, but particularly decision implementation and its effects in terms of 
feedback from indigenous groups that were important in reshaping the political system.  
 
3.7 Ethical issues in fieldwork 
Moral dilemmas were often confronted whilst doing this study not only because of 
the controversial nature of indigenous hunting issues in Taiwan, but also because of the 
cross-cultural nature of this research project. Ethical decisions within this study were 
particularly important, which led me to prepare in advance information sheets about this 
research and consent forms, which aimed to provide sufficient information to my potential 
informants and gain their consent to join this research. During the fieldwork period, I 
provided consent forms and information sheets to my respondents in different situations 
hoping that it would minimize negative impact. The following paragraphs are what I took 
into consideration about ethical issues of this project. 
 73 
 
3.7.1 Concerns while conducting cross-cultural study 
Researchers are often faced with both power and control issues when carrying out 
cross-cultural projects, especially among those who are minority or marginalised groups 
(Marshall and Batten 2004). These people have been regarded as lacking power in 
mainstream society. In this study, I collected data among one of fourteen officially 
recognised indigenous groups in Taiwan as a doctoral student, which seemed to indicate 
I have power over these indigenous people. However, the imbalanced relationship in 
power may improve if the researcher adopts a way to join the community instead of 
interloping within the group as a professional (Crigger et al. 2001; Marshall and Batten 
2004). During fieldwork, I sometimes joined the local church to attend services like local 
residents and told the congregation that I was a graduate student. The relationship with 
Truku villagers in church services helped me to get closer to potential informants and 
obtain their trust. 
Control problems involve the dominance of researcher and the cross-cultural 
study can empower the researched community by valuing different social systems 
(Hudson et al. 2001; Marshall and Batten 2004). These relate to research design of this 
indigenous study. I used a qualitative approach to conduct the study, which meant that I 
chose to interact more deeply with participants to undertake the field study rather than 
the superficial relationship between questioner and respondent on questionnaire survey. 
I established trust relationships first by visits and explaining my study concerns and ethical 
issues. Then I explored the views of the indigenous community on hunting issues and the 
relationship with the Park authorities or the government. Qualitative approaches offer 
opportunities for cooperative and participatory so participants can play an important role 
in the construction of the research project. The positive relationship with interviewees 
during the interview process allowed us to complete our dialogue together. In addition, 
this project is also concerned with the development of Truku people, so I should pay 
attention to their cultural practices, values and informal norms, Gaya, to reduce the 
control while doing field study. In practice, I visited Truku pastors in local villages to listen 
to their views of national policies and interpretations of contemporary Truku society with 
informal institutions. Certain wildlife governance practices of the indigenous community 
may be refined to benefit conservation policy. My role as a research student was an 
efficient tool for collecting sufficient data for further meaningful analysis rather than 
manipulating the study during fieldwork period. 
  74 
The problems resulting from power and control issues highlight the significance 
of informed consent (Hammersley and Traianou 2012; Wiles et al. 2012). Providing 
sufficient and clear information could improve unpleasant experiences during field study. 
Therefore, I gained the approval of the committee of research ethics of the Department of 
Urban Studies and Planning at the University of Sheffield before commencing fieldwork. 
They suggested some considerations to improve the information sheet and ethics form of 
this project such as confidentiality of back up data and confidentiality of information sheet 
when conducting research in field sites. It was necessary to translate the documents into 
a Chinese version that my participants could read during the study. For indigenous 
interviewees, I added oral explanation of this project and then invited them to participate. 
Key themes I noted in the information sheets comprised: 
1. The research aim, objectives that revealed my concerns. 
2. The involvement of participants on interviews primarily. 
3. The advantages and disadvantages of participating on this project. 
4. That I ensured that anonymity of interviewees and confidentiality of data 
(includes backup data). 
5. That participants could withdraw from the research without any reason at any 
stage. 
6. My contact information during field study period and after. 
All the information aimed to protect the respondents to minimise negative impacts 
or harm (Hammersley and Traianou 2012). It was easier for me to gain consent of potential 
informants through the communicative way of information sheet of research because the 
contents and my identity were clear. My informants did not play a passive role on the field 
study because they could get a primary picture of this project and possessed rights to join 
my study and withdraw at any stage. Due to the legal controversy of hunting activity, I had 
to keep my data confidential and I chose not to join any hunting trip during fieldwork 
period to avoid the risk of being captured by the police. Similar considerations were taken 
while interviewing the police system, including the local police, National Park Police and 
Forestry Conservation Police; I had to take notes rather than record the dialogue. 
Moreover, some of these policemen emphasised this was informal conversation in order 
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not to be identified in future litigations. I had to respect their concerns and carried on this 
project. 
3.7.2 Reflection on my positionality in the fieldwork 
In qualitative research, the researcher is a measuring tool. S/he has to, for example, 
select interviewees, conduct interviews, and observe events in field sites for data 
collection. Thus, the researcher’s positionality and reflections are significant for the 
establishment of research reliability and validity, to get genuine and analysable 
information about a topic. Moreover, a researcher’s reflections of position may reveal the 
limitation of the research. Minimising the bias of limitation is necessary for a responsible 
study. In this regard, I need to clarify my positionality when I did field work in order to 
show how I attempted to improve the reliability and validity of this study. The role I played 
in the field work was associated with my personal religion, working experience, and being 
a Han Chinese.  
I am a Christian and Christianity is a popular faith in the indigenous regions of 
Taiwan. Christianity in the Truku group can be traced to the Japanese period when a Truku 
woman converted to Christianity. She was seen as the first indigenous Christian in 
mountain areas of Taiwan, and she was trained to be a preacher to spread the Christian 
gospel among Truku villages. Within a few years, the majority of Truku people converted 
to Christianity. Chiu (2004) argues the Truku believed they were abandoned by the 
ancestry spirit because they were conquered by the Japanese and later under the Japanese 
rule. Unfortunately, they could not repair the relationship with the spirit by the ritual of 
‘head-hunting’ due to the ban of the Japanese police. Christian God preached by the lady 
in the meantime seemed to be the hope for the Truku to resist the Japanese domination. 
Chiu notes that Christianity in the Truku communities actually mixes biblical views and 
the traditional faith of the Truku. Christian pastors, for example, have replaced traditional 
psychics to conduct necromancy after the conversion. In this way, Christian pastors have 
become the interpreters of traditional faith and contemporary Christianity. Wang (2008) 
and Chiu (2004) both consider the only officially recognised ceremony of the Truku, 
thanksgiving ceremony (Mgay Bari in Truku language), as the reinvention of some pastors 
because they interpreted this forgotten term, Mgay Bari, as ‘God who weaves the universe’ 
in order to take the place of ancestry spirit. Chiu (2004) believes the combination of 
traditional idea and Christianity by Christian pastors is normal because many Truku 
people are Christians. There is usually more than one church in a Truku village nowadays. 
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In T village, for example, there are three denominations of Christianity, and the villagers 
belong to these three groups in terms of religion faith. Very few Truku individuals believe 
in other faiths. These religion groups in T village usually become the basis for collective 
actions. Being a Christian allowed me to use similar faith values and terms to dialogue 
with indigenous believers in the field sites. Trust and good relationships were built due to 
these interactions in the Truku churches. Attending Sunday service is an optimal 
opportunity to enter their life. Pastors and elders in the churches are usually local leaders 
whom I could interview and consult. My religion facilitated me to get access to Truku 
people and their life. Trust relationships was built easier through these interactions in the 
local churches. However, my study was associated with the issue of traditional practices 
such as ‘poaching’ in the park or national forest. Sensitivity around discussing these issues 
still existed, in particular to a Han Chinese outsider like myself.        
In the field work practice, although it was easy to access to pastors and other 
church members, I still had to build a trust relationship with them, especially when I 
discussed some sensitive issues such as poaching in PAs. I remember that when I 
interviewed a senior hunter in F village about his hunting practices with his son, his son 
suddenly appeared and refuted his practices. The senior told me his son had been arrested 
by the police the previous year. In T village, a relative of one Truku informant asked me 
why I focused on Truku ‘poaching’ when I interviewed a semi-professional hunter. Some 
church members in two cases once invited me to attend community events. Through 
these, I added more opportunities to observe and participate in tribal life, and contacted 
more villagers. Being a Christian, it was easier for me to get access to church members and 
experience tribal life through their eyes (participatory observation). A trusting 
relationship was then easier to build through introduction and further interactions. 
Therefore, they were willing to offer their genuine perceptions, reliable information and 
local knowledge. Yet talking about some controversial issues still require sufficient trust.         
I worked as an employee in an agency of Hualien County Government for a few 
months in 2005. During this short period, I got to know a few staff of the Agriculture 
Department in charge of nature conservation there. It was convenient for me because the 
community conservation in the T village was under the local government (township office 
and county government). According to the Wildlife Conservation Acts, the county 
government is the responsible governmental authority at the county level. My earlier 
personal network in the Agriculture Department of county government was therefore 
useful. Working in the agency increased the opportunity of keeping into touch with some 
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residents in T village. The reputation of the governmental agency was good among Truku 
residents in T village, thus there should be no negative effect on how the Truku residents 
saw me when I did the fieldwork for this PhD study. My work later as a research assistant 
to conduct projects about indigenous people before studying within a PhD programme in 
the UK allowed me to get access to more Truku residents in Hualien. The research network 
established from this work experience in several Truku communities allowed greater 
possibilities of finding the key persons in the two local communities.    
When I conducted this PhD study for data collection in the Hualien County 
Government, a woman staff of Agriculture Department still recognised me, and 
introduced me to an official accounting for nature conservation cases at the county level. 
She told the official that I was an ex-colleague and it was ok to tell me everything. Her 
words were important because she saw me as the insider who could be given information 
of ‘business secrets’ in administration. Her words reminded the nature conservation 
official that he could tell me the truth (reliable information). I used the official’s 
statements of interviews to examine the conservation policy implementations in T village. 
I also compared the ideas between him and local Truku residents in terms of nature 
conservation. In the example of T village, I had known a few informants when I carried 
out research projects of indigenous studies. Some informants mentioned that a young man 
(young leader L) assisted organising tribal meetings in the community and could express 
fluent Chinese. They helped me contact the young man and he became the most important 
interviewees in the T village. This young leader was a church deacon. He lived in T village 
and once worked as a tour guide in the township office and a substitute teacher in a 
primary school. He was one of very few young people who still lived in the hometown. He 
was always the spokesman in many protesting actions not only because he spoke fluent 
Truku language and Chinese, but also because he understood the difficulties of village life 
and his honest personality. He once challenged the head of township office in a public 
meeting by asking questions about the administrative acts in the village by the township 
office. His frankness impressed many residents and some seniors invited him to help 
organise protesting actions and meetings. The interviews with him offered many 
important sections of community conservation case in this study. Working experiences 
allowed me to build the networks in the local government as well as in some Truku 
villages. These networks to some degree reduced the entry barrier in my fieldwork.       
Being a Han Chinese studying an indigenous topic was sometimes a barrier in the 
field work because I look different from the majority of my indigenous interviewees. For 
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indigenous people in Taiwan, Han Chinese are the mainstream and powerful group. 
Historical experience confirms that Chinese and Japanese deceived indigenous groups in 
order to gain land ownership. Chinese and Japanese regimes had always dealt with 
indigenous peoples by adopting the assimilation policy. Some indigenous people thus take 
a defensive attitude to avoid not being manipulating or used by the mainstream Chinese, 
which is more evident among those officials working in the government. I had to take time 
to explain my studentship and research concerns when doing field work. I also showed my 
Christian faith to connect to those Truku residents. In the field work, an indigenous official 
in the county government mistrusted me in the first place because I was a Chinese. After 
a few times of sharing ideas about indigenous people with him, he changed his mind and 
invited me to his house to chat. I admitted that it did take time for me to get the trust of 
indigenous people, yet time improved it. Frequent contacts and sincerity were good 
strategies for those doing indigenous studies.                    
Overall, my personal networks based on religious faith and working experiences 
worked on the field studies. The networks primarily ensured that snowballing methods of 
gaining access to respondents worked, and removed the entry barrier of getting access to 
the key persons. Christianity further strengthened the trust relationship building before 
the interviews. Moreover, my Han Chinese identity indeed took me longer to get the trust 
of indigenous informants, especially those in the higher position. Frequent contacts and 
sincerity helped. These made sure I collected reliable data, and established the reliability 
and validity of this study. 
3.7.3 Contribution of master study to this PhD study 
I did my master programme from 2002 to 2005. My master dissertation (Jhuang, 
2005) explores the early evolution of an indigenous community conservation initiative 
between 1997 and 2005, containing the preparatory stage before conservation action (1997-
2003), the conservation stage of carrying out the conservation project (2003-2005), and the 
trial operation stage of tourism industry (2005.01-2005.03). This example was the same 
case of T village in this study. The evolution contributes to this study by the acts of local 
government and local Truku residents, and social struggles in the village during the period 
(see section 6.2 and 6.3). I adopted qualitative and quantitative methods for data collection 
in 2004 and 2005. The questionnaire examined the residents’ environmental awareness 
and attitudes toward community conservation project. Interviews and participant 
observation were employed to understand the integrated conservation with development 
 79 
 
project in this indigenous village. The primary findings were that firstly, some social 
conflicts within the local village affected the collective conservation effort and 
undermined social capital; secondly, owning sufficient capital influenced the local 
participation in tourism operation; thirdly, the external private travel agencies and visitors 
dominated the tourism in trial operation. These findings also contribute to this study. 
The first finding reminds me of the influence of political/social interactions, and 
the roots of these social clashes among groups in the village. It stresses the importance of 
social and political processes in the local community, which facilitated the composition of 
this research aim to critically examine the political interactions between the local people 
and state agencies. Moreover, these clashes within the local community were accelerated 
by the conservation interventions supported by the local government. An interviewee of 
my master dissertation viewed community conservation as a key to Pandora’s Box. Many 
unpleasant disputes and competitions disturbed the calm lake-like lifestyle in the village. 
In this study, these growing conflicts possibly are seen as the negative social effects 
stemming from the conservation idea when I investigated the political process between 
state agencies and local people. Based on the data of master study, the conservation idea 
was inspired by the local governmental agency. In this regard, it is an external idea which 
was hard to fit into village life, and caused unfavourable effects. The second and third 
findings offered this study the basis of local participation issues in T village.  Among the 
conflict problems in the village, the lack of local participation in conservation and 
development affairs was a common complaint. Some informants in my master’s research 
were discontented with their marginalisation within community conservation matters 
because the government just contacted a few specific groups and leaders. For them, no 
participation in conservation matters indicated that tourism development in the coming 
future was irrelevant to them. Actually in a tourism trial operation in 2005, the local 
industry association could not take part in the operation due to financial problem. I also 
observed some conflicts between visitors and local businesses in 2005. I thus predicted in 
the dissertation that the tourism development might not contribute to local people as 
much as locals expected because of the capital intensity of the tourism industry and the 
market of Han Chinese. When I collected data for PhD study, this prediction was 
manifested in resistance against further planning of the scenic area (described further in 
Chapter 6). The tourism development was actually controlled by external travel agencies. 
Local participation in conservation and development was limited to very few leaders and 
residents. The incomplete participation in conservation resulted in more doubts and 
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misunderstandings between state agencies and local people and among groups of T village. 
The lack of participation in tourism development caused the unfair distribution of interest 
(e.g. income and feedback fund) and environmental costs (e.g. pollution and 
inconvenience). These practical problems gradually shaped the motive of resisting actions. 
I consider the lack of local participation as the state’s territorial acts and the subsequent 
problems as negative social impacts on the local community in this study.              
Overall, my master data in T village set up the foundation for PhD study to look at 
the complex social and political processes in terms of conservation enforcement. The 
empirical example was further developed, updated through further data collection, and 
expanded through the comparison with the other park-based conservation to make a more 
thoroughly evidenced argument. The Masters study therefore provided some prior 
knowledge of T village, and a set of lines of inquiry that were important in supporting both 
the fieldwork and the analysis within this PhD. The data discussed in the rest of the PhD 
are, except where indicated otherwise, drawn from the two periods of PhD fieldwork 
described here. Where interview material or documentary sources was collected through 
the Masters work, this has been indicated in the text by adding ‘[Masters Study]’ to the 
referencing of the source. Similarly, where interpretation or findings are directly drawn 
from the Masters dissertation, this has been indicated by referencing the MA thesis as per 
other sources, ‘(Jhuang, 2005)’. 
 
 
3.8 Data analysis 
Data analysis and data collection in fact were conducted simultaneously in this 
study as Merriam (2009) notes. I was not sure who might be interviewed, and which 
questions would be asked when doing the fieldwork. While an interview was done, I took 
notes to analyse the meanings of the interview in order to check the aim of this study and 
then looked for the next interviewee and thought about interview questions. These 
repetitive processes continued until the initial analysis was done. As I interviewed a Truku 
hunter in F village, for example, for his hunting practices and his attitude toward the Park, 
he told a story about his father’s last words about the wish of maintaining the family 
hunting domain. I took note that this hunter still kept on his hunting practices in the Park. 
He justified his hunting practices by his father’s last wish. The last words of a father were 
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seen as the Gaya norms in the Truku culture although the wish was a violation of modern 
conservation legislation. Thus he might think that he had the hunting right on his 
traditional domain despite the external institution. I highlighted ‘hunting on traditional 
domain of the Park’ and ‘Truku Gaya’ in one section of this interview. This was the first 
step of data analysis. 
I then transcribed the interviews and compared these stressed terms and sentences 
of my notes. I did detailed coding on these transcriptions to understand the implications 
of each interview. From these codes and initial field notes, I built some categories. For 
instance, I found there were frequent hunting activities in the Park but the hunting scope 
was shrinking and the hunting pattern was changing according the interview codes and 
my notes of Truku hunters and residents in the F village. Moreover, these activities were 
based on the hunters’ reserved lands and their traditional domains. Some hunters 
obtained the help of indigenous policemen when they conducted their hunting practices. 
The hunters avoided the confrontation with the police due to the help. I constructed some 
categories such as ‘hunting practices in the Park’, ‘Truku values’, ‘deliberate avoidance’ on 
these codes and notes. The repetitive analysis of building categories according to interview 
codes and notes was the second step of data analysis.  
Some collected documents such as regulations and verdicts were regarded as 
transcriptions. Conservation regulations and verdicts regarding those against 
conservation laws were sorted as parts of state agencies acts. I initially coded the verdicts 
by the judgment and which articles of regulation were employed. The judgment included 
the category of the ethnic group of criminals, the penalty, and the reasons of decision-
making. These categories constituted the trends of court judgement regarding the 
violation of nature conservation legislation, especially indigenous criminals. These were 
later used to compare with interview data for the further debate of the interactions 
between state agencies and local indigenous people in PAs.          
When constructing numerous categories, I sorting these categories by the three 
research questions in this study and by linking to the theory of political ecology. The above 
hunting practices in the Park, for example, were the local Truku’s responses to the Park 
authorities and nature conservation institutions. They maintained the usage of natural 
resources in a protected park in order to keep their cultural values and livelihood. They 
claimed that the hunting right was their cultural foundation and sustenance, therefore it 
was permissible to exploit these natural resources on their domain within the Park. They 
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knew the restrictions on resource access in the Park, yet they still used resources but 
avoided the conflicts with the police. Moreover, their contemporary hunting activities 
were usually individual acts rather than collective actions. Thus the Truku’s deliberate 
hunting practices in the Park could be seen as the implicit resistance to the conservation 
system. The motives of resistance included cultural impact and livelihood impact. These 
analyses had been closely associated with the theoretical framework of political ecology.   
The data analysis aimed to obtain research findings and connect to the theoretical 
framework of this study. I started the data analysis by taking notes when interviewing 
different informants. The transcriptions codes and interview notes then were shaped as 
the foundational categories. Categories were sorted by primary research questions and 
political ecology theory. These sorted analyses were the findings of this study connecting 
to the theoretical framework and research aim.   
 
3.9 Summary 
This study adopted a qualitative and case study design. Two Truku villages were 
selected because one was in Taroko National Park while the other one was conducting a 
community conservation project. Qualitative methods were used for data collection. 
Informants included the officials in the Park, central and local government, policemen, a 
clerk of court system, Truku pastors, elders and hunters. My positionality helped me gain 
access to the informants. My master dissertation contributed to the analysis of the early 
revolution of the community conservation example. Doing cross-cultural study, I paid 
attention to ethical issues in order to get reliable data through methods. Finally, I explain 
the way I analysed the data from transcription to themes and categories closer to the 
theoretical framework of this study. Before empirical chapters exploring a park and a 
community conservation project, we should understand PAs and Truku people in Taiwan 
as a background/context in Chapter Four. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: PROTECTED AREAS AND 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN TAIWAN 
4.1 Introduction 
This context chapter aims to offer the background to the establishment of PAs in 
Taiwan in order to point out the forms of dominance expressed by the state in terms of 
conservation. Nationalisation of common property is seen as a way to avoid ‘the tragedy 
of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968). Moreover, this chapter also aims to depict the traditional 
lifestyle of the Truku group and their encounter with the Japanese colonial regime around 
a hundred years ago. The historical background indicates not just the forms of territoriality 
enacted by a modern state, but also the superior attitude of a state when dealing with 
indigenous affairs. The governance of indigenous people since the colonial period by the 
Japanese regime shows that for the indigenous community, external regimes tend to 
command indigenous people and resources in the indigenous areas in a coercive way. 
Neglecting the demands of indigenous people, the regime’s actions usually lead to 
resistance by indigenous people.  
Exploring the factors influencing the establishment of PAs may assist our 
understanding of the dominance of PAs’ authorities in Taiwan. When international 
conservation affected the state authorities of Taiwan in the 1960s and 1970s, the 
establishment of PAs with conservation legislation was the response to such an 
environmental trend. The political and social milieu also shaped the process of policy 
making. In practice, these PAs were located in, or close to, where indigenous groups 
resided. These minority groups had depended on natural resources for livelihoods and 
cultural practices for a long time. As PAs were established by the government in the name 
of conservation, the local indigenous people lost their rights to exploit natural resources 
and the right to undertake their cultural practices. State control caused complaints from 
local indigenous people, and such controversy at the local level increased the costs of 
conservation policy implementation.  
In this chapter, I firstly introduce the current status of PAs in Taiwan to stress the 
growing significance of PAs in conservation administration. Secondly, the national park 
system is seen as an example not just to explore the supremacy of the state but also to 
analyse some factors fostering the regulation and establishment of parks. In the third 
section, community-based conservation as an alternative protected area system 
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recognised by the state is presented. I consider whether this co-management scheme 
could be a solution to conflict between the state and the local indigenous people in terms 
of conservation. Fourthly, Japanese governance of indigenous groups is offered to show 
the manipulation of colonial rule. The Truku people are taken as a case in that colonial 
context to highlight the controversies between the state and the indigenous people. The 
question for the later empirical work (Chapters 5 and 6) will be to ascertain whether post-
colonial political regimes have dealt with the policies of indigenous people better than the 
Japanese colonial administration. Finally, the conclusion attempts to reveal the similar 
nature of control in the contemporary state administration in Taiwan according to the 
analysis of important indigenous policies. 
 
4.2 The current status of protected areas in Taiwan 
There are currently six kinds of official PAs in Taiwan including 22 Natural 
Reserves7, 20 Wildlife Refuges8, 37 Major Wildlife Habitats, 9 National Parks, 1 National 
Nature Park and 6 Forestry Reserves (Nature Conservation website of Forestry Bureau, 
2017) (see Table 4.1). In total, these PAs represent 19 percent of the land territory of Taiwan. 
PAs were initially established in the 1980s as reactions to emerging environmental 
movements and political reforms (Ho, 2010). The Forestry Act (1932), the National Park 
Law (1972) and the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act (1982) are the primary legal 
resources of these PAs established in the 1980s. A feature is that early PAs were stricter 
than those established later because of amended regulations. The establishment of PAs 
accelerated in the 1990s due to the Wildlife Conservation Act passed in 1989. Not only the 
central government but also local governments announced the creation of PAs. Local 
governments announced the majority of Wildlife Refuges and a few natural reserves. The 
growing numbers of PAs show that the establishment of PAs plays a vital role in nature 
conservation. These areas are given special significance via conservation regulations. 
Human actions within these areas are restricted due to these valuable protected resources. 
                                                     
7Nature Reserve refer to the ‘’areas which are representative of various types of ecological systems, 
which have unique topographic or geologic features, or which are deemed valuable for long-term 
observation, education and research regarding genetic preservation, and which are designated as such 
in accordance with the Act’’ according to the Enforcement Rules of Cultural Heritage Preservation Act.      
8According to the Wildlife Conservation Acts, Wildlife Refuges refer to major wildlife habitats with 
special conservation needs and are established by local government. Local authorities may announce 
restrictive measures regarding hunting wildlife, collection of plants, destruction of environment in these 
wildlife refuges.  
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Establishing PAs is considered as an act of internal territoriality of Taiwan by the state 
agencies.  
Protected area 
type 
Quantity Legislation source Time Authorities IUCN 
Category9 
Natural Reserves 22 Cultural Heritage 
Preservation Act 
1980s-
2010s 
Central-Council of Agriculture 
Local-County Government 
I, III,V 
Wildlife Refuges 20 Wildlife 
Conservation Act 
1990s-
2010s 
Central-Council of Agriculture 
Local-County Government 
IV,VI 
Major Wildlife 
Habitats 
37 Wildlife 
Conservation Act 
1990s-
2010s 
Central-Council of Agriculture 
Local-County Government 
IV 
National Park 9 National Park Law 1980s-
2010s 
Construction and Planning 
Agency of Minister of Interior 
II 
National Nature 
Park 
1 National Park Law 2011 Construction and Planning 
Agency of Minister of Interior 
II 
Forest Reserves 6 Forestry Act 1980s-
1992 
Forestry Bureau of Council of 
Agriculture 
I 
Totally 95 PAs totally occupy 1,133,488ha, about 19% of land area of Taiwan 
Table 4.1 Protected areas of Taiwan (Source: Conservation Website of the Forestry Bureau, 2017. 
Access: 22.02.2017) 
 
4.3 National park establishment 
4.3.1 The legal source of the parks 
The national park system was the most explicit conservation institution among 
governmental agencies in central government before the 1980s (Lu, 2006). As Taiwanese 
policies are based on the rule of law, there must be a legal foundation to the establishment 
of national parks. Huang (1999) explores the legislative processes of the National Park Law 
and finds that domestic demands and the pressure of international conservation in the 
                                                     
9International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) category indicates the creation of protected 
areas in Taiwan was affected by international conservation. There are six categories of recognised 
protected areas in the IUCN; Category I is Strict Nature Reserve or Wilderness Area; II refers to 
National Park. III is Natural Monument or Feature; IV is Habitat/Species Management Area; V refers 
to Protected Landscape/ Seascape, and VI is Protected area with sustainable use of natural resources. 
The first two categories are seen as strict protected areas. Others encompass proper resource use or 
participatory governance of the locals. 
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1950s and the 1960s led to the formulation of the National Park Law in 1972. These two 
forces affected the establishment of the early system of nature conservation in Taiwan.  
On the one hand, domestic needs came from the lobbying of specific civil 
organisations to advocate tourism in 1950s on the basis of the planning of national parks 
in the 1930s when Japan colonised Taiwan (Huang, 1999). These civil organisations and 
tourism associations were led by a senior legislator without a popular mandate for he was 
designated to be a legislator rather than through election. The tourism associations urged 
the authority in control of national parks, the Ministry of the Interior, to build national 
parks for tourism development to enhance the foreign currency reserves of the ROC. The 
Taiwanese Government aimed to facilitate economic development in the 1950s and 
accepted US aid from 1950 to 1965. The tourism departments in multiple governmental 
agencies and tourism associations played important roles in promoting the establishment 
of parks although they were not park authorities. The civil tourism association even 
drafted the National Park Law as a reference for park authorities. Yet the central 
government took a passive attitude toward the domestic demands in the 1950s (Huang, 
1999).  
On the other hand, in the 1960s Taiwan experienced more international pressure 
for conservation from the United Nations, IUCN (the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources) and from the US, which vitally influenced 
legislation of the National Park Law (ibid). In 1960 the UN urged member countries to 
send park regulations and a list of parks to collect park data from around the world. Some 
staff were sent to Taiwan to discuss the establishment of national parks in 1968. IUCN 
asked Taiwan to offer information on PAs and legislations on plant protection in 1968 and 
1970 respectively. Some American conservation professionals were invited to Taiwan to 
plan national parks and PAs. These international organisations and influential persons 
caused the pressure to start the policy of nature conservation.  
Before the legislation of National Park Law, the two major forces of economic 
development and environmental conservation were intertwined to facilitate park 
establishment. Domestic demands aimed for economic growth while the foreign pressure 
paid more attention to nature conservation. Huang (1999) notes that the former force was 
constant but loose while the latter was intermittent but powerful. The National Park Law 
was passed within this context. The draft law was transplanted from US regulations with 
high standards of nature conservation, although many legislators focussed on economic 
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development via the tertiary industry- tourism. Enforcing the National Park Law in 
practice tended to pay more attention to nature protection due to the US conservation 
model.   
4.3.2 The National Park Law and its implementation in the 1980s 
Four National Parks were established in the 1980s according to the National Park 
Law before the lifting of martial law in 1987. It reveals that the state was dominant when 
these parks were created under the authoritarian control. The decision-making of parks 
was based on the state agencies and experts rather than democratic local participation or 
co-management arrangements. Moreover, articles one and six of the National Park Law 
point out that three objectives of national parks are conservation, recreation and research. 
Therefore, nature conservation was more important than the locals’ development when 
these parks were created. The park police were established after the creation of parks. The 
park police were responsible for the legal enforcement of nature conservation. Local needs 
on development, in particular those who depended on local natural resources were 
exclusionary in light of conservation priority. Parks’ exclusion of locals was common in 
Taiwan under the autocratic political surroundings in the 1980s.     
 
4.4 The Rise of community-based conservation in Taiwan 
A few communities made independent, high-profile conservation efforts in Taiwan 
in the 1990s. Community conservation was supported by policy encouragement of the 
state such as the ‘community establishment policy’ of the Council of Culture in 1994 and 
the community movement of civil society (Lu, 2004). These conservation cases became 
famous due to the ‘bottom-up’ power in natural resource management. These small-scale 
community conservation cases mostly undertook stream conservation in remote 
indigenous areas. These indigenous communities did these as their traditional lifestyle 
had strong links to the stream resources. The starting point of the conservation idea was 
always that these locals were inspired by the government and aimed to attract visitors by 
creating new sightseeing sites of natural beauty. The interactions between the two primary 
stakeholders of such community conservation, the governmental agencies and the local 
communities, were key to the evolution of these community conservation initiatives 
because their interplay affected project sustainability. Moreover, as the result of collective 
conservation action, the majority of these early cases were included in the official 
protected area - ‘wildlife refuge’ in accordance with the Wildlife Conservation Act. In the 
  88 
following sections, the roles that the government and the local community play are 
introduced. The concluding section stresses that similar social impacts took place in 
community conservation projects as in the parks. 
4.4.1 Empowerment and financial support of the government 
The Wildlife Conservation Act offered the legal source for the local county 
government to announce PAs. Conservation affairs were authorised by the central 
government. An indigenous community conservation case, Nan, in southern Taiwan in 
early 1990s started the conservation effort when a local leader was elected as the supervisor 
of the township office. He mobilised the residents of some local villages to patrol their 
different stream reaches to protect their traditional practices of fishing through the 
sponsorship of the township office. His promotion of conservation was closely related to 
local development (Lu, 2001). In Lu’s study (2001), the township office cooperated with the 
police to enforce conservation according to the Fishery Act despite a few local people’s 
complaints about restraints of resource use. The two-year effort restored a good river 
habitat for fish and such a conservation result attracted anglers. It was hard to control 
anglers from accessing the river, so the county government and township office adopted 
the Fishery Act to establish closed fishing areas. Later the government used the Wildlife 
Conservation Act to continue the conservation effort and created sustainable use areas for 
anglers to fish. The township office was authorised to manage the community 
conservation affairs by the county government. The office charged anglers for fish licences 
from June and November every year. The township office paid for patrols of the river, while 
the county government entrusted an academic group for fish investigation. The 
continuous conservation acts of the local government gained the appreciation of the 
central government and scholars. Many local people also coordinated with the 
conservation policy of the local government. The dominance of local government in 
guiding a conservation path to the establishment tourism seemed to be accepted by the 
central government and the local people. The wildlife refuge of river fish with the 
sustainable use zone within it was therefore established in 1993 in accordance with the 
Wildlife Conservation Act.   
Another Han Chinese case, Wu, involving a waterfowl conservation effort in north-
eastern Taiwan also showed the dominance of the county government in establishing 
wildlife refuges. In the political and economic context in the early 1990s, the US was 
Taiwan’s largest trading exporter. However, Taiwan was a popular market for wildlife 
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transactions, so the US government decided to impose economic sanctions. This site of 
wildlife refuge had been dedicated as a site for a power plant, but was transferred to 
establish a protected area in order to show that the Taiwanese government was serious 
about conservation. Lu (2001) notes that central government was the decision-maker in 
light of the legal foundation. The interactions between the local people/communities and 
local government directed the establishment of this wildlife refuge rather than the voices 
of the locals. After the announcement of a protected area, the county government led 
matters of construction and investigation with the financial sponsorship of the central 
government. Some inappropriate decisions such as the exclusion of a few private plots 
from the refuge were made by the county government because of the limited 
understanding of the local environment. The transfer of management to the local 
organisation was key for the interactions between the locals and the government. The act 
of decentralisation improved the relationship between two main players of community 
conservation (ibid).  
The other indigenous case, Tou, in south-western Taiwan was famous for the 
autonomy granted to traditional institutions of the local indigenous community (Lu, 
2004). The supportive intervention of the government took place at the stage when this 
community operated this conservation and development programme well in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. This case was awarded the great honour of the president and conservation 
prize. This community conservation project was not employed as an official wildlife refuge, 
but was created as an ecological park by villagers themselves. 
These early community conservation cases revealed that the local governmental 
agencies exerted acts of territoriality (see the discussion in section 2.3) through the 
establishment of PAs. They also played the predominant role in the management of the 
refuges when they were politically empowered and financially supported by the central 
government. The Wildlife Conservation Act was adopted to territorialise the PAs. The 
design of a sustainable use zone was employed as a form of economic development such 
as the fishing zone in the first indigenous case. 
4.4.2 Support of the local community 
The dominance of the local government was evident when these early wildlife 
refuges of community conservation were established. Yet the establishment was still 
impossible without the help of local groups.  
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In the first indigenous case (Lu, 2001), Nan, when the elected supervisor of the 
township office proposed the idea of fish conservation, some seniors disagreed with it 
because they believed fish were part of nature, which should not be restrained by human 
regulations. Some others thought the conservation concept belonged to the Han Chinese 
rather than indigenous people. The supervisor turned to the local leaders and the local 
police to develop a consensus. The collective action of community conservation was 
mobilised through the executive order of the township office and the implementation of 
the local police and the local patrol teams. The early outcome of the conservation effort 
for a few months was to enhance the confidence and interest of the locals.  
The second Chinese case, Wu, changed because a local group participated in the 
conservation effort due to the environmental degradation of the refuge habitat. The group 
built the waterfowl habitat on private plots according to their local experience, which was 
different from the idea of the government. The group was later authorised by the 
government to manage the refuge. In this community conservation case, the disagreement 
between the officials with scholars and the local community was that the government 
insisted on the wildness of the wetland habitat for waterfowl, while the locals believed 
dredging was necessary for the human affected environment in light of their experience 
(Lu, 2001). The collective action of dredging on private plots opened the opportunity of 
communication between two sides because doing this did create a good habitat for 
waterfowl. In addition to the habitat creation by dredging, this local group also acted as 
the bridge between the government and the local land owners. Environmental education 
activity, conservation patrolling, resource monitoring and engaging in the planning of 
protected areas were all the conservation efforts of this local organisation.  
Another indigenous case, Tou, displayed the power of local autonomy via the 
traditional family system of fishing resource distribution (Lu, 2004). The core leaders 
persuaded villagers in an open village meeting to take advantage of their traditional family 
governance of river fish to make conservation effort. The local community association 
conducted such a conservation project to attract tourism. Paying attention to conservation 
for a few years, the community built a riverine ecological park. It became a popular tourist 
attraction through media promotion, and the local indigenous people made considerable 
profits. They also established a social welfare scheme to distribute these profits. The 
decision of stream conservation and tourism development were approved by villagers via 
open meetings. Every household was engaged with the community association and the 
distribution of benefits was comparably even. The choice to allocate tourism income into 
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forms of social welfare such as old age allowances and scholarships for students was 
popular in the village. The support of the local villagers contributed to the project’s 
success. This case combined the traditional norms and the modern conservation idea to 
find a way of local development and autonomy (Tang and Tang, 2001; Lu, 2004). Such 
integration gained the recognition of the local residents. Moreover, local participation and 
the distribution of social welfare strengthened the support of the locals.  
4.4.3 Social impacts in community conservation 
      In the first community conservation case of indigenous people, Nan, the social 
impacts from river conservation intervention was the cultural conflict which happened 
when the conservation idea was introduced to the local communities. This clash of 
different values was evident among senior residents, thus they disagreed with the 
conservation intervention. They thought the conservation idea stemmed from the Han 
Chinese rather than from their own indigenous tradition. Indigenous beliefs were that 
people gained a fish harvest as long as they made effort. Restricted access to fish due to a 
conservation intervention was a concern to many locals (Lu, 2001). The second impact was 
the livelihood problem. Lu’s study notes that poaching and corruption existed in the local 
communities, which indicated some residents still depended on fish as a source of 
livelihood. The conservation action directly affected their life. As this case was included in 
the official wildlife refuge, fishing without permission would be more serious in terms of 
punishment. The third influence brought from community conservation was that the 
dominance of the township office undermined the trust relationship between the office 
and the locals. For example, the opaque information about the distribution of fishing 
income caused local people to doubt the office administration (ibid). Yet the office did not 
respond to questioning. The dominance of the office also ignored the controversy of this 
conservation idea in the local communities as the local leader agreed with it while the 
general residents disagreed with it (ibid). Power sharing did not exist on a local level. 
These undesired difficulties took place due to the community conservation intervention. 
The social impacts in the second Chinese case, Wu, came from the dominance of 
the county government. The government insisted that its conservation knowledge rather 
than the locals’ suggestion should guide management, and this led to environmental 
degradation in the protected area. When the government authorised the local group to 
manage the wildlife refuge, there was poor communication between the government, the 
experts and the local group. After 2000, more governmental sponsorships flowed to the 
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local communities. These resources resulted in internal conflicts in the group and in the 
local communities (Lu, 2004). This support from governmental agencies aimed to 
encourage and empower the locals. However, these economic incentives could potentially 
undermine the harmony of the local communities and organisations due to interest 
competition (Jhuang and Tai, 2009).  
The third indigenous case, Tou, was not included in the official protected area 
system later, so the community kept their own self-governance. The community 
conservation implementation was approved by the village meeting and the distribution of 
tourism development stressed social welfare. These participation schemes seemed to 
minimise the unpleasant social impacts of external conservation interventions.  
These early cases of community conservation in Taiwan indicated that the 
conservation interventions dominated by local government probably resulted in negative 
social impacts such as livelihood problems and controversies about distribution. These 
difficulties undermined the social capital of the locals, which directly hampered the 
collective action of local residents. These social problems took place in the parks which 
were comparably strict in terms of conservation level. In this regard, community 
conservation as a co-management scheme did not always put the principle of power 
sharing into practice.  
These representative cases of community conservation showed some negative 
social impacts such as cultural conflict in the local communities when the external idea 
was introduced to the locals. These impacts undermined social capital and potentially 
damaged their collective action to achieve conservation efforts. Moreover, the Tou case 
demonstrated indigenous conservation with development and developed an example for 
other groups to study. Their performance in conservation and development impressed the 
mainstream society and was awarded with many honours. I think that indigenous people 
conducting conservation projects should develop their way rather than be guided by the 
government authorities or other experts because they are the users of local resources. 
Their local knowledge and traditional practices may offer some potential ways of 
conservation and development. Behind the practices are their norms and capacity building 
which underpins the structure of society. When a local community has a consensus based 
on locals’ rules and knowledge in terms of conservation and development, residents’ 
collective action tends to succeed more easily. Otherwise, external interventions 
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potentially cause or accelerate locals’ struggles which undermine social networks and 
cooperative actions.       
 
4.5 The governance of indigenous people in Taiwan 
This section introduces the governance of indigenous peoples of Taiwan by 
different political regimes. The Japanese colonial power is firstly presented in order to 
reveal how separate governance of indigenous groups and the Han Chinese residents was 
established. This isolated form of governance implies that the indigenous peoples were 
seen as unknown and brutal groups by the Japanese regime. I regard the Truku people as 
an example to explore how indigenous people were impacted by policy implementations 
of Japanese rule. The traditional lifestyle of Truku people in mountain areas will be 
discussed. Their lifestyle and living environment have been greatly changed by the 
Japanese reign. In the subsequent governments, policies of indigenous peoples in these 
Han Chinese regimes are examined to consider the influences over indigenous 
communities of Taiwan. These policies reflected the attitude of the government toward 
indigenous groups.  
4.5.1 Traditional lifestyle of Truku people 
Before the campaign of rectifying the name of Truku, Truku people in eastern 
Taiwan had been seen as part of the Atayal group according to the indigenous category of 
Japanese anthropologists since the Japanese period. Truku people had executed slash-and-
burn agriculture in highlands in eastern Taiwan since they gradually moved from ancestral 
locations in central Taiwan three hundred years ago. The motives to migrate to new places 
included the need for more agricultural lands and game harvest, transaction of goods, and 
enemy intrusion (Liao, 1984). Basic sustenance was the most important reason urging 
them to migrate east. With an increasing population, Truku people needed to search for 
new places to establish new small-scale settlements based on close family relatives owing 
to the narrow river terraces they inhabited. Agriculture and hunting were the primary 
economic activities of Truku people until a hundred years ago. Head-hunting was their 
impressive character. Contact with outside world was rare in this group (Bureau of 
Aboriginal Affairs, 1911). Wang and Tien (2009) remark on the spatial arrangement of 
upland indigenous groups. The core area is the residential zone which is surrounded by 
the agricultural zone. The outermost zone is for the use of hunting (Figure 4.1) Men in the 
same community conducted collective hunting and organised fighting groups to protect 
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their property such as their hunting territory and agricultural lands (ibid). The hunting 
territory system, including the boundaries and the norms, were developed by Truku 
ancestors of different families via negotiations. The Truku people also developed a 
complex system of social norms called ‘Gaya’ which regulated each aspect of everyday life. 
Gaya refers to the teachings of ancestors in light of literal interpretation (Wang, 2003, 
2008). It is associated with the ancestral faith and social practices such as hunting activities 
and agricultural pattern of Truku people. I can still see the influence of these traditional 
customs in contemporary Truku communities in my field work. For example, a short 
prayer before drinking was affected by traditional faith in ancestor spirit. A hunter’s dream 
was related to his hunting harvest according to the Gaya. Truku people believed that these 
customs were their culture and self-identity. Chiu (2004) indicates that contemporary 
Truku faith in Christianity is mixed with traditional faith in ancestor spirit. Truku values 
and customs affect Truku residents’ perception of conservation policy implementations 
and their responses to conservation policy implementations in this study.        
 
Figure 4.1 The traditional space arrangement of upland indigenous people 
Source: Wang and Tien (2009) p. 12 
 
4.5.2 Colonial Japanese reign  
Taiwan was ceded to Japan according to the Treaty of Shimonoseki when the 
Chinese Qing government lost the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. Japan colonised Taiwan 
until the end of World War Two in 1945. During the 50-year colonised period of Taiwan, 
the highest power, namely, the Taiwan Governor-General's Office, governed people in 
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Taiwan differently according to their ethnicity to avoid either conflict or cooperation 
between Han Chinese and indigenous people. Han Chinese people and 'civilised 
aborigines' such as the Amis people living in the flatlands were classified together in the 
general administrative district. Those indigenous people living in the remote mountains 
were called 'uncivilised aborigines' and were managed by certain special units such as the 
police department (Teng, 1988). From the perspective of geography, indigenous people in 
Taiwan were broadly divided into 'northern aborigines' and 'southern aborigines'. 
Northern aborigines were described as ‘brutal’ while southern aborigines were 
‘tame’(Bureau of Aboriginal Affairs, 1911; Ishimaru, 2008). Accordingly, different 
governance tactics were applied to different people. The ‘brutal’ northern aborigines were 
conquered by Japanese forces. The police were responsible for the everyday affairs of 
indigenous peoples in highland areas. These highland indigenous peoples were 
encouraged to resettle to the foothills or the flatlands for the convenience of their 
management by the state. The Japanese promoted the sedentary agriculture of paddy rice 
in order to change the livelihood of hunting indigenous peoples. The land policy in the 
forestry zone of Taiwan promoted by the Japanese regime restrained the living space of 
indigenous peoples.  The Japanese policy was handed over to the Chinese KMT 
government and affected the policy of reserved lands for indigenous peoples in subsequent 
periods.  
Special administration in highland 
The administrative system in Taiwan during the Japanese period was separated 
into two categories, which were the general administration of Han Chinese with plains 
indigenous people and the special administration of indigenous people. The difference 
between the two groups depended on their perceived degree of obedience and evolution 
(Huang, 2012). In the general administration, administrative power was held by the 
Governor-General Office of Taiwan which was supervised by the Japanese Cabinet. The 
legislative power was shared by the Japanese Parliament, Japanese Cabinet and the 
Governor-General Office of Taiwan. However, in the special administration, the police 
were the only power responsible for the affairs of education, industry, medicine, 
transaction and construction (Ishimaru, 2008; Lin, 2011).  
The colonial regime established the Department of Pacification and Cultivation in 
1896. The subject of pacifying was the upland indigenous peoples, while cultivation aimed 
at developing natural resources in the mountainous areas. The mountain areas of Taiwan 
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were demarcated as a ‘special administrative zone’ where special governance was carried 
out (Li, 2011). The majority of these highland areas were occupied by indigenous people. 
This department accordingly opened the governance of highland indigenous peoples by 
the Japanese regime of Taiwan. Since the exploitation of natural resources such as 
camphor in mountainous areas was the first priority of the early policies of indigenous 
affairs (Teng, 1988), it was important for this department to pacify indigenous people in 
the highlands in order to avoid the disturbance from indigenous communities.  
The Japanese regime adopted the ‘Guard Line System’ of the Chinese Qing 
government, to protect resource exploitation and simultaneously saw the system as the 
boundaries of upland administration. The system was used in the mountains in the early 
era of the Japanese colonial period. Within the guard lines was the general administrative 
zone where the Japanese officials managed, while outside the lines were the special 
administrative zone where the ‘disobedient’ indigenous people lived. The system was 
materially constructed by stations, lines and defensive facilities. There were soldiers 
guarding these routes to avoid the violation of indigenous people (Lin and Wang, 2007). 
The systems were primarily military facilities to prevent the attacks by indigenous groups, 
in particular the ‘brutal’ northern aborigines. The Truku group was seen as the ‘most 
powerful savages among the Atayal’ (Bureau of Aboriginal Affairs, 1911) in the east uplands 
of Taiwan. Although pacification was employed to govern indigenous people by Japanese 
rule in early times, the Japanese Governor-General Office decided to use violence to 
conquer the mountain areas with the completion of the subjugation of rebellions of Han 
Chinese people. Therefore, ‘advancing the guard line’ to violate the areas beyond the lines 
was a deliberate practice of indigenous management. The system was totally replaced by 
the police substations in mountains in 1920s and the mountain administration entered 
another era.  
Police governance and expeditionary force 
The police system was in general responsible for the social order of colonised 
Taiwan. Indigenous affairs were transferred to the police, indicating that Japan changed 
the strategy of governing indigenous people from the approach of pacification. Armed 
suppression was the aggressive way to dominate indigenous people and natural resources. 
Ishimaru (2008) notes that there had been several reforms of the police system since 1901. 
The 'Department of Police' under the 'Minister of Civil Affairs' at the central level was 
established in 1901, and the reform of the local administrative system enhanced the power 
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of the police and local governments who were mostly under the control of the police 
system. An indigenous revolt took place due to the camphor and land policies of the 
Japanese colonial regime in 1902, which resulted in the establishment of a dedicated 
agency of indigenous affairs at the central level in 1903, which was under the control of the 
police system (Lin, 2003; Ishimaru, 2008). The Department of Police was abolished and 
indigenous affairs was expanded to become the 'Department of Indigenous Affairs' in 1909. 
The Department of Indigenous Affairs dealt with affairs of indigenous people, and banned 
illegal camphor manufacture. In practice, this department enforced a 'Five-year Plan of 
Aborigine Control (1910-1914)', a military action plan, and managed forestry areas in 
Taiwan. In 1911, the Department of Police was re-established for the actions of ‘Aborigine 
Control’ by forces. After the Japanese Central Office conquered the ‘brutal’ northern 
indigenous people by force (in which the Truku group was the primary target), the 
Department of Indigenous Affairs was abolished and indigenous affairs returned to a 
section in the Department of Police in 1915. Indigenous affairs were still under the power 
of the police although the Department was downsized to the 'Bureau of Police Affairs' in 
1920. This section lasted till the end of Japanese rule of Taiwan in 1945. The police had 
manipulated the affairs of indigenous people of Taiwan for over forty years. The adoption 
of the police revealed that the force was used in indigenous affairs in order to control 
upland indigenous people. Chen (1998) notes the police had monopolised the transaction 
of mountainous produce since 1910. This was the most evident benefit that the police 
obtained when they dealt with the affairs of indigenous people.  
The Taiwan Office employed active control of indigenous people in the term of the 
fifth Governor-General (1906-1915) because the resistances of Han Chinese had been 
appeased. The strategy of pacification transformed to suppression. This Governor-
General’s plan of controlling indigenous people was carried out by the forces of military 
strength and the police.  Lin (2011) notes that the Japanese documents showed that ten 
thousand troops forced the surrender of the northern indigenous people, especially the 
Truku group in the Five-Year Plan. Moreover, twenty thousand shotguns were captured. 
Li interprets that the number of confiscated shotguns revealed the worry of the Japanese 
regime because indigenous people with shotguns caused uncertainty in mountain areas 
for Japanese Authorities. This military action in the Truku area in 1914 brought the Truku 
areas under Japanese administration (ibid). The police in the highlands represented the 
footprint of the Japanese Governor-General. The policy of pacification returned after the 
Truku people were conquered.  
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Relocation 
After the Truku areas were demarcated in the administration, the Department of 
Indigenous Affairs was abolished and the governance of indigenous people was transferred 
to the Department of the Police. The policy of relocation was implemented by the police 
in the mountain regions. Relocation here referred to the collective moving of upland 
indigenous people to the foothills or places close to the plains. The Japanese regime 
claimed that this policy helped the evolution of indigenous people because the new 
settlements were close to the culture of Han Chinese (Chen, 1998). The relocation policy 
was implemented more actively by the police after the indigenous revolt known as the 
'Wushe Incident' in central Taiwan in 1930. The 'Principle of Aboriginal Control' was 
announced in 1931 to suggest the collective relocation of indigenous people was necessary 
for the improvement of their economic condition and independence of indigenous people 
(Ishimaru, 2008). Chen (1998) mentions that the Japanese police claimed the relocation of 
indigenous groups was due to disease infection and the willingness of upland indigenous 
residents. However, the relocation policy should be seen as a means of manipulation 
because the resettlement actions were actually controlled by the police in terms of places 
and new combination of different families. 
The relocation of Truku people started after the Truku people surrendered to Japan 
in 1914. This policy was entirely guided by the convenience of management for the 
Japanese Authorities. Truku people scattered in the mountains were forcefully moved to 
new places according to Japanese orders. There were two basic strategies used by the 
Japanese for the resettlement of the Truku people (Liao, 1984). The first strategy was 
moving people from the mountains to the plains. The Japanese regime commanded the 
Truku people to establish new settlements on the river terraces or in the foothills closer 
to the plains. The majority of the Truku people living in the highlands in present-day 
Shaw-Lin Township were resettled to the river terraces and foothills in Shaw-Lin 
Township and two other townships in the south. The most extreme case was that three 
new Truku communities were settled in the territory of a different indigenous group. In 
addition, original family communities were usually split up among different new 
communities. The new communities therefore consisted of several families, which was in 
contrast to the Truku tradition. The other strategy used was moving to new places adjacent 
to the police substations which were responsible for indigenous affairs. The Japanese 
Authorities commanded several Truku communities in the same mountainous region to 
relocate to a new place near a police substation. The total number of Truku communities 
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decreased because of the relocation policy. Most Truku communities were resettled to 
foothills close to the plain which is now called the East Rift Valley.  
I attempt to show the great change from the relocation policy implementations 
during Japanese period by the examples of my field sites. According to Liao (1984), F village 
contains five communities, four of which were established during the Japanese period 
because of the relocation policy. Residents of each community consisted of various 
families. Taking one community of F village as an example, there were at least 13 families 
living in this community. Most of these families immigrated in 1927 following the guidance 
of the Japanese police. Besides, T village was made up of three communities. One of the 
three communities had mixed 14 families from different traditional communities, but only 
one big family dominated the community population. This family was forced to move to 
this location, a river terrace, from the highlands, by the Japanese police in 1928.  
The Japanese relocation policy changed the social construction of Truku society, 
namely, the single family centred community. Firstly, geographical relocation compelled 
Truku people to leave their original scattered settlements in the highlands which were 
made of houses, fields and hunting territory from the centre to periphery (Wang and Tien, 
2009). They had to adapt to the new environment closer to the plains. The interaction 
between Truku people and other groups inevitably increased in the new communities, 
which indicated the possibility of cultural infiltration. New sources of livelihood also 
needed to be developed to meet the basic needs of people. Secondly, the new concentrated 
communities made up of several traditional families resulted in some impacts within the 
communities. The original community was dispersed to various new places by the 
Japanese police in order to decrease family cohesion which may have led to the collective 
revolt. Physical distance and reduced enforcement of family rituals further weakened the 
family ties. Diverse families in a new community were prone to friction, especially between 
families with a history of hostility in the original uplands. Frequent interactions with 
different families and other groups became normal in the new Truku communities. 
Promotion of sedentary agriculture 
According to Chen (1998), in the early era of the Japanese period when the 
pacification policy was used to deal with indigenous affairs, the proposal of turning upland 
indigenous people into farmers was addressed. The authorities thought that it was not 
worthwhile to use force to treat indigenous groups. To annihilate all indigenous people 
would stimulate joint resistance, which was harmful to the Japanese reign. In the economy, 
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the sedentary agriculture would replace the hunting practices and help remove groups’ 
violent spirit. These highland indigenous people would become obedient residents 
without any shotguns or armed force. This idea was re-proposed after the battles in 1910s. 
Agricultural promotion in the mountains was seen as a determined objective of indigenous 
policy. In this principle, the authorities depressed the price of hunting-based produce such 
as antler and skins in order to suppress hunting as a practice. More budget provision of 
pacification was used in the mountains when the police gained the reconciliation of more 
tribes.  
The police were the only official power in the indigenous regions. Their 
responsibility included the promotion of industry. Mountain paddy cultivation was 
uneconomical because of environmental factors such as water provision and sloping 
terrain, let alone the problem of cultural conflict. Why did the colonial government 
advocate paddy cultivation in the mountains? Chen (1998) considers the demand of rice 
in Japan as the background. Paddy cultivation became popular after the implementation 
of the relocation policy. Moreover, the colonial regime nationalised the forestry lands to 
rationalise the exploitation of natural resources. The reserved lands used by the upland 
indigenous people were therefore reduced. The land policy directly caused the 
resettlement and indirectly resulted in the popular paddy agriculture in the mountains. 
Owing to several environmental and cultural reasons, the policy was a failure. When the 
Japanese government reviewed the policies of indigenous people after the large revolt of 
indigenous people in 1930s, some reforms in the mountains were proposed. However, the 
battle between China and Japan broke out and reflections on understanding the locals was 
thus interrupted. The control of indigenous residents in the mountains continued with 
the existing patterns without any reformed acts.  
Li (2011) argues that the promotion of paddy agriculture in indigenous regions of 
eastern Taiwan influenced the lifestyle of indigenous residents. Millet was displaced by 
paddy rice, indicating that traditional lifestyle practices such as shifting cultivation and 
mobile migration had been changed because the paddy fields required sedentary 
agriculture. The value of land ownership was accordingly stressed through the process of 
resettlement. In addition, millet was associated with many traditional rituals and customs 
of indigenous groups, so rice’s displacement of millet necessarily undermined the 
importance of traditional practices and norms. Moreover, the social status of traditional 
hunters was weakened because there were fewer hunting practices during paddy 
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cultivation. To own paddy fields also referred to good production and wealth. The 
replacement did undermine the values and lifestyle of indigenous groups.  
Land policy of indigenous people 
The traditional domains of indigenous people were reduced when the Japanese 
regime nationalised the forestry lands. The policy of reserved lands for indigenous people 
was regarded as a violation of the territory of indigenous people (Chen, 1998). At the 
beginning, the zoning of forestry lands was in favour of the Japanese enterprises exploiting 
natural resources. A forestry plan for the whole of Taiwan was implemented in 1925. After 
the land investigation, the living area of indigenous groups were from 1.6 million hectares 
to 0.20 million hectares (Lin, 2001). The reduction limited the living space for indigenous 
groups in mountainous areas. The reserved land for indigenous peoples regulated that the 
maximum forestry land each indigenous resident could hold was three hectares. 
Indigenous people could cultivate, graze and take firewood on their lands. In practice, 
many controversies happened such as demarcating cliffs as part of the reserved land, or 
not zoning the reserved lands after forestry investigations. The Japanese authorities 
ignored the traditional practices of indigenous people when implementing the policy of 
forestry lands, which caused indigenous people to be arrested when carrying out 
traditional hunting and farming. The land policy directed at indigenous people aimed to 
promote resource exploitation for Japan, which sacrificed the land rights of indigenous 
users and simultaneously undermined their culture due to the restriction of forestry land 
use. Chen and Yen (2011) argue that the nationalisation of communal lands of indigenous 
people and the privatisation of land use are the root of later conflicts over land use and 
the undermining of social cohesion in the indigenous communities.   
The colonial regime of Japan used different policies to take advantage of the 
natural resources in indigenous regions of Taiwan. They delimited indigenous regions as 
a special zone where the police governed the life of indigenous people. Policy 
implementations such as relocation and the establishment of reserved lands destroyed 
indigenous people’s traditional practices and customs. Their lived in the plains and 
depended on paddy agriculture rather than hunting with swidden agriculture in 
mountains. The territoriality by the Japanese regime was evident through special 
geographical boundaries, specific rules in the area, and the police enforced control.  
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4.5.3 Under the rule of Han Chinese KMT 
The KMT regime has ruled Taiwan over 60 years (1945-2000, 2008-2016) and over 
half of the period Taiwan was under the martial law (1949-1987, 38 years). This 
government’s overall policy about indigenous people can be summarised as ‘assimilation’ 
(Huang, 2010). Indigenous people had been called ‘mountain compatriots’ for a long time 
under the governance of this regime. It attempted to ‘flatten the mountain areas’ in 
practice, namely, an assimilation strategy to domesticate indigenous people to be as 
‘civilised’ as the ‘Han Chinese’ and to boost the mountain economy to be similar to the 
prosperity on the plain areas. Economic development in Taiwan was emphasised by this 
party, so development issues in the indigenous regions had been the focus for a long time. 
In the 1990s, some breakthroughs about indigenous policy were made under this regime, 
such that the term ‘mountain compatriots’ was replaced by ‘indigenous people’ and the 
‘Council of Indigenous People’ was established in the central government. I attempt to 
briefly introduce the policies of indigenous people and their evolution under the rule of 
the KMT party in Taiwan in the following paragraphs.   
The KMT government initially continued many Japanese policies regarding 
indigenous groups such as the policy of reserved land for indigenous people, because this 
regime did not develop an overall policy about indigenous people (Hsieh, 2012). The 
government spread the official language ‘Mandarin’ in indigenous areas when it moved to 
Taiwan, which could be seen as the very beginning of assimilation policy in relation to 
indigenous people. Under the authoritarian rule and martial law, the Han Chinese KMT 
regime aimed to assimilate indigenous groups with respect to ec0nomic development. 
Thus in the 1950s and 1960s, the KMT authorities promulgated a series of administrative 
rules and policies to improve the livelihoods of indigenous communities. For example, 
Taiwan Province Government announced the principles of mountain administration and 
mountain construction plans. Thus taking advantage of the forestry resources such as 
timber and mines was necessary. A series of development plans in the mountains allowed 
more Han Chinese to work or travel in what were the traditional areas of indigenous 
people. Excessive resource exploitation in the indigenous regions resulted in resource 
depletion (Shih, 2013). Economic objectives were prioritised after the KMT government 
retreated to Taiwan because Taiwan was the base from which they intended to retake 
Mainland China. The initial policies about indigenous groups of Taiwan were temporarily 
expedient because the objective was to transform indigenes into Chinese in terms of 
economic life and values, without recognising the differences of indigenous peoples. This 
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prioritisation of economic development resulted in environmental degradation in the 
mountains, and indigenous people were also influenced by the values of Han Chinese 
society. 
Land policy of indigenous people is a manifestation that indigenous communities 
were unjustly treated by the KMT government. The policy of reserved land for indigenous 
people is vital for indigenous groups because indigenous people have traditionally relied 
on lands for livelihood and established the strong relationship with the land (e.g. shifting 
agriculture and hunting practices on communal lands belonging to different families or 
whole community). The KMT government followed the restrictive land policy of the 
Japanese rule and announced that reserved lands were national lands while indigenous 
people had right of use (Lin, 2001). The rules of reserved land management in 1960 
regulated that the Han Chinese could not use the reserved lands unless they had rented 
the land before June 1958 and the Chinese with households in the mountains were allowed 
to rent reserved lands. Moreover, legal Chinese individual or company running business 
on the reserved lands could apply for their rent if they do not hinder the land use of 
indigenous people. Later in 1966, the amendment of the rules allowed more Chinese 
businesses to rent or use the reserved lands and continued the Chinese rent if their rent 
was before a specific time. This amendment also allowed individual indigenous people to 
get land ownership, which opened up individual privatisation of the reserved land. 
Although the rules of reserved land were amended again in 1990 to prioritise the 
development projects of indigenous people, it was also legal for Han Chinese to rent the 
reserved land. Some land use problems have emerged in practice (Yen and Cheng, 2012). 
Because the reserved land can only be transacted between indigenous people, and 
indigenous people are usually financially disadvantaged, banks usually refuse to grant 
them a loan. The shortage of agricultural fund has caused a practical problem that some 
indigenous land owners transfer their reserved lands to Han Chinese in private in order to 
access funds. The Chinese investments in the development projects on the reserved land 
resulted in the introduction of capitalist production which was environmentally 
unfriendly. Some clashes happened between Chinese and indigenous residents. In 
addition to these problems, Lin (2001) points out that some PAs have been created in rural 
areas and overlap with reserved land. Taking Taroko National Park as an example, 11.7% of 
the park land is the reserved land for indigenous people. Nature conservation virtually 
restricts the space for indigenous people (Lin, 2001). The evolution of reserved land policy 
from the Japanese colonial period to the Han KMT government reveals the modern states 
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unjustly treat indigenous groups. The land issue thus became the theme of indigenous 
movements in the 1980s and 1990s. The KMT government later responded to the petition 
movements through the policy of adding more reserved lands to indigenous people (Shih, 
2013; Yen and Cheng, 2012; Lin, 2001). Although the land movement of indigenous groups 
did not successfully claim the lands, it did reveal the ethnic conflicts on the land issues 
(Wang, 2003).  
Although the KMT regime ignored the indigene’s participation and rights when 
policies regarding indigenous people were made, some breakthroughs were made. After 
some civil groups’ libel petition to change the discriminatory ‘mountain people’ for ten 
years, this stigmatised term was altered to ‘indigenous people’ in the National Assembly 
in 1994 and the new term was put in the Third Amendment of the ROC Constitution. 
‘Indigenous people’ were transformed into ‘indigenous peoples’ in the Fourth Amendment 
of the ROC Constitution in 1997 to show the diversity of indigenous groups in Taiwan. 
These were the outcomes of social movement of indigenous people in Taiwan (Wang, 
2003). The movement also urged the birth of the Council of Indigenous Peoples in the 
central government. This council was established in December 1996 to deal with the affairs 
of indigenous groups. Diverse issues of indigenous people were discussed in the central 
government. The council was supposed to represent indigenous communities to fight for 
the rights of indigenous peoples and negotiate with other departments.   
4.5.4 Under the rule of Han Chinese DPP 
The DPP reigned between 2000 and 2008 during its first term in office. The history 
and rise of this party was the process of democratisation of Taiwan. It has become one of 
the primary parties in Taiwan. Its experience of social movements in the 1970s and 1980s 
made it spawn a more sympathetic policy towards indigenous peoples. For example, the 
DPP promoted the autonomous law of indigenous peoples with higher levels of self-
governance. According to Shih’s study (2013), the DPP tended to plot the major policy 
principles of indigenous peoples in advance and implemented policy in an orderly way. 
This was relatively progressive compared to the acts of the KMT. The DPP’s reign 
confronted a difficulty that the KMT controlled the majority of members of the 
Legislature. It hindered the promotion of policy making by the DPP government in the 
administration.  
When the DPP ruled, the principle of ethnic policy was multiculturalism which 
was revealed in its party platform, in particular the acts of safeguarding minority rights 
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(Shih, 2013). The concrete acts of policy about the indigenous peoples during the DPP 
tenure contained the ‘new partnership’ confirmation between the indigenous peoples and 
the Taiwan state; the institutionalisation of the legal system of indigenous peoples; the 
tribal name rectification of five new groups; the establishment of a College of Indigenous 
Studies, Indigenous TV, International Austronesian Conference, and authentication 
mechanism of indigenous language; the promotion of co-management schemes; and the 
planning of traditional domain, autonomy and land policy.  
The legal system of indigenous peoples passed some significant legislation such as 
the ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Employment Rights Protection Act’ (2001), the ‘Basic Law of 
Indigenous Peoples’ (2005), the ‘Status Act for Indigenous Peoples’ (2001), the ‘Protection 
Act for the intellectual creations of indigenous peoples’ (2007). The Status Act defines who 
indigenous people are in different conditions, while the Employment Protection Act 
promotes employment of indigenous people in public agencies and schools. The Basic Law 
regulates some basic rights such as autonomy and natural resource use in the indigenous 
areas, while the Protection Act ensures the authentication of intellectual creations such as 
rituals and folk arts. The passing of the Basic Law was vital because the regulations were 
seen as the legal source of indigenous rights. One official informant even regarded the 
regulations as the ‘constitution of indigenous peoples’. However, it was a pity that many 
other regulations related to the Basic Law were not corrected by other departments in 
central government after the legislation. Article 44 of the Fishery Act, for example, allows 
state authorities to pass rules to restrict or prohibit aquatic organisms because of adjusted 
resource management. This conflicts with Article 19 of the Basic Law, which regulates the 
permission to indigenous hunting wildlife for non-profit purpose in the indigenous 
regions. The legislation of indigenous rights indicated that the DPP regime recognised the 
disadvantaged position of indigenous peoples in Taiwan and ensured their interests on 
multiple levels. Yet because the Legislature was dominated by the KMT, the vital 
Autonomous Law by the DPP Administration had been amended and returned by the 
Legislature. The KMT suggested indigenous autonomy in education rather than the 
autonomy with land ownership and financial power because land rights and financial 
issues are controversial. 
Shih (2013) notes that the indigenous policy of the DPP government generally 
coincided with three dimensions with which the indigenous movement was concerned: 
the rectification of the name of indigenous groups, autonomy and the return of lands. 
These topics are controversial in Taiwanese society because they are associated with lands 
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and political interests such as the budget allocation to each group. The DPP government 
did make progress on these topics despite the dominance of the KMT in the Legislature. 
In rectifying group names, five new groups were approved including the Truku people I 
study. In relation to autonomy, at least two versions of the autonomous draft had been 
elaborated and proposed, yet the interest groups had no consensus and the plans for 
greater autonomy failed. In land issues, the highly controversial nature of this topic 
resulted in a failure to establish agreed traditional domains of indigenous peoples. Other 
dimensions such as education and culture had made more evident progress (ibid). The 
cultural communication by the creation of Indigenous TV and the establishment of the 
College of Indigenous Studies in Hualien were significant achievements of the Council of 
Indigenous Peoples during the tenure of the DPP Administration.  
Over their eight years in power, the DPP regime showed their sympathy towards 
indigenous communities by advocating some important policies of indigenous peoples 
such as the Basic Law of Indigenous Peoples. However, the land rights of indigenous 
peoples and the land associated controversies were the target of diverse interest groups 
and governmental agencies. The withdrawal of the Autonomous Law and the regulations 
related to traditional domains for indigenous peoples was the outcome of such a policy 
debate. Many governmental agencies responsible for regulations associated with 
indigenous rights did not respond to the Basic Law of Indigenous Peoples by addressing 
corrected versions. For example, national parks in the indigenous areas should establish a 
co-management mechanism. Yet such rules of a co-management mechanism were created 
via an executive order by the Minister of the Interior in 2009. The trend summarised by 
these administrative acts indicated that the state could not insist on the just principle to 
deal with the policies of indigenous peoples nor follow the legal base due to certain 
controversies during the DPP reign period. Minority rights were subsumed under the 
dominance of the state through the bureaucracy.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the establishment of PAs and policies of indigenous 
peoples under colonial and post-colonial regimes in Taiwan. Truku people, as an example, 
have experienced oppression in these contexts of national policies. The Japanese colonial 
government adopted ‘advanced’ approaches such as the modern army to attack Truku 
residents and advocated paddy agriculture in the mountains to deal with the control of 
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indigenous peoples. The police were the only official representatives of the Japanese 
colonial government. Many policies implemented in the indigenous areas restrained the 
rights of indigenous communities of Taiwan. The control of indigenous groups aimed to 
exploit natural resources in their regions. The next political regime, the KMT government 
of Han Chinese, accepted many handovers of Japan in terms of policy of indigenous 
peoples. Taking advantage of resources in the mountains caused environmental 
degradation. The appeal of conservation was addressed in the 1970s. The National Park 
Law following the US model was passed in 1972. Early strict PAs were created in the 1980s. 
The Wildlife Conservation Act was legislated in the 1989. The government at central and 
local levels jointly demarcated PAs. Newer types of protected area such as community 
conservation were recognised by the government. Empowerment and bottom-up 
conservation became popular in 2000s. The DPP government used the partner 
relationship to describe the state and the indigenous community. The passing of the Basic 
Law of Indigenous Peoples secured the basic rights of indigenous community. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONSERVATION FIRST? PARK 
AUTHORITY DOMINATION AND THE RESISTANCE OF 
THE TRUKU PEOPLE 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the interactions between Taroko Park Authorities with 
other governmental administrations and the Truku residents living within and adjacent to 
Taroko National Park as a means to understand the relationship between the state and 
indigenous people in PAs of Taiwan. It is of importance because the relationship is 
associated with the wellbeing of minority groups as well as environmental conservation in 
PAs. A good relationship is defined here as a situation where content indigenous residents 
live in a healthy environment, and also in which the locals support the conservation 
implementation of governmental agencies in PAs.  
In this chapter, the creation of Taroko National Park is firstly examined to reveal 
the fact that the local Truku inhabitants were not consulted during the planning and 
setting up of the Park. This was investigated by interpreting the literature and documents 
including the history of the national park system of Taiwan, the Taroko National Park Plan 
and the regular Retrospective Reviews of the Taroko National Park Plan. After reviewing 
the official documents, it is necessary to understand Truku communities’ perception of 
the Park and their responses to conservation institutions. The second part, reviews the 
Truku people’s response to the strict regulations and vigorous enforcement of 
conservation policies by political actions in the first decade of the Park. After failing to 
change national parks policy, Truku residents retreated to conduct passive resistance. 
They continued their everyday practices making use of natural resources in the highlands 
within the Park in spite of the conservation regulations. The chapter will argue that their 
practices avoided a   head-on collision with national conservation legislation with the help 
of some indigenous policemen who not only provided information about the Park Police 
and Park Authorities but implemented conservation laws in a flexible way. Truku residents 
took advantage of covert tactics to express their resistance to retain their cultural identity 
in modern society. 
In fact, according to my field work, the attitude of the legal sector and the 
enforcement of these conservation regulations in the Park have changed to become more 
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favourable to indigenous people. Therefore, the relationship between the state and the 
local Truku villagers has improved a little. The judicial system makes the final decision on 
poaching crimes by indigenous groups. Interpretations of judges about conservation 
regulations not only put legislation into practice but reveal the state’s attitude toward 
indigenous poachers. In the third section, the change in thinking of the judicial system 
about aboriginal crime is studied via the analysis of the verdicts by Hualien District Court 
and some interviews. The informal conversations with Park policemen and local 
policemen also indicated the elastic enforcement of conservation legislation. In addition, 
the judgements showed not only a more liberal trend, but revealed some critical problems 
in National Park Law. These coincided with the interviews with certain officials in the Park 
authorities. However, the tolerance of the legal system may reflect the nature/malady of 
legislation of Taiwan.  
The fourth section investigates the opportunities for local Truku people to 
participate in Park management. Taroko National Park Authorities started the 
participation mechanism at the beginning of the 21st century. The participation of the local 
Truku people in the park system seemed to show that indigenous culture and inhabitants 
were respected by the governmental agencies. In general, there are four types of 
participation in Taroko National Park headquarters. Different groups of Truku people took 
part in the management of Taroko National Park through the official meetings of co-
management mechanism, festival events, projects and employment opportunities. 
However, the participation schemes revealed the controlling nature of the Park 
Authorities. The Park was seen as a special geographical area with a few special regulations 
of conservation implemented within it.  
Finally, this chapter draws conclusions about territoriality of the government, the 
resistance of indigenous people and social impacts. It argues that local indigenous people 
searched for their own practical development based on their cultural identity under the 
strong conservation institutions of PAs. 
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5.2 The history of the establishment of Taroko National Park 
5.2.1 Before the establishment of the Park 
The establishment of Taroko National Park can be tracked back to the 1930s during 
the Japanese colonial period when the Council of National Parks investigated, planned and 
announced three national parks in Taiwan. Before the official council, there was a local 
civil organization promoting the attraction of the Truku area which suggested establishing 
a national park there. The decision making was in the hands of a committee which 
included the Governor-General of Taiwan and other professional staff. The territory of 
Taroko National Park today was part of ‘Tsugitaka-Taroko National Park10’ established in 
1937. However, the outbreak of World War Two in Asia suspended the planning and policy 
implementation of national parks because the Japanese government focused on the war. 
At this stage, the contributions made were the protocols of national parks containing the 
regulations of national parks, the management architecture as well as the determination 
of geographical scopes of national parks (Construction and Planning Agency, 2000).  
The KMT government from China came to political power in 1945and paid more 
attention to economic development than nature conservation (as discussed in Section 4.3). 
Therefore, the conservation regulations were not proposed by the governmental agencies. 
There were several forces advocating the establishment of national parks. One was the 
tourism association of Taiwan. Another was some officials of the National Parks of the 
United States. The other force was some academics who were concerned with 
conservation values. Advocacies for national parks of Taiwan came from the fields of 
economics, diplomacy, and academia. The National Park Law was legislated and published 
in 1972. The Truku area was the first priority selection for a national park site in this phase 
(ibid.). Yet the Premier at that time suggested the Kenting area in southern Taiwan could 
also be a national park according to National Park Law to preserve the natural landscape. 
Kenting then became the priority for national park selection. The Agency of Construction 
and Planning under the Ministry of Interior was established in 1981 to take on the practical 
affairs of the national park system. The Enforcement Rules of National Park Law were 
formulated in 1982. The ‘Organizational Act of National Park Administration’ and the 
‘Organizational Regulations of National Park Police’ were enacted respectively in 1983 and 
1984. Kenting National Park Administration was established in 1984 as the first national 
                                                     
10 The park contained the territories of Shei-Pa National Park and Taroko National Park today. 
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park in Taiwan. Taroko National Park Headquarters were created in 1986 as the fourth 
park in Taiwan. 
There were some topics to be discussed when the Truku area was planned to be a 
park that reveal the conflict between conservation and development. The Truku area was 
to be designed as a national park because of its tourism interest, rather than the value of 
conservation according to the rationale of national park system in Taiwan (ibid.). That is, 
the purpose of this national park was to develop the tourism industry for economic 
demands. Moreover, two departments of central government held different views on the 
power plant and industrial area in the planned territory of Taroko National Park. The 
website of National Parks of Taiwan Digital Archive describes the evolution of Taroko 
National Park (Construction and Planning Agency, Ministry of Interior). The Economy 
Minister saw the national park along with conservation as a priority, meanwhile the 
Secretary of the Interior stressed the importance of resource development. Advocating the 
value of conservation, the Economics Department therefore paused the project for the 
development of the cement industry in the industrial area. The Director of Planning 
Agency in the Interior Ministry also regarded ecological protection as a priority in the 
national park. However, The Bureau of Mines of Taiwan suggested mining should be 
excluded from the national park to safeguard people’s interests. Some legislators hoped to 
re-scope the territory of Taroko National Park in order to protect business interests. 
Several days after the discussion, the territory of Taroko National Park was approved by 
the central government. Some mines within the park were exploited without restraint, 
which destroyed some of the landscape of the park. Some academics proposed pausing the 
industrial and energy development projects in the predetermined territory of Taroko Park 
until the completion of an environmental impact assessment. The central government 
indeed stopped the plant project to reserve the natural beauty of the Truku area. These 
controversial events highlighted the dilemma between resource use and conservation 
within central government itself. 
These events before the creation of Taroko Park indicate that the value of 
conservation was not taken seriously among the policy makers in the Central State in 
Taiwan. What they were concerned with was the development of a non-consumptive 
tourism industry. The conflict between resource use and conservation was great in that 
different departments held different views toward the positioning of Taroko National 
Park. Before Taroko National Park was officially established, the issues of the local 
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indigenous people did not emerge as an obstacle or a serious problem due to the 
authoritarian attitude of the State.  
5.2.2 The interactions between the Park and locals in official documents 
Taroko National Park Plan in 1986 
The headquarters of Taroko National Park were established in 1986 after the park 
plan was approved by central government. The first director was a botanist, which may 
indicate he would pay more attention to natural resources rather than people when 
dealing with the affairs of the Park. According to Tan’s (2000) analysis of the Taroko 
National Park Plan, the local Truku people were ignored by the planning authority. He 
notes that there was no statement in relation to the interactions and relationship between 
the local Truku residents and the Park headquarters although one of the objectives of the 
Park was that the historical sites and culture of local Truku people would be reserved. The 
Park authorities seemed to follow the isolation characteristic of the US national park 
system to separate humans from the natural environment. The local development of 
Truku culture and livelihood was excluded while Taroko National Park was established.  
Major issues raised to be solved in the plan were irrelevant to local Truku culture 
(ibid). The only issue relating to Truku residents was that their historical heritage within 
the park should be preserved. The concrete measures in the Plan were: to set up a 
committee to deal with the affairs of the heritage of Truku people; to organise a team for 
the investigation of Truku culture and heritage; to add some facilities to protect the 
heritage; to build an exhibition room of local indigenous culture. The main issues the Park 
focused on were about the natural environment, infrastructure and park management 
rather than the local inhabitants. Again, the Park was considered primarily as wilderness 
without people within it.  
It was obvious now that the planning authority and Taroko National Park 
headquarters paid much more attention to the natural environment, recreation and 
conservation issues rather than local indigenous culture and their development. This was 
confirmed through analysis of the Taroko National Park Plan which devoted large portions 
to the issues of natural ecology. The social impacts on local residents resulting from the 
establishment of Taroko Park were not examined in the Park’s early stages. Before its 
establishment, Truku people living in the two communities in the highlands had been 
moved to the flat land due to the lack of primary education. However, some authors (e.g. 
Simon, 2011; Lin, 2010) see this as a strategy to isolate people from the natural environment 
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of scheduled national parks. This may also be the reason why the Plan did not consider 
interactions between the Park authority and local Truku inhabitants in the Park. The Park 
was created during the era of martial law: people did not have freedom of speech and 
policy makers were the government and the experts during that period. The authoritarian 
style of national park management could partly result from the bureaucracy of the period 
of martial law. 
The First Retrospective Review of the Taroko National Park Plan in 1995 
The First Retrospective Review of the Taroko National Park Plan was announced 
in 1995 to reflect on Park management. The central government suggested that Taroko 
National Park headquarters should pay attention to the problems of natural environment, 
recreational matters, and should support private enterprises investing in the Park’s public 
facilities (Taroko National Park, 1995). Tan (2000) analyses the issues raised by the Review 
and finds that it was similar to the original Plan because the local Truku residents were 
excluded. There was no interaction between the Park and the Truku villagers mentioned 
in the Review. He again confirms that the Review regarded the Park as an unpopulated 
region (Tan, 2000). However, a protest against the Park happened in 1994 when Truku 
people expressed their dissatisfaction with conservation of Taroko Park including the 
restrictive use of natural resources, land issues within the Park, and few conservation 
regulations were enforced by the park police. Many specific questions raised by the Truku 
protesters could only be solved by the amendment of regulations (ibid).  
This First Review of the Park Plan in 1995 after the large political protest in 1994 
revealed the Park authorities did not realise the value of local culture and claims of Truku 
residents in the Park. The Truku community and their development were excluded once 
again despite their mobilisation around some political actions. This document showed the 
dominant hegemony to control natural resources and local people’s access to natural 
resources in the Park in accordance with the conservation laws. The amendment of 
conservation legislations relied on proposals of the central government and legislators.  
The Second Retrospective Review of Taroko National Park Plan in 2003 
The Second Review in 2003 re-iterated the objectives of the Taroko National Park, 
and restated the significance of conservation of nature and heritage, recreation and 
scientific research (Taroko National Park, 2003). The preservation of local Truku culture 
was mentioned but the focus was placed on the historical sites in the Park. The evaluation 
of zoning of the Park accepted the reality that some private reserved lands of the 
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indigenous people could be developed appropriately for agricultural use and housing. This 
implied that Taroko National Park headquarters agreed with appropriate development as 
long as it met the principle of conservation. 
Some issues about the local Truku were raised in the Second Review. The first issue 
for Taroko National Park authorities was to establish good relations with local Truku 
villagers, to preserve Truku culture and to promote local development (Taroko National 
Park, 2003). The Park headquarters thought the Truku culture had gradually weakened so 
that they were responsible for the support of local culture. Second, the Park recognised 
the conservation concept in Truku tradition, such as the prohibition of hunting practices 
when wildlife was breeding. Third, the Park introduced local Truku culture to travellers 
and facilitated local economic development through the promotion of eco-tourism in the 
Truku region. Fourth, Truku people were encouraged to participate in the affairs of Park 
management to improve the relationship between the Park and Truku community.  
Concrete measures taken by the Park to solve the issues of indigenous people 
included the amendment of Article 13 of the National Park Law for the maintenance of 
Truku tradition; to start training courses on traditional Truku artistry for the maintenance 
of Truku culture; to provide information about online training courses and to increase the 
communication channels between the Park and local indigenous residents (ibid.). Among 
these measures, revising Article 13 of the National Park Law seemed to address the 
difficulty of indigenous people in terms of natural resource management as the Article 
listed the Park prohibitions containing fire use and hunting activities. However, there were 
no further specific steps to be taken for the amendment after this Review.  
The Second Review displayed the concerns of the Park authorities such as ‘the 
Committee of Cultural Consultation’ for local Truku leaders to advise Park management 
and a conference of indigenous culture. The Truku representatives of the Committee could 
take part in some official meetings and expressed their views. The Park also promised to 
allow an eco-tourism industry to improve the livelihoods of local indigenous people. It 
seemed to be a milestone of national park management in Taiwan because it was the first 
participation mechanism for locals to take part in national park management. These 
friendly schemes in Taroko National Park were initiated by the fourth director but some 
of them stopped working when he left the Park in 2002. The Park headquarters opened a 
new page of national park management to allow local indigenous people to participate in 
Park affairs.  
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Taroko National Park authorities in the Second Review recognised the importance 
of the relationship and interactions with local residents. Simultaneously, the nature of 
conservation/protection was also emphasised by the Park. Therefore, appropriate 
development could be permitted as long as the development met the principle of 
conservation. This was why eco-tourism was seen as a development approach for Truku 
people by the Park for it accorded with the principle of ecological conservation11. However, 
was eco-tourism the most appropriate way of development for Truku villagers? It seemed 
necessary to understand the perception of local Truku community about the development 
issues. 
The Third Retrospective Review of Taroko National Park Plan in 2015 
The Third Review was displayed publicly in 2013 and was approved in 2015. At the 
beginning of the Third Review, the Taroko Park headquarters stressed that it reflected the 
problems of the lands within the Park belonging to various governmental agencies and 
some private owners. It also discussed the development of the livelihoods of the local 
Truku community (Taroko National Park, 2015). These opening statements reveal that the 
Park authorities seemed to recognise the significance of the local Truku inhabitants and 
their livelihoods. The contents of this Review are different from the previous reviews in 
that firstly, it referred to several international conferences on environmental governance 
to emphasise that the Park was linked to certain international movements on issues of 
conservation and development; secondly, it reviewed some development projects in 
relation to the local indigenous community in order to confirm the endeavours of the Park 
headquarters to improve the mutual relationship; thirdly, it analysed the current planning 
projects supported by multiple levels of the Government. These inclusions indicated that 
the Taroko National Park authorities had become more aware of the local indigenous 
people and intended to handle the difficult land problems within the park territory. 
Further, the Park viewed the local Truku residents as partners in terms of 
management and sought consensus of governance between the local inhabitants and the 
governmental agencies on multiple levels. The Park headquarters took advantage of the 
franchise rights to cultivate some local people through environmental education and eco-
tourism. A project about organic agriculture has been supported by the Park for a few 
                                                     
11 According to the definition of eco-tourism in the book published by the central government (2005), it 
is a type of travelling in the natural environment and stresses the conception of ecological conservation; 
sustainable development is its ultimate goal. 
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years, which I consider as a participation scheme for the locals (see section 5.7.2). The Park 
authorities hoped these locals would educate the local communities. According to this 
report, the ideal processes of cooperation may start with administrative coordination and 
then establish the platform of partnership in order to promote environmental education 
and eco-tourism. Therefore, cooperation will help promote the economic conditions of 
local indigenous residents (Taroko National Park, 2015).  
In order to increase participation and partnership, the Park made short, medium 
and long term plans. In the short term, the Park authorities hope to strengthen ‘the council 
of co-management consultation’ for the elite and communication schemes for the public. 
In the medium term, the Park encourages local Truku residents to participate in 
conservation affairs and increase job opportunities for them. In the long run, the 
authorities intend to establish participatory institutions for enterprise, allowing local 
villagers and environmental non-governmental organisations to participate in the Park 
management. The Park may empower the local organisations and residents with franchise 
rights to develop the eco-tourism industry to enable people to experience the natural 
environment in Taroko National Park.  The plan will help create more job vacancies for 
the locals (ibid. Chapter 6).  
In this Review, the Park authorities seem to have ensured partnership with the 
local Truku residents and value local economic development. They have taken some 
measures to confirm the good relationship and have made plans to sustain benign 
interactions with the local people. I believe the good intentions of the Park headquarters 
would be recognised by the local inhabitants if the locals were aware of these intentions 
and experienced supportive acts of the Park. Thus further interactions could also facilitate 
meaningful reforms such as co-management arrangement schemes in Park management. 
Therefore, the awareness of the partnership with the Park by the local Truku people is vital 
for furthering reciprocity between them. Accordingly, the next section investigates the 
reactions of the local Truku residents to the conservation institutions of Taroko National 
Park in order to understand the interactions on the ground. 
Examining these official documents of Park Plan and Reviews of Plan helps to grasp 
the attitude of the Taroko Park authorities toward the local Truku people. From the 
exclusion of locals to partnership with locals, the Park Headquarters seemed to have 
changed their approach towards the local Truku people and granted more sympathy to 
local development. It is necessary to explore the local Truku’s perception of the Park with 
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conservation institutions to see if a reciprocal relationship is developing. If the perceptions 
of Truku residents were consistent with the views of the Park, we should fully understand 
the relationship between the Park and the local Truku people is as the official documents 
noted. Yet if the perceptions of the Truku were different from the views of the park, we 
should explore further. 
 
5.3 The responses of local Truku residents to Taroko National Park 
This section is primarily made up of interviews and observations of field work in 
exploring the Truku community’s perceptions of Taroko National Park, particularly the 
conservation institutions. Firstly, it presents the responses to the conservation regulations 
and the enforcement agency, the National Park Police. These external regulations and 
agencies forced Truku residents to stop their livelihood practices such as hunting and 
agriculture in the highlands of the Park. Accordingly, the Truku residents firstly expressed 
their complaints and dissatisfaction through the local representatives. They also protested 
against some policy implementation of Taroko Park by demonstrations and movements 
in the 1990s. At the beginning of the 21st century, the fourth director of the Park opened a 
new page of co-management with the local Truku community through a ‘Committee of 
Cultural Consultation’. The judgements made by the Hualien District Court also showed 
more tolerance for indigenous people when indigenous hunters violated conservation 
regulations. The policemen in the Park expressed a more flexible attitude in the 
enforcement of conservation regulations when I did the field study. These changes of the 
public sector indeed improved the interactions between the local Truku community and 
Taroko National Park authorities a little. Yet the Truku still perceived the restrictions in 
everyday life. Conservation regulations and conservation implementations elicited 
complaints. The following sections reveal the views of the local Truku. Their opinions and 
perceptions indicate they would take actions to respond to the conservation interventions. 
5.3.1 Truku’s perception of conservation legislations 
National parks are comparably stricter PAs in Taiwan in accordance with the 
National Park Law. The strictness of the National Park Law expressly prohibits activities 
such as hunting, fishing and breaking off the branches of trees. In addition, the 
implementation of the provisions is the mission of the National Park Police, park staff and 
some volunteers from national park headquarters. In Taroko Park, such a prohibition has 
impacts on the lifestyle of the local Truku people, who traditionally make use of natural 
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resources in the mountainous areas. The majority of Truku residents who engage in the 
primary sector of the economy in this region have been affected greatly due to these 
conservation regulations. The livelihood of these people has been threatened directly just 
because their homelands are classified as a national park, which is viewed as an external 
institution for the locals. That these restrictions were imposed on them without any 
communication in advance is the first injustice I want to point out. The second one is that 
the content of these conservation regulations are inimical to the lifestyle of the local Truku 
people. The values of the indigenous community, which are different from those of the 
mainstream, should be addressed here to understand their reactions to these external 
institutions. Moreover, there are some problems which result not merely from the 
implementation of National Park Law itself, but from general ignorance of the human 
environment of PAs. 
5.3.2 Conservation regulations vs. Truku Land Practices 
The National Park Law and the Wildlife Conservation Acts are the foundation of 
conservation enforcement in Taroko National Park. The restrictive use of natural 
resources in the Park is expressly provided for. However, the local inhabitants did not 
know the regulations until they were warned by the staff of Park authorities or caught by 
the Park Police. They were unaware of these regulations in detail. In addition, they were 
unsatisfied with the way the police implemented the laws. All these eventually led to the 
resentment of the local Truku people. They resisted the Park with conservation 
institutions via various practices. They mobilised collective actions to protest against the 
Park. Their everyday lifestyle of exploiting natural resources in the highland of the Park 
can be seen as implicit resistance. In contemporary practice, the National Park Law has 
been in operation for over 30 years and some articles are out of date. Therefore, some of 
the penal provisions of the Wildlife Conservation Act have replaced the penalties of the 
National Park Law.  
5.3.3 Dominant conservation legislations and ignorant Truku residents 
Truku people did not know that the establishment of national park would change 
their lifestyle. One amateur hunter, T, also an elder in a local church, noted local residents’ 
ignorance of the complex conservation institutions. He also expressed his discontent 
about the domination of Taroko Park authorities. 
‘We were ignorant of the provisions when Taroko National Park was 
established…It seemed they [the Park authorities] came to our land whenever they 
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want…What they did seemed to be ok, which is totally different from our situation…’ 
(Hunter T, 13.01.2013) 
It is obvious that local Truku people were not consulted when the national park 
was planned and established. They were not aware of the many restraints being imposed 
on them with the establishment of Taroko National Park. The Park headquarters 
apparently played the role of an authoritarian, who could not be challenged. The hunter 
T therefore used irony to stress the strong power of the Park authorities against the 
powerlessness of local Truku community. 
According to a Pastor H in F village, his awareness of ‘endangered species’ and 
some conservation regulations was based on third hand information and also from the 
news of indigenous poaching. He also complained about the lack of a forum which would 
help the local indigenous Truku community recognise the conservation regulations. 
‘I know about the endangered species by word of mouth, or from news reports 
about poaching. The news noted the regulations in relation to poaching…There are 
no conservation regulations on the bulletin board. There is no forum for us to know 
these things.’ (Pastor H, 21.11.2012) 
Truku hunters in F village do not know about the basic concept of conservation 
legislation, let alone the details of these articles. Hunter C, who is an active huntsman in 
the Park, expressed his doubt and confusion about conservation. 
‘Honestly I don’t know about these regulations…we cannot hunt so many 
species because of conservation…I heard of the endangered species from others’ 
talking. There are many endangered species such as birds and mammals…actually I 
don’t know which bird we cannot hunt…I know wild boars are not the endangered 
species. But the boar will be confiscated if we catch it. This is very contradictory 
because it is not the endangered species… they always mention conservation but they 
never clearly explain what conservation is…anyway, we cannot hunt anything.’ 
(Hunter C, 20.01.2013) 
One pastor, S, whose hometown is F village, was captured by the Taroko National 
Park Police while hunting within the Park. He rebuked the irresponsible public servants 
of the local government who should be accountable for promoting the government’s new 
policy about indigenous rights.  
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‘I was caught by the police…in the process I found out that there are new rules 
for indigenous people to go hunting for the ritual demands. But my compatriots do 
not know this. The local representatives and the supervisor of the Township Office 
did not promote the policy which is close to our life…they never teach people nor take 
care of people.’ (Pastor S, 27.02.2013) 
However, one Truku hunter who is now the traditional leader of one community 
in F village said he knew about the applications for indigenous hunting in a meeting he 
attended and an official document from the local government. Because of the complicated 
process of applying, he thought such a way of applying for hunting is unfeasible. 
‘It is very troublesome to apply for legal hunting. You have to point out where 
you intend to go hunting when applying. You cannot go to the forestry areas, only 
within the territory of reserved lands of indigenous people. But there are merely few 
wild animals in reserved lands…you also need to register the number of animals you 
want to hunt. What if the number you hunt does not match the number you register? 
There are other limits about the hunting time and the specific species…so we don’t 
apply for the legal hunting. (Hunter G, 05.01.2013) 
The interview citations above have at least two important implications. The first 
one is that the majority of Truku people are unaware of the conservation legislation which 
is associated with their traditional practices. They usually obtain the conservation 
information from everyday chatting and meeting with others in their communities. On 
my field trip, all the Truku huntsmen did not know that one species of flying squirrels had 
been removed from the list of endangered species since 2009. The other implication is that 
the mixture of two sets of conservation regulation also makes them feel confused.12 As a 
result, the Park authorities should pay more attention to promoting the conservation 
policies and strengthening communications with the locals. Also, the meanings and value 
of conservation could be explained and interpreted more in the PAs to assuage the doubts 
among the local Truku communities. The communication forum with the local 
inhabitants may be a good start. The Park authorities justify conservation in the Park 
through legislation, and through this manipulate local Truku people’s practices in the 
                                                     
12 The Wildlife Conservation Act defines what the endangered species are, while the National Park Law 
doesn’t allow any natural resources to be taken away. Non-endangered species can be hunted when 
necessary but it is prohibited in the national park. 
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Park. Yet they did not consult the locals when Park was created, neither did they publicise 
the conservation legislations well. The local Truku lifestyle was impacted by conservation. 
5.3.4 The external conservation institutions 
Further, the responses of local Truku residents toward the conservation 
regulations and Taroko National Park can be attributed to seeing them as external 
institutions. The views of Truku inhabitants showed not merely the hostile relations with 
the Park but the subjectivity of the Truku community. One interviewee, L, who ministers 
a large Presbyterian church in this region, thought that Truku people do not possess the 
conception of ‘nation’ beyond the identity of family and Truku community. These external 
institutions are different from the traditional norms of Truku community. The norms 
represent the identity of Truku group in spite of the rapid change in contemporary Truku 
communities.  
‘We have the concept of hunting territory traditionally rather than a nation... 
This is our hunting territory which is the inheritance from our ancestors. It is given 
by our ancestors instead of the state. The government is exotic. We have lived in this 
region before the establishment of Taroko National Park and the state in Taiwan. 
Before the national park, our ancestors had frequented this region. The conservation 
regulations are formulated by the Han Chinese instead of us…If we need any natural 
resource, we use it rather than waste it because we believe there is spirit on everything 
and we respect every natural resource.’ (Pastor L, 22.12.2012) 
The pastor hunter S told a story about a Truku huntsman, who depended on 
hunting as livelihood, who was caught by the state, in order to reveal the difficulty Truku 
people face: 
‘The state sets many barriers to stop people going hunting, which is simply to 
kill us Truku. There is a true story about a Truku huntsman who has a six children 
family in this region. He is not educated so he can only go hunting to make a living. 
His wife felt difficult and left him. When he was arrested by the police due to poaching 
and sent to the court, he brought his six kids and talked to the judge that there is no 
problem for him to be sent to the jail and stop hunting. For he then asked the judge 
to help raise the children for him. This may be a special case. However, we are 
helpless. If we want to have the mountain food for protein nowadays, we have to go 
hunting surreptitiously with the sacrifice, fine and prison things in our mind. Do you 
know how heavy our hearts are? It is very stressful.’ (Pastor S, 27.02.2013) 
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For some Truku people, hunting practices are the traditional way of living. The 
conservation regulations oppress their livelihood. Lower educational qualifications and 
less social integration in mainstream society of Taiwan mean the Truku have fewer 
employment opportunities. When I worked as a research assistant before my PhD study, 
A Truku hunter in T village expressed his voice on a hunting trip while we were going back 
home. He thought it was difficult for him to adapt to the life in the city. He enjoyed the 
life in the countryside of his ancestral land. Hunting for him is a way of making a living. 
What he needs is subsistence hunting only. In this way, this minority group should also 
have the freedom to live and pursue their way of life. Truku lifestyle was different from the 
mainstream Chinese society. These conservation regulations were passed by the Chinese 
legislators rather than indigenous people. Nevertheless, lifestyle and practices of Truku 
residents needed to be changed by these external laws. Their livelihood was affected by 
these interventions of Park creation and conservation implementations. 
One female elder, Y, in a Presbyterian church of F village, remembered the days 
before the establishment of Taroko National Park. She and her husband relied on natural 
resources as their livelihoods. They searched for wild orchids and some herbs in 
mountainous areas and sometimes went hunting for their family’s food. After the Taroko 
National Park was established, their lifestyle became illegal. Her spouse also died in an 
accident in the 1980s when she was in her 30s and thus she raised her five children (two 
are disabled) through agriculture in the highlands in the Park.  
One ranger, D, who works in the park, explained why the local Truku inhabitants 
dislike the Park authorities. He thought that there were many limitations within the Park, 
which contradict the ideas of Truku people. It is unfair for those Truku residents 
depending on natural resources in the Park territory. 
‘Some people rely on hunting to improve their life a little…The park restricts 
the land development within the park territory. No plant or animal life in the park 
can be taken away. If one needs to do something on his land in the park, he has to 
apply for the permission of the park headquarters. You need their permission to do 
everything in the park…Instead, our concept is that we can do what we want on our 
own lands. Why can’t we develop our lands? So many limitations are put on our lands 
in the highlands in the park.’ (Ranger D, 19.02.2013) 
Truku lifestyle was composed of the continuous interactions with the natural 
environment. Truku people were characterised by taking advantage of natural resources 
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sustainably. Their strong dependence on natural resources was destroyed by the external 
conservation institutions. Some Truku residents’ livelihood was greatly influenced, which 
was an unpleasant social impact in Truku society. The restraints of access to natural 
resources within the Park imposed on the local Truku by conservation institutions 
revealed the asymmetrical power relations between the locals and the Park authorities as 
well as behaviour control in the Park.  
5.3.5 The implementation of conservation legislation in the Park 
The National Park Police is the system enforcing the conservation regulations in 
the Park. According to the official website of National Police Agency, Taroko National Park 
Police was established in May 1988. After several administrative reforms, there are 
currently 31 policemen in four teams in Taroko National Park Police. The primary mission 
of the Taroko National Park Police can be categorised into: 1. Security of visitors, especially 
during some special festivals and events; 2. Security of land and forests in the Park; 3. 
Service for residents in the Park (Source: http://www.7spc.gov.tw). The second one is the 
mission of conservation in the Park. For Truku residents, the image of the Park Police is 
formed by their practices of dealing with indigenous offenders.  
An old hunter, L, an elder in a local church, talked about the way the police 
implemented the ban during the initial years of the National Park.  
‘In the past, once the police paid attention to one person who was the suspect 
of violating regulations, they would ambush him in turn the whole night. They might 
also ambush in roadside at night. So the police arrested many people at that time.’ 
(Hunter L, 06.01.2013) 
A retired pastor stated his impression of the implementation of the conservation 
regulations by the police. This reflects the operation of the police system as well as the 
helplessness of the indigenous people. 
‘The police don’t know indigenous culture at all… They push indigenous 
policemen to arrest indigenous people… those indigenous policemen want to keep 
their job and win the praise of higher police officers…but recently I know these 
policemen aren’t rewarded…anyway, we don’t make friends with the police. They 
always do harm to others. Those who are caught are very poor, serious. It is said that 
the fine of the poaching hunters is ten times the price of selling the game. These 
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huntsmen have no good end. The police deliberately make things difficult for those 
poor locals.’ (Pastor D, 11.01.2013)  
The rigid implementation of the conservation regulations by the police resulted in 
resentment among the local Truku community. Some of my interviewees expressed their 
wrath when mentioning the police in the park. 
‘The most excellent hunters in this community are almost marked by the 
police. It is like me, we are the people with criminal record. They may monitor my 
mobile phone communication whenever they want…it is true. I am not afraid of being 
arrested again. If they are brave, just follow me to the hill. I will…’ (Pastor S, 20130227) 
‘Some compatriots feel disgusted with the police. They want to use shotgun 
to shoot them. If we are pushed to the extreme, we may go to excess, be forced to 
commit crime.’ (Hunter T, 13.01.2013) 
The police in the past used controversial methods such as ambushes to carry out 
their legal mandate for their personal interest, which developed the hostile relationship 
with the locals. Truku residents had to use natural resources carefully in their everyday 
life. The tension had an uneasy social impact among Truku villagers. The retired pastor 
noted that those who bully the poor would come to a sticky end according to Truku 
tradition. The unpleasant tension forced Truku to indignantly take extreme measures such 
as force for solution. Truku people took advantage in what they were expert in to retaliate 
against the police. The pastor S mentioned revenge acts in the mountain while the hunter 
T talked about shotgun shooting. They intended to take advantage of their good shooting 
skills and the knowledge in the mountain to retaliate against the police who always 
arrested Truku huntsmen. Simultaneously, the difficulties Truku people face are the 
inhumanity of the system including the legislation and its implementation. It seems that 
Truku people have to accept the institutions passively and then be persecuted by the 
institutions to commit more crimes. 
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5.4 Overt resistance of the local Truku people 
The previous section indicated that Truku residents experienced oppression from 
the Park authorities and conservation implementation. The responses of the local Truku 
residents to Taroko National Park can be divided into two kinds, namely, everyday 
resistance, and political demonstrations to express their claims. These implicit and explicit 
resistances to Taroko National Park Authorities by the local Truku revealed not just the 
tension between the local indigenous people and the state, but also the unexpected 
outcomes of conservation policy, as evidenced by Truku people’s collective actions against 
the Park Authorities via political channels and demonstrations. This open protest showed 
their dissent against conservation interventions.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Truku residents in the Shio-Lin Township mobilised several political protests 
against the Taroko National Park Authorities due to restraints by the Park. According to 
the ‘Historical, Linguistic and Cultural Dictionary of Indigenous Peoples of Taiwan’, the 
Movement of Return Our Land by the Truku tribe constituted of four outcries. The first 
was that the Township Representative Council proposed a condemnation in 1988. These 
representatives blamed the Park Headquarters for the neglect of the due right of local 
Truku people. The second protest action in 1990 was a countersignature by the residents 
of three neighbouring villages. These Truku neighbours censured the arrogant attitude of 
the Park Authorities who never respected the local indigenous people. The third 
demonstration happened in 1993. Over 50 Truku residents countersigned a petition about 
the amendment of the National Park Law. A hearing was consequently held to demand 
the modification of the Park Law and the allowance of hunting practices in the Park by the 
local Truku. In 1994, a large scale demonstration was mobilised by Truku people to encircle 
the Park Headquarters building. A non-indigenous politician and many local leaders 
organised the protest and over 2,000 Truku residents participated in the demonstration. 
The primary slogan, ‘Anti-oppression, Strive for Survival and Return My Land’, expressed 
their claim. The trigger of this protest was that a resident found his land had been 
expropriated by the Park through the Township Office without his permission. More local 
people also found their lands were in a similar situation. In addition to the controversial 
issues of land, the rigid implementation of conservation legislation had elicited the rage 
of local Truku people. The director of the Park Headquarters replied to the protesting 
Truku people by attempting to demonstrate his sincerity through promising more 
communication. One informant, Pastor N, noted his experiences of participating in the 
political protests when he studied in a seminary in east Taiwan.  
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‘…my classmates and I encircled the Park Headquarters located in that 
previous place…the director ordered the secretary to see us…But the secretary had 
nothing to say to us. The director finally furiously said to us that if this happened 
before, we would probably be executed by shooting. I also replied to him that if this 
happened before, I do not know where your head is. You invaded us first...The Park 
Authorities forced the land expropriation of the current headquarters building. One 
unit of land (0.96992 ha) is only worth 5,000 NTD…Truku people were poor and did 
not know the value. The price later increased to 50,000 NTD, which was about one 
tenth of that unit. But the locals thought the land was worthless and sold it to the 
Park. We eagerly fight for the justice yet our compatriots sold the land for money. 
We lost and we quarrelled due to this… We aimed to let people select freely rather 
than the means of inducement and menace used by the Park…’ (Pastor N, 11.03.2013) 
His views paid attention to the injustice behind the establishment of Taroko Park. 
He considered that the Park authorities took advantage of power relations and the 
financial disadvantage of the local Truku to gain land. In the process of land expropriation, 
the local Truku people could not but accept what the decision of the authority due to 
unequal power relations. Moreover, the financially disadvantaged Truku residents gave up 
land due to the higher purchase price after a protest. This pastor thought that the local 
indigenous residents actually had no other options such as renting lands or cooperative 
development which were beneficial for them for a longer time, because the Park 
authorities were the only decision-maker. Without any consultation in advance, the 
creation of Taroko Park actually affected the land use and natural resource exploitation of 
the locals. 
These concrete political actions revealed the conflictual relationship between the 
Park and the local indigenous people, in particular on the issue of natural resource 
management. Using political powers via politicians and legal channels, Truku people 
explicitly showed their resistance to conservation regulations and land use restrictions 
within the Park. Their dissent stemmed from these social impacts, especially the restraint 
on livelihoods they relied on. Protest actions such as countersignatures and petitions were 
adopted as the response to such a restrictive policy of conservation. However, the political 
protests did not shake the foundation of conservation policy in the Park. The local Truku 
still perceived the inconvenience resulting from the Park. Challenging the Park collectively 
was costly and like banging your head against a brick wall. Paying attention to sustenance, 
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Truku individuals changed their strategy against the Park with conservation institutions 
in their everyday life.  
 
5.5 Everyday practice as resistance 
Besides the explicit protesting conflicts via collective actions, the local Truku 
individuals used several tactics to continue their lifestyle based on their singular idea, 
which can be regarded as implicit resistance against the external institutions, especially 
against the conservation schemes. These tactics were carried out in a hidden way. In 
general, the local Truku residents prefer roundabout methods to avoid confrontation. The 
tactics may look weak, however, their continuity in everyday life is powerful and long-
lasting. As Scott (1985) notes resistance through everyday practices by the disadvantaged 
class is a more possible way to show dissent than open protests although these practices 
are hidden. The political implications of this hidden resistance should not be neglected 
(Holmes, 2007). 
5.5.1 Getting National Park Police into trouble 
The National Park Police is the main tool used to implement the conservation 
policies in national parks in Taiwan. In Taroko Park, the attitude of early enforcement of 
the policies by the police was arrogant and tough. Thus, they are disliked by the local 
Truku people, especially the huntsmen who were always seen as criminals by the Park 
Police. If lawbreakers are arrested by Park Police in the Park, the Park Police have to 
transfer them to the state police as the Park Police do not have the power of investigation. 
Certain Truku hunters ‘framed’ the Park Police to show their dissatisfaction. An old hunter 
told a rough story about this.  
‘The Park Police caught the poachers and then transferred them to the local 
police station. There were two versions of the evidence in the Park and in the police 
station respectively. Both statements were sent to the district court. The judge asked 
which one was correct and the hunters answered that the record of local police station 
was correct. They also said that the Park Police did not ask anything but they made 
up the evidence. The indigenous people framed the Park Police this way. The court 
blamed the Park Police for not inquiring in detail but making up the evidence. The 
Police replied to the court that the poachers did say what was in their statements. 
However, the indigenous hunters did not recognise it but said the Park Police made 
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up fake records themselves. Therefore, the judge blamed the Park Police.’ (Hunter L, 
06.01.2013) 
Truku hunters put the blame on the Park Police in the process of investigation due 
to the hostile relationship. Hunter L said this was a true story which happened in a 
neighbouring Truku community. This device demonstrated not only the anger of Truku 
hunters against the conservation oppression but their action against the conservation 
regulations. This kind of protest against the Park Police reflects that Truku people do not 
oppose the current institutions directly but take advantage of the legal system to show 
resistance to the dominant conservation narrative.  
5.5.2 Asking for the help of indigenous Truku representatives 
Truku people took advantage of democratic representative politics to protect their 
own interests. In F village, a majority of interviewees told me that they would seek help 
from indigenous representatives at multiple levels if their family broke the conservation 
laws. The intervention of elected indigenous representatives usually pushed the 
governmental agency and judicial police to deal with the criminal case leniently because 
of the supervisory powers of Legislature.  
‘A Truku resident living in the next village was caught by the Park Police 
because of illegal poaching in the Park. He was fined over 300,000 NTD [about 
6,000GBP]. He hunted several protected species including goat, deer and flying 
squirrel. Then he negotiated with the court and finally he was fined over 200,000 
NTD. Then he complained to an indigenous legislator that he depended on hunting 
as a livelihood but was arrested by the Park Police. He asked the legislator to help 
him. When the legislator came to the Park, he was angry with the Park authorities. 
He blamed the Park headquarters and the Police. He said that he believed the staff 
had nothing to do but make problems for the local Truku… He said that he could cut 
the budget of the Park… Later, the budget of the Park seemed to be deleted about 15 
million NTD. The Park headquarters may be afraid of this a little.’ (Hunter L, 
06.01.2013) 
‘An Atayal pastor came to Hualien for hunting in the Park but was arrested 
by the local policemen. The news was published in the paper. But he asked for the 
help of an indigenous legislator and nothing more happened… I am not embarrassed 
because the natural resources are ours. From then on I know that indigenous culture 
is valued. In the past, he would have been sent to jail without any recourse to appeal. 
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It is stressful to be in the hands of the Police…This happened last year. I thought he 
must be fined much but several legislators helped him later. The governmental 
agencies are still afraid of this.’ (Pastor H, 21.11.2012) 
 
 ‘I prefer the help of indigenous legislators who I know. Other ways are not so 
effective…One legislator can help this…He can help intercede if that is the felony…He is A 
Seediq in Nantou. I often heard that he helps Truku hunters…The news spreads among the 
indigenous communities…The poachers have to go to the court…But the outcomes are very 
different with the help of that legislator…We are not wealthy and go hunting because we 
want to eat…doing this is only for life…we don’t want to hunt much and go back when we 
carry enough on back.’ (Pastor T, 11.01.2013)  
Truku people refrain from head-on collisions with powerful institutions, instead, 
they make use of the elected representatives on multiple levels to revenge the conservation 
institutions.  
5.5.3 Truku hunters exploiting windows of opportunity to harvest natural resources 
without detection 
National Parks are carefully PAs in Taiwan and satellite monitoring of forest lands 
is common used in the park. It is inconvenient for Truku people owning reserved lands in 
the Taroko Park. Truku residents exploit natural resources naturally in the highlands. 
However, to use natural resources without the permission of Park authorities is illegal. 
Truku people therefore avoid the monitoring time to make use of natural resources to 
continue their everyday practices in the highlands.  
‘We still live in the highland and we need wood in everyday life. We have the 
ownership of reserved land; it should be alright to use the trees on our lands. The park 
authorities know that we use the wood in the mountainous areas instead of selling 
them on the flat…We should be very careful to use fire in the highland…The Park 
headquarters use a satellite to monitor hillsides at the time between 10 am to 11 am 
and they prohibit hillside reclamation. This was according to the staff of the park 
headquarters when we chatted …We don’t use fire at that time. Our way is to use fire 
in the afternoon. Since we have done it, they have nothing to do about it… Anyway, it 
is all right if they do not see us doing that…’ (Hunter L, 06.01.2013) 
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Truku people expressed their resistance by insisting on their original way of living 
of using natural resources in the highlands within the Park. They could exercise the 
practices because they knew about the time of satellite monitoring by the park. They also 
possessed the desire to exploit natural resources on their own land. Before getting the 
information about monitoring, they had known the prohibitions of Taroko Park and felt 
annoyed as they had no solutions. Finding out when monitoring occurred from certain 
staff of the Park, Truku residents farming in the Park found their own way to avoid 
confrontation. The tactic of avoiding the Park monitoring time for resource use thus was 
applied here. Such a daily practice of Truku inhabitants may indicate the strong voice of 
the powerless indigenous people in the strict PAs. Subsistence demand of using natural 
resources by Truku residents was necessary in the highlands of the Park because there was 
no infrastructure such as power and water supply there. Besides agriculture on their 
reserved land, few Truku people who lived there went hunting by trapping and shooting.  
5.5.4 To continue hunting practices 
Keeping on hunting practices within the Park is an obvious protest against the 
unfair conservation legislation for Truku people. In F village, such traditional practice 
continues within Taroko National Park in spite of the conservation ban and socioeconomic 
change. These huntsmen know that it is illegal to go hunting in the Park, so they find some 
ways to avoid the investigation of the Park Police and the staff of the Park authorities. 
Some Truku hunters insisted on their hunting practices as part of their cultural identity 
and inheritance. Others were motived by livelihood demand. Some others went hunting 
for leisure only. Pastor H stressed that a Truku tribe is naturally a hunting group. 
‘We have the tradition of being fond of hunting, and people like to eat wildlife animals 
since they were young. We have the traditional dialect sentence to describe that I want to 
eat game. This is a very positive expression.’ (Pastor H, 14.11.2012)  
When I asked about the linkages between Truku masculinity and hunting, Pastor 
S told me that hunting is the natural existence for Truku hunters. 
‘Hunting is the root of Truku people… this is the root of Truku culture, the 
ineradicable thing. It is very natural and original in Truku tradition. It is like that 
grass is grass, tree is tree, and soil is soil. It is foundational.’ (Pastor S, 27.02.2013) 
Hunting as the essential element of Truku culture is also recognised by the 
governmental agency of Council of Indigenous Peoples on the central level. The official 
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website states that the Truku culture is characterised by ‘hunting for men while weaving 
for women’. The cultural identity of Truku community is embodied in long lasting hunting 
practices. In contemporary Truku society, the traditional motivations of hunting practices 
such as ritual needs and livelihood demands have partly been transformed into a leisure 
or sporting activity. In general, the population engaging in hunting activities declines 
because of employment options and conservation institutions. The new generations do 
not live in the appropriate environment for them to perform traditional hunting practices 
like the older generations. However, the comparably newer motive of leisure is an 
important element of identity in modern Truku culture. This modern demand of leisure 
may sustain the practices of hunting, especially among the new generations.  
’I don’t think hunting practices become less, instead, there are more and more 
people going hunting. They just go hunting surreptitiously. Some Han Chinese also 
feel curious about hunting and go to the highland with indigenous people. They 
always use shotguns to shoot the game directly.’ (Hunter G, 09.03.2013) 
‘I seldom went hunting before. I had no chance to go to the mountainous area 
because no one could lead me to do so as well as hunting was physical-demanding…I 
have gone hunting when I ministered the church here. Hunting has become my 
hobby…Some people in the church encouraged their children to study rather than go 
hunting. I think we should go hunting for our children because the modern internet 
and computer games are more toxic. These activities cause physical deterioration and 
vision loss of new generations. They are addicted to the computer.’ (Pastor H, 
14.11.2012)  
There remain few Truku people carrying out their hunting practices and the trend 
of hunting as a leisure activity gradually increases according to the curious visitors of Han 
Chinese and leisure needs. Hunting practices exist in Taroko National Park and were run 
by Truku residents in spite of the pressure of conservation institutions. In addition to 
cultural identity, other motives for Truku huntsmen to carry out hunting practices can be 
explored. 
Hunter C in F village still went hunting in his traditional hunting territory to 
execute his father’s last wish. Fathers’ words were traditionally regarded as the norms for 
daily life, which formed the norm system of Truku society, Gaya. Hunter C justified his 
hunting practices in the Park by citing his father’s wish before death. Such an expression 
also indicated that Truku identify was much more important than the Park bans. For him, 
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hunting was a way of living when he returned home from urban life in his forties. He 
depended on hunting to raise children in 1990s. He now also works as a driver but he 
remains to hunt. He noted he used to go to the mountain for hunting.  
‘This is the tradition from our fathers as well as a habit. If Truku people did                          
not go hunting in the past, we cannot know how to hunt the game. We cannot like    
hunting…my motive of hunting is due to livelihood. Some of us aboriginals depend on 
hunting because we do not have a stable job. If I have a stable work in modern society, 
it is impossible for me to do this. I have no other ways of living. I just go hunting for 
livelihood. Some people prefer to eat the game, which means there is such a market’ 
(Hunter C, 20.01.2013) 
’There have been much fewer hunters hunting by trapping within this 
decade…most people use shotgun to hunt the game because the gun is convenient and 
easy…some huntsmen go hunting on the main roads while some others are on the 
trails in the park. These trails were developed and used for walking and hunting by 
our fathers. The park authorities widened them for visitors…Others open their own 
trails due to the fear of the police…’ (Hunter T, 13.01.2013) 
‘The policeman I know in the Park Police came to tell me not to tell others you 
are going hunting and it is better to go by yourself. You had better not come down 
before mid-night. You can come back between 2am and 4am because the Park 
policemen always take rest at this time. (Hunter L, 06.01.2013) 
‘I start off in the early morning and patrol my traps along the way. I then sleep 
there and continue the patrol next day. Finally, I come back home on the flat. It is 
difficult to come home at night. But it is easy to be caught by the police in the day 
time. Why am I not be caught after hunting for decades? It is because I am cautious, 
that is, I make use of night and small hours when the police are still sleeping. I do not 
sleep. I do not have other way.’ (Hunter C, 20.01.2013) 
‘We do not have other way here and as long as the Park Police wait for the 
hunter at the entrance of the Park, where do hunters go? So when the hunters need 
to come back, they usually place the game in the vegetable blankets and the game is 
covered by vegetables. How do the police recognise? ...In fact, they should know the 
tactic. They just do not open the blanket. They are not silly…When I hunted in the 
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Park, I always placed the game in the big toolbox in my car. Then I put some tools 
inside the box…I always did so at that time.’ (Hunter G, 09.03.2013) 
Truku residents continued their traditional practices of hunting due to cultural 
habit, livelihood, and leisure sport in the Park despite hunting activities being illegal in 
terms of conservation. From the perspective of culture, hunting practices had changed 
with time in terms of motivation and ways of hunting. We could interpret these changes 
as cultural adaptions. However, the fact was that Truku individuals kept on hunting 
practices in PAs because of livelihood and cultural reasons, which should be seen as 
resistance to conservation in the Park. The political implication of hunting practices as 
implicit resistance to Park restrictions is that Truku people are more concerned with their 
lifestyle than the external conservation interventions. Indigenous identity of Truku culture 
with custom was more powerful in their mind. The cultural nutrients were embedded in 
Truku lifestyle, especially in hunting practices and wedding rituals. Moreover, Truku 
hunters got reminders from certain indigenous policemen to avoid confrontation with the 
Park Police, which revealed the support of indigenous policemen. There will be discussed 
further in 5.6.1. about the law enforcement by the police. The support enhanced Truku’s 
covert protests via hunting practices in the Park.  
 
 
5.6 The changing thinking in the legal system 
The legal system in Taiwan contains two main sections, namely, the prosecutor 
system of the Justice Minister in central government (Executive Yuan) and the court 
system in the Judicial Yuan. Prosecutors investigate legal cases and decide whether to file 
the lawsuit or not. They may also suspend some prosecutions due to insufficient evidence 
or in the case of minor offences so that there will no longer be a further stage involving 
court judgements. Judges in the court make verdicts according to the legislation and the 
investigation by prosecutors. The police system belonging to the Interior Minister of 
central government aims for law enforcement. In this section, I pay attention to the law 
enforcement of conservation in the Park by the police and the subsequent verdicts made 
by the district court, particularly on those indigenous ‘lawbreakers’. Such an examination 
helps understand the disadvantaged position of indigenous people and the dominant state 
in terms of the legal system despite the importance of some sympathetic measures.  
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5.6.1 The elastic enforcement of conservation legislations by the police 
I had informal conversations with some Park policemen and administrative 
policemen in F village in order to explore their views of indigenous hunting. Two police 
units execute their missions in F village. Taroko National Park Police is directly under the 
National Park Police of the National Police Agency at central level, while the 
administrative police belong to the local police station under Hualien County Police at a 
local level. The local police substation is responsible for accidents and general policing, 
meanwhile the Park Police are accountable for the specific missions such as conservation 
duty and public security in the Park. Both of them can arrest conservation violators such 
as poachers. Their attitude is significant for they are part of the conservation institutions 
to implement the conservation regulations.  
Implementing conservation legislation by the Park Police in the Park at earlier 
stages has been discussed in the sections above. Here I pay attention to the regulation 
enforcements by the police in F village to understand the current interactions between 
this conservation institution and local Truku residents.  
A hunter remembered his experiences of the Park Police. Nowadays some Park 
policemen may come to give information about the Park Police. He unfolded the 
appropriate time of returning from hunting on the mountain. This example compared the 
difference between the contemporary Park Police and the Park Police before. He thought 
the current Park Police was changing their arrogant attitude in this regard: 
‘Sometimes certain policemen come to my place to tell me that if I intend to 
go hunting, do not tell others. It is better to go alone. ‘If you want to go hunting this 
evening, you start off around 6 or 7 p.m. when it is dark. You cannot see anything at 
that moment. You can park your motorbike in the foothills and go to the mountains. 
Never come down before mid-night and it is ok to come back between 2a.m. and 4a.m. 
because we are sleeping at that time. There is no one to examine people on the roads.’ 
he said. It was very rigorous before. They never came to me to inform this. Now it is 
better.’ (Hunter L, 06.01.2013) 
One ex-staff member of Taroko National Park shared his observations on Park 
Police to show the pressure from the peers in the indigenous community and the cultural 
conflict for those police members who were also indigenous people: 
  136 
‘Many members of National Park Police are indigenous people because the 
parks are usually located in remote rural areas or mountainous regions and those 
who may be transferred back to the parks are always local indigenous residents. They 
have the pressure from their peers. If they destroy the locals’ hunting traps, they may 
be cursed by the hunters after work back to the village. The extreme case is that they 
can be attacked when they drink in the village. They have this kind of pressure and 
people also say they can be warned or provoked. Therefore, they do not like to execute 
this type of duty. They also have the cultural conflict. The hero in the indigenous 
community becomes the criminal when the indigenous policemen are at work. For 
these indigenous policemen, they have confusion of values. So this section is not what 
the Park headquarters implement or handle seriously.’ (Official G, 03.03.2013) 
‘Some policemen are nice and most of them are indigenous people. They are 
more tolerant to hunters. They understand hunting and seldom arrest the local 
indigenous residents for poaching. They may sense the pressure. If they treat the 
indigenous residents badly, they have the pressure. The bad policeman can feel the 
stress and the hatred of the villagers.’ (Pastor H, 21.11.2012)  
A short conversation with a park policeman happened when I interviewed an 
indigenous elder in F village. He came for a chat with this interviewee. He advised the local 
hunters to be more cautious when they return from the mountainous regions. 
Simultaneously, he expressed his awkward position of being an indigenous park 
policeman. Besides, his interpretation of a good policeman nowadays is to implement the 
legislation flexibly and to impress people with a benign attitude and service. 
‘I sometimes tell them that they shall be smarter. We indigenous people are 
very simple. When bringing back the game from the mountain, the hunters should 
hide the game at a safe place and then come to see whether there is any strange person 
or not on the road and wait for a while…the poaching pastor might think there was 
no policeman on the road and boldly carried the game to the road…I just want to 
remind them to be smarter when they go hunting…I am embarrassed to be the bad 
person to arrest the hunter. Maybe I am pushed to ambush someday…Sometimes I 
feel awkward for we are friends. I don’t hope that people ignore me when I retire from 
the police…yesterday my team leader said that some indigenous people asked him 
why the Park Police hamper the traditional customs. He is in a pickle. He must arrest 
the poacher because of the Wildlife Conservation Act…But I think that while the 
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regulations are ossified, people can implement them flexibly. The attitude on duty is 
important. If the violator commits a minor crime, we can caution him/her verbally 
because the higher officers taught us this way. They stress nowadays the police 
should serve people. It is service-oriented rather than authoritarian governance. 
During the Japanese Era, people were extremely deferential to the police. But now it 
is different, the police should give people a good impression, to serve the people…We 
cannot be so rigid to dealing with everything according to the law. It is good to replace 
the penalty by persuading. Sometimes…when I was at the police school, the officers 
there also suggested us to treat people well, not to regard the public as criminals…We 
should impress people with our good behaviours. The attitude when enforcing the 
duty shall be good. We cannot search people’s items, and the correct steps are to 
check by sight firstly. Then if there is bloodstain on the item, we may check further...’ 
(Police Officer C, 12.01.2013) 
These interviews reflect the modern picture of implementation of conservation 
regulations by the Park Police in the Park. The Park Police are changing the attitude on 
duty, especially among those indigenous policemen. The awkward role of an indigenous 
law-enforcer makes them want to give the local indigenous residents certain information 
or some ways to avoid being arrested by the Park Police. These indigenous policemen can 
make friends with the local Truku inhabitants easily because of their aboriginal status. 
Behind the status is their cultural identity. That is, they still agree with the lifestyle of 
indigenous people such as indigenous hunting practices. At least, indigenous hunting is 
not the major violation in their mind. This coincided with the case Hunter C mentioned. 
When meeting the indigenous park policemen he knew in the mountains, he understood 
what the policemen asked was a kind of caution for him. Hunter T talked about his 
experience of meeting Park policemen with his brother-in-law. It also revealed that the 
policemen knew their hunting purpose but did not purposely make difficulties for them. 
By contrast, a Han Chinese park policeman interpreted the flexible law 
enforcement differently. He agreed that a policeman should enforce the laws flexibly to 
respect the local culture. For him, a minor crime such as picking up tree branches can be 
dealt with verbally. Nevertheless, the hunting practices are not misdemeanours. 
The local administrative policemen whom I talked to in the Park agreed that the 
police should respect indigenous culture. One indigenous policeman recalled the teaching 
of a higher officer of a local police station in a training conference a few years ago. The 
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officer taught the police attendees to respect local indigenous customs when they were on 
duty. Moreover, the team leader of the local substation also told me that they do not take 
the initiative to seize the local indigenous people. He thought it was more important to 
get along with them harmoniously. They used their judicial discretion while implementing 
the regulations. However, they took one indigenous policeman they knew as an example 
to present differences in regulation implementation. That policeman had arrested several 
local indigenous residents in the Park, which made other policemen concerned. Other 
policemen guessed he just wanted to be promoted for his good performance. In general, 
the majority of local policemen who are also indigenous people respect the indigenous 
culture including hunting practices when they work as law enforcers. 
The arrested Pastor S has three younger brothers who are policemen. They always 
encourage him not to go hunting again. This is because of their brotherly relationship. Yet 
Pastor S complained that many policemen still go hunting and eat game in spite of the ban 
on hunting. He explained the curse that those policemen bullying hunters do not have a 
peaceful end according to traditional norms. 
‘These conservation regulations prohibit hunting. My three younger brothers 
are policemen and they don’t want me to go hunting…which policeman does not go 
hunting? Which one does not eat game? The policeman who arrested me can hunt 
and the other policeman who found other game was Truku. Son of bitch. Forget it. I 
don’t blame them. They want to be the flunky of the government. Up to them. There 
is no good end for those who bully hunters according to the words of our ancestors…’ 
(Pastor S, 27.02.2013) 
This pastor meanwhile revealed the problem in the indigenous community 
resulted from the enforcement of the conservation regulations. 
‘There is a Truku policeman working in the public sector in this village. He 
came to arrest a villager with his colleagues because of a shotgun. It is ridiculous. 
You know that we indigenous people have a shotgun for hunting only. Because of this, 
many people stared at the person with the shotgun. Now many villagers do not talk 
to one another. The hunters do not talk to others easily. They also warn their family 
not to talk to others nor call others because the news of hunting spreads quickly. The 
hunters use argot to refer to hunting things. We have to do many things 
surreptitiously…the atmosphere of some Truku villages is very terrible…you had 
better deal with the game in the mountains and return home to cook it immediately. 
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Never let the neighbours know this, otherwise you will be unlucky. The neighbours 
may come to check your fridge, which causes you to be arrested. A Truku man wanted 
to eat game and bought one barking deer. When he signed it, his neighbours reported 
him to the police to take him and he was arrested. There are more and more bad 
happenings in the Truku villages, even our own compatriots bully our own people.’ 
(Pastor S, 27.02.2013)   
It is clear that the conservation legislation in the indigenous villages was sometimes 
seen as a tool of revenge or power struggle, which undermined the social capital of the 
indigenous community as pastor S pointed out. Therefore, collective action by the Truku 
people may be more and more difficult with the repetition of this vicious circle. The 
undermining of community harmony can be seen as a social impact of conservation 
intervention. Because of the illegal nature of hunting practices in light of conservation in 
the Park, Truku residents could report a hunter with opposing views. Hunting practices 
became hidden in order not to let others have information about hunters. The decline of 
Truku community cohesion was the social impact attributed to conservation intervention 
such as the Park creation.  
To sum up, the implementation of conservation legislation in F village is changing 
to be friendlier toward indigenous residents with regard to hunting. This tendency may 
stem from the atmosphere of respecting of indigenous culture in Taiwan. In addition, the 
majority of indigenous policemen do not regard indigenous hunting as a crime. They may 
agree with such a traditional practice. However, indigenous hunting practices in the Park 
are still a crime according to conservation regulations. The dilemma of the indigenous 
policemen pushed them to search for new options. In the case of last resort, the indigenous 
policemen gave their indigenous friends some information about the police in order to 
help them reduce the risk of being arrested. They did not deliberately make difficulties for 
indigenous hunters when they were aware of hunting activities. The other notable effect 
is that this conservation legislation can undermine the social capital of an indigenous 
community. This hinders the possibility of collective action persisting in the indigenous 
villages. Yet social impacts like this resulted from conservation intervention possibly 
elicited the dissent of the local people. Individual resisting actions such as hunting 
practices and other means of using natural resources against dominant conservation might 
be taken by the affected local Truku.  
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5.6.2 The trend of adjudications of conservation cases in Hualien District Court 
The adjudications of Hualien District Court about conservation cases are 
important because these verdicts show the ultimate outcome of violating the conservation 
legislation. The judicial court system of Taiwan is the institution making judgments 
according to the various laws. Before going to the judge, the prosecutors of the 
administrative system always review suspects to decide whether to bring a lawsuit or not.  
I have examined 146 verdicts in relation to the Wildlife Conservation Act, which 
were issued by Hualien District Court between January 2000 and March 2013 via the online 
Law and Regulations Retrieving System. The jurisdiction of this court contains the whole 
of Hualien County, which is the largest in terms of territory in Taiwan’s district court 
system. The judges of this court would hear the criminal cases such as conservation 
violations in the two Truku villages in my study. Among the collected verdicts, a few are 
about petition of forfeit and revocation of probation, and most others can be categorised 
in general litigation and summary judgment. The majority of litigants of these cases were 
indigenous people of different minority groups in Hualien. They usually violated the 
Wildlife Conservation Act by hunting rare wildlife, mammals and fish or endangered 
species. Some verdicts discussed the controversial problem of indigenous people 
possessing a shotgun with cartridges. The motives, attitude and education of litigants were 
taken into consideration on verdicts made by judges. Almost half the litigations were 
summary judgments, which indicate that these cases were not complicated. These 
indigenous criminals usually admitted their crimes. There were judgments about service 
labour, legal education and conservation education as additional conditions. The special 
court for indigenous people only started in 2013 and I collected one verdict from the special 
court in Hualien.  
Before entering the court system, the prosecutor has the power to make important 
decisions about criminal cases. There are three choices; to prosecute, not to prosecute or 
to defer prosecution, which can be made by the prosecutor as a result of his/her 
investigation. Some conservation cases I examined just confiscated the wildlife and 
deferred prosecution. The reasons for deferred prosecution include the maintenance of 
public interest, the motivation, purpose, attitude, education, disposition, living condition 
of the offender, and the means used of the offence, in accordance with the Criminal Code 
and its enforcement law. These cases should not only affect the misdemeanour. The 
punishment of deferred prosecution on conservation cases is the power of the executive 
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institution---the prosecutor’s office of Ministry of Justice. This is a system in the Executive 
Yuan, so prosecutors’ decision may be influenced by other officials or legislators. This is 
why my indigenous informants usually mentioned the involvement of the legislators at 
central level or representatives at local level if their relatives or friends disobeyed the 
conservation regulations. One interviewee G who once worked in Taroko National Park 
discussed his observations about conservation offences by indigenous people.  
‘When I worked in the Park headquarters several years ago, I reviewed the 
cases by gathering the indictments of not to prosecute cases. Maybe indigenous 
people develop their tactics to deal with these legal situations. The prosecutors 
probably think the regulations about nature conservation and indigenous culture are 
changing. Also these cases of violating conservation legislation are minor offense for 
prosecutors. If the suspects are indigenous people, the outcome of violation is very 
different from the Han Chinese criminals’. My conclusions show that suspects were 
not prosecuted as long as they were aboriginal, and they refused to admit their guilty 
no matter how exaggerated the excuses were…’ (Official G, 03.03.2013) 
His conclusion to some degree is right when I examined the verdicts of 
conservation cases. Quite a few indigenous lawbreakers, nature conservation law in 
particular, were not prosecuted or got deferred prosecution because of poor living 
condition, low education, weak legal conception, and customary motives for hunting. 
These requirements for non-prosecution and deferred prosecution in the Criminal Code 
have been mentioned above.  Some indigenous people did meet these conditions, thus 
they got light sentences. The official noted that the legal system saw indigenous people as 
different groups when investigating and making judgment. This may have facilitated the 
birth of ‘Indigenous Court and Investigation’ in 2013. An official N working in the Taiwan 
High Prosecutors Office, briefly talked about the start of establishing a new special court 
for indigenous peoples. It is due to their distinct value. Yet it is difficult for the state to 
legislate new regulations for indigenous groups.  
‘This is the primary goal of creating the specific court for indigenous 
peoples…their history and values are different from the mainstream legal system. But 
it is impossible to pass a new law only for them. It is too hard. For example, land 
registration and sale are common in Taiwan. The principle of land pre-emption as the 
traditional value of indigenous groups is not recognised…the legal system cannot 
amend the land system because of the value of indigenous peoples in theory no matter 
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if the system is right or not. In this authoritarian society, groups with power and force 
can manipulate these…the state does not allow exception…Taiwan just started the 
change…’ (Official N, 30.09.2014) 
Among the verdicts I reviewed, half of the conservation litigations were summary 
judgments, which indicated these cases were comparably simpler than other criminal 
cases. The defendants’ confession and sufficient existing evidence made the oral 
arguments of general litigation unnecessary. The other precondition of summary 
judgment was that the case was a misdemeanour and it could merely be declared 
probation, imprisonment of six months or commutation to a fine by the judge finally. This 
did save the public sector legal resources as well as the litigant’s financial expenses. The 
violators of conservation cases are always indigenous people, and the summary judgments 
revealed that many indigenous suspects confessed their violation of conservation 
legislations. These conservation violations were not treated as felonies. Therefore, the 
judgements were simple to describe the punishment and then the facts and reasons were 
listed including the regulations.  
In general, the punishment in conservation cases was usually slight according to 
these verdicts. For example, the indigenous litigants who were arrested due to poaching 
were usually sentenced to the minimum term of imprisonment which was six months 
according to Article 42 of the Wildlife Conservation Act. However, they were in the end 
sentenced to probation. The judge usually considered they were indigenous people, which 
meant they usually had different living styles from mainstream society in Taiwan. Many 
verdicts used the following descriptions. ‘The litigant had poor awareness of the laws and 
did not know it was wrong to violate the regulations in this case. But his attitude was good 
after being committed, which revealed he was remorseful. After the lessons of this 
sentence, he should exercise greater vigilance. There should be no danger of recidivism. 
The court therefore thinks it is appropriate not to perform the punishment temporarily 
and declares probation for several years to encourage his rehabilitation.’  
This typical judgment adopted the mainstream idea of legislation to see indigenous 
people as having a weak understanding of regulations. The sincere attitude of indigenous 
criminals showed their repentance. The shock education of prosecution must teach them 
a lesson to avoid recidivism. Since they did not commit the crime on purpose and it is 
impossible for them to repeat the offence, the judge decided to suspend punishment. The 
outcome for indigenous ‘offenders’ may be good, but such statements did not really 
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respect differences in society of Taiwan. The powerful mainstream values still look down 
on the minority groups in terms of their institutions. The dominant Han Chinese society 
defines what crime is and establishes institutions to implement the legal system. The 
‘criminal behaviours’ of indigenous people here such as hunting and collecting natural 
resources were reasonable under their traditional customs and contexts. The rights of 
indigenous people in the justice system are still neglected despite the lenient sentence 
according to these adjudications in relation to the Wildlife Conservation Act.  
The other controversial issue among the adjudications was the shotgun “problem”. 
It is illegal to make and possess a gun in the light of the Regulations of Guns, Ammunition 
and Weaponry Control. However, several amendments of such regulations to deal with 
the particularity of lifestyle of indigenous people have decriminalised this act. That is, if 
the gun is a living tool for indigenous people, it is legal to make and possess a gun. The 
prosecutor or judge thus sought for evidence whether the shotgun was used only as a tool 
in their life. The decriminalisation of manufacturing/owning a shotgun for indigenous 
people was based on the spirit of Article Ten of the Additional Articles of the Constitution 
to recognise cultural pluralism and promote the development of indigenous cultures. 
Further, some judges interpreted above legislations to suggest that owning a shotgun is 
not the prerequisite only of those indigenous people who rely on sustenance hunting. 
Indigenous people who use a shotgun as a tool in their life can also own it legally. The 
judges cited the processes of amending the law and affirmed the constitutional 
amendment in order to confirm the innocence of indigenous litigants regarding shotguns. 
In fact, the majority of indigenous people possessing shotguns use them for hunting 
practices or ritual needs, not for harming others. The opinions of these judges on the 
shotgun topic supported the speciality of traditional culture and ensured that some 
indigenous residents still go hunting when they are free. Since the shotgun was seen as a 
life tool, the decriminalisation of manufacturing/ possessing a shotgun should apply to the 
whole indigenous group. Such opinions are similar to those of one aboriginal legal 
professor: 
‘National Police Agency established a rule to examine whether the shotgun is 
traditional or not…what is the purpose of the rule? What does it limit? People have to 
stress they are indigenous people first. Then their possession of a shotgun seems to 
return to the situation one hundred years ago such as they made a shotgun according 
to traditional ways, and it is reasonable and legal to own it. However, many 
indigenous people are arrested, prosecuted and sentenced. The police still arrest 
  144 
indigenous people owning shotguns in these years but some prosecutors dislike this 
because the regulation has changed. Some prosecutors still prosecute these offenders. 
A few judges have declared they will acquit13 but they are few only… there has been a 
new verdict which claimed the aboriginal litigant having two shotguns was not guilty. 
A judge adopted two covenants (ICCPR, International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and ICESCR, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights) to explain his opinions. The primary spirit is ‘cultural development’. The judge 
thought the right for indigenous people to possess the shotgun should also coincide 
with the concepts of cultural development and cultural creativity. Indigenous people 
cannot sustain the original situation of long ago with the development of science and 
technology. A shotgun is also developed. There are new technologies being put into 
traditional knowledge system. But a shotgun is still a shotgun. The concept of a 
shotgun is the same (for hunting only). The judge established his opinions on this.’ 
(Professor A, 08.03.2013) 
The next discussion was whether the litigant was aboriginal or not. Indigenous 
communities were usually convicted leniently on shotgun topic in accordance with a series 
of amendments of the Regulations of Guns, Ammunition and Weaponry Control. It is easy 
to know one’s status of indigenous people by checking the identity card. Among these 
verdicts, there was an identity controversy and the judges referenced the Status Act for 
Indigenous Peoples, the official documents of Council of Indigenous Peoples and the 
explanation letter of household registration unit to confirm his status. In this case the 
defendant showed his great grandfather’s census data from the Japanese Era to insist on 
his aboriginal status but this was rejected because on the documents above there was no 
note about his being an aborigine on his identity card. He was therefore sentenced to 
imprisonment over one year due to possessing a shotgun. The other special defendant was 
a non-aboriginal but had lived in indigenous community for a long time. He learnt the 
skills of making shotguns and did manufacture one for hunting wildlife. The judges 
considered his situation and the punishment of his crime of manufacturing of firearms 
was mitigated.  
                                                     
13 Such a judgement came from a verdict of Taitung District Court in 2012. An indigenous man possessed 
a shotgun made by modern ways in his hut. He was arrested by the police according to the Controlling 
Guns, Ammunition, and Knives Act. A judge acquitted this indigenous man finally because he thought 
that indigenous people have their own culture (hunting) according to the Additional Articles of the 
Constitution of ROC, and indigenous people should benefit from scientific progress (making shotguns 
in accordance with modern ways) in line with two covenants.       
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I found some new precedents were established when reading these judgments. For 
example, labour service was usually an additional condition for one year after issuing the 
verdict during the probation period. A charitable donation could be the basis of mitigation 
of punishment. Legal education and conservation learning both seemed to become the 
means to reduce the violation of conservation regulations. In addition, I collected a 
conservation adjudication in 2013 and its reference number indicated that it concerned an 
aboriginal person. It was judged by the new aboriginal court which deals only with 
aboriginal cases based on Article 30 of the Basic Law for Indigenous Peoples. By examining 
this case, the old indigenous hunter was sentenced to imprisonment for six months but 
probation for two years. The game, shotgun, and ammunition were confiscated. The 
additional condition was legal education for twenty hours. It seemed there was no 
difference from the previous verdicts about conservation violation because the current 
conservation legislation is the foundation of this adjudication. Indigenous people and their 
customs unfortunately still lose their importance in the special court. 
In summary, indigenous hunting practices were in conflict with conservation 
legislation in Taiwan, in particular in PAs. All cases in national parks (there are two parks 
in the jurisdiction of Hualien District Court) were penalised according to the Wildlife 
Conservation Act rather than the National Park Law because the loss of few animals did 
not significantly damage the parks. Indigenous huntsmen were usually sentenced to 
probation for several years as most of them were arrested for hunting for the first time. 
The lenient sentence for indigenous defendants was one climate among the justice system. 
But such a ‘grace’ exposed the institutional conflicts between different groups. The 
dominant community controls the justice system and imposes its institutions on other 
groups. Article Ten of the Additional Articles of the Constitution stresses the cultural 
pluralism of Taiwan and indigenous culture should be promoted sustainably. The 
emphasis of fundamental law still cannot strengthen the position of indigenous people 
within the justice system. Indigenous people of Taiwan still need the amnesty of all 
dominant institutions if they offend these institutions.  
5.6.3 Some essential problems of National Park Law 
There have been some problems when the Park Police carry out their conservation 
mission in the park. These problems stem from the nature of National Park Law. Firstly, 
the law has been formulated for over 40 years without any essential correction. It implies 
that the problem of outdated provisions may not coincide with contemporary conditions. 
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The second problem is raised when people interpret some relevant articles of National 
Park Law.  
Most of the forests in Taroko National Park belong to forest compartments of the 
Forestry Bureau, so the Wildlife Conservation Acts formulated in 1989 can be applied to 
the territory of Park. In the interview with a female elder Y, a park policeman came to chat 
with her. I took the opportunity to ask him about the implementation of the conservation 
regulations in the Park. He talked about poaching and said that hunting the general 
wildlife such as wild boar in the Park will be penalised in accordance with National Park 
Law. As for hunting protected endangered species, the Wildlife Conservation Act becomes 
the legal source of the penalty rather than National Park Law. This coincides with the 
interview with an official of Taroko National Park headquarters. This is the second 
controversy that two streams of conservation legislation are used in national parks. This 
problem simultaneously highlights the domination of conservation in the Park. The Park 
authorities use both regulations to control resources and people within the Park. 
‘It is different in and out the park. Outside of the national park, the Wildlife 
Conservation Act is used and legal hunting can be applied according to the 
regulations. Meanwhile, it is forbidden to hunt wildlife because the 13rd Article of 
National Park Law…The Park Police apply Wildlife Conservation Act to poaching 
matters in the Park now. The poaching cases are usually divided into protected 
endangered species and general wildlife in terms of the wild animals a hunter hunts. 
The Park Police then transfer the hunter to the local police station. He will be 
punished according to Wildlife Conservation Act.’ (Official C, 07.11.2012)   
Its application of Wildlife Conservation Act reflects the problem of National Park 
Law formulated over 40 years ago. The penal section of the law seems to be out of date 
when the newer act is used. The two reasons may explain why the Act is applied when the 
Park Police conduct their conservation mission. The problems which emerge are the 
correction of the law and the integration of conservation regulations and governmental 
agencies in the park. 
One of the management partitions of a national park is existing use area in 
accordance with the Article 12 of the Law. The eighth Article defines the general controlled 
area, namely, the existing use area, and notes the residents can sustain the original land 
use in the park. Therefore, Truku people should claim that their hunting territory, a type 
of land use, can be sustained within the general controlled area in the park. They can 
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continue their hunting practices in the park. However, Article 13 of the Law expressly 
prohibits hunting practices in the park. The different clauses related to original land use 
can be interpreted differently be various stakeholders. This fuzzy space of interpretation 
is a problem itself, but can be adopted as the negotiation between the local indigenous 
people and the Park authorities. The Taroko Park official, C, pointed out the vague 
interpretation. 
‘Existing buildings can be sustained in the general controlled area. The Law 
recognises the original land use. There was no clear definition and explanation of the original 
land use when the law was formulated in 1972. Whether afforestation or hunting can be 
continued or not? Article 13 notes the hunting prohibition... there is no integration among 
several articles of the law… in fact, it gives room which the local indigenous people can use. 
When the wildlife from the protected area destroys the farm, why can I hunt the animals? It 
is legal in accordance with Wildlife Conservation Act…why do the authorities designate the 
traditional hunting territory as the ecological protected area rather than the general 
controlled area? ...maybe it is sufficient to designate one-tenth of Taroko National Park as 
the hunting territory of the local Truku people.’ (Official C, 07.11.2012)   
Overall, there are three points here in the interview. First, some articles of the 
National Park Law were out of date. Second, the Wildlife Conservation Acts were 
employed by the Park to supplement the slight penalty of the National Park Law in order 
to strengthen the power of nature conservation. Third, the zoning of the Park could be 
used by the locals because of loose restriction. These problems reveal the domination of 
the Park for they strengthen the power of manipulation within the Park boundary by the 
Park authorities. Access to natural resources by the local Truku residents is concurrently 
restrictive. The law is the main legal source of the park. It is a tool for the Park authorities 
to justify their conservation intervention and communications with the locals. Yet there 
are critical defects in the law. The Park authorities and the state did not propose a revised 
version in order to adapt to the current environment and society. Accordingly, the Park 
authorities with Park Police could keep on implementing such a strict regulation in the 
Park. The Park remained a territory where special law was enforced to control local 
people’s behaviours.  
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5.7 Participation schemes of Taroko National Park 
The local participation schemes in the Park suppose that participation must 
improve the relationship between the Park headquarters and the locals. Thus local 
participation is the foundation for further co-management arrangements in the Park. Yet 
can such a positive supposition be applied to the Taroko Park? The tangible scheme for 
the local indigenous people to participate in Park affairs is the beginning of the inspection 
of local participation. The participation schemes of Taroko National Park Headquarters 
can be traced back to the start of this new century. The director at that time held a series 
of events to demonstrate a friendly attitude towards the local Truku residents. A new 
cultural participatory committee was established for Truku people to join in the 
management of the park but only on a consultation level. This innovation in the National 
Park system was later discontinued because there was no legal basis for the committee. 
There were at least four types of scheme of Taroko National Park for Truku people 
to join in the management of Park according to my fieldwork. These channels of 
participation contained the official committees, commissioned projects of the Park 
headquarters, festival events, and employment opportunities of the park. The 
participation levels of these types vary, and primarily depend on the designation of the 
schemes by the administration. The Park authorities play the dominant role in these 
participation schemes. For example, the Park headquarters designed the cultural 
committee and selected its members. Without these specific conduits, the local residents 
cannot express their views about the Park and the Park authorities easily. That is because 
these mechanisms are the only form of interaction between the Park authorities and the 
local Truku people. 
5.7.1 Participation in official committees 
The start of local participation of Park management was a series of cultural events 
such as lectures about indigenous culture in 2000. In 2001, the ‘Indigenous Cultural 
Consultation Committee’ was formed by the Park authorities. Before forming this official 
committee, the Park authorities once claimed they had a communication platform in the 
form of a committee to deal with the matters of the local indigenous people after the 
protest in 1994. However, Sung and Yeh (2010) found that such a committee for aboriginal 
affairs did not exist. The fourth director of Taroko National Park Headquarters 
commenced consultation with the local elders and held a series of events such as for the 
rectification of the local names, and a conference about indigenous culture in 2000. The 
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establishment of the ‘Indigenous Cultural Consultation Committee’ was the final outcome 
after these welcome events in relation to Truku culture. The proposals and discussions of 
the three meetings of the committee in 2002 were seen as official proposals for various 
sections of the Park to deal with. An official L explained why the Park headquarters used 
‘culture’ as a participatory aspect, 
‘That was a breakthrough at that time. The reason why the director selected 
the aspect of ‘cultural consultation’ was because the perspective coincided with what 
the management unit could expand. Culture was one way for the administrative 
system at that time to break the budget restrictions. Culture was a possible link…this 
should be the limit of the management authority. Without the legal rules there was 
no power to sustain the affairs of co-management…there must be a legal basis for the 
administration to establish every unit in it. People in the administration including the 
leader cannot violate the legal norms.’ (Official L, 05.03.2013) 
This committee was composed of the local leaders, staff of the Park authorities, 
and some scholars from the universities. The aboriginal representatives accounted for half 
of the committee (11/22). The proposals of the meetings were handled by different sections 
of the Park headquarters and the planning section was responsible for the administrative 
affairs of this committee. The Agency of Planning, which was above the national park 
system, issued an official document to command national parks to establish committees 
similar to Taroko National Park later in 2002 (Sung and Yeh, 2010). The new committee 
for communication with the local people seemed to be approved by the central 
government. However, due to the lack of legal force, the fifth director intended to cancel 
the fourth meeting in December 2002. Many representatives expressed their ideas for 
convening the assembly and pushed the Park headquarters hold the meeting. The Park 
did not deny the committee that meeting but there was no meeting of the committee 
called in the following years. In 2006, the Park authorities discussed with several local 
churches to establish a committee to deal with local matters but such planning was 
stillborn because the director was transferred to another national park (Sung and Yeh, 
2010). The official website of Taroko National Park Headquarters reveals that different 
sections of the Park accounted for different communities in the Park territory as the 
partnership network during 2003-2006. The staff entered the communities to understand 
the problems and views of the local indigenous people and provided help. In 2007, the 
section of planning of the Park also established a ‘petition window’ for local people to 
express their opinions (interviews with official L, 2013). The informant thought the Park 
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headquarters interacted with the local people all the time, but there might be no the 
official channel or formal name for the cultural committee. There were four joint 
conferences being called in 2007 and January 2008 for the leaders of governmental 
agencies, local churches, communities and Truku elites to attend. Some specific themes 
such as eco-tourism development and cultural events were discussed in the conferences. 
The third conference noticed the new draft of rules of co-management in the indigenous 
regions and recommended 11 representatives to prepare for the co-management 
committee. The fourth meeting in January 2008 declared the co-management committee 
would replace the conference. Two preparatory meetings of the co-management 
committee were convened in 2008 and then were paused for a while because of the change 
of director (Sung and Yeh, 2010). The Ministry of Interior issued the ‘Standards for 
Establishing Co-Management Committee in Indigenous Regions’ in October 2009. The 
Park thus held the first meeting of co-management committee in 2010 and second one in 
2011.  
 
Time Official communication scheme Remark 
2002 The committee of indigenous cultural 
consultation (non-official committee) 
Four meetings 
2003-2006 Partnership network Irregular visit 
2007- The petition window For nearby 
communities 
2007-2008 The conference of indigenous affairs Four meetings 
2009 The standards of establishing the co-
management committee in indigenous 
regions (official administrative rule) 
Agency of Planning, 
the Ministry of 
Interior 
2010-2011 The committee of co-management Two meetings 
Table 5.1 The official participation schemes of Taroko Park 
Source: Information drawn from interviews with L, and Sung and Yeh (2010) 
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The development process for official participation schemes of the Park indicates 
that first, the legal basis of every scheme is significant because this is in relation to the 
budget and implementation. The legal basis ensures not only budgeting of such a scheme 
but the legality of implementing such a scheme. Two factors affect the implementation of 
such a scheme. First, the legal basis of a scheme supports the finance and implementation 
of such a scheme, which allow the scheme to run smoothly and sustainably, irrespective 
of any change to the Park directorship. Thus, the scheme may become a formal institution 
of the Park headquarters. Second, these schemes vary according to the change of directors 
of the park. This means the schemes run only for a short time. It is not easy for the schemes 
to transfer to be long-term institutions.  
Since the legal basis of the co-management committee has now been established, 
I will examine the legal resource and the implementation of the new participation rules. 
The standards are formulated in the ‘Rules of Co-Management of Resources in Indigenous 
Regions’ of 2007. The rules can be traced back to the ‘Basic Laws of Indigenous Peoples’ of 
2005. This implies that the standards were passively enacted in accordance with other 
regulations rather than due to consultation with the indigenous people.  
‘These are the standards, because there was an article in the ‘Basic Law of 
Indigenous Peoples’ about establishing the co-management committee to protect the 
rights and resources of indigenous people. A parent law extends to many agencies to 
formulate their administrative rules. These rules are based on the parent law.’ 
(Official L, 05.03.2013) 
The standards note that the main mission of the committee is to deal with affairs 
in relation to indigenous people including the plans of the Park and the proposals of the 
indigenous community. In other words, the committee is a task-oriented group. The 
members of the committee are the representatives of the local indigenous people, experts 
or scholars, and the representatives of governmental agencies which are relevant to 
indigenous affairs. Half of the members of the co-management committee must be 
indigenous people who are recommended by the indigenous communities. If there is no 
tribal meeting organisation, the township office can recommend members. The director 
of the Park is the convener of the meeting. The meetings are convened every half a year in 
principle.  
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‘The standards are also task-oriented. Unless the Legislation Yuan at a 
central level amends the law, the committee may become permanent or the necessary 
section. It is possible to change on that high level. (Official L, 05.03.2013) 
The records of the two meetings of the co-management committee reveal that 
those representatives of indigenous people were the leaders of Truku social organisations, 
the head of F village and the head of the township office. These Truku leaders represented 
the local indigenous communities to express their opinions. Official L explained the 
members of the co-management committee and the problems happening at the meetings: 
‘The members of the committee contained the Park authorities, local 
governmental agencies---county government, county parliament, township office, 
and township representatives, and those representatives recommended by the tribal 
meeting groups. However, there was no tribal meeting group in this township. 
Therefore, the township office offered the list of members of indigenous people. The 
people the office recommended of course belonged to the same faction. So you can 
imagine what happened at the meeting. That is, what the head of the office said on 
the meeting was supported by the other seven members. No objection among those 
aboriginal members. This was the problem which happened in practice…In principle, 
no matter on the legal and practical levels, we hoped to invite members who were real 
representatives in the indigenous groups. But we saw the practical difficulty that the 
standards stipulated the tribal meeting groups recommend members but the group 
in the village was not running or immature. Thus, the implementation changed to the 
governmental agency like the situation. I think if the regulations are incomplete, 
people may interpret by themselves. If the legislations are complete, it may be not 
flexible to implement the legislations. It is difficult in practice. It is not easy to 
consider both sides, it is kind of dilemma.’ (Official L, 05.03.2013) 
The benign conception of the standards can lead to a power struggle in practice 
when the tribal meeting groups at the local level do not operate well. This was not what 
the policy makers expected at the beginning. It indicates that the policy or regulations at 
the central level may not be implemented successfully locally because not every factor of 
the policy is complete. Even if the elements are complete, the local environment could 
affect the policy implementation. It indicates that the policy should take the environment 
of implementation into consideration when policy making, or policy ideals may be 
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distorted. In this way, the head of the township office can dominate the indigenous 
community of the committee, even the meeting, to carry on a personal agenda. 
Further, it is important to examine the proposals and discussions at the meetings 
in order to understand the practical operation of this co-management committee. The 
motions of the first meeting primarily concerned the development issues of the local 
Truku people. Some members suggested increasing employment opportunities for the 
local indigenous residents. The training programmes such as a tour guide course were 
needed for the local people to develop eco-tourism in the Park. Some local leaders asked 
for more participation of Park festivals and for a budget increase for cultural events. The 
head of the Township Office hoped that the land problems in the Park could be solved, 
especially the reserved lands for indigenous people. It is worth mentioning that a retired 
Truku principal noticed this committee was a task-oriented one and suggested a change 
to a permanent committee. In addition, a scholar who worked in this Park before, 
suggested adding the representatives of the local inhabitants (Taroko National Park, 201).  
The second meeting was held three months after the current director’s 
inauguration. The meeting started with the responses to the motions at the first meeting. 
I found the Park usually replied to the proposals with projects. For example, a new festival 
event ‘Happy Taroko 2011’ was used to promote Truku culture and local tourism industry. 
The Park also financially sponsored the training programme with the Township Office. 
The Park headquarters thought they had hired many indigenous people in accordance 
with the regulations to respond to the issue of local employment. As for the land issue, the 
Park authorities would report to the higher agency. These replies seemed to ignore some 
fundamental difficulties of Truku people such as employment and tourism industry. Most 
job vacancies for the local people were labour service with low income. The employer was 
the outsourcing company instead of the Park. This meant poor protection and harsh 
working conditions. The eco-tourism industry benefited merely a few residents who were 
wealthy enough to run such a business. The empowerment of training courses to cultivate 
the aboriginal tour guides did not ensure that these trainees would have jobs in the future. 
In fact, the travel agency usually hired their own tour guides rather than the local people. 
I do not think that eco-tourism is what the local indigenous people embrace. Eco-tourism 
could be the wishful thinking of the Park headquarters after considering the dilemma of 
conservation and development. 
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The majority of motions at the second conference focused on development as well, 
particularly the suggestions of construction projects and environmental improvement. 
These motions were proposed by the head of township office and the chairman of 
township representatives. These motions looked like the motions at the meeting of 
township representatives. This led to a negative complaint of the Park headquarters. So 
some Park staff did not expect a proactive meeting of the co-management committee. 
‘We have established the committee of co-management. But everyone thinks 
it is a disaster. It is not a disaster for an individual. If it is not necessary to establish 
the committee, we don’t do it. If it is not necessary to call the meeting, we don’t do it. 
If it is not necessary to discuss motions, we don’t do it. Can you understand? That is 
a very heavy burden…because what the committee can offer are ‘resources’. However, 
we cannot afford the resources… it was like the interaction between the township 
office and the township representative, that kind of level…’ (Official C and L, 
05.03.2013) 
Another problem came from the nature of the standards which were designed by 
the administration. The standards place limitations on the committee. For instance, the 
Park authorities have the power to pick half of the members. The task-oriented nature also 
implies that the committee is needed when necessary.  
‘The committee is still the design of the administration. There are many 
things under it secretly. These secret things are meant to help the person in charge 
(the power) to eliminate interference. It looked fair to distribute the members to every 
community…but when some experts/scholars join in the committee, the local leaders 
join, and the director of the Park also selects some non-indigenous people to join in 
the members…now the co-management is running the ‘consultation’ only…this is 
relevant to what we talked ‘suffrage’, the rights to participate in public affairs…’ 
(Official C, 05.03.2013) 
Informant C stressed the motivation for designing such standards to avoid the 
interference of the local indigenous people since the convener (the director of the Park) 
possesses the power of selecting the members from other governmental agencies and 
academia. These half members of the co-management committee may form a force to 
counter the interests of indigenous people. The standards makers who represent the 
mainstream Han Chinese society, did not allow the aboriginal members to participate in 
these public affairs of the Park. The participation level is merely ‘consultation’ in practice.  
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The irregular meetings cannot effectively take care of the needs of the local 
indigenous people. This is not only because the nature of them is task-oriented, but also 
for the operations of meetings. 
‘I think the committee should operate regularly and continuously. But it is 
not the fact. As I know, the reasons why the committee cannot operate like that is 
because many members admitted that they came for the resources. When the Park 
authorities can’t afford the resources, we really cannot do it. So we called two 
conferences in 2010 and 2011 respectively. The members of the first session expired the 
term at the end of last year. If we convene a meeting this year, we need to select 
members. (Official L, 05.03.2013) 
These official meetings and co-management committees participated in by the 
leaders of Truku people unfolded that the Park authorities were the dominant agency to 
manipulate the schemes. The directors of the Park usually guided these schemes such as 
the selection of committee members and the frequency of meetings. The Park 
headquarters grasp the utmost power to control the committee. Their control might stem 
from the design of legal foundation. The rules allow the Park to own the greatest 
discretion. The level of local participation by the local leaders was comparably low. 
Moreover, in such schemes, did the local representatives really express the voice of Truku 
residents? They appeared to merely represent their interests according to the analysis of 
meeting records. In general, the participatory schemes failed to improve the relationship. 
The Park authorities led the formal meetings. The co-management arrangements did not 
achieve the goal of co-management with the local Truku people.  
5.7.2 Participation in commissioned projects 
The commissioned projects were the projects financially supported by Taroko 
National Park headquarters. Some of these projects were in relation to the local Truku 
people, particularly the industry planning for the local residents in the Park. These plans 
were usually allocated to professional organisations such as NGOs. Here the participation 
of the local people in the projects denotes that the local people had the opportunity to join 
the process of conducting the projects. Perhaps they could express their views of the 
commissioned projects despite the projects being sponsored by the Park. I selected five 
projects as examples to explore the participation of Truku people in the park management. 
These plans involving the local people were studied after 2000, which indicated that the 
participation issue was to be valued in the new century. These projects included ‘a public 
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forum for developing community-based ecotourism action plan’ in 2004, ‘An overall 
planning of ecotourism in Taroko National Park’ in 2005, ‘An ecotourism programme with 
the local hunters in one highland area in the Park’ in 2007, ‘Expanding partnership with 
the local people on conservation action in the Park’ in 2009, and the series of ‘Agriculture 
transformation to organic agriculture in a highland area in the Park’ from 2010-2013. 
Furthermore, a conservation project sponsored by the conservation section of the Park in 
2005 is also worth mentioning for some Truku residents participated in conservation 
action to protect the river in their traditional territory. The following paragraph outlines 
the projects in order. 
In the Project forum discussion, the different views and concerns between one 
local group and the Park headquarters became clear. The Park regarded natural 
conservation as the priority while the Truku community stressed their livelihood 
development. The research suggested that mutual communication and making use of the 
current regulations for both sides’ interests were necessary. The Park authorities should 
empower the people and the amendment of inappropriate regulations was also needed 
(Lee and Wang, 2004). Findings of the holistic planning of ecotourism of the Park in 2005 
indicated the Park authorities should take hierarchy principle of ecotourism and cooperate 
with the local Truku inhabitants for management of ecotourism trips. Accordingly, the 
planning suggested establishing a co-management mechanism for the local aboriginal 
community to take part in Park management (Lin, 2005). The trial ecotourism programme 
with the local huntsmen playing the role of tour guides developed the connection between 
wildlife conservation and local economic development. The idea was to offer interests to 
Truku hunters that they may recognise the un-consumptive value of wildlife so that the 
conception of wildlife conservation could be established in their mind. The participating 
visitors could experience the lifestyle of indigenous people and see this as a special 
ecotourism trip. The practical project ran five trips during June and November in 2007 and 
found some elements that could impede the promotion of such an ecotourism tour by 
questionnaire survey (Wu, 2007). The project concerning partnership with local residents 
noted the general controlled area could hold a chance for the local people to enhance the 
partnership with the park authorities as people were allowed to develop certain economic 
activity in the area according to the National Park Law. The Project therefore suggested 
that the Park authorities establish a long-term mechanism to connect to the local people 
in order to facilitate the partnership (Lu, 2009). The agricultural reform projects have been 
sponsored by the Park headquarters for at least four years, which indicated the park 
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authorities were serious about this topic in the Park. Among these project documents from 
2010 to 2013, several stages of agricultural reform occurred in one highland area of the Park 
including the initial promotion of organic agriculture and communication, there was 
further cooperation by signing contracts for producing organic vegetables, to gain 
verification of organic food, and the marketing of organic fruits and vegetables. More 
farmers joined the organic group in the highland area according to the data of the projects 
(Su, 2013).  
The participation of the local Truku residents highlighted the differences in 
thinking and concern from the Park authorities when the projects were carried out 
because these projects primarily dealt with the economic development of the local people. 
In the forum project in 2004, by holding the joint conference among the stakeholders, the 
local people and the Park headquarters dialogued on certain issues on economic, socio-
cultural and environmental domains for the better management of that highland area. For 
example, the local Truku residents owning reserved lands in one highland area of the Park 
stressed their livelihood needs such as the transportation of agricultural products and 
employment. Issues of everyday life such as electricity also indicated the practical concern 
of the local people. The representative of the Park headquarters listened and responded 
with the expectation of collective consensus of the residents at the meetings. This project 
organised the forum platform for the local Truku residents to attend to express their 
thoughts, which could be seen as the initial step of communication between the Park 
authorities and the Truku civilians. The local Truku people in that area also self-organised 
a new association as a response after these communication conferences held by the 
programme moderator. However, the project aborted and lasted only for one year. The 
suggestion of collaborate planning might be shelved after the project.  
In 2005, the overall eco-tourism planning found six challenges of developing eco-
tourism in the Park. One of those was that the economic development of the local 
inhabitants was difficult in the Park because of the conservation restrictions. The eco-
tourism industry might be the reconciliation of conservation and development in the 
Taroko National Park. The local people could be trained as eco-tourism professionals to 
improve their livelihood. The suggestion was also consistent with one principle of 
ecotourism--- the participation of the local inhabitants. Furthermore, the culture of Truku 
people played a significant role in the human resource of the Park. The culture enriched 
the ecotourism development in the Park. The project recommended that cooperative 
management of ecotourism was necessary. The communication platform of the Park for 
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the local people to participate could be established. The participation of the local residents 
in this planning project was a suggestion for the future development of eco-tourism. Local 
residents’ concerns were addressed as one of the concrete recommendations. This was at 
best an indication of the policy of the Park rather than a feasible substantive policy. The 
next year of this project paid attention to the participation of social enterprises. This might 
imply that the Park authorities did not anticipate any further step in the co-management 
with the local people.  
The initiators of the project in 2007 arranging an actual hunting trip with the 
Truku hunters thought that it was a chance for Han Chinese visitors to experience the life 
of Truku people in the highland. The questionnaire survey of the visitors attending the 
trip replied that the hunter guides of Truku people were not as expert at interpretation as 
they anticipated. An official L of the Park headquarters mentioned that one of the plights 
of this project was the capacity of interpretation of the Truku hunters. 
‘The first problem of the project was the resource of the visitors. The bad 
weather impeded the trip. The other one was the hunters were not good at guiding 
tours and interpreting, so they had to depend upon some outsiders…. but my personal 
opinion was that it took time to empower and coach these local residents.’ (Official 
L, 05.03.2013)  
This subjective opinion of visitors and the official reflected the views of 
mainstream Chinese society about what an excellent tour guide was. These Han Chinese 
tourists were not aware that Truku huntsmen were always quiet because the informal 
norms of Truku tradition---Gaya standardised the hunters and made hunters behave. They 
had been disciplined by these teachings of traditional norms since they were young. Being 
a hunter one should behave quietly and cannot freely speak. Therefore, Truku hunters are 
unlikely to be eloquent tour guides. There is also the typical response that the customer-
oriented conception of the mainstream Chinese society imposed on the minority 
indigenous community, which was unfair. One essential principle of authentic ecotourism 
is the participation of the local people. This idea can be applied to these trial trips of the 
project that the tours shall be led by the local Truku residents to reflect the Truku 
characteristics. The local residents can involve the visitors in their life-style more deeply. 
They should take the initiative to organise such travel in their territory. Moreover, the 
non-consumptive use of wildlife of this project did not coincide with the traditions of the 
Truku people. According to my interview with one Truku park ranger the real hunting trip 
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occurred after the tourism trips. This revealed the local Truku people’s identity, which was 
greater than the modern interest in the ecotourism programme.  
The partnership project in 2009 pointed out certain weaknesses of one local Truku 
community when exploring the partnership between the local people and the Park 
authorities. The Truku inhabitants seemed to lack traditional knowledge in everyday life 
and some people simply pandered to the visitors. They doubted the governmental agencies 
and the institutions. When ecotourism was concerned, the response of the majority of 
residents was passive including the weakening of traditional knowledge in modern society, 
the mistrust of governmental agencies, and the passive responses of residents. It can be 
concluded that indigenous people are more greatly affected by modern institutions rather 
than their traditional culture. Their identity in modern times is also highly dynamic. In 
addition, according to the project findings, I can detect that the local Truku people may 
not so passionate about the ecotourism being strongly promoted by the Park authorities, 
due to the poor interaction between these two primary stakeholder bodies. In this project, 
the participation of the local Truku residents was mainly in the public participatory 
geographic information system for land use analysis and Truku residents’ responses to the 
Park headquarters in the interviews and focus group. The data from the residents showed 
their understanding and interpretation such as the traditional place names and land use 
in the traditional territory by the geographic technology. The information and the 
suggestion of co-management on industry topics had been raised several times by these 
projects. Nevertheless, the Park authorities seemed to see these as the suggestions rather 
than a feasible policy. Otherwise the co-management mechanism in the Park should have 
been established earlier than the official rules of co-management that were decreed in 
2009.  
The series of agricultural reform projects aimed not merely to transform 
agriculture but to create a new ecotourism industry in one highland community in the 
Park. In the participation the local inhabitants including the farmers joined the organic 
group to gain training courses, to attend conferences, and to grow vegetables and fruits. 
This was a process of communication and negotiation for the Park to deal with the 
agriculture issues in the Park. First, conservation was the priority of this protected area, 
so the use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides degraded the environment, which was a 
problem. Second, the eco-friendly way for the environment was organic agriculture and 
such a transformation was beneficial for the local people and the Park. Finally, the 
transformation of agriculture was regarded as the base of ecotourism industry. The process 
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showed the new industry---ecotourism was not introduced directly to the local residents. 
Rather, the Park authorities commissioned a professional NGO to communicate with the 
local farmers and talked about the eco-tourism. The Park headquarters concerned 
themselves with local economic development and persuaded the people gradually to 
transform their agriculture for a better future. The Park financially sponsored this project 
for several years in order to improve the environment and to repair relationships with the 
local people. The efforts of the commissioned foundation and Park authorities for several 
years seemed to get initial success as more and more farmers agreed to the transformation 
and joined the organic group.  
‘People in that highland area make living on agriculture and it is ok for them 
because they provide vegetables when there is lack of vegetable in plains in summer. 
The problems they face are the typhoon disaster which may cause cut-off of roads 
and destruction of agricultural products. The transportation problems and 
destruction resulting from the disaster are the difficulties in agriculture. For us Park 
authorities, we hope to develop ecotourism in that area. But the obstacle to this is the 
general farming way of adopting pesticide. We believe that the transformation of 
agriculture from the general way to organic way is beneficial for the ecotourism 
industry in the future. This is the general direction.’ (Official L, 30.09.2014) 
‘In 2010, we coached a community for agricultural reformation in the 
highland in the Park. We wanted to help them reform their agriculture from general 
way to organic way. If the project lasts for one year merely, it is hard for the 
community to change because all people must resist against change. How to make 
them agree to change, to change step by step, you can see that we spent half a year 
to persuade them to try the new way. Then we spent one more year making them try 
to grow organic vegetables. This is the third year, we hope all the farmers agree to 
grow organically and all agricultural products reform to be organic. Doing these 
demands to link all details. For example, the marketing of the organic products is also 
needed. The farmers have to ensure all these steps from production to sales, otherwise 
no one wants to change the way they use to be.’ (Official L, 05.03.2013) 
In the interviews of staff of the Park headquarters, my informants in different 
sections expressed their disparate views of the effect of the series of agricultural 
transformation projects.  
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‘There are two areas where larger-scale agriculture exists in the Park, and 
these two areas are the source of some problems in the Park… there are two ideas 
among the farmers there. One is that they are familiar with the whole procedures of 
the general agricultural way including the farming and the market. The Park 
authorities commission a foundation to implement a series of project there to 
promote organic agriculture. The foundation also grasps the distribution channel of 
organic vegetables which is the other idea. The organisation understands both 
production and marketing, which is good…If the typhoon ruins the vegetable zone in 
the flats of west Taiwan, the farmers in the highland in the Park make much 
money…Farmers there adopt the general way to grow vegetables near the primary 
school while organic agriculture is used close to their houses. They make much there 
but lose here by the organic way. The challenges are that organic agriculture cannot 
earn much money nor solve their original problem of transportation. Also people in 
the other agricultural area do not envy the organic production, which indicates it is 
not good enough. They may think everything of organic farming is just so. My 
personal opinion is the series of agriculture projects are not successful. The Park 
headquarters support the projects with several hundred thousand NT dollars to 
commission the foundation every year. Otherwise the foundation cannot help the 
agriculture there. People there still keep both ways of agriculture…there are thirty 
households in that area but merely seven households actually living there nowadays. 
Totally ten households including neighbourhood area join the organic agriculture 
group in these years…It is difficult to conclude that the series of project are successful 
or failure for we are carrying out the project at the moment…’ (Official C, 29.09.2014)  
The different views of the project can be analysed from the perspective of the 
different roles they play in the project. L is the official in charge of the project and she has 
participated in most processes of the project for five years. She accordingly comprehends 
the difficulties of conducting the projects within the five years such as mutual 
communications and the problem of plant pests for the participating farmers. Instead, the 
chief, official C, is the examiner of the projects and he understands these through monthly 
briefs. He used a higher level to compare two agricultural areas in the park. He therefore 
thought since the organic project did not attract the other farmers of the other area, it 
seemed the project was not successful.  
A public TV programme depicted organic agriculture in this area of the Park in 
2012. The participating farmers expressed their ideas of the organic experiment in the 
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mountain. One farmer mentioned the organic idea was a win-win approach because it was 
friendly to the environment, farmers and consumers. Another farmer said he tried the 
organic way in a small part of his field at the beginning and then most of the field was 
applied this soft farming despite the problems of pests and wildlife. Confronting these 
difficulties, he optimistically thought he may make less but sustainable profit. The other 
participant said she wanted to leave the benign land to the next generation. The positive 
feedback from the project participants justified the project and did change their minds. As 
for the farmer who did not join the organic team he was concerned about the lower yield 
and less income.  
Examining these projects one could conclude that the national park authorities 
emphasized natural conservation rather than economic development of the local residents 
because these industry development projects were based on the prioritisation of 
conservation. The compromise way between conservation and development was the eco-
tourism industry which less negatively impacted the environment. It seemed to be the 
bottom line of the Park authorities in terms of development issue. These projects had 
proposed some suggestions and solutions to the problems of the local people, but they 
were at best regarded as suggestions for the direction of policy making of the Park 
authorities. These showed the hegemony of the Park authorities that they had the 
established stereotype which could not be challenged. The commissioned projects were 
entirely perfunctory. Furthermore, these trial researches confirmed the difference in 
thinking of the local people from the Park authorities. The norms for participation of the 
local people in these programmes implied that they could merely express their opinions 
on the execution of the projects. There were some opportunities for mutual dialogue 
between the Park authorities and the local people, yet there was no tangible progress made 
for improvement of mutual trust.  
The organic agriculture project showed a different scenario from other projects. 
Not only was there a longer implementation time than others, but there was a priority of 
implementation. The mutual communications and training courses affected their 
environmental awareness. Their livelihood was prioritised while the ultimate goal—eco-
tourism was the secondary at the initial period. The project concerned both farming 
production as well as sales, which also reinforced participants’ dependence upon the eco-
friendly way of agriculture. The processes allowed the local farmers to agree with the idea 
of the Park and were willing to change to organic cultivation. However, the organic 
experiment was merely based on the agricultural areas of Han Chinese. The Truku farmers 
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did not propose the demand of agricultural transformation to the Park headquarters, 
which indicated indigenous residents might prefer other ways of development in their 
areas. If it was true, the Park authorities could not advance the relationship with Truku 
residents because the Park blindly pursued eco-tourism and organic agriculture rather 
than the demands of Truku people. If the Park knew the needs of Truku people but just 
promoted these environment-friendly projects, it was evident that the Park was dominant 
within the Park territory. 
5.7.3 Participation in festival events 
The participation of local people in the festival events held by the Park is the 
residents’ involvement in the events primarily comprising stalls and ethnic performances. 
Those who took part in the events were the local groups such as community associations 
and craft workshops. Since 2004, there have been tribal concerts and a cultural market 
held once every month (the second Saturday afternoon) at the visitor centre by the Park 
headquarters. These events allow those local aboriginal workshops and associations to 
increase income meanwhile the cultural events enhance the diversity of the national Park. 
‘The frequent events have been held since 2004. At the beginning, the 
participating craft shops thought the income was limited after the whole-day selling. 
But later the local craftsmen might tell you that some visitors saw their works at the 
stall and then order their craft by other means when they needed. So the effect is not 
just the income on that day but the later sales. The stalls on the day led to the 
subsequent marketing. Therefore, I think the events can continue to operate because 
the events work.’ (Official L, 30.09.2014)    
Taroko National Park headquarters have cooperated with the local township office 
to hold the events during the summer since 2011. The Park is responsible for the 
performance and booths from Monday to Thursday while the township office is in charge 
from Friday to Sunday. The events become routine activities of the Park and the township 
office during the summer.  
The ‘Gorge Marathon’ and ‘Gorge Music Festival’ are two other large-scale festival 
events of the Park. However, the participation of the local indigenous community is rare 
and Truku culture seldom plays a main role in the events. Official C frankly questioned 
that the Park authorities had ever put the local indigenous people the first priority in the 
important events: 
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‘The Marathon should be a good chance to promote the ideas of the Park. The 
organisers can lead visitors and competitors to some attractions and trails to listen 
to the interpretation. It is good to experience nature but this lacks the human 
dimension. The local indigenous culture can be this medium. Furthermore, the 
terminal point of the contest is always the buildings of Park headquarters. Why not 
bring people to the local indigenous community? ...In fact, if the Park takes people to 
the indigenous community, there are more chances for interactions between visitors 
and indigenous people. As for the food at the competition, it is always the food of 
convenience store. If the food changes to the ethnic food, it will give significant 
economic benefits for the local indigenous people. The family of the competitors also 
need feeding and the benefit may be over million NT dollars. The organisers must take 
food security into consideration. Honestly this is what the state can help with. The 
local government can help improve the hygiene standards and it should be alright. A 
lot of foods of indigenous people are distinctive but are not shown at the event. To 
sum up, the local people are not the first priority of the Park authorities 
unfortunately. This is the same for the music festival. The locations of concert are 
not in the places of the local people. The music is always western and Chinese 
melodies rather than the music of Truku people. Only one time, about six or seven 
years ago, that the music of the indigenous people was emphasised. In the first half 
was the performance of aboriginal children and the music was arranged from 
melodies of indigenous people. Indigenous people were put at the front place at that 
time. If the Park really values the local indigenous culture, their music can be the 
opening and closing songs sung by the local chorus…’ (Official C, 29.09.2014)    
The above interview by official C revealed that the Park authorities did not 
sincerely take the local indigenous people into consideration when they hold festival 
events in the park. Indigenous people were not given priority to help them benefit 
materially from the events. Even if the local indigenous people are involved in the festivals, 
their participation here is just for payment only. Their vital rights to the natural resources 
and lands are still in the shadow of conservation power. As for the leisurely singing and 
dancing performance and cultural market, the type of participation can be seen as the 
opportunity for the indigenous groups to increase income and promote ethnic tourism. 
For the Park headquarters, the events would enhance cultural aspects of the park and 
attract more visitors. The events should also create an impression of a good relationship 
between the Park and the local indigenous community. These seem reciprocal at first 
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glance as the local groups gained benefits from the events held by the Park meanwhile the 
Park won the reputation as a good neighbour. Nevertheless, the benefit flowed to a few 
residents and such a way of performance may become the stereotype of ethnic tourism in 
Taiwan, which is, the lost subjectivity of indigenous people. Visitors may believe that the 
local indigenous people are excellent at recreational performances, which reinforces the 
impression that indigenous people indulge in pleasure but neglect work. These ethnic 
performances of the Truku people makes the performers the objects who are watched by 
Han Chinese audience. Their culture being judged by the surface impressions such as their 
dresses, speaking accent and singing rather than the deeper implications of solemn 
ceremony and norms. Again, their natural sovereignty and rights cannot be recovered by 
the participation in these events. The participation of indigenous people in these cultural 
events or festivals can be regarded as therapy to compensate for their sacrifices or the 
sugar-coated poison that manipulates them to forget their rights. This type of local 
participation should be seen as non-participation. 
5.7.4 Employment and the feedback funding of the staff shop 
The employment in the Park is viewed as a broadly defined participation of 
management. Levels of participation depend on vacancies. The local indigenous residents 
were usually hired as employees, park rangers, shop staff and cleaners. The employees 
could be involved in administration of the Park but their temporary employment and low 
position reduce their participation. Park rangers assisted conservation of the Park. Their 
practical tour for conservation in the wilderness forced them to destroy the traps set by 
local indigenous hunters. Accordingly, their reputation in the community might be bad in 
terms of culture. Moreover, their low rank limited their participation in Park management. 
Some local people complained to me that the Park headquarters seldom hired rangers, 
which broke the promise before the creation of the Park. There were only two local Truku 
full-time rangers in the park. The shop staff were hired by the union of the Park. They 
were not the regular employees of the Park. Yet the income of the shop was partly 
distributed to the local associations of Truku people. Two associations got the feedback 
fund of the shop in 2011. Vacancies for cleaners were many but low pay and highly physical 
demanding reduced employment inspiration. Cleaning jobs had been outsourced, which 
meant no pension guarantees. The director of the Park showed slides to me that the Park 
Headquarters were concerned with the employment demands of the local Truku people 
yet rejected my question about concrete measures taken due to his busy schedule.  
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We can observe that the local employment offered by the Park authorities 
contained low ranking vacancies and non-employees of the Park Headquarters. These 
confirmed that employment was an outreach and reward rather than a participation route 
for the locals.  
 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to explore the interactions between the state and the local 
Truku residents living in and close to Taroko National Park. I have analysed the acts of 
governmental agencies, legal system and conservation regulations in Taroko National 
Park.  Moreover, the responses of the local Truku people are also presented. I finally 
conclude that the establishment of Taroko National Park can be considered as an act of 
internal territoriality by the state (Holmes, 2014). The responses of Truku residents to 
conservation in the Park are seen as individual and collective resistances due to negative 
social impacts in their daily life. I attempt to draw on the theoretical framework to analyse 
the interactions over 27 years.  
First are the territoriality acts of the state in various agencies. The Park authorities 
and their acts should be the most important part for analysis because the Park 
headquarters were created for policy implementation in this protected area. The history 
of Taroko National Park and the Park plan indicated that there were clear boundaries of 
this park after the negotiations between departments in the central government. This is 
the first of Sack’s (1986) characteristics of human territoriality. Moreover, the Park was 
established according to national legislation. The Park Law regulated some prohibitions 
in the Park, which was regarded as the easy way of communication. This is the second 
characteristic. The third characteristic is associated with behaviour control enforcement 
in the Park. This one can be expanded to other manipulations in the Park, especially the 
manipulation in different schemes of the park. The Park plan and history of this Park 
seemed to stress nature conservation and recreational function yet excluded the 
participation of local Truku people because they were seldom mentioned in these 
documents. It revealed the attitude of the government to see a Park as a wilderness 
without human disturbance, which is similar to the US park model. The indifferent 
attitude possibly enforced control without sympathy. However, the second and third 
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reviews of the Park plan showed the Park authorities gradually confirmed the value of local 
Truku, in particular the local knowledge of conservation (see the reviews of the Park plan 
in section 5.2.2). The changed stand of the Park toward the local Truku should be 
confirmed by specific actions and could gain friendly responses of Truku residents, 
otherwise the official documents were self-deception. I accordingly examined the 
participatory schemes of the park and the perceptions of the local Truku residents.  
The Park established some new schemes for the local Truku people to join the Park 
management around 2000 and included Truku culture in Park zoning, which were 
regarded as a breakthrough in the park system of Taiwan (see section 5.7.1). A non-official 
committee of cultural consultation was later changed to an official co-management 
committee in light of an administrative rule. I further examined the meeting records of 
the co-management committee. The interviews and the text analysis reveal that the Park 
director controlled the committee (also see the discussion in section 5.7.1), which implied 
the supremacy of the Park authorities within the park. Other potential ways of local 
participation of project participation (see section 5.7.2), event participation (see section 
5.7.3) and employment (see section 5.7.4) in the Park all uncovered the fact of tokenism 
and no participation of the Park. I supposed the improved attitude of the Park authorities 
could be put into practice by means of these participation schemes. However, the 
hegemony of the Park authorities enforced control in the territory of this park.  
Another legal system (a representative of the state) in the Park including the Park 
Police and the district court is responsible for the law enforcement of conservation. 
Interviews, conversations with some policemen and a court clerk and the analysis of 
verdicts of Hualien District Court concluded that these law-enforcers had practised 
tolerance when they implemented conservation regulations (see the analysis of sections 
5.6.1 and 5.6.2). However, indigenous residents are still constrained by the external 
institutions. They accordingly lost autonomy and subjectivity when they are under 
pressure of these series of external institutions, in particular the conservation institutions. 
This does not meet the pluralism principle of the R.O.C. Constitution. Moreover, the 
National Park Law without amendment over 40 years has been partly replaced by the 
Wildlife Conservation Act in practice when poachers are arrested, particularly the penalty 
section, which should not occur in the society of rule of law in Taiwan (the discussion in 
section 5.6.3). The contradiction between the conservation legislation and law 
enforcement indicated indigenous people in the Park (their traditional domain) lost their 
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autonomy and opportunity for self-development. Their behaviours were manipulated by 
the institutions of the state.  
To summarise the acts of the government via different institutions imply that the 
state territorialised this Park as a protected area and enforced its control in the territory. 
The participatory schemes could be seen as a tokenism and the tolerant law enforcement 
could not change the nature of hegemony in terms of legislation. In this Truku example, 
the creation of this Park can be understood as a practice of internal territoriality of the 
state. 
When we turn attention to the local Truku people, their responses to these policy 
implementations of conservation and institutions should demonstrate their perceptions. 
The findings through literature and broad interviews revealed that Truku people in general 
resisted these conservation institutions (see the overt resistance in section 5.4 and covert 
resistance in everyday practices in section 5.5). They stated their traditional values and 
practices (in section 5.3.2) were very different from these external institutions such as 
conservation legislations and the Park (see section 5.3.4), yet they had to follow the 
dominant institutions because the Park authorities and other conservation institutions 
had power in the Park (see the interviews in sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.5). Truku residents’ 
disadvantaged position in the Park was evident in their perceptions of the Park and other 
conservation institutions despite the fact that the Park should be their traditional domain.  
When the park was established, Truku residents were not aware of conservation 
regulations and conservation implementation, so some Truku hunters were arrested by 
the Park Police because of poaching in the Park. The law enforcement of conservation was 
serious (the description in section 5.3.5) and some local Truku politicians and residents 
protested against these conservation restrictions a few times (see the open resistances in 
section 5.4). The most impressive protest in 1994 mobilised over a thousand Truku 
residents to encircle the Park centre and to raise their claims about natural resource 
management. Nevertheless, these were worthless because the National Park Law and 
many restrictions were the same after open resistances. In addition, many Truku residents 
could not afford the high cost of overt resistance. The majority of individual residents 
therefore continued their everyday practices of farming and hunting in the park as implicit 
resistance (see section 5.5). Some tactics were employed to avoid the confrontation of the 
Police and park rangers (see 5.5.3). If the locals got the chance, they got the Park Police 
into trouble (section 5.5.1) and sought for the help of indigenous legislators with greater 
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power (section 5.5.2). The help of a few indigenous policemen was key for them to resist 
implicitly in everyday practices was. The policemen disclosed information to the locals, so 
that the locals could exercise the practice of natural resource management and averted 
arrest by the Park Police. This might indicate these indigenous policemen to some degree 
had the identity of being indigene. Such an identity was sometimes more important than 
their work. Moreover, the identity made the policemen see the local Truku as friends 
rather than potential criminals.  
The interactions between the government and the local Truku people could be 
interpreted as that the territoriality of the state resulted in the resistance of indigenous 
people. It was vital to further explore the reason why the indigenous people took actions 
of resistance. As the debates in section 5.3 demonstrated, Truku people were still familiar 
with their foundational values such as Gaya and local knowledge. Conservation 
institutions of the Park and legal system were regarded as external restrictions. These 
limits hindered their traditional practices of hunting and livelihood selections of natural 
resource use. The special administration of the national park also made some document 
applications more complex. A pastor also complained that the social order in the Truku 
community became mistrusting because conservation regulations could be treated as a 
tool to threaten others. The custom of sharing game with joy had been changed. Hunting 
activities were individual and furtive rather than important rituals for a whole family. I 
argue that these undesired social impacts in everyday life of Truku society turned to 
motivate the explicit and implicit actions of resistance. 
Overall, conservation control was much more significant than development of the 
local Truku communities in the Taroko National Park territory. As a result, development 
of the local Truku people was constrained by the conservation institutions. Some 
seemingly sympathetic measures were taken in the handling of the affairs of indigenous 
people by the public sector such as the legal system and national park authorities. These 
institutions were actually dominated by the state. The uniqueness with autonomy of 
indigenous people was not recognised by these institutions. In the special geographical 
area, Taroko National Park, the Truku residents needed to be manipulated by the state 
according to conservation legislation in terms of natural resource management. The 
internal territoriality of the state was manifested in the establishment of the Park. Being 
aware of negative social impacts in life, the local Truku continued their everyday practices 
exploiting natural resources in the Park as covert resistance against the external 
conservation regulations. Their resistance features sustenance agriculture, hunting 
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practices, informal norms of Gaya, and autonomy. This type of development was based on 
their cultural identity in contemporary society.  
 171 
 
CHAPTER SIX: AUTONOMOUS DEVELOPMENT? 
TRUKU PEOPLE SEARCH FOR THEIR SOVEREIGNTY 
6.1 Introduction 
In the last chapter, I examined the oppression imposed on Truku people in F village 
primarily by the strictly protected Taroko National Park at central level. In this chapter 
Truku people in T village encountered A series of policy allocations made by the local 
governmental authorities. This main policy design was community-based conservation, 
which is a co-management arrangement of protected area. It is usually considered as an 
amendment to the fences-and-fines parks. If community conservation is seen as a decision 
made through a political system in terms of Easton’s political system (1957), people in the 
environment should respond to this decision when it is implemented. People’s responses 
develop, and become feedback that affects the demands and support of people as the 
‘input’ to enter a political system. A new circle of the political system therefore continues. 
Since this study pays attention to the interactions between the government and local 
Truku residents, what is of interest in this chapter is the responses of Truku dwellers 
towards the implementation of a series of projects supported by the local government in 
their village. Analysing the interactions chronologically for almost two decades, this 
chapter divides the period into three stages: the early interaction (1997-2001), community 
conservation intervention (2002-2005), and development planning for tourism (2006-). 
Moreover, social impacts within the surveyed village are also examined to grasp the factors 
affecting responsive actions of Truku people.  
This chapter begins with the intervention of the local governmental authorities via 
a nature conservation idea in the late 1990s. The local government here refers to the 
Hualien County government and the Siou-Lin Township Office. The local response 
showed Truku autonomy. Then the idea was transformed into a community conservation 
project which mixed with development objective. The idea was accepted by the locals. This 
community-based conservation initiative indicated the reform of the conservation policy 
regime in order to empower the local community. Tourism development based on 
conservation achievements was seen as a means of livelihood for the local people. In 
addition, such a conservation intervention guided the Truku village to open a new page of 
economic development. 
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Tourism development following conservation actions, played a main role in this 
village in terms of economics after 2005. Hualien County authorities thus transferred 
developmental affairs of this village to the Tourism Department and the Department of 
Indigenous Affairs at the end of the conservation project in 2005. The village also created 
a new ‘industry association’ aiming to deal with tourism-related matters. Simultaneously, 
external travel agencies offering tour packages and transportation companies providing 
tour mini-buses also joined the tourism development of this village to promote this 
indigenous village as a new tourist attraction. The interactions between the public sector, 
private companies, and the local people complicated the issues of tourism development. 
This section highlights the empirical difficulties from the popular development of the 
tourism industry in this village.  
In order to deal with the emerging difficulties, the local government promoted the 
planning of ‘Natural Cultural Ecology Scenic Area’ (NCESA). The new idea of the ‘Natural 
Cultural Ecology Scenic Area’ was a term with its definition in the ‘Act for the 
Development of Tourism’, but it lacked the sub-laws to support its practical enforcements. 
In 2003, the central government announced the ‘Regulations Governing Professional 
Guides at Natural Cultural Ecology Scenic Areas’ and in 2007 the ‘Directions Establishing 
Natural Cultural Ecology Scenic Area’. There had been no such scenic area in Taiwan prior 
to my field-work in 2012. In Hualien, the local governmental authorities worked on a 
special project of conservation with development in order to plan T village as the first 
NCESA, and enacted regulations at the local level to put the planning into practice. Truku 
villagers’ responses to the new policy implementation constitute the main part of this 
section to highlight their perceptions about local government’s neglect. This ignorance 
justified the collective actions of the Truku.  
The final section looks at various social impacts on this village since the 
community conservation intervention, in particular the negative effects which stimulated 
the collective actions against the policy implementation of local government. To conclude 
this chapter, I interpret the acts of the local governmental agencies, social impacts, and 
the responses of the Truku protesting residents, to explain such an unexpected feedback 
to the policy of community conservation.  
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6.2 Early local governmental acts and Truku response 
6.2.1 The cautious Truku and the conservation intervention of local government 
The story started when the Department of Agriculture of Hualien County 
Government intended to conduct a river resource survey and historical trail exploration 
in T village in 1997. Some officials contacted a few local leaders. The relatively isolated 
village welcomed the curiosity of the outside world but rejected the further survey because 
some opinion leaders and the village head insisted on protecting their land rights and 
natural sovereignty over the village (Jhuang and Tai, 2009). It seemed that the leaders were 
worried about the excessive intervention of the public sector. The most obvious 
intervention of governmental agency in the Truku community was the case of Taroko 
National Park in F village described in Chapter 5. The conflicts between the local Truku 
residents and the Park authorities were serious enough that the majority of Truku people 
were aware of the displeasure. In addition, some residents relying on natural resources 
might be banned if the county survey was conducted. It was also the legacy of Taroko Park. 
The Truku of T village were cautious about every government intervention due to the case 
of F village. They used their decision-making to refuse what they did not want. To some 
degree they had their autonomy in everyday life at this point.  
When T village residents noticed the environmental degradation problem of over-
fishing or illegal fishing, they accepted the county government which carried out a 
conservation project in 1998. The county government simultaneously also proposed 
establishing a management committee to deal with river conservation and potential 
tourism development, but this was rejected again by the village leaders because some 
residents’ livelihoods depended on fishing (Jhuang, 2005). Again, it is evident that the 
village doubted the development project addressed by the local government, not only 
because of some villagers’ livelihoods, but because the trust between both sides was not 
easily established after a brief contact. 
At this stage, the Truku residents and leaders were very cautious about every 
intervention from the government, especially those projects which were associated with 
their livelihood selections. Their rejection was effective in preventing the government’s 
conservation and development suggestions. The local government also respected the 
locals’ decision. The experience reminded the officials to consider local needs and different 
ways of communication with local indigenous people.       
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6.3 Local government’s introduction of community conservation and 
local Truku acceptance 
6.3.1 New strategy for policy introduction 
In 1999, some village leaders were invited by the county government to join a trip 
to view river development projects in other indigenous communities. They were surprised 
by the profits brought by a river conservation project in an indigenous Tsou group. The 
leaders spread the idea of river protection mixed with economic development by 
interpersonal communication in the village. They began to increase fundraising for two 
community associations, and hoped that they could develop the industry to eradicate 
poverty in the village. The county authorities strengthened conservation education, 
organisational training, and organised further trips to existing river conservation projects 
in order to gain the support of the villagers. The Aquaculture Breeding Institute of Hualien 
(ABIH) started to undertake river conservation following the organisational reform of 
county government in 2000.  
The supervisor of the governmental agency eagerly promoted the conservation 
industry to the village head of T village and other leaders. After the 2001 election at the 
local level, the new village head actively promoted conservation and development in the 
village. They decided to follow the profitable model of the Tsou community, carrying out 
a river conservation project for future tourism development. They believed the landscape 
of the village was more attractive than the Tsou community, and thus that they would 
make more profit. A retired military officer and his younger brother working in the 
township office helped with the paperwork in the name of one existing community 
association. The village, led by the head, cooperated with the local governmental agency 
to propose the conservation initiative for the tourism development. 
At this stage, the local government used ‘pragmatic’ strategies such as visits to 
other indigenous communities gaining community conservation profits, and 
environmental education to communicate with the locals. These personal experiences of 
opinion leaders of other indigenous communities running tourism businesses influenced 
other residents. The transfer of river protection affairs to a specific agency outside the local 
government building made the relationship between the local government and local 
indigenous groups a little closed because the locals could contact the government more 
easily. The supervisor of the ABIH frequently went to the T village after work for the 
communications with local leaders also increased the Truku people’s trust. The township 
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office always coordinated with the agency attempting to run a new ecological economy by 
river protection with tourism development. The local government recognised indigenous 
people’s need for economic development and provided them with a conservation option 
to reduce poverty.  
The locals’ response to the acts of local government was changing because the 
opinion leaders experienced the potential profits of tourism development. The new elected 
village head actively cooperated with the agency desiring economic development in this 
village. The coordination between local state agencies and the Truku as a result of the 
changing strategy and benign intention of the local government pushed the community 
conservation initiative.        
6.3.2 The start of the community conservation initiative 
The decision to conduct a conservation project for further tourism development 
had been made by T village’s head, after promotion in public and in private. The retired 
military officer and his brother were responsible for the administrative affairs of applying 
for a financial subsidy. A conference held in December 2002 depicted the future picture of 
the village, which contained two river conservation areas, a travel package, and one 
deserted military base would be reused within the village. The agency of ABIH helped to 
prepare the necessary documents for the official announcement on the county level. A 
community association applied for employment grants from the central government to 
hire temporary workers for conservation implementation. A conservation patrol team of 
ten residents was therefore established in December 2002. The village also provided the 
supporting records of public hearing conferences in the village and the river survey to the 
county government through the township office, favouring the official announcement of 
river conservation. The elected village head with his team organised these and increased 
personal contacts with the supervisor of the governmental agency. 
The local governmental agencies and local Truku people helped each other to 
apply for the community conservation initiative. The central government offered funding 
for temporary employment. The state and the locals optimistically expected the new 
approach to nature conservation and local development.   
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6.3.3 The practices of community conservation initiative 
The information in this section is based on my master dissertation (Jhuang, 2005) 
which focuses on the early evolution (1997-2005) of community conservation initiative of 
T village. In March 2003, the county announced that people could not fish in two river 
reaches of T village for two years under the Fisheries Act. The patrol team was financially 
supported by the Council of Labour Affairs to implement the conservation actions. The 
project was conducted in the name of a community association of T village. The 
conservation initiative attracted the attention of some governmental agencies. In May 
2003, some officials of the county government and township office, along with the 
aboriginal representatives of township and county attended an inaugural event declaring 
that T village was the first conservation initiative of Hualien County, to show the 
determination of implementing conservation at a county level. The designated agency of 
county government also released native fish in the conservation reaches in the village. In 
June that year, the headquarters of the East Rift Valley National Scenic Area (ERVNSA)14 
held a conference to discuss whether they might financially sponsor the village for tourism 
development or not. The head of the village, some members of the patrol team, and the 
retired military officer also attended the conference. When the supervisor of the 
headquarters mentioned that T village could be included in the management of the scenic 
area, the head and some patrol members expressed their worries and discontent and then 
left the conference furiously. What the villagers were worried about was similar 
restrictions to those in the Taroko National Park, however, the supervisor of the National 
Scenic Area explained the difference according to different regulations. The head and the 
patrol members seemed to doubt that and then left on bad terms. Meanwhile in the same 
conference, the retired officer accounting for the documents and paperwork, thought T 
village could take advantage of the financial support from the National Scenic Area 
headquarters to develop the infrastructure and tourism industry, rather than refuse the 
opportunity.  
In November, the Chinese Taipei Alpine Association along with some societies 
held their annual celebration in the village. They held this annual activity there because 
they were aware that the village stressed natural conservation associated with their values. 
The association intended to cooperate with the village to take conservation actions such 
                                                     
14This governmental agency aims to deal with tourism-related matters in East Rift Valley of Eastern 
Taiwan. It is a subsidiary organ of the Tourism Bureau in the central government. 
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as releasing fish fry. They gained the permission of the village head, and entered the 
restricted reaches early in the morning for upstream trekking. The head was extremely 
angry when he heard the news from the patrol team that many visitors had destroyed the 
stream by trekking. When staff of the ABIH with fish arrived, there had been violent 
disputes between the locals and the participants of the external societies, so some societies 
left early. The local police attended to maintain order amongst the groups and locals. The 
head of the patrol team quarrelled with members of the Alpine Association. The head 
expressed that they could prevent the others from accessing the conservation reaches by 
blocking the roads.  
The patrol team visited the conservation reaches in turns. The members checked 
the conservation reaches, persuaded people not to play in the water or fish, and 
occasionally fed the fish bread. All of them listened to the head of the village to conduct 
the project. During their salaried nine months in 2003, the village head and the patrol 
team focused on development matters. For instance, they planted cherry trees along both 
river sides in order to create attractions in the future. They paved trails providing access 
to the stream by using natural materials to attract tourists. In addition, they searched for 
some spots for the future visitors to explore. The laborious jobs occupied the majority of 
their working time in addition to the conservation task.  
During the period of implementing the conservation project in 2003, the retired 
officer who had been helping the project by writing and applying for funding left the 
association. His resignation was not just because his idea of development was different 
from the head of village, but also because some villagers rumoured he did not deal with 
money clearly. He disliked this misunderstanding in this hometown village so much that 
he chose to leave. Some Truku people interviewees mentioned that traditional Truku 
society was based on the faith in ancestor spirit and the Gaya norms. These norms were 
passed on by word of mouth. Many norms were associated with curse, fear and taboo. 
People’s curse was traditionally seen as a powerful tool. Contemporary Truku 
communities are still affected by the Gaya and other ideas of fear. Rumour and reputation 
are still important disciplinary processes in Truku society. This clerical staff member left 
his position partly because he hoped to stop misinterpretation and justify his innocence 
in his hometown community.  
The retired officer’s departure resulted in the interruption of financial funding to 
hire temporary workers in 2004 because the continuous proposal was cut by central 
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government. The supervisor of ABIH later organised a meeting and invited the village 
head; a retired teacher, the leaving officer, both chairmen of two community associations, 
and the Truku representatives from both county and township levels to discuss a solution. 
The county representative encouraged the village to pay attention to the future profits 
rather than the hard conservation actions. Furthermore, they decided to establish a new 
industry association in addition to two community associations aiming for ecotourism 
management in the coming future. The subsequent processes of establishing this new 
industry association stimulated new power struggles in the village. Firstly, the name of the 
association referred to one family in the village, which caused dissatisfaction among 
different power factions. Secondly, the list of association initiators led to complaints 
because some of the initiators were too old to be the core management team in the future. 
The village head therefore held a meeting to explain his will of supporting the public 
interest. Finally, the majority of elected core directors and supervisors were familiar with 
the head of village or in the same family as the head, so other groups within the village 
expressed their displeasure. Three-quarters of the important posts of the industry 
association were from the same community as the head. Villagers of the other community 
also complained about this unfairness. The processes and the election result enhanced the 
competition for power among factions in the village, because many villagers thought the 
core managerial positions of this association would be connected to future profits from 
tourism.  
In February and March 2004, the magistrate visited the village twice because of 
this bottom-up conservation initiative. He promised to sponsor the building of the visitor 
centre which was a disused barracks. Cooperating with the township office, the designated 
governmental agency of county government helped the property transfer and the building 
of the centre. In October, the village took part in a competition of ecotourism sites held 
by The Council of Indigenous Peoples. The supervisor of the ABIH gave the brief 
presentation while a retired local teacher worked as the tour guide. T village won 
recognition as an excellent ecotourism place through this contest. This denoted that the 
village had gained approval among indigenous areas by the state, and the highest 
governmental agency of indigenous people would help promotion of this Truku 
ecotourism site.  It also implied that it was very possible for the village to gain financial 
support of the council, when the village addressed the project proposal. 
In July 2004, the visitor centre was completed. The county government and local 
villagers celebrated the new era of tourism.  However, the local attendees almost all came 
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from the same community as the head and the management team of the industry 
association. Some villagers of the management team intended to run a coffee shop there, 
and learnt the skill of making coffee and dessert. Then, the property rights of the centre 
were transferred to the township office, and the office declared that the management rules 
were being developed. As for the operation, the office would entrust a civil association 
according to the rules. The new association were worried that the management rights of 
centre might encompass other groups, and expressed their concerns to the Township 
Office.  The management team submitted an operation project to the Office to defend 
their rights in accordance with the normal procedure. The Office supervisor later stated 
he was inclined to let the next supervisor make the decision about the franchise of this 
visitor centre in 2005.  
The industry association sent three young members to participate in the intense 
three-month course training of environmental education, which was financially supported 
by the central government. This was undoubtedly the preparation for the tourism 
operation. This was the primary way for the governmental agency not only to teach 
indigenous people modern life skills, but also to change their minds about development.  
Before the intensive training, the designated agency held several conservation and 
development courses in the classroom, but the effect was limited because the villagers 
preferred to do practical jobs outside rather than listen to indoor teachings. The invitation 
of a lecturer of local history course illustrated the power struggles within the village. An 
official of the designated agency pointed out that the serious power competition resulted 
in the temporary replacement of the lecturer before the course began. The original lecturer 
thought that since the other retired teacher had been designated as the leader of tour 
guides, that he should be the teacher of the course, otherwise the different interpretations 
of history might confuse learners. Furthermore, the professional investigation 
organisations carrying out biological projects supported by the county government should 
gain the permission of the village head to enter the village; otherwise the investigation 
could not be conducted. 
In September, a marketing company under contract from the county government, 
had intended to interview the village head, and to make a promotional video of T village. 
Yet the head refused the invitation until the supervisor of ABIH intervened to explain that 
the video could be used by the village in the future, when the village head agreed to the 
interview. The other travel agency was introduced by the supervisor to test the possibility 
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of upstream tourism, but the head worried that employment opportunities for the locals 
in the agency might not be guaranteed.  
In November 2004, a training course sponsored by the county agency was held in 
the village. A member of the core management team of the new association was rejected 
by the village head because he intended to use a public space as the classroom for training.  
He felt disappointed, and used a private house as the classroom. The patrol team did not 
attend the training course because they listened to the head only.  
At this stage, a new association above two community associations emerged to lead 
the future tourism matters. This new organisation would concentrate on tourism 
development which was close to the potential profits. Therefore, the processes of 
establishing it resulted in power struggles which undermined the social capital of the 
village. On the one hand, the village head was the most powerful person at that time, so 
the majority of the core management team were his ‘troops’. He embraced the 
conservation suggestion of county government, and the financial support of centre 
government for human resources. However, he rejected the intervention of a national 
scenic area because of the unpleasant restrictions imposed on Truku residents of F village 
in Taroko National Park. It implied that the local people had the ability to refuse the entry 
of most governmental agencies. This coincided with the study teams needing to gain 
permission of the village head through the county agency before conducting projects.  On 
the other hand, different interest groups in the village also coveted the potential tourism 
profits; otherwise competition over establishing the association and the membership of 
the core management team of the new association would not have been so intense. 
Rumours about the process were so negative that the village head had to explain and 
apologise to all members. This meant that the power of restriction among social groups in 
Truku community still worked. The rumour and complaint were still powerful, which 
could stem from the traditional Truku society with informal norms---Gaya. The practices 
of the norms were partly based on the power of words among a family community so that 
members of a community could not violate the traditional teachings when placed under 
public pressure. However, making rumours could be a tactic to deal with people in other 
groups because rumours could be either factual rumours or tactical false rumours.  The 
blackmails of warning or accusing spread between hostile camps, and were even sent to 
the administer outside the village 
 181 
 
The conservation initiative attracted the attention of some governmental agencies 
because of its ‘bottom-up’ nature. The governmental agencies usually used financial 
support as a way to interact with the village. The specific sponsorship contained hiring 
temporary workers such as the patrol team, training courses of environmental education 
and ecotourism, and the building of the visitor centre. The county agency introduced other 
professional groups to give training courses and to carry out biological surveys for the 
future ecotourism, and played the role of mediator. The central government Council of 
Indigenous Peoples also approved the initiative and recognised this new ecotourism 
attraction. The local township office mediated between the village and other governmental 
agencies. The interactions between T village and the township office depended on the 
supervisor of the office. At this stage, the supervisor came from the north of this township 
while T village was located in the south, and was not seen as an insider of T village.  Some 
villagers complained about the unfair distribution of construction plans in the official 
meeting. Few villagers with good relationships with the officials in the local government 
might work in the office as a temp or employee.  
The development issue was still the focus of this village by examining the 
implementation of the conservation project. Development acts were given much more 
attention than conservation patrol actions. There were rumours about the poaching in the 
conservation reaches but no further action was taken. For Truku villagers, conservation 
was just a concept or slogan; development was seen as the real essence because they 
recurrently stressed their development. Because the conservation for public interest was 
regarded as the insignificant surface of the development plan, various camps aimed for the 
tourism benefits rather than conservation efforts. Neglecting the importance of collective 
actions, the village lost the opportunity to negotiate between different interest groups. 
The effect of elite capture was more powerful than the collective conservation effort. 
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Time Event Significance 
March 2003 River conservation was 
approved by county 
government. 
The county government announced the 
official conservation reaches for two 
years. 
April 2003 Patrol team started visit in 
turn. 
The conservation initiative was 
financially sponsored by central 
government. 
May 2003 Public event to announce 
the conservation initiative 
Many local politicians jointly declared 
the river conservation initiative to show 
their support. 
June 2003 A conference of East Valley 
National Scenic Area  
The village head and patrol team refused 
the intervention of national scenic area 
because of worry of limits in national 
park. 
November 
2003 
An event of external 
societies leasing fish fry 
The village head rebuked those 
destroying stream bed and drove out 
some external societies.  
January 
2004 
A meeting, gathering  
leaders of T village and 
Truku representatives 
The decision of the meeting contained 
to establish new industry association for 
tourism management and to continue 
patrol visit without pay. 
February 
and March 
2004 
The Magistrate visited the 
village twice and promised 
to support the 
establishment of visitor 
centre. 
 
The village was again financially 
sponsored by the public sector for the 
establishment of visitor centre. 
July 2004 The new industry 
association was established 
to function tourism 
development. 
The establishment of new industry 
association enhanced power struggles 
because majority core management 
team of this organisation were in the 
same faction of the village head. 
Different groups competed their 
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interests more eagerly since the tourism 
profits could be a lot. 
July 2004 The visitor centre 
completed. 
This implied that T village entered the 
new age of tourism as a development 
way. 
September 
2004 
Some external companies 
were rejected by the village 
head. 
The village head was powerful to reject 
outside interest groups. The supervisor 
of county agency helped the negotiation. 
October 
2004 
T village awarded the 
excellent ecotourism site. 
The Council of Indigenous Peoples 
holding the contest might promote this 
village and offer financial support when 
the organization addressed the 
development project. 
Table 6.1 The important events during the practices of river conservation project 
source: Information drawn from Jhuang (2005) 
6.4 Difficulties from tourism development 
6.4.1 Tourism development in T village since 2005 
 In January 2005, the county held a marketing event to promote the activities of 
the county government. T village was seen as a new ecotourism attraction to enjoy natural 
beauty and ethnic culture. The supervisor of ABIH made use of this event to connect the 
village and some local travel agencies. The village was also reported by the media as a new 
indigenous tourism attraction in Hualien. The new Industry Association made the 
decision to entrust a local shop owned by a representative on the township level, as the 
agent to deal with tourism affairs on a five months’ trial period before the end of the official 
river conservation. On behalf of the association or the village, a diner owner interacted 
with a travel agency which was introduced by the supervisor of the designated ABIH. The 
travel agency was responsible for attracting tourists and taking them to the centre. The 
visitor centre was regarded as a platform for visitors and the tour agency to get information 
about the village. There were six stalls selling local agricultural products and ethnic food, 
most of them were run by villagers of the same community, which elicited discontent 
among the villagers of the other community. The travel agency cooperated with the diner 
to operate package tours. There had been a maximum tourist amount of 600 people every 
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day according to their planning. The township office also held an annual celebration in 
this visitor centre.  
The association chose to entrust the rights of operation to the political leader of 
the shop and the external travel agency primarily because of the lack of funds. The 
association could simultaneously observe the tourism operation and learn through 
experience. Many villagers were not sure whether there was tourism interest. When taking 
a closer look at the management team of this new association, the problem of power 
struggles entangled some leaders so that a few members intended to leave the team. In 
addition, the coming local election of village head stirred power relations in T village.  The 
dictatorial style of the head seemed to provoke grievances in the village, despite his 
promotion of the conservation projects. 
The development of the tourism industry initially was not going smoothly in this 
village, in particularly the issues of capital and internal conflict. The local government 
served as an intermediary and helped introduce travel agencies and hold tourism festivals. 
The locals paid more attention to getting resources for development. Both primary actors 
focused on the tourism development.  
6.4.2 The side effects of tourism development from conservation 
The local Truku were busy searching for funds and other resources. 
Simultaneously, the emerging problem of power struggles within T village became more 
serious. This social problem accelerated because of the resource arrangements and interest 
conflicts via the community conservation intervention of local government. The existing 
conflicts were ‘ecologised’ (Robbins, 2004) when the conservation idea was introduced. 
Tourism development later was controlled by the external travel agencies due to the lack 
of capital and no consensus among locals. After some power competitions within the new 
industry association, the leading team of this organisation held a meeting with travel 
agencies to discuss the issue of tourism benefit arrangement. However, travel agencies 
were aware of the clashes within the village and as there were no rules restricting tourism 
business in this area, they ignored the locals’ voice of interest allocation.  
I would like to point out some problems since the idea of community conservation 
emerged in this village. The analysis is related to the interactions between local 
government and the local Truku, and the implementation of community conservation. 
The lessons here can be analysed at three levels. First is an exploration of the power 
relations of the initial processes of tourism development through conservation initiative 
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in the village. Second is reflection on governmental agencies and the short-comings of top-
down governance of indigenous communities. Finally, I discuss how the imagination of 
development among residents of T village caused unexpected results. 
In the first place, I would like to argue that the power relations of the village 
affected the initiative, and resulted in the undermining of social capital. Tourism 
development was dominated by a few elites and external travel agencies. That a 
community is never homogeneous group is evident from the initial process, confirming 
Agrawal and Gibson’s (1999) critique of assumptions of homogeneity within community 
conservation. They emphasise paying attention to the decision-making influenced by 
different interest groups, and internal and external institutions. T village’s political leaders 
dominated the scheme’s evolution by promoting the idea of tourism development 
wrapped with conservation actions. At the beginning about 1997, conventional leaders 
such as the elders and village head excluded the interference of local government for the 
consideration of livelihoods of some residents. The local development of T village mainly 
depended on agriculture and using natural resources such as hunting and collecting herbs. 
As the head and leaders were replaced by a new generation of leaders of middle-aged elites, 
their conception of development became different from their elders. The inspiration of the 
county government via trips to other prosperous indigenous areas stimulated their 
imagination; these successful cases usually relied on popular ecotourism. The leaders of T 
village comprised of chairmen of two community associations, the village head, local 
representatives on township level and other elites, who agreed with the attractive 
suggestion of the county government to start the conservation initiative. Their motives 
may contain political ambition, economic profits and sense of place; however, competition 
among them undermined the consensus and weak collective action in the past. The 
dominant village head fought for his group’s benefits and excluded other interest groups’ 
participation, which offended other elites and their groups; for instance, the head led the 
election of the core management team of the new industry association to make sure his 
supporters jointly formed the team so that he could dominate tourism development. His 
peremptoriness offended many elites and villagers because it undermined any collective 
ownership of tourism development. The head’s exclusionary tactic to refuse an external 
NGO a public space for training and to reject a local leader’s participation aroused 
complaints from villagers and dissatisfaction of opponents. Many villagers perceived that 
only a few leaders were decision makers of public affairs of the village at this stage, even 
in the industry association, and a transparent discussion forum was lacking. The elite 
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capture which happened in the village undermined mutual trust not just among different 
interest groups, but between leaders and villagers.  The majority of villagers seemed to 
think the leaders considered their private profits only rather than the public interest.  
Second, the local governments, particularly the county agency—ABIH, attempted 
to guide the development of T village to reduce poverty. The approach the authority 
selected was popular conservation mixed with development projects to reach this goal.  
The supervisor believed that only strong intervention by public sector experts could 
improve the condition (Jhuang, 2005). Perceiving the development demand of the village 
leaders, he used the strong elected head of the village to promote such a conservation idea.  
The specific method was to invite the elites to attend the trips to several indigenous 
communities where the conservation programmes were successfully conducted. The huge 
economic incentive of tourist-led development attracted the attention of leaders of T 
village. These attendees believed the scenery of T village was much more beautiful than 
these cases.  They therefore agreed with the idea of a conservation programme and 
expected the tourism dream. However, the local elites and the public sector ignored the 
fragile characteristics of T village, where collective action was problematic. Villagers’ 
participation in public affairs was low because of various family factions and political 
groups, resulting from the effects of Japanese resettlement policy. The conflicts in 
everyday life increased since then because of frequent contact. The spread of Christianity 
to the village integrated parts of the village. There were three primary Christian 
denominations in the village, the three groups seldom co-sponsored events or 
celebrations, and their followers established their own churches in their neighbourhoods 
respectively. The large-scale religion cooperation in this village was rare. The public sector 
neglected the historical context of the village and introduced the joint conservation plan; 
the initial outcome showed that there was serious competition over employment, political 
leadership and development profits. One middle-aged member who once joined the 
management team of the industry association expressed his regret by saying that the 
external institution intervened in the affairs of the village without taking the social capital 
of the village into consideration. The conservation project became a competition of power 
due to the under the table profits.  
Finally, the common dream of T village at the initial evolution of the conservation 
initiative was development through tourism. The basic demand of development was 
necessary, nevertheless, the requirement of a successful community-based conservation 
project was the negotiations during the period of conservation actions according to the 
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proposition of Tai (2007). He suggested that a development-through-conservation 
approach may be an appropriate tactic when carrying out community-based conservation 
initiative in indigenous areas, because the conservation actions facilitate collective action 
and institutional building. In practice, the actions for public goods without evident 
economic interests foster the consensus before the distribution of benefit.  In T village, the 
goal of development greatly surpassed conservation, which could be seen via the work of 
the patrol team, was not conducive to the negotiation between interest groups and to the 
building of appropriate management institutions. The fatal injury, was that the 
development demand and economic interests possibly crowded out other benign 
motivations such as sense of place and environmentalism (Jhuang and Tai, 2009).  
Examining the initial stage of conservation initiative, the potential failure could be 
anticipated (Jhuang, 2005). 
 
 
6.5 Local government’s introduction of scenic area and local Truku 
resistance 
Community conservation initiative in this Truku village has been conducted over ten 
years. Through the practices of river protection actions and tourism development, this study 
examines the acts of local government and the indigenous Truku residents, and social impacts on 
the Truku community. First, I analyse the introduction of the NCESA to the T village by local 
government, and how governmental authorities ignored the needs and voices of the local Truku 
by series of administrative acts. Second, I interpret the responses of the Truku to the acts of local 
government as open resistance. The locals’ views showed why they took the protesting actions 
against the policy of local government. Their opinions contain current social impacts since the 
community conservation idea was introduced to the village. Some existing conflicts were also 
exacerbated since the community conservation intervention by local government. In this regard, 
it is vital to employ the locals’ views, in particular the voice of the protesters. I thus depend on 
the interviews of a young informant L in this village. I have introduced him on section 3.7.2 that 
he was fluent in Chinese and Truku, and his experience of participating in public affairs in the 
village was rich. In the process of open resistance, he helped organise the agendas of meetings, 
represented the tribal meeting group to express protesters’ voice, and organise young generation 
to join protesting actions. Other senior leaders in the tribal meeting group recommended him and 
introduced him to me. They told me that L could interpret the opinions of the tribal meeting group 
very well. Their ideas regarding the NCESA and the community development were the same to 
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his because they had discussed these issues. We had interviews and informal conversations in his 
workshop room for a few times in my field work. I gradually grasped the context of resisting 
actions, and perceived the Truku protesters’ concerns via these interviews and conversations. 
Therefore, I frequently used his interview quotations in this section to clarify the protesters’ 
views. Throughout my fieldwork, I was able to cross-check his account through informal 
discussion with other inhabitants of the village and my own observations: these helped to 
triangulate the information gained from L, and confirm that he was able to represent the views of 
many within the village. Protesters had accumulated over two hundred countersignatures against 
the NCESA and The petition action in the county hall had gathered over one hundred villagers. 
These showed that the protesters were not the minority group in the village.      
          
6.5.1 Introduction of the ‘Natural Cultural Ecology Scenic Area (NCESA)’ to T village 
This section continues the process of conservation mixed with development 
project implemented in the previous section, and starts the new page of tourism 
development in this village. The pilot sightseeing from January to May 2005 was entrusted 
to a local political leader who was a representative at the township level, and an operator 
of an aboriginal restaurant. He cooperated with a travel agency introduced by the 
supervisor of ABIH to run the package tour containing a trip and meal. The chairman of 
the industry association paid attention to the coming election of village head (end of 
November 2005) and other matters of association. The supervisor of ABIH suggested that 
T village could be planned as a ‘Natural Cultural Ecology Scenic Area, NCESA’ according 
to the ‘Act for the Development of Tourism’. However, the central government refused the 
application because there was not such a scenic area before. The county government was 
also advised by central government to take advantage of other regulations rather than the 
NCESA without complete enforcement rules. The supervisor of ABIH discussed this with 
other departments in the county government and township office, the conclusion was that 
the scenic area had flexible planning compared to other reserve areas: 
‘I remembered that the supervisor of ABIH told us clearly that the ‘Cultural 
Heritage Preservation Act’ would strictly protect an area and restrict people from 
entering the area. These regulations are rigid and inappropriate for the village to 
develop in the future. What we could do, is to introduce the public to know the area 
with beautiful landscape. We should preserve the area from destruction rather than 
restrict the area as the historical heritage from the entrance of people. Thus, we 
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insisted the direction of ‘Natural Human Ecology Scenic Area’ after discussion. 
(Official Y, 06.03.2013)  
Suffering from defeat in the village head election, the chairman (village head) of 
the industry association resigned. Some other members of the core management team 
gradually left the board with him in 2006. Other factions took the opportunity to enter 
the management team of the association. A woman representative at the township level 
was elected as the association leader later. Tourism development of the Truku village was 
transferred to the Department of Indigenous Peoples and Tourism at the county level. The 
county head decided to establish a ‘Natural Cultural Ecology Scenic Area’ and in 2006, the 
‘Rules and Operation Directions of Review Committee for the Establishment of Natural 
Cultural Ecology Scenic Area in Hualien County’ were announced. Hualien County 
Government appointed board members to consider several designated natural cultural 
ecology scenic areas according to this autonomy statute. The Shou-Lin Township Office 
entrusted the academic unit to study the planning of a scenic area in T village in 2007. 
‘It was a project implemented from October 2007 to 19th August 2008, which 
was under one year… the planning was from scratch, there is no planner in the 
township office nor staff studying law. We don’t know how to plan the scenic area 
according to the current regulations to comply with the requirements of establishing 
a scenic area. The requirements also contained the communications between 
different governmental agencies…we need a planning report for us to talk to county 
government. The planning should conform to the requirements of establishing such 
a scenic area on county level.’ (Official Y, 06.03.2013)  
The planning of a scenic area was financially supported by the township office. The 
office entrusted this plan to a professor and it was later sent to the county government. 
Both local governmental agencies supported the plan associating with tourism 
development. On the one hand, the outcome of promoting a ‘Natural Cultural Ecology 
Scenic Area’ among governmental agencies on multiple levels during the period between 
2006 and 2010, was that Hualien County agreed with the establishment of this kind of 
scenic area in T village as the first one in Taiwan. On the other hand, the practical tourism 
development in the village was dominated by outside travel agencies. It was not only 
because there was no legislation in relation to charging fees for indigenous attractions, but 
there was no single group or association representing the majority of villagers either. A 
few villagers with lands close to the tourist attractions and those with sufficient funds 
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started operating booths and package tours. Tourism development did not actually benefit 
the majority of Truku villagers since they never engaged in any work relevant to the 
tourism industry. There seemed to be no feedback scheme or benefit distribution through 
social welfare in the village. Instead, Truku villagers engaging in agriculture suffered from 
traffic congestion on the way to their farmlands. Most villagers’ summer production was 
affected due to too many visitors and pollution. A few tourists destroyed the crops in the 
farmland adjacent to tourism attractions, although tour guides embellished stories of 
environmental damage by tourists. Occasionally, visitors belittled local indigenous 
villagers as they travelled in the village.  All of these indicated that the development of 
tourism in the village negatively affected the life of local people without much benefit 
while the local governments insisted on the promotion of the Natural Human Ecology 
Scenic Area.  
The county government started to formulate the management regulations of 
NCESA by entrusting the same planner in a national university in Hualien. This planning 
project contained the management rules for NCESA in T village as a practical case study.  
In June 2011, the township office advised ‘stream closing’ one stream where the primary 
tourism attraction was and to hold a public conference, but the proposal was refused by 
many villagers because the closure would affect their lifestyle. In July, the local 
governments held a public hearing: the planners producing management rules for NCESA 
were invited to explain these and the planning of this new scenic area. Dozens of villagers 
protested by disrupting the meeting, stressing that there was insufficient communication 
about NCESA’s role. The second public hearing was also interrupted due to the fierce 
protest of villagers, and a self-help group was organised by these demonstrators to seek 
for their tribal sovereignty and to protest against the NCESA in T village. The 
dissatisfaction urged the township office to make the village head explain to the local 
people: the head convened the heads of neighbourhood to organise an investigation 
committee of 50 members to conduct an opinion poll about the scenic area.  
According to a TV programme, News Magazine of Indigenous Peoples, which 
recorded part of the investigation committee’s conference in August 2011, the meeting 
intended to examine the draft ecological convention. It also pointed out two problems of 
the meeting; one was that the chairman did not check the attendance, the other was he 
did not confirm how the members were generated. Both these were contrary to formal 
conference procedures. In the meeting, the controversy of the name of the new scenic area 
was addressed by the chairman of a community association. One villager expressed that 
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the township office intended to dismantle all illegal buildings including huts and block 
houses adjacent to the attraction, this action would threaten his livelihood, and he 
therefore would like to commit suicide by self-immolation in front of the township office. 
The supervisor of the office explained that office authorities would dismantle illegal 
houses on the state-owned lands only, instead of those on private lands. The chairman 
emphasised that the convention draft aimed to manage visitors rather than local people.  
Finally, he said completed conference records would be sent to every family to seek 
villagers’ advice. During the conference, the dissenting villagers submitted a written 
protest against the establishment of the scenic area to the supervisor of township office.  
They expressed their objection at the end of the conference; one protestor noted that the 
majority of attendees were ‘their own people’, but the land owners in the attraction were 
not invited to attend the conference, so humans were not respected in the new scenic area, 
let alone nature. The chairman was interviewed by a journalist after the conference; he 
pointed out that ninety percent of villagers refused the NCESA because they regarded this 
as the prelude to the establishment of a national park. The township office supervisor in 
the interview thought the villagers had rights to express their opposition: however, she 
stressed that the statements of these protesters ‘that the staff and supervisor of township 
office collaborated with travel agencies’ were incorrect and hurtful.  
In the conference recorded by the TV programme, opponents of the scenic area 
seemed louder than those who supporting it, because the supporters were silent.  Without 
the disagreement, the planning of NCESA supported by the local governments would be 
implemented soon. The protesters raised questions about the planning; first, who was 
making decisions about the future of their homes. Being the land owners of the primary 
attraction, they were unsatisfied that they had no rights to participate in the conference. 
Second, the process of planning was not transparent. The majority of villagers had no 
understanding of the NCESA which might be relevant to their rights and future, this led 
to the fierce protest by some villagers. Third was the development of tourism in the village. 
Some villagers suffered from the congestion, pollution and disrespect resulting from 
tourism development. However, most benefits flowed to outside travel agencies, an 
injustice that aroused resistance against the scenic area.  
NCESA regulations insist that the surrounding natural beauty of this scenic area 
should be strictly protected. The aboriginal reserved lands can also be zoned into the 
NCESA scope. As long as one area is planned as the NCESA, the lands there should be 
transferred into another category. Private-owned reserved land becomes nationally 
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owned, which shows that the local indigenous people lose the connection to the land they 
depend on. The extended problem is the restriction of their livelihoods. Overall, 
indigenous people in the scenic area cannot take advantage of natural resources such as 
hunting practices nor can they own private reserved lands.  
These Truku residents fear that if the state extends its powerful administration 
into the indigenous community, their lifestyle will be compromised because of the 
example of their compatriots in F village in Taroko National Park. Although aiming to 
develop tourism, this scenic area is a kind of ‘protected area’ for Truku people because the 
natural environment is also rigorously preserved. They imagined that similar conditions 
would occur at the NCESA in the future and that their livelihoods would be highly 
restricted. They were especially concerned about the institution of successive 
management agencies every four years because the regulations behind these governmental 
agencies would confine what they do for livelihoods. 
 
6.5.2 What is NCESA in Hualien and its problems? 
In this section, I introduce the development of the NCESA in Hualien. The 
attention is drawn to the establishment of series of regulations concerning the NCESA. 
The active acts of promoting the NCESA may reveal that tourism is concerned by the local 
government. The development of the NCESA in Hualien is greatly connected to the case 
of T village because the plan of the NCESA sponsored by the local government adopted 
this example to create management rules and promoted the case as the first NCESA in 
Hualien. The NCESA itself was a new idea in Taiwan because there has been no such an 
area so far. This term originates from the Act for Development of Tourism, and refers to a 
natural area where the scenery is impossible to recreate by humans, and the environment 
of fauna, flora and prehistoric relics should be strictly protected. The county government 
created a committee in 2005 to examine the establishment of the NCESA at the county, 
rather than national, level. The management rules of the NCESA were formulated in 2012, 
and here I indicate several problems based on this Truku case. 
County-level legislation established the NCESA committee and operation 
directions of the NCESA in Hualien. The regulations were announced in 2006 and 
amended in 2007 in accordance with the operation directions of the designation of the 
NCESA announced by the Bureau of Tourism in central government. Amendments 
increased the public hearing conference in order to include the views of the local people, 
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and required the listing of current conditions and facilities of tourism development in the 
explanatory memorandum of the NCESA. Comments of different governmental agencies 
including the local township office and other agencies in that territory also needed to be 
provided, along with the offer of several specific plans for the future tourism industry.  It 
is obvious that the establishment of the NCESA is for the development of the tourism 
industry. The competent authority for related matters which offers the explanatory 
memorandum is usually a governmental agency, because it should be easier for an agency 
to interact with other governmental agencies and then gain comments from them.  
Interactions and negotiation among different governmental agencies should be easier than 
those between NGOs and the public sector. For residents of T village, the definition of the 
NCESA has excluded the traditional hunting practices of the Truku community for the 
natural ecology system, in that the ambit of the scenic area should be strictly protected. 
The establishment of the NCESA in one area depends on the decision of this 
committee organised by the county authorities. The committee is made up primarily of 
specialists and officials at multiple levels. Three of the 15-members committee are local 
representatives, or individuals of NGOs engaging in community-building work. These 
local people are not the decision-makers of the establishment of the NCESA, they can join 
in the meeting to express their views in the public hearing, but the committee makes the 
final decision. This again affirms the expert or official oriented feature of regional 
planning, with public participation playing a tokenistic role within the NCESA legislation. 
It is very possible for the local residents to be marginalised in the process of planning the 
NCESA, as in the case of T Village. 
According to the Regulations Governing Professional Guides at Natural and 
Cultural Ecology Scenic Areas promulgated in 2003, people travelling in the scenic area 
should be accompanied by a professional guide. These guides are qualified due to 
certificates of completion of training programmes as well as of service, the basic 
requirements comprise being a local citizen over 20 years old, educated to at least 
secondary level. However, the authority can adjust these requirements to the specific 
social environment and tourism market. Requirements around NCESA’s professional 
guides protect the priority of employment of local people. In practice, the protesting 
villagers were concerned they would not be guaranteed employment in the scenic area 
according to their observation of current tourism development in the village. A protesting 
leader K did not trust these necessary training subjects, but further hoped the local tour 
guides would be equipped with traditional/local knowledge through the teachings of older 
  194 
generations. He also stressed Truku culture was undermined by the mainstream culture 
and institution. 
‘The tour guides may not be the local villagers. Now the tour guides are those 
who do not understand the local history, and they speak carelessly. I don’t know 
whether they have the license or not. Some locally-taught people guide for making 
profit. I don’t agree with this, I think the tour guide should be taught by the elderly 
who understand the local areas, not according to the regulations of the governments.  
The local people who are familiar with the local areas are ok. The external tour guides 
don’t know these local things. The governments marginalise our culture and customs, 
but apply the Chinese values to us. The public sector destroys this place in order to 
make profits. I can’t help it.’ (Hunter K, 29.01.2013) 
The regulations relating to NCESA guides are based on modern knowledge and the 
value of mainstream society, rather than the traditional knowledge and ideas of 
indigenous communities. In addition, the current development of tourism in the village 
reminded the local people that they may be marginalised by the industry due to different 
values of making profits. The guides and visitors just consumed the natural beauty and 
culture of the local indigenous community and left inconvenience and pollution, therefore 
many local residents enthusiastically protested against the NCESA and sought their own 
way of development. 
NCESA Management Rules in Hualien, state that the county government is the 
competent authority, and can entrust NCESA matters to the township office or other 
registered NGOs. The opposing villagers thought these management agencies must be 
various governmental agencies whose scope of jurisdiction overlaps with the territory of 
the NCESA. Accordingly, there will be more and more legislation restraining their lifestyle:  
‘They restricted us via the legislations…it is very possible that every four years 
different governmental agencies managed us via different regulations because we are 
under different authorities…these are the problems in the future NCESA…these were 
proposed by villagers in the tribal meeting….’ (Young Leader L, 28.01.2013) 
The competent authority intended to establish the scenic area to manage visitors 
and to create a charging system for the local people. The county government created a fee-
charging standard. Eighty-five per cent of the fee goes to the allowance of the professional 
guides while fifteen per cent goes to other matters including administrative jobs, 
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conservation, community-building matters, and training programmes. NCESA had a 
specific account of the NCESA, its fee being included in the annual budget of the county 
government. This resource allocation was however severely misunderstood by local 
people: 
‘Eighty-five per cent of every fare of the visitor will go the national treasury of 
county the government while fifteen percent as the fee for tour guide…these visitors 
do so many things here on our land but the county government wants so much.’ 
(Young Leader L, 28.01.2013) 
‘Fifteen per cent of the income is attributed to the tour guide with license 
while eighty-five per cent belongs to national treasury of the county government.  
What can the local residents do? The township authorities do not make sense on this.  
The local indigenous people don’t have any working opportunity. The public sector 
wants to take advantage of the resources in indigenous areas for making money. The 
local indigenous people cannot gain any profit.’  (Hunter K, 29.01.2013) 
These local people worried that fee distribution would not be possible because the 
fee is part of the financial budget of the county authorities.  If there are remaining funds, 
they will be incorporated into the budget of the next year. Moreover, the county 
authorities seem to dominate the matters of the NCESA. The local residents and 
organisations are unable to use the fee freely, as it remains within the financial budget of 
county authorities. The feedback scheme isn’t clear in the management rules. This could 
result in complaints about the current tourism development in the village that local people 
suffer from inconvenience and pollution but do not profit. It is obvious that the feedback 
scheme of the NCESA plays an important role but it is neglected by the county authorities. 
6.5.3 Local government’s dereliction concerning the NCESA planning in locals’ view 
This section collected what the local government did to arouse complaints from 
Truku villagers in the process of promoting the NCESA. The implementation of policy 
undermined trust between the local Truku villagers and the local governments, which 
resulted in fierce and persistent resistance against the establishment of the NCESA in this 
village. These actions by the local governments included opaque processes of 
communication and decision-making, the negligence of administrative jobs, the problems 
of legislating for the NCESA, proposed restrictions on the livelihoods of Truku villagers, 
the issuance of land ownership certificates, and their attempts to mine in the village.  
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Opaque communications and decision making 
The planning of NCESA was closely related to all villagers’ interests because almost 
the whole village was in the territory of the scenic area; however, the local governmental 
agencies, and the township office in particular, usually communicated with a few leaders 
and specific groups rather than undertaking public participation. Decision-making was 
thus dominated by an elite few, which aroused complaints and protests among villagers, 
who questioned both their representativeness and their decisions. When one community 
invited the local governmental authorities to attend a tribal meeting to discuss the NCESA, 
these public servants never attended. Accordingly, the protesting villagers believed that 
the local government never understood their voice.  
A protesting hunter stated his observations that the local governmental agencies 
and an elite few led the private meeting of the project of the NCESA. The conclusion of 
such meetings was not approved by the majority of villagers. The secret operation of public 
affairs resulted in distrust between the local people and local governments. 
‘There were merely few villagers such as directors and supervisors of the 
industry association took part in the meeting in private. They were playing…They 
expressed their views but claimed it was the idea of the whole village without gaining 
approval.  Most villagers didn’t know this project of NCESA. Their secret meeting 
didn’t allow villagers to attend.  It must be the government or few leaders to dominate 
the meeting. Only few people spoke in the meeting. This happens in many villages.  
Such caused the local residents to mistrust the governmental authorities.  It was hard 
to believe them.’ (Hunter D, 09.03.2013) 
A young leader in the village helped the protests against the scenic area. He 
perceived that the county authorities discriminatively responded to different interest 
groups on the same issue. This indicated that the county government favoured those 
whose position was consistent with the county authorities’.  The unjust response incited 
further protest. 
‘Their response document has been delivered while we still wait for our reply 
though we petitioned earlier than their action…they are chairmen of associations, 
representative on township level…they are powerful people…and they have received 
the reply. We went to the county hall earlier but there has been no response…. The 
county head supports tourism development. He must agree with those who favour 
the scenic area. We oppose the scenic area. It is very possible that the county 
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government neglects our petition…It is obvious that county authorities deal with 
things effectively when these things are beneficial for them. It is no problem not to 
receive our opinion, however, they should respond in accordance with the official 
programme…it seems as long as we do not agree with them, they can backlog 
documents…’ (Young Leader L, 28.01.2013) 
In addition, he thought that the under-the-table negotiation between the 
township office authorities and the specific local associations must divide the protestors. 
The contact of specific interest groups by the local governments exacerbated the 
mistrustful relationship between the governmental agencies, and the Truku villagers 
which simultaneously undermined social capital in the village. 
‘We guess the local associations contact the township office. They 
communicate with each other in private. What we worry about is that the more 
frequently they contact, the more tired we are (because of new tactics). We have to 
gingerly handle these things.’ (Young Leader L, 08.03.2013) 
An amateur hunter who leads the protesting group thought diversity of views was 
normal in a village. Nevertheless, few leaders should be blamed because they expressed 
their own ideas on behalf of the whole community. This misled the public sector to regard 
the ideas as the whole community’s. When the public sector agreed with the ideas, some 
villagers were afraid of the negative impact the ideas may result in and queried where the 
ideas came from, raising wider questions about the representation of indigenous 
communities in contemporary society. Who and what represent the community? Through 
whom, and how are representatives deputised to represent the community? To which 
degree do they represent the community?  
‘My wife, my son and I in one family may argue the simple meal, let alone a 
village. So, there was no objection to approve, the establishment of the NCESA was 
impossible. Such a statement was according to the township authorities and the 
chairman of the other tribal meeting. The project was approved by the committee at 
county level but now the argument that whether the whole community agree with the 
idea or not just started. People of that community told us that they had the meeting 
to vote for the chairman only, the meeting was irrelevant to the NCESA, and they 
thought the agreement of the idea came from the chairman and the township office 
only. The residents of that community doubted the idea and were aware of the 
seriousness of that matter.’ (Hunter K, 29.01.2013)  
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The local governmental agencies’ decision to communicate with specific interest 
groups in the village, affected broader trust between the public sector and Truku villagers 
of T village. The neglected villagers more eagerly expressed their voice via demonstrations.  
Moreover, this undermined social capital in the village because it seemed that specific 
groups represented the community only. Other groups’ protesting actions and complaints 
to fight for its representativeness usually irritated the conflicts between camps with 
different interests.  Possibility of cooperation or negotiation may accordingly reduce due 
to fierce opposition. The vicious circle certainly weakened the implementation of policy 
at the local village.  
The new planning of stream closure for nature conservation in 2011 
River conservation was seen as the first step to develop the tourism industry in the 
village. Suffering from the inconvenience of tourism development, some villagers refused 
the conservation decision made by the township authorities and the industry association. 
The tourism development benefited a few people only rather than all villagers. 
Furthermore, the conservation action indicated that the local people cannot access to the 
stream where they used to play in summer. The restriction on the lifestyle of the local 
residents was not welcome. Based on these considerations, the majority of the villagers 
categorically rejected the plan in a conference. The planning of river conservation in 2011 
stemmed from the township office and the industry association in order to prepare for the 
NCESA could not be implemented due to the resistance of most villagers.  
‘They (the local governmental agencies and the industry association) have 
planned the scenic area for a while…from the river conservation to the establishment 
of the industry association…many villagers do not agree with what they have done 
during the period of nine years. They never paid attention to the conservation things, 
instead, tourism development was their focus. The tourism development results in 
trash pollution and a lot of conflicts among villagers. We cannot reach the consensus 
and suffer from the troubles from the outsiders. They cannot solve these 
problems…They never create a good atmosphere in the village…they did intend to 
protect the stream again about one and half years ago. Many villagers were angry 
with this. After the stream blocking conservation was the public hearing conference.  
Now we can understand that all these were a series of procedures…they hoped us to 
have no time to respond to these. We fortunately stopped their action when they 
wanted to protect the stream…’ (Young leader L, 28.01.2013) 
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The rejection of the idea of stream closing in a public conference indicated that 
many villagers were tired of tourism development in the village. First, they were aware 
that the nature of conservation action from the township authorities and the local industry 
association was tourism development rather than pure rehabilitation of nature. Second, 
the development experience in the past years had not benefited the local economy.  
Instead, the local residents suffered the inconvenience resulting from tourism. Industry 
interests were mostly dominated by the external travel agencies. Third, conservation 
might restrict their rights to access the stream. The local people finally refuted this 
proposal. The public response to the conservation idea also revealed that the development 
imagination of a specific few individuals and township authorities may not be approved 
by the local people. The young leader highlighted that the conservation idea was in fact 
the preparatory step for the creation of the NCESA which aroused protests in the village. 
The purposeful planning of a NCESA affirmed the opaque communications between 
villagers and local government. 
The draft ecological convention in August 2011 
The formulation of this draft convention followed the same type of private 
discussion between the township authorities and the local industry association.  The 
purpose of this convention was to manage the tourists visiting this village. This could be a 
new start for the village to deal with travelling issues, if it gained approval by the majority 
of villagers through an investigation committee. However, it was seen as a supporting 
measure of the NCESA policy. Due to the mistrust, the protesting villagers expressed their 
voice outside the conference venue. Some land owners in the attraction complained that 
they were not invited to attend the conference. The conference failed to be convened for 
lack of a quorum. The village head noted that the office authorities temporarily asked him 
to convene the conference, but many members of the committee could not attend the 
conference when he notified them. The chairman of the committee decided to send the 
record along with the convention draft to these committee members, in order to entrust 
them to investigate the villagers’ opinion on the convention and the NCESA. With the 
development of the protesting wave, this supporting measure became useless because it 
would not be approved by most villagers. Again, the opaque communication undermined 
the trust between Truku people of T village and local governments. 
‘The township office convened a conference of draft of ecological convention.  
This was about the future of our village. The convention aimed to manage the visitors 
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in the village rather than the local villagers. There were fifty representatives of various 
groups such as Catholic Church and Presbyterian Church discussing the draft.  But 
finally the conference failed to convene because the draft was from the township 
authorities rather from villagers. They formulated that and waited for the decision of 
the village. It seemed to be all right. However, this was made by the office authorities 
and industry association. They usually didn’t recognise the convention when the 
leader changed. It is in vain. We didn’t believe them. We opposed the draft of 
convention…’ (Young leader L, 28.01.2013) 
The absence of from tribal meetings 
The tribal meeting aimed to seek the most consensus on diverse issues in one 
indigenous community. In this community of T village, the issues of the NCESA were 
proposed for discussion for several times in the tribal meetings. The meeting group also 
invited the local governments to attend the forum in order to let them understand the 
voice of the local community as well as to explain the planning of the scenic area. 
Unfortunately, the public sector at the local level never participated in their meeting. 
Instead, the local authorities held the recall election of the chairman of this tribal meeting 
group, which was proposed by the community association. The selective attendance 
seemed to express their position on the issues of NCESA, which disappointed those 
villagers opposing the establishment of scenic area and showed their resent.  
‘We have held several tribal meetings. The guiding agencies are county 
government and township office. We invited staff of these governmental agencies to 
attend the meetings, but they never attended. One day, the chairman of the 
community association sent an official document to the local governments in order 
to advise to recall the chairman of the tribal meeting group, these governmental 
agencies did come here for the recall election. You can understand what the problem 
is.’ (Young Leader L, 28.01.2013) 
‘I don’t really know what these officials do for the local villagers. What their 
concern is, is the money. They never attend our tribal meetings…In other indigenous 
groups the conclusions of the tribal meetings were implemented by the public sector.  
I think our township office is too bad.’ (Hunter K, 29.01.2013) 
The absence of the local authorities to attend a tribal meeting of this ‘trouble 
making’ community revealed that they were unwilling to confront those protesting 
villagers. The development of such an infrequent communication seemed to strengthen 
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their antagonistic relationship. Contacting specific leaders and groups when promoting 
the NCESA of the village, the local government aroused more and more complaints of 
many villagers. They worried about their interest damage so they were ready for their 
insisting demonstration. 
The negligence of administrative jobs 
During the period of promoting the policy of the NCESA, the local governments 
were negligent in their administration. These specific actions led to misunderstanding 
between the protesters and the local public sector. The disadvantaged protesting villagers 
believed that the power authorities did this on purpose in order to implement the policy 
of the NCESA despite the demonstration in the village. The negligence contained the short 
notice of the public hearing, the tokenism of public hearing, postponing of the negotiation, 
cognitive difference on the news release of local governments, the new director’s 
unawareness of the NCESA issues, and the collision of different legislations on the NCESA 
issues. The ignorance could serve as a tactic for the policy Implementation of the NCESA.    
Short notice of the public hearing conference 
The official public hearing was held to understand opinions of the villagers, but 
the local people received the public hearing on the day of meeting. There must be 
something wrong with the short notice. The administrative error might have been a 
tactical ploy, to avoid the attendance of the protesters who opposed the NCESA.  
‘They should notify us one week ago, but in fact they notified us on the day of 
the public hearing, which was inappropriate. That was a week day, and there were few 
people in the village in the day time. The notice was announced in the morning while 
the meeting was in the afternoon. Most villagers were working. People knew the news 
by word of mouth. This should be done at least one week before the meeting. This was 
the first public hearing. The director of the Tourism Department, supervisor of 
township office and representative attended the public hearing. The short notice was 
unusual. People knew this on that day. The village head said he didn’t know the reason 
why it was a short notice.  He stressed he was neutral.  I think he was not responsible.’ 
(Young leader L, 28.01.2013)   
As the young leader mentioned, it was unusual to convene a public hearing with 
very short notice. The possible explanation was that it was a tactic to notify the older 
generation at home only because they seldom addressed questions in the conference, 
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which might show the locals agreed with the policy. The village head should be the 
conductor at the local level. For the public sector, using the tactic might be a way of 
successfully implementing the policy to avoid the confrontation. However, it was a public 
hearing aiming to listen to voices of the local people to facilitate the policy 
implementation. Such a tactic was totally inconsistent with the purpose. Actually, word of 
mouth mobilised the opposing villagers to express their voice. This administrative 
negligence or tactic not merely irritated these protesting people but enthused their 
rebellion. 
Tokenism of the public hearing conference 
Following the short notice, the conference was held in a public space next to the 
village office in the afternoon.  
‘The preparatory jobs were not good, but the public hearing was convened on 
that day. The public hearing said that there was a consensus and that they just 
listened to some opinions.  Many stakeholders of the NCESA were in the conference, 
so it was noisy. The public hearing was paused then. The planning team (a professor 
and his assistant) were explaining the advantages of the NCESA and the potential 
benefits toward the local community. Some villagers made uproar when the planner 
just started several slides. The villagers questioned why the establishment had not 
been discussed with, and approved by villagers. Why did they not respect the local 
residents while the establishment was closely relevant to the whole village?  Can we 
participate in the meeting to express our views in the future? It seems that the public 
sector can conduct what is approved by local governments themselves even if it were 
controversial in the local community or excludes the local people…’ (Young leader L, 
28.01.2013) 
‘We want to manage ourselves; but the governmental authorities said we 
don’t communicate with them, the thing is that the development project should gain 
approval of the local people and then start the establishment of the scenic area. They 
were different from this; they planned the NCESA and approved it by themselves, then 
they convened the conference of public hearing as a formalism. The planning had 
been ensured before the conference, they just told villagers about that planning.’ 
(Hunter D, 09.03.2013) 
An amateur hunter who was a retired contractor in the other community, blamed 
the local government for the ill-defined explanation of the NCESA in the public hearing.  
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He also pointed out what the demonstrators were worried about and the poor interactions 
between the local villagers and the local governments. 
‘The county authorities didn’t explain the NCESA well in the public hearing, 
it was more unclear when some villagers made an uproar. In my observations people 
in our community don’t actively attend the meeting because they’re self-centred as 
well as busy at work. Many people attended the meetings because of some villagers’ 
encouragement, and they also considered their rights might be violated. Rome wasn’t 
built in a day. They distrust the government due to many reasons.’ (Hunter U, 
08.03.2013) 
The public hearing seemed to serve as a specimen for the policy makers. However, 
there were at least two points showing the tokenism of the public hearing. First, the project 
had been planned for several years but lacked public participation. The majority of 
villagers were not aware of the NCESA, not to mention the content. Before the public 
hearing, the planning project had been approved by the committee at the county level. 
Second, the presentation of the management of the NCESA used the official Mandarin 
language, which many villagers could not use well. Some ideas might not be interpreted 
well in Chinese in the conference. It suggested that the understanding of the NCESA by 
the local people was not the highest priority. 
Procrastination and cancelation of negotiation meeting 
After the protest against the NCESA happened in the public hearing in July 2011, 
the county authorities promised the opposing villagers that they would convene a 
coordination meeting. Simultaneously, the authorities appointed the planners of the 
NCESA to understand the opposing views. The township authorities were also involved; 
attempting to change the complaint of the establishment of the NCESA in the village.  
Accordingly, the negotiation meeting was never going to be held after the public hearing.  
‘They (the local governments) told us that they would come to negotiate with 
us, they changed the time three times, but ultimately they never came. So we decided 
to petition in the county hall... Originally, the county authorities would come to us, 
but the supervisor of the township office said it was unnecessary and she would come 
to talk to us. When we knew this, we believed she was lying…’ (Young Leader L, 
28.01.2013) 
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‘We protested because these things were not good for indigenous people and 
they (the governmental agencies) didn’t communicate with us. The county 
authorities promised to communicate with every household but they didn’t keep this 
promise once in the whole year. They might only talk to the people in their own camp 
such as the village head and the chairmen of the local associations. It was impossible 
for them to communicate with those protestors because it was unnecessary. How do 
I believe these local authorities?’ (Hunter D, 09.03.2013) 
‘When we started the protest, they (the local governments) should pause the 
project of NCESA, but they didn’t. They continued to make progress of the project.  
They used a method of calling on the opponent villagers one by one in private rather 
than in a public hearing conference. This was the tactic of crushing one by one…we 
doubted that whether they may negotiate under the table…that was why some people 
opposed the project but then they supported it. Later, they returned to the protesting 
groups due to disinterest…their trick was exposed.’ (Young leader L, 28.01.2013) 
Even when the protesting villagers petitioned in the county hall, the county 
government used the delaying tactic to change the time of meeting the county head in 
order to talk to the director of Tourism Department first. Later, these Truku villagers failed 
to meet the county head due to the altered schedule of county head. The deputy county 
head met the protesting villagers but the villagers were disappointed because he was not 
the decision-maker.  
‘It was supposed that we met the county head at nine o’clock, but they told us 
the time changed to ten o’clock. We needed to talk to the director of the Tourism 
Department. It was they who always changed the time. This was not good because 
they changed the original meeting time…It was problematic…the sub-prefect was 
sitting there… did not respond to our voice…’ (Young Leader L, 28.01.2013)   
The local governments delayed the coordination meeting and hoped to solve the 
problem by contacting the leaders of various views in private. Nevertheless, these actions 
irritated the protesting groups and forced them to search for other ways to express their 
opinions.  The county authorities used the same tactic of delay to face the protesting Truku 
people’s petition. The county head avoided the protesting masses and left, and the sub-
prefect who was not the decision-maker talked to the demonstrators. What is of interest 
here is that the local governments attempted to seek negotiation in private, but failed due 
to the insistence of these Truku protesters. The local governments lacked capacity of crisis 
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management, being as they opted for a tactical avoidance strategy. The unresolved 
problem was still there and the relationship between them were undermined due to these 
administrative actions. Protesters were aware that the county authorities deliberatively 
ignored the locals’ voice and insisted the plan of the NCESA. The authorities used some 
more other means such as media to promote their decision.   
Cognitive difference on the news release of local government 
The news release of the county government depicted that the idea of the NCESA 
had gained the support of the majority of villagers of T village, particularly the total 
agreement of one community. The opposing villagers were surprised at this when they 
read one local daily newspaper. They saw this as a way to manipulate public opinion by 
media.  Such a statement was not based on a public poll, but views of a few leaders. As the 
protesting groups stated their questions of the NCESA, more and more villagers joined the 
camp. They were afraid that their rights might be negotiated if the NCESA was established 
in the village.  The cognitive difference originated from the fact that the local governments 
contacted some specific leaders and groups of the village and regarded their views as the 
majority villagers’. The views became the forged mainstream opinion of the village via the 
press release. The county authorities should be blamed for the media manipulation and 
the negligence of a villagers’ opinion investigation. The young leader stressed their 
protests coincided with the views of most villagers. Simultaneously, many negative 
impacts had been resulting from the tactics of the local governments. 
‘The county authorities stated that eighty percent of villagers supported the 
establishment of scenic area and only a few people opposed. How could they say so?  
If there were few residents in the conference, it coincided with what they said, but 
there were over two hundred villagers there in the video. These people were not few in 
the village. The county government emphasised this but the township office didn’t 
endorse this. The website of the county government describes that eighty-five percent 
villagers agree with this idea and the other community totally agrees with the 
establishment. However, over twenty residents of that community came to our last 
tribal meeting last year and told us they didn’t know about the NCESA. Some of them 
were emotional…they doubted the number…they knew they’d elected a chairman of 
tribal meeting…does the views of that chairman represent the whole community? 
...these people came to attend our meeting and refuted the number of county 
authorities…What is the administrative data based on? It seemed to be falsification 
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of documents. If such a statement aimed to be beneficial for the village, there should 
be complete measures and procedures rather than doing things under the table. They 
made a mess and declared this is the consensus of the village.  These things have 
caused a lot of unpleasant conflict, controversy, and confusion in the village.’ (Young 
leader L, 28.01.2013) 
Moreover, he compared the people joining in the petitions of two camps and 
justified the protest. The ridiculousness of the press release was also highlighted.  
‘The local governments mentioned that the two communities have different 
views on the NCESA and they wanted to promote this when reaching consensus. We 
have stressed that we don’t need this but it seems that they want to continue to 
promote this…last December the advocators went to the south to meet the county 
head. The news reported their petition. There were only 35 people there while there 
were over one hundred villagers when we petitioned in the county hall. They claimed 
we were the minority but the majority of the local residents agreed with this idea. It 
was possible for them to say so because they were village head, representative, tour 
guides…etc. So far, we insist to say no to the NCESA but it seems they still want to 
promote it. (Young leader L, 08.03.2013) 
The local state agencies claimed they stood with the figure that eighty percent 
villagers supported the NCESA, while the demonstrators justified their protest via the 
countersigned documents of over two hundred villagers who opposed the establishment 
of the NCESA. Some villagers of the ‘supporting’ community also questioned what the 
source of the news release statement was. The cognitive difference between the county 
authorities and protesting villagers resulted from poor communication and views of 
villagers were always dominated by few leaders. In this way, complete participation should 
be emphasised in the process of communication meetings before policy implementations 
on controversial topics. Through local participation, the unexpected consequence of 
policy such as the resistant actions against the NCESA policy implementation could be 
reduced.      
New director’s ignorance 
The new director of Department of Tourism and Public Affairs was appointed in 
July 2012. She dealt with this difficult case but the complexity made her become the target 
of protesting Truku villagers.  She was blamed by the Truku protesters for her poor 
preparation and lack of power.  
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‘The newly appointed director did not do the lessons because she didn’t know 
these things. She took the post in July last year… when they transferred duties, they 
didn’t talk about these…’ (Young Leader L, 28.01.2013) 
Before the petition in the county hall, the director phoned leaders of the protesting 
villagers in order to negotiate with them directly. She hoped that there wasn’t going to be 
a clash in the County Hall between the Truku leaders and the county officials. The villagers 
were prepared with supporting documents, and people ready to back their petition. They 
refused her suggestion and didn’t answer her phone call later. It was possible that the head 
avoided the petition because of the breakdown of negotiation.  
‘We made the appointment with the county government before and we agreed 
with the schedule arranged by the officials. The evening before the day of petition, the 
director of Tourism Department called us to ensure that we would meet the county 
head or not. She said that it was unnecessary to talk to the head, and it was more 
appropriate to meet her. But what we want to see was the county head rather than 
her. We did not think that she could make decision for our community.’ (Young 
Leader L, 28.01.2013) 
For the Truku protesters, the new director was not familiar with the issues of the 
NCESA, and she was not the decision-maker in terms of the NCESA. The Truku knew that 
the county head was famous for his dominance on governance, so her strategy of interim 
negotiation meeting with her was ineffective. The strategy of negotiation might attempt 
to shake the determination of the Truku. She didn’t have enough authority to deal with 
the issues which affected their communities under the governance of the county head. The 
Truku protesters therefore petitioned the head as they planned in order to withdraw the 
approval of the NCESA in T village. Nevertheless, the objection of negotiating with the 
director might start up the crisis management of county authorities. The head’s avoidance 
could reveal the position of the county government and rejection of the protest. The 
county government did not listen to the petition in relation to local development and 
sustenance. Instead, the government insisted the decision of the NCESA and tourism 
development in T village. 
Conflicts between different regulations 
Here the conflict occurred between different legislations at various levels grasped 
by different stakeholders on the NCESA issues. The protestors insisted on the protection 
of the Basic Law of Indigenous Peoples, while the supporters accused the opposing 
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villagers of illegal block houses. Simultaneously, the local governments promoted the 
NCESA the county level according to local autonomy and the Act for the Development of 
Tourism. Accordingly, the conflicts lay in the interactions among supporting villagers, 
opposing villagers, and local governments via different regulations.  
The protesting Truku complained that some local residents and political leaders 
allied to report the illegal hut of some protestors which had existed for a long time. They 
stressed the Basic Law of Indigenous Peoples protects not only the traditional lifestyle of 
indigenous people, but respects the willingness of local people on development 
construction in modern society.  
‘They used the external regulations (Building Act) to oppress the Basic law of 
Indigenous Peoples.  The Basic Law regulates the rights of building a block house. The 
old people do the farming and build the house…the law also mentions the developers 
should get the consent of the local people when they intend to start a major 
development…this is the foundational protection.’ (Young Leader L, 28.01.2013) 
‘If there is an important development project in the community, the tribal 
meeting should be convened to get the consent of the majority of residents…in the 
meeting we hoped that our community was not restricted by these new things…we 
are the masters, we should own the advantage…they should respect the local 
people…the Constitution stresses that everyone is equal…I think people should 
respect the local people and their lifestyle in a specific area…’ (Young Leader L, 
28.01.2013)   
These clashes on legislations happened within the village, and highlighted the 
discord in T village. The conflicts were the expansion of the controversy of the NCESA and 
power struggles between groups within the Truku communities. Social capital was 
undermined with the development of some firm actions of both sides. Therefore, the 
difficulty of cooperation among villagers increased. More importantly, was the fact that 
the local governments could not help solve the regulation issues. They dealt with the huts 
whenever receiving reports. This hut issue in T village stemmed from power struggles 
between different camps with opposing views on the creation of NCESA. 
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6.5.4 Rising of resistance forces---from self-help group to tribal meeting group 
The previous section explored the acts of local government regarding the 
promotion of the NCESA from the views of local Truku residents in T village. These shaped 
the locals’ discontent. The discontent linked to an organisation and became collective 
actions of resistance against the policy of the NCESA. This section studies where the 
resisting group originate and how collective protesting actions were organised. These 
analyses are based on my interview data and document data. 
A new self-help group for tribal sovereignty led the protest against the scenic area. 
The group originated from a mining activity in a mountainous area close to a 
concentration area of this village. Some villagers gathered to protest for villagers’ safety in 
future excavation, as a severe landslide over 20 years ago had concerned many villagers.  
This new self-help group investigated the mining proposals and reported to the county 
government with an indigenous member of the legislative body at the county level. The 
instigator was the township office itself: it was fined by county government according to 
the regulations of soil and water conservation, and villagers’ trust in the office was further 
reduced.   
The self-help group transformed into a ‘tribal meeting’ in March 2012. Tribal 
meetings seek consensus around the specific issues affecting the community. For this 
community, the chairman of the tribal meeting group was finally elected after twice 
cancelled meetings. The chairman was a member of the self-help group and he adopted 
issues of scenic area for discussion in the tribal meeting. The second meeting refused the 
convention proposed by the township office authorities because the office never discussed 
its content with villagers. This group invited the office and county government to attend 
the third meeting but they did not. The meeting made a stand against the establishment 
of the NCESA in their traditional domain. On the same day, the chairman received an 
anonymous letter in which he was accused of spreading rumours and attempting to cause 
intra-tribal disharmony. 
In August 2012, the county government approved the rules for NCESA’s 
management, the authentication of its tour guides, and for its use of funding at a county 
level. The county government continued to promote the scenic area in spite of opposition 
within the village, the statement of the county government was that the other group totally 
agreed with the establishment while there were only a few villagers who objected to the 
scenic area. In September, the government authorities formally announced the 
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management rules of NCESA in Hualien County, but the protesting villagers were only 
aware of these when they read a local daily newspaper.  
In October, the office authorities received the community association’s request to 
recall the chairman of the tribal meeting and held a meeting in the village. Due to low 
attendance, the chairman of tribal meeting could not be recalled by a quorate vote. In the 
same month, a member of the county legislative body introduced the self-help group to 
the director of Tourism Department of Hualien in the county government. The director 
hoped that NCESA could be a win-win situation.  If some villagers still disagreed with the 
establishment, it was possible to cancel the planning in the village.  
A few protesters received blackmails from different law firms in 2012 (Figure 6.1). 
The mails accused that the receivers and other protesters illegally spread lies and used 
violence for collective demonstration, and the acts caused the whole village uneasy. The 
district court had dealt with the litigation accused by other leaders of the village regarding 
the slander, intimidation and violence. The blackmails evidently stemmed from the 
clashes between groups with different voices within the village. The statements in the 
mails only expressed one voice of the NCESA controversy. Moreover, the law firms didn’t 
exist. Blackmails were seen as a means attempting to menace protesters.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Scanned blackmails in T village  
(source: the author, 2018) 
Some staffs in the local government and the chairman of community association 
had measured the block houses close to the attraction and declared their intention to 
demolish these illegal buildings. The office authorities did not inform the house owners 
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before measuring these buildings, an action that aroused more displeasure among the 
protestors. At the end of November, the self-help group decided to use a ‘Meet the County 
Head’ event to petition the head and hold a press conference. The protestors’ leaders 
received a phone call from the director of Tourism Department requesting negotiation 
before the petition. The leaders still insisted on their action the next day, the day of 
petition, and the county government announced that the county head had a previous 
engagement and that the vice-head would talk to the villagers instead. These petitioners 
were enraged by this and protested in the county hall. When the director of Tourism 
Department talked to them, the representative of villagers stressed that the local 
governments planning the scenic area lacked transparency. In addition, the 
inconveniences resulted from tourism development aroused complaints of villagers. They 
expressed their desire to govern themselves on their lands, and refused the establishment 
of NCESA in their home village.  
A few weeks later, the village head, several chairmen of local associations, and 
some villagers went to another ‘Meet the County Head’ in southern Hualien to express 
their enthusiasm for NCESA. One informant told me he knew this because an old villager 
joining the action complained this petition in a tribal meeting of December 2012.  These 
senior attendants were originally invited to join the free spa tourism in southern Hualien, 
but finally they ‘by the way’ met the county head to petition for the establishment of 
NCESA. They were used by some political leaders who organised the trip. He felt cheated 
in the petition action with these leaders. The response of the county government toward 
the petition in the south came via a formal document delivered the village soon after while 
there was no reply to the earlier petition/ protest in the county hall.  
Both groups of self-help for tribal sovereignty and tribal meeting were aware that 
the local governments kept on promoting the NCESA. They therefore sought the help of 
an indigenous legislator on the centre level. One legislator came to visit the village and 
promised to hold a negotiation conference. In February 2013, the legislator invited several 
representatives of different governmental agencies to attend the conference. In the 
meeting, various interest groups stated their views on the topic. Most governmental 
agencies did not insist on the establishment of NCESA in this village. Villagers in different 
camps addressed their views as the legislator chaired, but from my observations, the 
opposing people seemed to have more time to depict their complaints. Finally, the 
legislator concluded that since the NCESA was controversial in this village, it was 
appropriate to suspend the issue until a consensus was reached. Later in February, the 
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county government documented to notify that the establishment of NCESA in the village 
was suspended because no consensus on the topic had yet emerged.  
 
 
6.6 Social impacts from community conservation on Truku community 
The community conservation project with development planning caused some 
serious negative effects on T village. I highlight three points including livelihood selection, 
land ownership and power struggle which are closely associated with the everyday life of 
Truku residents. 
6.6.1 Restriction on livelihood selections 
As mentioned in section 6.5.1, the NCESA regulations protect the natural 
environment within and contiguous scenic areas. It caused some questions and complaints 
among villagers when the plan was completed. They didn’t trust the plan supported by the 
local government because many residents were not aware of the plan. Land users in and 
next to the expected tourist attraction of the NCESA could not attend the meeting in the 
process of planning. These land users and some other residents worried about the 
potential negative influence once the scenic area is established, in particular the restriction 
on their livelihood. They guessed that the surrounding natural beauty of this scenic area 
should be strictly protected similar to the national park. The aboriginal reserved lands can 
also be zoned into the NCESA scope. As long as one area is planned as the NCESA, the 
lands there should be transferred into another category. Private-owned reserved land 
probably becomes nationally owned, which shows that the local indigenous people lose 
the connection to the land they depend on. The extended problem is the restriction of 
their livelihoods. Overall, indigenous people in the scenic area cannot take advantage of 
natural resources such as hunting practices nor can they own private reserved lands.  
‘The scenic area will limit the use of our reserved lands such as water resource, 
crop, plantation and wildlife. The restrictions affect the development and livelihoods 
of indigenous people. What can we do without land? We grow vegetables for family 
use and a little for sale. The farmers must be affected negatively as the first victim. 
The lands cannot be developed, what can our children do? Working in the scenic area 
usually requires license while the local people lack such an opportunity of making a 
living unless they have the special relationship with the officials at higher level. We 
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indigenous people cannot survive due to the restrictions. We cannot do farming and 
go hunting freely. The scenic area is like the national park. Many Han Chinese make 
money in the indigenous tourism attractions. Few indigenous people can make profits 
as well because they retire from the public sector. The general indigenous people have 
no chance to make a living in the scenic area. They keep saying the employment of 
indigenous people but there is no chance in the national park now. In the past, there 
were job vacancies such as once ranger and cleaners for the local indigenous people. 
This is the fraudulent scheme of the governments.  There is sweetness at the 
beginning but no pension ultimately. (Hunter K, 29.01.2013) 
‘It is better to let nature take its course that the government gives up the 
establishment of the NCESA. At least the lands can still be utilised by new generations 
of indigenous people. If the scenic area was established, the lands must be restricted 
due to ecological conservation…Our culture dies or becomes extinct because we 
cannot practise it. Our fathers were famous for hunting practices, they made use of 
the mountains. Now we want to follow them but are limited by the conservation 
regulations. If we continue to protest against the NCESA, it is possible that 
indigenous hunting will exist in the future.’ (Hunter D, 09.03.2013)   
These Truku people fear that if the state intervenes their community, and their 
lifestyle will be changed because of the example of their compatriots in F village in Taroko 
National Park. Although aiming to develop tourism, this scenic area is a kind of ‘protected 
area’ for Truku people because the natural environment is also rigorously preserved. They 
imagined that similar conditions would occur at the NCESA in the future and that their 
livelihoods would be highly restricted. They were especially concerned about the 
institution of successive management agencies every four years because the regulations 
behind these governmental agencies would confine what they do for livelihoods. 
‘If the scenic area is developed, it is very possible to be like the Taroko 
National Park, that there are hotels and B&B’s. Then there will be more development.  
It is also like the previous situation where the Amis community anticipated the 
wonderful future with tourism development after the building of a large hotel. Later 
the local Amis people complained that there were no job vacancies at all.  The local 
people were driven away without paying them. We learnt the lesson from the case… 
The scenic area will destroy our lifestyle and customs. The local government 
promoted tourism development but there were no follow-up measures. The first 
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priority is to make more money, but where are the rights and interests of indigenous 
people?’ (Young Leader L, 28.01.2013) 
‘Our Truku hunters are almost arrested in the Taroko National Park. They 
cannot apply for hunting there. If this village becomes the NCESA, we cannot apply 
for hunting, either. What we can do is stay at home rather than go out because of the 
policing of the NCESA. We cannot do the farming unless we gain approval of many 
governmental agencies including the township office, county government, police 
station, Tourism Bureau, and Forestry Bureau. If one of these authorities refuses it, 
we cannot cultivate in the area. These multiple regulations suffocate us. We’re used 
to the traditional way, but the public sector doesn’t accept it.’ (Hunter K, 29.01.2013) 
‘It is possible that people cannot grow vegetables in the scenic area.  We may 
be restricted like the people in the Taroko National Park...now I don’t really trust 
what the government says...’ (Hunter G, 29.01.2013) 
The livelihood was the priority for the locals. They depended on agriculture 
on their land for sustenance. The intervention of the NCESA was seen as the same 
thing like the Park intervention due to the mistrust between the locals and state 
agencies in PAs. Moreover, the management system in the NCESA was not clear. 
Protesting residents worried that different state agencies could adopt diverse 
regulations for the management. Their life could be affected due to different 
managers. 
 ‘They have planned the large territory in the village as the scenic area. Then 
it is a problem as we do farming, weeding and hunting…the draft of management rules 
mentions several groups such as the Forestry Bureau, River Management Office, 
Township Office, Police Substation, Indigenous groups of vigilante…etc. These 
agencies will affect our everyday life in the future. (Young leader L, 28.01.2013) 
A few residents were concerned with their Truku customs. The natural 
resource management of the Truku such as hunting practices may be banned in the 
NCESA intervention. The changing regulations regarding hunting activities 
probably change again once the scenic area is created in their village.   
‘The local people cannot touch the vegetation under the power of the 
regulations, not mention to the wildlife. Our traditional domain is now nationally 
owned and we can go hunting in celebration. But we can’t do this in the future if the 
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scenic area is built. Hunting practices are our traditional culture.  For instance, I have 
to visit the girl my son loves with the present of wildlife. The custom still continues in 
modern time. We can exploit the resource of wildlife according to the Basic Law of 
Indigenous Peoples.  The new rules permit us to go hunting but we can’t do this once 
the NCESA is established.’ (Hunter K, 29.01.2013) 
A young hunter observed the difference between Han Chinese and indigenous 
people around employment, stressing the recent disadvantaged status of indigenous 
people in Taiwan. Importing foreign labourers prevented indigenous Taiwanese labourers 
from gaining employment in urban areas. Indigenous people returned to their hometown 
in the countryside and depended on farming as well as exploitation of natural resources.  
Although establishing the NCESA in indigenous areas increased employment for the local 
residents, their original work such as agriculture could be restricted, particularly certain 
traditional practices. Without sufficient economic capital, it is very possible that they will 
merely be employed by wealthy Han Chinese at the NCESA. Such a development way 
seems to lose the cultural autonomy and livelihood selection of indigenous people.  Taking 
these into consideration, the protesting villagers continued to claim their rights for a 
sustainable livelihood. 
‘They told us the advantages only but neglected some restrictions on purpose. 
For example, they mentioned that young people and offspring must have jobs in the 
village and they don’t need to work outside the hometown after the establishment of 
the scenic area, but they didn’t tell us the limits. This meant that we have to give up 
the current jobs in order to allow the tourism development. I think we cannot learn 
the skill. Such scenic areas cannot help the development of Taiwan. It will be really 
terrible if most reserved lands in Taiwan become the NCESA. In fact, the governments 
cannot guarantee to offer jobs in the village because it is usually the Han Chinese 
people which undertake the jobs rather than indigenous people. They are capable of 
doing these jobs. They don’t hire the indigenous employees due to the impression of 
drunken people and lazy personality. No one guarantees to offer the job vacancies for 
the local people. The scenic area is not beneficial for the local residents.’ (Hunter D, 
09.03.2013) 
The restrictions related to the NCESA were never put into practice in this village. 
The locals’ worries came from the negative example of F village in the Park. Residents there 
were restricted by state agencies and the Truku lifestyle was greatly influenced by 
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conservation regulations. Truku people in T village cherished their hunting tradition and 
land use, so they resisted the plan of the NCESA.  
6.6.2 Controversy over land ownership 
Truku villagers opposing the NCESA questioned the issuance of ownership 
certificates of reserved lands in the tourist attraction. These land users claimed their 
ancestors utilised these plots for a while, so that they applied for private owned reserved 
lands for indigenous people. They had applied for the ownership certificate and the field 
measurement of land had been completed much earlier, however their certificates still had 
not been issued. Once the NCESA is established, they worried that they would not gain 
their certificates after land alternation. This was unfair because the lands were inherited 
from their fathers, and were still in use. Therefore, their protests can be seen as 
safeguarding their land rights. 
‘The officials in the governmental agencies didn’t communicate with us, but 
the planner visited me, I protested because of the land problem. We cannot gain the 
certificates after the measurement. We want to express our opinion if the NCESA is 
permitted, we can never get the ownership. The land ownership certificates are our 
premise to talk about the establishment of the NCESA. (Hunter K, 29.01.2013) 
I had an informal conversation with an NCESA planner when doing field work, 
who noted that the land problem was one primary issue for those protesting. She thought 
the lands were close to the stream, which indicated the public sector would not be able to 
issue the ownership certificates of the lands for private use there. The local land users had 
followed legal procedures but finally they couldn’t gain the ownership, and therefore 
doubted the Township Office authorities, which mediated the matters of reserved lands. 
They believed the promotions of the tourism development and the NCESA affected the 
issuance of ownership certificates in the tourist attraction. 
‘There are sixty plots without issuing land ownership certificates in the two 
sections (close to the primary attraction of the scenic area). People said the 
measurement of lands should not charge at that time, but they were charged 3,000 
NTD by the township office and land office. No one explained where the money 
went…some villagers talked about this problem of the charge in the tribal 
meeting…many details emerged…some were legal but became illegal later because of 
individual interest…they said so in the meeting…we illustrated some regulations such 
as the Basic Law of Indigenous Peoples…the case of losing lands…it is possible that 
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the lands are developed and then the lands are transferred to the state because of land 
alternation… each land in the two sections was charged 3,000 NTD in the past ten 
years, but these villagers have not gotten the ownership certificates…there are sixty 
lands…these are on the hands of the township office supervisor…some counsellors 
discuss whether the office supervisor’s jurisdiction is appropriate or not…they believe 
that the authorities should issue the certificate as long as the land is reserved for 
indigenous people. ’ (Young Leader L, 28.01.2013)    
Rights of reserved lands for indigenous people are close to private property. The 
delay or rejection of issuance of ownership certificates by the public sector meant the 
violation of individual property. Collective action was therefore formed due to the same 
loss of land ownership. 
The other land issue took place when the NCESA was uproarious in this village. 
That was when the land agency re-measured land boundaries using satellite imagery. It 
did so because land information based on manual measurement was out-of-date according 
to an informant in the other community. Yet the young leader L of M community 
considered this re-measurement as a way of occupation by the state. His perception was 
built on experiences of some Truku compatriots in a neighbouring village. 
‘The Land Office is measuring our lands in three communities containing 
house lands and mountain lands…in the past, it took four thousand NTD while one 
certificate charged hundreds NTD.  However, it will be free for measurement this 
time.  The staff said it is because that the lands here have not been measured over 
fifty years. In fact, it is wrong; the lands here were measured in the 1980s and 1990s 
from time to time. They mentioned the information is old.  But older people here think 
it is impossible to be free. You cannot make bricks without straw. The village head 
also endorsed this. It is said that if your land is measured, they cannot measure as 
the same size as original measurement.  Part of the land will be taken away.  
Otherwise, you must quarrel with others due to land conflict. This causes opposition. 
Neighbours possibly fight for lands…these measurement staff are endorsed by the 
County Government.  For us, this moment is unusual because there are NCESA, and 
the planning of cable cars according to the new legislations for development of 
Hualien and Taitung. The scheduled areas are here within the areas for re-
measurement. What we’re concerned about is as the neighbouring village head 
mentioned, is that we have the rights not to join the re-measurement. Yet if the staff 
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inform you twice, they can measure your land without permission. When they post 
the certificate to you, you cannot have objections…the staff said this village is now an 
obstructing community because we don’t want the re-measurement. We protest 
against the NCESA and this field measurement is closely associated with our land 
right.  These things are going-on simultaneously, which makes us feel doubtful…we 
don’t need them but they continue to do these…the government should give us the 
buffer time after we absorbed many different ideas (the NCESA and different laws) … 
Nowadays there is always protest when policy implementation is concerned by the 
state… (Young leader L, 08.03.2013) 
This young Truku leader revealed some implications about resistance by these 
protesting Truku people. First, Truku residents didn’t trust governmental agencies due to 
past unpleasant experiences and unreasonable excuses. Contradicting and dominant acts 
of government underpinned their mistrust. The overlaps between controversial policies 
made the protesting people doubt the ulterior motive of governmental agencies. Second, 
policy interventions relating to land rights potentially lead to controversy due to personal 
interests. Every land owner tended to defend his/her private property. Some Truku 
villagers worried about property loss after measurement, so they rejected re-measurement, 
expecting that controversial cases always result in land loss rather than gain. Yet coercive 
act of measurement by the government incited their resentment. At the same time, an 
informant in a different interest group in this village thought the re-measurement was 
proper policy implementation, commenting that the opposing villagers were poorly 
educated. Finally, empowerment is a vital variable during the protesting period.  
Protesting Truku residents knew these regulations which were related to their life 
although these were made by Han Chinese mainstream society. They were inspired to use 
the Basic Law of Indigenous Peoples to fight for their rights. Some groups such as the 
Truku Presbytery of Presbyterian Church of Taiwan provided information about land 
rights of indigenous peoples, so that these local people were connected to other 
indigenous groups with experience of oppression and to a few Han Chinese lawyers 
favourable to indigenous rights. This empowerment enhanced persistent resistance by 
Truku villagers against unfair treatments. 
6.6.3 Tangled power relationships within the village 
Power relations in the village affect villagers’ collective actions because they are 
usually mobilised and organised by various interest groups. The groups included 
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traditional families and relatives; religious groups of Christianity, political groups, the 
local community organisations, industry associations among others. Interactions among 
these groups form a primary part of village life. For example, the chairman of a community 
association accompanied one legislator candidate to visit some local family leaders of the 
village. These interest groups in various domains may compete for resources or cooperate 
for the same interest. Competition and unfairness among these groups could usually cause 
the undermining of social capital of the village. This thesis argues that these power 
struggles are reinforced by interventions of the state agencies. These negative social 
impacts include not merely livelihoods and traditional practices affected by access to 
natural resources, but also the weakening of social capital through power conflicts.  
Conflicts over interests stemmed from external interventions containing community 
conservation projects, event sponsorships and tourism development directly or indirectly 
supported by governmental agencies. These struggles were acknowledged by many 
residents and they noted that this disadvantage was serious in this village. The following 
are details of power struggles on various issues, which revealed complex scenarios in T 
village. 
Controversy over the name of the NCESA 
The association for tourism promotion’s name 15  refers to the name of one 
traditional family. This family submitted to the Japanese and moved to the flat lands earlier 
than others during Japanese colonial period. The family advised other families to 
surrender, and the patriarch of the family was appointed as the chieftain of this area. The 
current patriarch of this family is now the leader of traditional matters in one community, 
and attends the meeting of indigenous traditional affairs in Hualien county government.  
Adoption of the name of this family as for the tourism association originated from the 
proposal of an attendee of one closed meeting before the tourism development started.  It 
implied that only a few people attended the meeting while most villagers were neglected.  
The outcome of the meeting was that the name of the association almost replaced the 
name of this village through the development of its booming tourism industry. The 
singular family name representing the whole village made of many families led to 
complaints among villagers because the adoption of the name lacked agreement. Such a 
complaint extended to the establishment of the NCESA as the name which should be 
continued to be used. In the meeting of the investigation committee in August 2011, the 
                                                     
15 The name of this association is not shown here to protect anonymity. 
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chairman of B community association proposed this.  The petition of protesting villagers 
also concerned the name issue.  Their argument about the name stated that neglecting 
justification of the name highlighted the disrespect of culture in the NCESA.  
‘Many people think this village is famous for the natural beauty, which is good 
for tourism development: they may also believe that this is a harmonious village. 
Honestly it is wrong, we have disagreed with the name of this tourism attraction. 
There are many families in this village and everyone can share the common resource 
rather than one family monopolising resources and making decision. What can other 
families do? These families own lands in the attraction. They cultivate there.  We 
should respect them and reach the consensus. It is not right that only one family is 
the decision maker.’  (Young leader L, 28.01.2013) 
‘We intended to correct the name of the attraction via media… these names 
of sites in the attraction are only for business use only.  These sites have their own 
names and meanings which were legacies of older generations, but we know that the 
local governments have promoted tourism here for a while.  It is not easy to change 
the name suddenly. But I have to stress that the pre-process of tourism development 
is incomplete.  (Young leader L, 28.01.2013) 
Responding to the urgency of tourism development, sites in the main attraction 
area were renamed in Chinese, which lost the connotations of the local Truku legacy. The 
implication of such a complaint is that the cultural identity behind current economic 
development may be lost.  
The controversy of the name revealed that the local people sought fairness on 
village matters, in response to a few people making decisions for the whole village.  
Different interest groups accordingly obtained a topic to criticise their autocratic style.  
This controversy was addressed in many public meetings and private gossip. People in 
different interest groups expressed the unfair mechanism of past decision-making.  It is 
reasonable to let more groups obtain the opportunity to attend meetings as well as 
decision-making.  
Power struggles among local interest groups 
Power struggles in the village can be examined through the interactions between 
the groups over the operation of funding, the emergence of a new organisation, threats in 
the village, and the attitude of some leaders. These everyday interactions in the village 
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revealed that first, many villagers sought fairness16 so that they might easily complain 
about funding operation of an organisation if they felt it was unfair. Second, each interest 
group had its strong self-identity so that creating a new group was easier than coordination 
between existing organisations. Separation appeared to be normal in the village. Finally, 
negative communications through menace, threatened some people’s livelihood, arousing 
more resentment and undermining social relationships. I argue that these conflicts sapped 
trust between villagers: without basic common faith, collective actions of villagers would 
be hard to be mobilised and the actions would collapse easily. The communications within 
the village affected the interactions between villagers and the local governmental agencies 
and vice versa. The implementation of policies would be hampered due to the vicious 
circle of poor communications and mistrust: these conflicts reinforced problems with the 
interventions of community conservation and other sponsorships from governmental 
agencies on multiple levels.  
‘The tribal meeting group of that community exaggerated their mistakes to 
the maximum. They thought the planning of the NCESA from the county government 
was not approved by the local people. Last time, they wanted to come to this 
community to hold a meeting. We have our own chairman of tribal meeting.  They 
didn’t respect us; otherwise our chairman should be invited to attend the meeting. 
Why did they go over the line of community? The group despatched an official 
document that they intend to hold a meeting last week. I think the conference is for 
the public but why did they not invite the public sector such as the township 
authorities and village head? Why did they go across the boundary? I accordingly 
suggested shutting the door so that they could not use the space. They should respect 
us.’ (Hunter U, 08.03.2013) 
One tribal meeting group was the leading organisation of mobilising collective 
protests to the NCESA. This group became notorious for its fight against the local 
government and other opposing groups whose position was close to the government. Thus 
the violent reputation aroused some residents’ and groups’ dissent. Other groups used 
various means to undermine the mobilisation of the leading group. Similarly, when a 
group attempted to organise collective action to protest against acts of the government, 
                                                     
16Truku group is an acephalous society without permanent power mechanism. In general, every 
man is equal in political power (Simon, 2013). 
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other groups might decide to ‘let it alone’ in order to avoid confrontation and hindered 
the mobilisation. These non-cooperative actions appeared to deepen mutual antagonism.  
‘When we dealt with the event of excavation in the hillside, the chairman of 
the community association helped take photos and data collection. We hoped that 
the association could dispatch the document to the local government, but I don’t 
know why he did lose the data and why the computer was out of order. Later he 
admitted that he didn’t want to send the report because he was afraid that doing so 
might cause unnecessary conflict. I have not joined the association since then 
because of these.  The group is empty and the meeting there was a kind of formalism. 
There were no concrete actions after meeting.  It is meaningless to stay there.’ (Young 
Leader L, 28.01.2013) 
Diverse camps with different points of view sometimes induced them to avoid the 
important part, but to dwell on the trivial.  Some protesters were the land owners in the 
planned tourist attraction.  The camp supporting the NCESA attempted to persuade the 
county head by pointing out that some protesters were outsiders living in another village. 
 ‘What I mention here, are according to the statements of petition in the 
south, those supporting people said some protesting people come from the other 
village. In fact, they are also the local residents of this village. They were forced to 
move due to the serious landslide. They owned lands in this village. Some people’s 
households are still in this village. So people should respect them and their rights.’ 
(Young Leader L, 28.01.2013) 
Different camps took advantage of political power to menace other camps.  Land 
owners in the planned tourist attraction used to build huts for storage or raising chickens.  
When the owners joined the protesting group, their lifestyle was disturbed by the threat 
of the demolition of huts which was based on the legislation.  This threat affected the 
livelihood of some protesting residents and undermined mutual trust in the village.  
‘To rebuild the house let alone the henhouse is not allowed in the tourist 
attraction.  If the village becomes the NCESA, this is the first one in Taiwan. Now this 
area is not a scenic area but the block house should be demolished. The representative 
said that some people petitioned, but I believe the petition was a lie. She (the 
representative) wished that this village becomes the NCESA because she has no land 
inside the attraction. The collusion between the government and businessmen works 
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when the scenic are established. She took advantage of many means to influence 
villagers so that there will be no protest against the NCESA…’ (Young Leader Y, 
02.01.2013) 
Moreover, a few hunters were threatened that their illegal acts would be reported 
due to their opposing views on the NCESA. One leader of the protesting tribal group 
explained that he and his brother were warned by menace because they used to go hunting 
and mobilised demonstrations in the village. Menaces were the embodiment of power 
struggles in this village, and were a means to stop other rival individuals continuing their 
action. Several types of menace had been recorded during my fieldwork, which contained 
warning by blackmail, verbal warning, and report to some authorities concerned. These 
threats were significant in the village for they caused psychological pressure on those 
people threatened, and reports to officials made some villagers worry about their personal 
property and livelihood. Such menaces undermined social relationships in the village, and 
reduced the possibility of negotiation or coordination between interest groups. These 
menaces, as parts of power struggles, are seen as the negative social impacts from 
governmental interventions; because interventions reinforced these power struggles in the 
Truku village.  
Blackmail was a type of menace (see section 6.5.4) which exposed the position and 
motive of the sender.  It showed the complexity of power relations among different groups 
in the village. When the trick was exposed, that was, the receivers knew that the blackmail 
was a warning from other groups with opposing views, they felt more resentment at the 
supporting group and were determined to hold a demonstration.  As a result, the blackmail 
warning did not work to stop receivers’ action.  
The second threat was a verbal warning. This warning was usually in relation to 
the livelihood of the threatened villager. The example was illustrated that two brothers in 
the village were famous hunters, and had greatly depended on hunting in the 1980s. More 
recently one was an amateur, while hunting accounted for half of the other’s income, and 
both fought against the establishment of the NCESA. One led the protesting locals, while 
the other directly protested against the supporting camp in Truku in a public meeting.  
During this period, they were warned that they should be cautious if they continued to go 
hunting because it was very possible that the police were waiting for them. The reason 
why hunting practices could be regarded as a menace was because the game in the area 
was usually an ‘endangered species’. It was not easy to get approval to hunt endangered 
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species when applying for legal hunting, despite the rules that allowed indigenous hunting 
for endangered wildlife for non-profit purpose. For the brothers, the hunting practices 
were traditional culture as well as a way of livelihood. When they got the warning, the one 
depending more on hunting chose to be a wage labourer in the suburb of another city.  
This was his first time working outside the village for a comparably long term (over one 
year) since he married over 25 years ago. However, he frequently came back for protest 
actions and exercised hunting practices as he stayed home.  
‘Few supporters of NCESA paid attention to my brother and me. They said 
that we   mobilise the protesters. These supporters warned us when chatting in the 
village. They knew that we used to go hunting for livelihood and would report to the 
police about our poaching. They believed that it will be calming in the village if we are 
arrested. Few villagers went hunting this winter only because supporters of the 
NCESA monitored us. They go to the police substation frequently, which is very 
troublesome. I still go hunting but go surreptitiously.’ (Hunter K, 29.01.2013) 
The supporting camp also warned some poor old people that their subsidy for low-
income household could be cancelled if they attended the tribal meeting. These illiterate 
locals worried about the sustenance subsidy and listened to the rumour. One informant 
heard of this from an old man in his community. The case was also seen as a threat to a 
sustenance livelihood.  
‘When we convened tribal meeting, a specific powerful person in the village 
treated some villagers so that they couldn’t participate in the meeting. There are a 
few low-income families here in this village. He also menaced some poor villagers that 
they cannot gain social benefits if they attend the meeting. He did say that to some 
old people. These old villagers were afraid of attending the meeting when he told them 
about the loss of social subsidy. It was related to their livelihoods. It was too risky for 
them…when we met last August, he organised a trip of dining out. The other trip was 
also organised as we held the third tribal meeting to avoid their participation of tribal 
matters. (Young leader L, 28.01.2013) 
It appeared that the menace of an oral warning on livelihood worked to some 
degree for it forced a Truku hunter to work outside the village and stopped an old person 
attending a tribal meeting supporting the opposition. Nevertheless, the hunter still joined 
the protest actions and kept on his traditional practices of hunting.  
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The third type of menace was the report to the authorities of certain illegal 
activities of the rival group. The instance in the village was the block houses in the 
attraction. These buildings belonged to those villagers opposing the NCESA. After public 
conflicts between the two sides, the supporting group reported the illegal houses to the 
township office on the lands where the local users did not gain the ownership certificates. 
The houses were important personal properties for the owners, so one expressed his 
thought of committing suicide in a public conference. Some users worried about the 
demolition by the local government, and the protesting group searched for the help of a 
lawyer. In the public conference, the tribal meeting group stressed that the Basic Law of 
Indigenous Peoples safeguarded the rights of building block houses for farming and 
hunting: 
‘We disagreed with the establishment of the NCESA last year and the 
representative advised to demolish the block houses of those protestors. These houses 
are regarded as the lifeblood of indigenous people. The local newspaper reported that 
she proposed to do so in the township representative council. What she meant was 
this area. Those who supported the NCESA petitioned the county head also 
mentioned the illegal block houses should be destroyed.’ (Young Leader L, 28.01.2013) 
The existence of menace in the village demonstrated that the public negotiation 
seemed to be impossible between the two sides. These different threats did not really affect 
the stance of the majority of protestors, but they did result in trouble in the village in 
addition to psychological pressure as the discontent between the two camps increased, 
particularly the threatened opposing camp. These conflicts in the village were reinforced 
because of intervention from the government. We could see the weak social capital in the 
village was undermined due to the planning of NCESA supported by the local county 
government. This planning stemmed from the development dimension of the community 
conservation project. Different interest groups in the village held different views of the 
planning. The land owners in the tourist attraction tended to oppose the scenic area while 
many leaders supported the local government’s plans. Many villagers were neutral to see 
the planning. The protestors were organised by the tribal meeting group and self-help 
group. The supporters depended on the industry associations and community 
associations. After a few demonstrations and mobilisations, the protesters evoked a sense 
of crisis in many villagers. They perceived that their livelihood, land rights and Truku 
lifestyle would be invaded when the planning of NCESA was put into practice. Moreover, 
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the unpleasant social impacts such as menace and inconvenience from tourism 
development had affected their life. More residents joined in the opposing camp. 
Local leaders’ flag-flopping attitude towards the issue of the NCESA 
Some leaders and retired teachers of the village changed their position over the 
NCESA. This appeared to be normal since they understood the issues more deeply with 
the development of communications between villagers and the local government. But the 
opposing residents thought that there could be a benefit exchange under the table. In 
addition, the village head always insisted on his neutrality, which irritated the protesting 
villagers because he in reality helped the local governmental agencies. A retired teacher 
opposed the scenic area but changed his mind later to support the plan. These leaders’ 
changing views impressed the protesters. The protesting residents guessed that the leaders 
might have been bribed.  
‘When the planners talked to some leaders of villagers in private, there may 
be illegal transactions under the table. We are sure this problem exists…that is why 
some people opposed the NCESA but then they agreed with this idea, later they found 
there was no interest and returned to protesting camp. Such a trick exposed…’ (Young 
leader L, 28.01.2013) 
‘When the planners came to us, the retired supervisor of the primary school 
opposed the establishment of the NCESA. However, he supports the scenic area now 
and is in the same camp of the supervisor of township office. (Hunter K, 29.01.2013) 
The point of view of the village head was vital for he represented the village to a 
certain degree. When more villagers joined in the protesting camp, the head still insisted 
on his own neutrality, yet his actions exposed his support of the plans. Many opposing 
residents expressed their complaint that the head was not in favour with the opinion of 
the majority of villagers. 
‘We invited the village head to come to our tribal meeting but he didn’t. He 
came when the recall election of chairman of tribal meeting was held. He may think 
that the tribal matters affect his duty of village head. He may not know how to 
respond to these matters. However, when we asked him, he was utterly ignorant and 
replied that he was neutral. I think he was elected by villagers (two communities) and 
he should help a little. He can at least come to listen to our opinions and help express 
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our views. No, he never helps. How can we express our opinion?’ (Young leader L, 
28.01.2013) 
‘The village head stressed he was neutral when the weak villagers had difficulty. 
It is unbelievable that the elected village head emphasised his neutrality. What should 
we say about this? The NCESA is in relation to the local governmental agencies, 
politicians and the consortium, which is hard to deal with.’ (Hunter D, 09.03.2013) 
An opposing leader blamed these Truku leaders including the village head, the 
representative and supervisor of the township office because they always cooperated with 
the businessmen for their interest rather than the will of many villagers. He therefore 
suggested that the local residents could run their micro-businesses in their village rather 
than let the public sector entrust external companies.   
‘Why do we protest against the planning so hard? The village head, 
representative and the township supervisor don’t support us. They support the 
consortium in order for their benefits only rather than popular will. If the village head 
helps us, the public sector cannot do the planning. The project of the NCESA must 
have been vanished long time ago. I think it is appropriate to run the business 
ourselves.’ (Hunter K, 29.01.2013) 
The evolution of community conservation project revealed that local community 
suffered from the power struggles among groups, local leaders could not help seek the 
consensus of controversies of the NCESA, the problem of land ownership and land use was 
getting serious, the custom practices might not be exercised in the NCESA, and the 
distribution of tourism resource was uneven. I considered these as the social impacts on 
the Truku village from the intervention of community conservation. These negative 
impacts aroused these local Truku’s collective actions of open resistance.   
 
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter explored the evolution of a community conservation example over 17 
years in order to examine the interactions between the government and local Truku 
villagers. I have reviewed the early interactions between local government and the Truku 
village via conservation issues in section 6.2. In the section 6.3, I looked at the new 
communication strategy of the local government with the local Truku. This strategy 
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successfully persuaded the locals because of the common goal of tourism development. 
Hualien County Government was famous for its tourism industry and the Truku needed 
economic development to improve their life. However, Truku practice of community 
conservation paid much more attention to development expectations rather than the 
conservation effort. This practice model unfortunately resulted in a serious problem of 
elite capture and power struggle (Jhuang and Tai, 2009). I noted the external conservation 
idea showed this participatory conservation was actually manipulated by the local 
government. Moreover, the internal hegemony of a few leaders contradicted full local 
participation. This community conservation greatly depending on the market 
demonstrated that financially disadvantaged Truku people were easily marginalised due 
to lack of capital. Tourism development was therefore dominated by external travel 
agencies. The local government again intervened the village in order to deal with the 
difficulty. A solution to the difficulty was to create a new scenic area and new rules. The 
planning of the NCESA by the local government was not spread among the whole village. 
Quite a few residents protested against this plan. They complained to the local 
government as section 6.5.3 pointed out. They considered the NCESA as an intervention 
attempting to control their life and natural resources. I regarded Truku residents’ political 
actions as the legacy of strict conservation implementation in the Taroko Park. Many 
social impacts from the policy interventions are described in the remaining sections in 
section 6.6. Focusing on the acts of the local government, responses of the locals to those 
governmental acts and social impacts resulted from the policy on the study village, I 
conclude that community conservation containing conservation and development 
strategies can be understood as an act of internal territoriality by the powerful 
government. The territorialisation of the government resulted in some negative social 
impacts on the local community, which threatened their livelihood, land property and 
social cohesion. Accordingly, most of the local Truku residents exercised overt resistance 
to the policy intervention of the NCESA. These three conceptions have constituted the 
main argument of this study, the territorialisation of the state caused the resistance of 
local indigenous people due to negative social impacts, which is seen as an interpretation 
of policy implementation in the indigenous regions.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
7.1 Introduction 
This study set out to explore the interactions between state agencies and local 
indigenous people in PAs in order to review nature conservation policy implementations 
in the indigenous regions of Taiwan. Three broad research questions about the state acts, 
locals’ acts and social influences on local community were raised to reach the research 
aim. Specifically, I have examined conservation policy implementations and institutions 
of the central and local governmental agencies in Taroko National Park and a community 
conservation case. Moreover, the perceptions and responses of the local Truku residents 
to policy implementations and institutions in these PAs were also investigated. This study 
is important for PA management because state agencies and the locals are primary actors. 
Their interactive processes shape nature conservation policies and reflect policy 
implementations. Their interplay also informs debates about biodiversity conservation 
and social justice.  
In this concluding chapter, I firstly present empirical findings to reply to these 
questions. The data analysis was based on two different types of PAs in two Truku villages, 
and placed within the theoretical framework to verify the primary argument. In this 
framework examination, I also attempt to compare the similarities and differences 
between these two Truku examples. This is followed by the theoretical contribution and 
policy implications of this study. Finally, I make policy recommendations for the future 
and a conclusion. 
 
7.2 Research questions and findings of this study 
There were three research questions in this study to understand the interactions 
between state agencies and local Truku people in Taroko National Park and a community 
conservation initiative:  
Q1. What were the policies and policy implementations of governmental agencies 
in Taroko National Park and a community conservation initiative? 
Q2. What were the local Trukus’ responses/actions to these conservation policies 
and policy implementations in PAs? 
  230 
Q3. What social impacts from conservation occurred in the two Truku villages? 
These questions are concerned with what the acts of state agencies and the local 
Truku, and social impacts occurred in the two Truku villages. This study adopts the 
definition of human territoriality of Sack (1986), social impacts from conservation, and 
Scott’s everyday resistance (1985) to structure the framework design in chapter two in 
order to examine two Truku cases. As section 2.2.2 points out, political ecology studies 
have identified that the powerful actor’s hegemony is embedded in conservation 
interventions through the manifestation of specific institutions and technologies. 
Therefore, Sack’s human territoriality containing the feature of behaviour control is 
employed in the framework. The institutions and specific technologies such as the co-
management arrangements in the Park and the NCESA planning were scrutinised in this 
study to understand whether the acts of the state authorities met Sack’s definition of 
territorialisation. Scott’s implicit resistance was adopted because many hidden ways of 
resistance might be ignored. Yet these everyday acts contain important political 
implications (Holmes, 2007). When analysing the local Truku’s actions to conservation, I 
not only looked at evident actions but these covert responses and checked the political 
implications.  
Research question one was concerned with the acts of state agencies including the 
conservation policy-making, diverse conservation institutions in the PAs, and 
conservation regulation enforcement. Question two explored the responses of local Truku 
people containing Truku values of natural resource management, local attitudes toward 
PA authorities and the police, Truku hunting practices, collective actions related to PA 
authorities and the police. Question three investigated the influences resulting from 
conservation or PA establishment on the local Truku communities, especially the negative 
effects. I used these questions to interview officials in charge of nature conservation and 
indigenous development affairs in state agencies on multiple levels, Truku leaders on 
politics and Christianity in two village examples, and Truku hunters who frequently 
exercised hunting practices. Moreover, I attended celebrations, meetings, and church 
services in two villages for participant observation. Documents such as court judgements, 
and official documents were collected through governmental website and interviewees. 
Some video clips about some events were collected via interviewees and YouTube. Data 
collection was conducted between October 2012 and March 2013, and September 2014. The 
data were analysed by the framework of political ecology to examine whether the acts of 
state agencies were the operation of territorialisation according to Sack’s definition (1986), 
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whether the performances of local Truku people were practising covert and over 
resistances against conservation authorities as Scott (1985) and other authors (e.g. 
Norgrove and Hulme, 2006; Holmes, 2014) note, and finally whether negative social 
impacts occurred in Truku communities and the effects were strong enough to drive the 
resistance of the Truku. In the following sections, I answer these questions in order by 
exploring the acts of government agencies, responses of the local Truku, and the extensive 
social influences.        
 
7.2.1 Internal territoriality of state agencies in two protected areas 
I used the three principles of Sack’s definition of human territoriality as the 
indicators to examine the government authorities’ acts in two PAs. These principles were 
spatial classification, ease of communication, and behaviour control. I applied these to two 
PAs of this study and explored decision-making, local participation institutions, 
conservation legislation, and conservation implementations.  
Reviewing the history of national parks in Taiwan in sections 4.3 and 5.2 provided 
a broad picture of the specific socio-economic background and political atmosphere in the 
1970s and 1980s. Taiwan was at that time under the rule of martial law, so the state ruled 
the whole country in a dictatorial way. The foreign force of the US and domestic economic 
demand for recreation affected the establishment of parks. The decision-making of park 
creation was a ‘top-down’ process based on experts’ scientific knowledge and excluded the 
locals. The Taroko National Park Plan clearly declared the scope of the park by 
professional maps with park zoning. The Park Plan and the First Review of the Park Plan 
both confirmed the fact that the local Truku were overlooked. In the Second and Third 
Reviews, the local Truku were mentioned by their traditional knowledge contributing to 
conservation and some specific institutions such as the Cultural Advisory Committee and 
Co-Management Council were elaborated to accommodate local participation. However, 
when examining these participation schemes, I found the level of participation for the 
Truku was surprisingly low. The majority of participants could not be involved in the Park 
management. In the Co-Management Council considering Park management, local 
participation was restricted to a few leaders who were invited to be the Council members. 
The analysis of meeting records and my interview data showed that the Park authorities 
retained the power to select indigenous members and to decide when to hold meetings, 
which implied that the local participation was controlled by state conservation authorities. 
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In addition, the Council meeting had been suspended since August 2011. Some officials 
also thought that those Truku members were concerned with their own interest only.            
In the other example of community conservation, the river conservation area was 
publicly announced by the Hualien Government, and set up a sign on the main road close 
to the river. The development project of the NCESA was planned by a professor and his 
assistant. In the NCESA plan, the professional planner delineated the boards of the scenic 
area after a few negotiations with the Forestry Bureau in order to avoid other existing PAs. 
Both conservation and development projects were spatial designations. However, the 
decision-making of both conservation and development programmes was grasped by the 
local government and few local leaders as shown in sections 6.2. and 6.3. The lack of full 
local participation and the opaque political process caused complaints among Truku 
residents. The name of this tourism attraction and the Industry Association, for example, 
has long been complained about by some local leaders in public meetings. The 
complaining leaders pointed out that they could not participate in the meetings and the 
decision about the name was made by some specific leaders only. Moreover, the plan of 
NCESA also eliminated the participation of the land users of the main attraction in the 
scheduled NCESA. The expected participatory community conservation in fact was 
dominated by the local government agencies and experts rather than full participation of 
local stakeholders. In this regard, two examples demonstrated that the Park and 
community conservation project were both spatial classifications, and that the decision-
making of the boundaries was expert-oriented and exclusionary. Local participation in the 
co-management arrangement of the Park and community conservation projects was solely 
opened to a few leaders, yet even they could not affect the decision-making.        
The legal source of PAs embodied the restrictions in the territory of a protected 
area, which was seen as an easy way of communication of human territoriality (Sack, 1986). 
The legal foundation of the Park example was the National Park Law and its sub-laws. 
Besides, the Park authorities and Park Police also adopted the Wildlife Conservation Act 
to strengthen the implementation of conservation (the penalty section) as section 5.6.3 
showed because the Law has not been amended over 40 years. These conservation 
regulations have listed some forbidden activities such as using fire and hunting in the 
parks. In the practices of communication with the locals, many Truku informants in the 
Park case expressed their lack of awareness of the detailed rules such as endangered 
species and other restrictions on natural resources until some locals were arrested due to 
poaching (section 5.3.1). The example of community conservation employed more legal 
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sources when making conservation efforts and dealing with development issues. When 
the conservation project was conducted, the local government proclaimed the 
conservation announcement in light of the Fisheries Act because the conservation effort 
aimed to protect fish and river resources. The development planning after the end of 
conservation implementation was a new scenic area of NCESA (see the development of 
the NCESA in section 6.2.3 and the problems of the NCESA in section 6.4). The local 
government developed specific regulations (the rules of NCESA establishment and the 
Regulations of Governing Guides in NCESA) for the NCESA. Similarly, the majority of 
residents in T village did not understand the creation of a new scenic area nor the rules 
associated with the NCESA. In this regard of territoriality, the restrictions of resources in 
PAs were clearly justified with respect to specific legislation, yet lacked effective 
communication with the local indigenous residents.  
The differences between the local practices and the conservation policy 
implementation in PAs highlight the control enforcement of territoriality by the state and 
the Truku identity. The Park headquarters, Park Police and local police were responsible 
for controlling poaching within the Park according to these conservation regulations. The 
traditional practices of Truku residents about natural resource management were 
prohibited. Quite a few interviewees mentioned they knew the conservation restriction 
when they or their neighbours were arrested by the police. When I examined the Second 
and Third Reviews of the Park Plan, the Park authorities expressed their inclusion of Truku 
culture and practices. Some measures of participatory or co-management arrangement 
were taken by the Park since 2000. Yet when further analysing these participation 
schemes, I found these schemes were tokenistic because the Park authorities manipulated 
these to make sure they still maintained the power within the Park as section 5.7 revealed. 
The Park elaborately interwove power control in these participatory schemes. Moreover, 
the police and district court also changed their law enforcement to be favourable for 
indigenous people. The legal system usually used probation to pardon ‘indigenous 
poachers’ rather than legislating new regulations for indigenous people. Nevertheless, 
their grace of law enforcement highlighted that the nature of conservation law lacks the 
idea of pluralism although the Constitution has declared this as a guiding principle. The 
local Truku lost their autonomy and rights over decision-making. In the other example, 
the locals conducted a community conservation project but the fact that only a few leaders 
hold power caused a backlash from other interest groups in the village. The opaque process 
of planning and negotiation between government officials and a few leaders produced 
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mistrust between the locals and the local government. When the meetings were behind 
closed doors and public hearing became the endorsement for the planning of local 
government, more and more residents raised their doubts about the NCESA planning. 
Protesters in T village complained that they were potentially restricted and manipulated 
by the new rules of NCESA when they got the planning project and studied the rules of 
the NCESA (as with the problems they pointed to in section 6.4). The development of 
tourism which was included in the idea of community conservation indicated that local 
tourism resources were controlled by the external travel agencies. The development idea 
originally came from the local government (see section 6.2.1).  
This section ensured that PA establishment and conservation policy 
implementations in PAs in the two Truku villages by the state agencies were the acts of 
territorialisation, which echoes the argument of Vandergeest and Peluso that modern 
states tend to internally territorialise their ruling scopes for their interest. The government 
used scientific knowledge, experts, and legislative power to zone territory for nature 
conservation. Within the PAs, resource and behaviour control was common even though 
some participatory schemes were adopted. These measures caused inconvenience to the 
local Truku. Their responses to these territorial acts were various forms of resistance.     
7.2.2 Resistance as responses of Truku residents to conservation interventions 
My second question is the responsive acts of Truku people to state acts in two PAs. 
There are sub-questions including Truku residents’ perceptions of PA authorities, 
conservation regulations and conservation implementations. Moreover, what were the 
local Trukus’ specific actions to these PAs, conservation regulations and conservation 
implementations? Almost all Truku informants in the Park case expressed their 
antagonism between them and the Park with Park Police because of the restriction on 
resource exploitation in the Park as sections 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 outlined. Some interviewees 
recalled that some policemen used controversial tactics to trap Truku residents (the 
depiction in section 5.3.5). The conservation implementation in the late 1980s and early 
1990s directly caused the overt protests of the locals combined with local politicians as 
descripted in section 5.4. Therefore, a Truku pastor regarded these conservation 
institutions as external rules and the state as an external political regime in section 5.3.4. 
These more or less reflected the inner voice in many Truku residents’ mind for the subject 
of this accusation was Truku/indigenous community. A church elder thought that the 
political actions and claims were costly but did not gain tangible feedback. Truku 
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individuals retreated and continued their everyday practices for basic sustenance. The 
practices contained their traditional customs and activities such as hunting, farming and 
social norms in the highland within the Park. I see these practices as implicit resistances 
because Truku individual residents deliberately practised these. They avoided the 
confrontation with the police and the satellite monitoring of the Park authorities, got the 
Park Police into trouble, went on hunting practices, and asked for the help of indigenous 
politicians. I have outlined these tactics in section 5.5. They kept on with the everyday 
practices not only for their sustenance, but for cultural identity that these practices were 
part of the roots of Truku community. Truku residents could do these primarily due to the 
help of some indigenous policemen. These policemen provided useful information for the 
Truku to evade those conservation implementations. The policemen might have a stronger 
sense of Truku identity and saw the locals as friends. In section 5.6.2, some informants did 
mention that indigenous policemen helped them on their hunting trips. Truku people in 
the Park individually took actions of covert resistance against conservation institutions. 
These actions in everyday life looked similar to the peasants in Scott’s weapons of the weak 
(1985). Holmes (2007) also notes that to continue livelihood practices is a frequently used 
strategy of hidden resistance against conservation.  
In the other Truku village, residents articulated the mutual distrust between the 
local government and them because of many unpleasant experiences in the past. When 
the local government introduced the idea of community conservation, many leaders and 
residents questioned the public sector and the suggestion. After communications and 
educational trips for a while, the locals roughly accepted the conservation intervention 
because of the idea of tourism development. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 described the evolution 
of the project. The development vision of tourism then frustrated the locals because it 
needed a great amount of capital. There were actually only a few residents joining the 
industry and most of them ran small businesses because their fallow fields were close to 
the attraction. The external travel agencies introduced by the local government 
monopolised the tourism resource in this village yet they did not build the mechanism of 
feedback with any local NGO as Chapter 6.2.3 revealed. The local government considered 
the NCESA as an attempt to solve the tourism difficulty in T village. However, the series 
of opaque acts in the process of planning the NCESA taken by the local government with 
very few leaders were considered as dereliction by the many residents (see the points in 
section 6.5.3). The planning of the NCESA was the straw that broke the camel’s back. The 
action of overt resistance was mobilised by the tribal meeting group. Some young people 
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also participated in the protests. The protesting Truku took advantage of the media to 
express unfairness, challenged the officials in open conferences, and asked for the help of 
powerful politicians. Finally, the opposing residents successfully caused NCESA’s planning 
tobe suspended in a negotiation conference held by an indigenous legislator. The local 
government returned the planning because there was no consensus of the creation of 
NCESA in the village. Four months later, some residents mobilised a protest against 
current tourism development in order to claim that tourism activities should obey the 
Mountain Control Rules. That was, visitors could only walk in the mountain area of T 
village.   
Both examples coincidentally revealed that the responses of the locals to the 
conservation interventions were resistances implicitly and explicitly. Their perceptions of 
the conservation institutions and the government were negative and based on mistrust. In 
this study, both kinds of resistance interacted with each other. Individual covert resistance 
was the foundation for collective action of overt resistance. Overt resistance could return 
to hidden resistance by individuals when open actions did not work or were difficult to 
mobilise. These two patterns of resistance could be alternatively used by the local Truku. 
Their resisting responses to conservation implementation in the PAs by the Truku showed 
that there might be something wrong with conservation policy implementations. 
Otherwise it was costly for the local Truku to resist state policies in explicit and implicit 
ways. Some informants commented that they could not find steady jobs while the political 
actions were on going. Covert resistant acts of exploiting natural resources in the Park also 
took the risk of being arrested. The calculated risks of organising resistance aimed not only 
to point out the unfairness imposed on them, but also to continue to use resources. Local 
Truku resistance was the unexpected result of policy because such resistant actions 
reduced the effectiveness of conservation policies.  
The difference between the two examples concerning resistance was evident in my 
fieldwork. The Truku in F village tended to resist individually while collective political 
actions were used in T village. Actually the Truku used these two patterns of resistance 
alternatively. F villagers mobilised open protests and T villagers implicitly used natural 
resources. Yet it was true that natural resources were more seriously protected in the Park. 
The police system (local police and the Park Police) and the patrol system of the Park 
authorities made frequent conservation efforts. The National Park Law banned every 
resource use within the Park. In the T village, however, the law system was more flexible 
because the Wildlife Conservation Act and the Forestry Act allowed resource use in some 
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specific contexts. Some amendments concerning local use and resource use in the national 
forests had been passed according to the Indigenous Peoples Basic Law, except within the 
strict park system.  
Furthermore, empowerment plays a key role in explicit resistance as Poteete and 
Ribot (2011) note. In the community conservation example, the tribal meeting group was 
inspired by church organisations and some professionals in a conference about the land 
conflicts between indigenous groups and the state. Also, through the discussions and 
communications in each tribal meeting between attendees, the leaders of the tribal 
meeting group realised that they could justify their resistance because the Basic Law of 
Indigenous Peoples conferred Truku protesters the rights to self-determination in the 
indigenous areas. External groups should get the consent of local indigenous people when 
engaging in development activity or conservation in indigenous regions (Article 21-23). In 
this regard, these protesters were also empowered by decentralised legislation. Early open 
actions were also exercised in the Park example because of the support of local politicians 
and churches. Political support could be seen as political empowerment. The leaders and 
residents complained about the restrictions of the Park. In alliance with a social movement 
of indigenous groups regarding land issues, the Truku leaders positioned their collective 
actions as resistance against resource restriction and land intervention. It did not mean 
that there was no political support after the early collective actions. Yet the political 
support after the actions was indirect and not so powerful to mobilise an open action. 
These indicate that if the imposition of conservation continues and the Truku are 
empowered by these factors, Truku collective resistance to conservation may happen.   
The resistance as a response to conservation was the unexpected consequence of 
conservation policy for resistance acts undermine conservation efficiency. It was also 
costly for the state to deal with the resistance. For the locals, collective actions of open 
resistance took their time and money. Since the main stakeholders both see the resistance 
to conservation as a high cost, it is vital to understand the reasons that facilitate resistance 
and to prevent it from policy implementations. I attempt to summarise these factors in 
next section. 
7.2.3 Social impacts from conservation intrusions in the Truku villages 
I consider the social impacts from conservation interventions, no matter whether 
they were in strict or more participatory protected areas, as the main factor contributing 
to the resistance of indigenous people because these caused direct influences on the life 
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of Truku residents. I categorise these impacts as three types. The first one is the effect on 
livelihood. The second type is the cultural impact. The final one is the influence on social 
capital. I attempt to justify this argument by my empirical data. 
The natural resource use ban in protected areas influenced the livelihoods of a few 
financially disadvantaged residents. They were hunters, stone and herb collectors, and 
mushroom growers who heavily relied on natural resources as their livelihood. Truku 
hunters played a vital role in traditional Truku society although there are fewer and fewer 
hunters in modern society. Few of these modern huntsmen made a living on hunting only. 
According to the discussions in my fieldwork, they sold game to other indigenous villagers 
and their relatives, and a little to Han Chinese friends and game shops. They did this 
cautiously due to conservation regulations. When their hunting job was threatened by the 
other camp in terms of political position as section 6.8.2 noted, the huntsman was forced 
to leave home for other jobs. The majority of hunters used shotguns rather than traps, as 
making setting and checking traps in mountain areas took more time. Spending more time 
in hunting domains meant there was more opportunity to be arrested by the police, 
especially in the Park. Although the police were becoming more permissive towards 
indigenous habits, as discussed in section 5.6.1, the hunting activity in the park was still 
called poaching. Conservation institutions prevented the desire of Truku people to hunt, 
as the ranger of the park mentioned in section 5.3.4, and more hunters said the practices 
would be exercised continuously in section 5.5.4 because it was a cultural habit. In the 
community conservation village, the opposing protesters worried that hunting activities 
would be banned when the NCESA was established because hunting and sight-seeing were 
different (see their worries in section 6.5). In general, hunting practices still existed despite 
the pressure of conservation. The senior generation took hunting practices more seriously 
and emphasized traditional norms. Instead, younger people regarded hunting as a 
recreational activity or cultural habit, and hunting was not a livelihood priority. Yet for 
the disadvantaged hunters in the two examples, their livelihood selection was restricted. 
The livelihood impact resulting from community conservation was the tourism 
development in T village. It was a vision among the Truku residents when the locals made 
conservation efforts. Yet the practices of tourism showed that majority of the locals could 
not afford to run a costly business of tourism like the Han Chinese businessmen. It was a 
market-based strategy which was unlikely to be favourable for the disadvantaged 
indigenous groups. The tourism resource was controlled by external private agencies 
rather than the locals. There was no sound system of distribution of tourism interest. The 
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tourism industry exploited the resource of T village and caused inconveniences such as 
traffic jams and mess in the attraction. Cultural misunderstandings also occurred when 
the external tour guides introduced the local landscape. These negative experiences had 
been noted in section 6.6. Low employment and poverty were not improved, but more 
environmental problems emerged. These impacts allowed the Truku to rethink their 
development approach.  
The second social impact which pushed the resistance should be the cultural 
implications of conservation measures. I have recurrently mentioned that the hunting 
practices were associated with Truku culture and Gaya norms. The prohibition of hunting 
wildlife and using trees clashed with the values of natural resource management held by 
local Truku people. A general impression that indigenous people are cruel to hunt wildlife 
was created by the mainstream media and conservation discourses. Several Truku 
informants stressed their value was to use natural resources sustainably for they had 
depended on these resources for livelihoods in the past (see section 5.3.1). Their traditional 
norms didn’t allow them to waste any wilderness resources, and their resource use was full 
of reverence for nature. Some contemporary significant celebrations of Truku 
communities such as weddings and funerals require game for sharing among relatives (see 
the statement of a Truku hunter in section 6.6.1 that he must go hunting before his son’s 
wedding celebration as a traditional ritual). The implications of using natural resources 
contained not merely physical demands but social and spiritual meanings, although 
hunting was declining with the socioeconomic change in Truku community. The 
mainstream discourse of conservation sees indigenous hunting as poaching. Hunting as a 
cultural symbol in Truku society was still important (Simon, 2013). Traditional heroes 
raising the whole family by hunting game were regarded as criminals in terms of 
conservation regulations, in particular in the protected areas. Cultural clashes were 
undermining the Truku identity. Such a social impact spread with formal education and 
mainstream Han Chinese media. Truku huntsmen arrested by the police were labelled as 
criminals and they usually experienced lengthy legal trials. Conservation interventions, 
regulations and other institutions affected the material and spiritual connections to 
natural resources in Truku culture, which possibly impacted the ideology of the Truku. 
Oppressing cultural practices of Truku people in the Park forced them to take individual 
action of hidden resistance. They kept on hunting practices by justifying that it was father’s 
will of sustaining traditional domain (see hunter C in section 5.5.4) or it was an admirable 
practice and they saw it as the foundation of Truku culture (see the hunters’ statement in 
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section 5.5.4). Similarly, protesting residents also worried that the hunting practices could 
not be exercised when the NCESA was created so they resisted the establishment of the 
scenic area.  
The third negative impact in the local Truku communities is the undermining of 
social capital. As we can see in the two Truku examples, social conflicts were reinforced 
through the external conservation interventions. Garcia’s study in Kenya shows that some 
existing inner clashes are the crux of surface environmental conflicts. These existing 
conflicts are ecologised due to conservation projects (Garcia, 2017). Pretty (2003) has 
demonstrated that high social capital groups are related with positive economic and 
ecological outcomes. Social capital matters not only for the local community, but for the 
collective action of nature conservation. Here I analyse the possible origin of the existing 
conflicts, and how these were ecologised by conservation policy implementations in the 
Truku communities. As we can see the colonial policy of relocation in Truku group in 
section 4.5.2, the new community was constituted of different families. The social capital 
was weak and collective action was rare in the relocated Truku communities. When 
conservation policy entered the Truku regions, social impacts from conservation 
interventions were embodied in the everyday life of Truku villages. Some informant 
pastors, leaders and hunters noted that their Truku community was changing. Due to the 
restriction of conservation legislations, hunting practices were stigmatized and were seen 
as a means to menace others as pastor S complained in section 5.6.1. In my fieldwork, many 
Truku residents thought that hunters being arrested was mostly because of them being 
reported to the police. These reporters were supposedly always some jealous Truku 
villagers or the Truku residents of different political camps. Accordingly, hunting activities 
became a secret action exercised in a stealthy way. Arrested Truku hunters usually avoided 
mentioning anything about hunting after the arrest. Mutual trust was undermined in the 
village. A professional huntsman in T village left his village for livelihood reasons as his 
hostile camp threatened to report his hunting practices (see the case in section 6.6.3). 
Pastor S also blamed the external conservation regulations which confused the order and 
trust of Truku community in section 5.3.4.  
Conservation interventions with sponsorship led to serious competition among 
various camps in the Truku villages. They competed over limited employment 
opportunities, business interests and political power. The outcome of these power 
struggles was opposition and division. For example, at the conservation stage of 
community conservation in T village, problems of elite-capture and rent-seeking took 
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place and caused a crowding-out effect (see sections 6.2. and 6.3 and the comment in 
section 6.4.2). Those community members whose social and normative motives were 
deterred, undermined the will of collective action of conservation effort (Jhuang and Tai, 
2009). Conservation intervention in T village caused more conflicts, reflecting Robbins 
(2004) observation that conservation can ‘ecologise’ many pre-existing tensions within a 
locality. This disharmony further undermined social capital amongst the locals. Another 
example was that the tribal meeting group organising protests against the NCESA in T 
village created a new association not just for leaders of other associations which were in 
favour of the establishment of the NCESA, but the group hoped to control the new 
organisation even though they complained about too many associations in the village (see 
the complaint in section 6.6.3).  
Conservation interventions resulted in many negative social impacts on livelihood, 
culture and everyday life within the two Truku villages. These undesirable experiences 
directly threatened their foundational demands. Truku residents therefore expressed their 
voices by individual and collective actions of resistance. 
From a macro historical lens, we can see that the Truku region was demarcated as 
a ‘special administrative region’ when the Truku capitulated to the Japanese colonial 
regime in 1914. They were governed by the Japanese police in almost every aspect of life. 
They were discriminated against through their official categorisationas a brutal group and 
the police forced them to discard some practices such as head-hunting. Other policies 
such as relocation and nationalizing forests were also imposed on them. The evident 
territoriality during the Japanese period aimed to make use of natural resources in the 
indigenous regions of Taiwan. Many policies regarding indigenous people continued when 
the Han Chinese regime ruled Taiwan. The Taroko Park was created in 1986 and 
implemented the National Park Law which was passed in 1972 when martial law was still 
implemented in Taiwan. The Park with conservation regulations restricted access to 
resources in the Park. The Park Police also assisted the conservation legislations in the 
Park. These institutions and restrictions reminded the local Truku of their colonial 
situation (Simon, 2013) because of the similar acts of territoriality. Some political actions 
were mobilized but these did not work effectively. The locals individually resisted 
conservation interventions by taking various tactics to maintain everyday practices. 
Community conservation, regarded as an alternative to strictly controlled parks, was a 
participatory approach aiming to reach the goals of conservation and development. The 
local Truku carried out the conservation project as part of a vision of community 
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development, yet the tourism development was manipulated by a few external travel 
agencies. The local government advocated local development through the attempt of 
creating the NCESA. A few rules associated with the NCESA had been passed at the local 
level in order to manage local tour guides and visitors. However, the local Truku perceived 
the spirit of a park would be manifested by the NCESA and resisted the establishment of 
the NCESA. Likewise, the local government attempted to territorialise the indigenous 
region by the means of community conservation with development. The Truku exercised 
collective action of resistance as a response to the conservation intervention. The 
livelihood restrictions, cultural clash, and the undermining of social capital were the 
catalyst to speed up the action of resistance. 
7.2.4 Territorialisation of state authorities causes resistance of local indigenes due 
to social repercussions 
According to the analysis of collected data, this study concludes that the territorial 
acts of the state agencies in PAs result in the resistance of local indigenous neighbours 
primarily because of the negative social influences from conservation. The concluding 
argument based on fieldwork answers research questions by demonstrating that the acts 
of the state agencies in PAs were dominant and based on low levels of local participation, 
even within participatory projects and co-management institutions; that local indigenous 
responses to conservation were resistance in various patterns; that the negative social 
effects on the locals were serious and aroused the local indigenous movement.          
 
7.3 Theoretical contribution 
This thesis adds to the debate in political ecology by using conceptions of 
territoriality, social impacts and resistance to examine PA management in Taiwan. It pays 
attention to the social process of conservation by looking in detail at the interactions 
between the state agencies and the local indigenous people. This political ecology 
framework emphasizes that the hegemony of the state possibly results in some 
inconveniences in affected peoples’ lives via imposed conservation measures, in particular 
those effects associated with locals’ livelihoods. These negative influences stimulated local 
indigenous opposition. The local indigenous people in this study considered the resisting 
actions as customary practices or legal self-defenses. The locals in fact deliberately 
opposed nature conservation policies in the PAs. The interactive process between the two 
vital actors in the two indigenous examples interprets why these conservation 
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interventions elicited resistance. From the exclusionary strategy to co-management 
arrangements, for instance, the Park authorities and other state agencies imposed 
different conservation values on the locals and caused negative social impacts. In the 
community conservation case, participatory planning also excluded many affected 
villagers. The negative impacts from tourism development of community conservation 
and the power struggles from conservation interventions in the local community were so 
serious that many local residents organised political protest actions. Local resistance 
against conservation occurred in both cases because of social impacts, behaviour 
manipulation and the low level of local participation. Focusing on the social dimension of 
conservation, the debate about communication process between actors and social effects 
on the locals in this study adds to the literature of political ecology. According to the 
analytical categories of political ecology literature described by Robbins (2004), this study 
connects to three themes for it deals with conservation issue and explains why PA 
establishment and conservation policy implementations arouse opposition and conflicts.             
This study also adds to debates around conservation and development by analysing 
the complex institutional arrangements of balancing two objectives. According to the 
empirical examples, the participatory institutions of the new co-management 
arrangement of the Park and the community conservation in T village revealed autocratic 
and undemocratic processes. In the Park case, nature conservation was the priority, so the 
local Truku’s economic demands and ethnic development were sacrificed. Conservation 
agencies even manipulated the co-management regime. The local participation in the Park 
was tokenism. The local Truku people thus did not support the conservation priority. 
Individuals adopted hidden resistance against conservation institutions. It was never a 
balanced institutional allocation in this Park. Although the ecological recovery was 
efficient, the repair of the conflicting relationship was costly for the Park authorities 
because of the nature and conservation priority. More outreach and friendly 
communications would be hard to improve the mistrust. In the community conservation 
case, the local government holds the power of communications with specific local leaders 
and legislations, so the policy implementations of community conservation and 
development projects lacked the participation of more locals. The participatory initiative 
became tokenism in practice because many residents chose to protest against the 
development planning. When further thinking about the dilemma of conservation and 
development, local well-being and development were constantly emphasised but other 
important social impacts from conservation intervention were ignored. For instance, local 
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Truku overlooked the opportunity of internal negotiations when making conservation 
efforts at the early stage of community conservation because conservation was given less 
emphasis. Internal consensus was hard to be reached in the competition of development 
interests. Putting too much emphasis on development seemed to result in the problem of 
a crowding-out effect as Jhuang and Tai (2009) point out. In this regard, a ‘development 
through conservation’ model tends to be more appropriate (Tai, 2008).  The dilemma of 
conservation and development makes the optimal arrangement difficult in practice. 
Brown’s (2003) suggestions of inclusionary knowledge and decision-makings, plus with 
pluralist and adaptive approaches to reconcile both objectives may be useful to deal with 
the plight of conservation and development regarding natural resource management. In 
the Park case, the Park authorities should support the project combining conservation and 
development organised and conducted by the local Truku groups in order to fulfil their 
needs. The community conservation example indicated that local participation should be 
put into practice and the process of participation should be transparent, so that local 
residents could express their voice. A consensus on various topics might be reached 
through such a process. Collective actions based on consensus should enable the project 
goals to be met more easily.        
 
7.4 Policy contribution 
This thesis makes a contribution to the policies of PAs of Taiwan by analysing the 
interactions between state agencies and the Truku people in the contexts of Taroko 
National Park and a community conservation initiative. The policy of the national park 
system has been implemented in Taiwan for over 30 years. Since three mountain national 
parks were established in the 1980s and 1991, no park has been created in the indigenous 
areas because of the constant controversies between the state and the local indigenous 
people within these three parks. An alternative form of conservation is community 
conservation which integrates conservation and development goals. In the community 
conservation project, the locals make the conservation effort, linking this to development 
planning. In the indigenous areas of Taiwan, tourism development is getting popular with 
the spread of the idea of community conservation. Tourism is regarded as the panacea of 
indigenous areas for poverty eradiation in these developing areas. The thesis is based on 
the review of these conservation policies in Taiwan to reflect the policy implementation 
in indigenous villages.  
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The analysis of policy implementation of parks and community conservation 
confirms that the rigid conservation intervention such as a park establishment did affect 
livelihood and cultural values of the local indigenous community. The dominance of 
conservation implementation in the Park excluded local people despite participation 
schemes. Moreover, tourism development possibly excluded the poor locals due to its 
capital- intensive nature. These conservation interferences also elicited some severe social 
impacts such as power clashes and value chaos in the local villages. These difficulties 
initiated the resistance of the local indigenous community even though the intentions of 
development planning were for the indigenous locals. In the community conservation 
case, I interpret that the overt resistance of the Truku protesters stemmed from the social 
impacts resulting from acts of territorialisation by the local government. The primary 
argument of this study explains why the locals opposed development planning. The 
Truku’s ongoing protests surprised the policy makers in the local government. My 
argument interprets the unexpected consequence of policy, which contributes to the 
policy of community conservation of Taiwan. Reviewing conservation policies from strictly 
protected parks to co-management arrangements of community conservation, this study 
has identified the controlling nature of state authorities which runs counter to democracy. 
The argument based on both examples also reveal why it has been hard for the state 
authorities to create new parks in indigenous regions. The problem resulted from the state 
not conferring power to the locals in terms of natural resource management. Hayes’s work 
(2006) indicates that legal parks may not be the most efficient way for local conservation. 
Rather, local users could establish rules for effective resource governance. A true 
participatory approach based on local demand, empowered by the state, could be the first 
step for the local indigenous residents to participate in local governance in terms of 
conservation. Last but not least, from Easton’s political system, the resistance of the local 
indigenous populations can be seen as the feedback to the output of conservation policy. 
Such resisting responses can influence the people’s demand and support which then go 
through the operation of a political system to yield a new decision/policy. The locals’ 
resistance actually affects the policy-making. The community conservation case 
demonstrated this because the protesters constant political actions altered the 
implementation of the NCESA planning.  
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7.5 Suggestions for Further Research 
I have two suggestions in this thesis. The first one is for the government. As I note 
above, a participatory project with empowerment may be a first step for mutual trust. This 
study found the past and current interactions between state authorities of PA 
management and the local Truku people were often unpleasant. The Truku perceived the 
oppression imposed on them via the policy interventions such as relocation and 
conservation policy implementations. Mistrust has existed in the political process for a 
long time. It is vital to establish mutual trust through an empowered programme. 
Moreover, it had better be based on indigenous tradition and current legislation, which 
indicates that the locals and the government may be interested in it. This suggestion of 
mixed knowledge is similar to the advice of Brown (2003) to deal with the challenge of 
expert-driven policies in community conservation initiatives. I suggest creating a 
community-based wildlife zone for sustainable use in T village. Truku people still keep 
their hunting practices based on customary Gaya, and the Wildlife Conservation Act 
allows indigenous populations to apply for non-profitable hunting. Demarcating the zone 
is definitely an act of human territoriality, a geographical area where some specific rules 
are enforced to control resources and people’s behaviours. Yet the rules should be made 
by the locals. On one hand, this planning would be a recovery of the traditional hunting 
territory of the Truku people. The local Truku people could plan, conduct and review the 
territory for wildlife use (which can also be consumptive and non-consumptive use). The 
Truku participants have to build their own rules about hunting types, hunting routes, 
quantitative restrictions, self-monitoring and review to ensure that they are abiding by 
them in order for sustainable utility. On the other hand, the planning would be a 
compliance with current regulations. The Wildlife Conservation Act has been revised to 
allow indigenous hunting for ritual or non-commercial use. However, the application of 
hunting requires many documents that are hard for indigenous people to complete. The 
period allowed is too short, which is different from the indigenous tradition. The 
bureaucrats in this programme need to negotiate the restriction of wildlife use and provide 
necessary financial sponsorship. I suggest the hunting period sustains for one season in 
the light of the Truku tradition. The participants have to protect the given forest around 
their individual hunting territory when they inspect their traps and do their shooting. The 
forest protection can be conducted for a whole year although the hunting period is only 
three months. The forest protection is not just beneficial for conservation but for wildlife 
use. The local indigenous hunters are motivated to protect the mountain as their way of 
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natural resource management, which promotes the public interest. I think the planning of 
wildlife use meets the needs of the Truku as well as the interest of the public and the state. 
The government has to empower the local Truku by decentralised policy and trust them 
with their rules in this programme. If the plan works well, I think the mutual trust can be 
established a little.  
The other suggestion is for the research in the future. I found that indigenous 
tourism is popular in indigenous regions of Taiwan. Yet some emerging social problems 
associated with tourism should be given more attention because these problems may 
damage the sustainable development of tourism. Tourism is at the interface between the 
environment and human society, which indicates the forces of the environment and 
human society potentially affect tourism development. In this study, I did not explore the 
practical operation of tourism in the Park and the other community conservation example 
due to the time limitations. There are plentiful studies on the tourism development in 
indigenous community in Africa and America (e.g. Butler and Hinch, 2007). The Asia-
Pacific experiences should also be shared to contribute to knowledge. I suggest indigenous 
tourism is an interesting topic for further exploration.  
 
7.6 Conclusion 
The interactions between the indigenous locals and the governmental authorities 
in protected areas affect the establishment of protected areas and well-being of indigenous 
residents in Taiwan. This exploration of the political processes of conservation contributes 
to the debate between social science and science. I adopt the theory of political ecology to 
examine this topic by the conceptions of human territoriality, social impact and resistance. 
The empirical data show that the acts of territorialisation of the state agencies resulted in 
the resistance of indigenous people due to negative social impacts. The establishment of 
protected areas such as national parks and scenic areas of community conservation is 
understood as the operation of internal territoriality by the state as Holmes (2014) notes 
because the state made use of every mechanism to control resource and people within the 
protected territories. The conservation interventions by the state authorities caused social 
impacts such as livelihood restrictions, value confusion and the damage of social capital 
in the local indigenous villages. The elicited chaos in the village, which directly led to the 
resistance of the locals. The implicit resistance was based on everyday practices because 
surviving should be the first priority. The indigenous policemen assisted the covert 
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indigenous protesters to avoid being arrested. The open indigenous protesters used means 
of political demonstrations, petitions and public relations to express their claims. Because 
their claims were based on the legal foundation, their overt resistance caught attention 
and reshaped the development policy. Empowerment was the key between two types of 
resistance. Empowered by the government, civil organizations and regulations inspired 
the local indigenous residents to resist the conservation policy explicitly. More 
empowerment tends to induce overt resistance (Poteete and Ribot, 2011). The 
interpretation of the unexpected consequence of conservation policy contributes to policy 
makers by reminding them of social impacts of conservation amongst the locals. The 
primary message of this study is that the internal territoriality of modern states 
(Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995) by the means of conservation potentially results in the 
resistance of the local indigenous people due to the undesirable social impacts resulting 
from conservation interventions.  
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APPENDIX 1.  The interview list in the fieldwork 
 
Category Interviewee 
(Anonymity) 
Interview Objectives Main Questions 
Public sector Vice Director in the 
Department of 
Economic and 
Public Construction, 
Council of 
Indigenous Peoples, 
Executive Yuan (M) 
The processes and opinions of 
the new hunting regulations 
for indigenous people 
 
 
1. What are the 
position and 
advantages of 
CIP while 
negotiating with 
the Forestry 
Bureau on the 
new hunting 
rule? 
2. What are your 
views of 
contemporary 
indigenous 
hunting? 
 Executive Officer in 
the Department of 
Planning, Council of 
Indigenous Peoples, 
Executive Yuan (A) 
Questions about 'tribal 
meeting' 
1. What is the 
objective of 
'tribal meeting'? 
2. Is there any 
scheme helping 
to solve conflicts 
stemming from 
'tribal meeting' at 
local level? 
 Officer in the 
Department of 
Planning, Council of 
Indigenous Peoples, 
Executive Yuan (G) 
Information about nine new 
courts for indigenous people 
in district courts 
1. How does CIP 
communicate 
with other 
Judicial 
Departments (in 
Executive Yuan 
and Judicial 
Yuan) on issues 
of the new 
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indigenous 
courts? 
2. What 
is the process of 
the 
establishment of 
new indigenous 
courts? 
 Two Legal Staff in 
the Legal Affairs 
Office, Council of 
Indigenous Peoples, 
Executive Yuan (C, 
D) 
The processes of the making 
new hunting regulations for 
indigenous people 
What is the 
process of 
formulating new 
hunting rules for 
indigenous 
people? 
(informal 
conversation) 
Technical specialist, 
Forestry Bureau (W) 
The processes of the new 
hunting regulations for 
indigenous people 
What is the 
negotiating 
process of 
formulating new 
hunting rules for 
indigenous 
people? 
(Telephone short 
conversation) 
Officer in Hualien 
Forest District 
Office, Forestry 
Bureau 
The opinion of the new 
hunting rules 
What is the 
division of 
responsibility on 
the new hunting 
rules? 
 Chief in the Section 
of Conservation, 
Taroko National 
Park Administration 
1.Rights of indigenous people 
2.Views of indigenous hunting 
3.Duties of conservation 
section and national park 
1. What is the 
relationship 
between 
indigenous 
people and 
national parks in 
Taiwan? 
2. How do you 
see 
contemporary 
indigenous 
hunting? 
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 Officer in the 
Section of 
Conservation, 
Taroko National 
Park Administration 
(C) 
1. Indigenous culture 
2.Ecological management 
within national park 
1. What are your 
views of 
indigenous 
hunting by local 
Truku in the 
park? 
2. What are the 
differences 
between 
ecological view 
and national 
park 
management on 
issues of natural 
resource? 
 Chief in the Section 
of Planning, Taroko 
National Park 
Administration (N) 
1.The relationship with local 
communities 
2. The future planning of an 
indigenous area in national 
park 
What is the 
relationship 
between the 
administration 
and local 
residents? 
 
 Employee in the 
Section of Planning, 
Taroko National 
Park Administration 
(L) 
1.The scheme for local 
residents to participate 
national park management 
2.Experience of dealing with 
indigenous matters 
1. What are the 
participation 
schemes in 
Taroko National 
Park and the 
operation of co-
management 
committee? 
2. What are 
critical problems 
when handling 
affairs of 
indigenous 
people in the 
park? 
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 Policemen in 
Hualien 
Detachment, 
Forestry and 
Conservation Police 
(E, F) 
Attitudes toward indigenous 
hunting and enforcing the 
conservation regulations 
1. What are your 
opinions of 
indigenous 
hunting? 
2. What is your 
attitude toward 
indigenous 
hunting while 
enforcing 
conservation 
policies? 
(informal 
conversations and 
only two interviews 
with C) 
Policemen in Taroko 
National Park Police 
(L, M,  N, C) 
Attitudes toward indigenous 
hunting and  law enforcement 
in the park 
1. What are your 
opinions of 
indigenous 
hunting in the 
park? 
2. What is your 
attitude of 
indigenous 
hunting while 
enforcing 
conservation 
policies? 
 Policemen in the 
local police station 
(F village) (G, Q) 
Attitudes toward local 
indigenous hunting and 
enforcing conservation act 
1. What are your 
opinions of local 
practices of using 
natural 
resources? 
2. What is your 
attitude toward 
indigenous 
hunting while 
enforcing 
conservation 
policies? 
 Policeman in the 
local police station 
(T village) (O) 
Attitudes toward local 
indigenous hunting and 
enforcing conservation act 
1. What are your 
opinions of local 
protesters? 
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2. What is your 
attitude toward 
the traditional 
practices of local 
Truku? 
 Vice Director, 
Hualien Indigenous 
People Department 
(W) 
1.Opinions on indigenous 
development 
2.Duties of Indigenous 
Department in Hualien 
1. What is your 
view of 
indigenous 
development, 
autonomy in 
particular? 
2. What are the 
duties of 
indigenous 
department at 
county level? 
 Senior Officer, 
Hualien Indigenous 
People Department 
(P) 
1.Views of indigenous 
practices on natural resource 
management 
2.Indigenous land policy 
1. What are your 
opinions of 
indigenous 
movement? 
2. What are 
indigenous land 
policies in 
Taiwan? 
 Associate technical 
specialist, Hualien 
Indigenous People 
Department (B) 
1.Forestry matters on 
indigenous reserved lands 
2. Opinions of contemporary 
indigenous hunting 
1. What are your 
views of natural 
resource 
management of 
indigenous 
people? 
2. What are your 
views about 
indigenous 
hunting on 
reserved lands? 
 Associate technical 
specialist, Hualien 
1.Wildlife conservation 
matters in Hualien County 
1. What are the 
implementation 
of wildlife 
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Agriculture 
Department (G) 
2.Views of indigenous hunting 
and conservation policies 
conservation 
policies at county 
level? 
2. What are your 
views about 
indigenous 
hunting? 
(Informal 
conversation) 
Supervisor, Siou- Lin 
Township Office (S) 
1.Truku modern society and 
culture 
2.Planning of new scenic 
(NCESA) area in T village 
1. What are 
characteristics of 
modern Truku 
society? 
2. What are 
conflicts on the 
planning of new 
scenic area in T 
village? 
 Chief of Section of 
Culture, Siou-Lin 
Township Office (M) 
Views of conflicts in T village 
 
What conflicts 
happen in T 
village? 
 Officer of Section of 
Culture, Siou Lin 
Township Office (J) 
Views of conflicts in T Village 
 
What conflicts 
happen in T 
village? 
 Veterinarian of 
Section of 
Agricultural 
Tourism, Siou Lin 
Township Office (Y) 
1.Conflicts between 
indigenous T villagers and 
township office 
2.Views of the planning of new 
scenic area in T village 
(NCESA) 
3.Implementation of 
the tourism events in F village 
1.What conflicts 
happen in T 
village? 
2. What is the 
stance of 
township office 
on the planning 
of scenic area in 
T village 
(NCESA)? 
3. What were the 
implementation 
of tourism 
planning in F 
village? 
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 Veterinarian of 
Section of 
Agriculture, Shou-
Feng Township 
Office (G) 
1.Views of indigenous hunting 
2.Experiences of conservation 
implementation 
1. What are your 
views about 
indigenous 
hunting? 
2. What are your 
experiences of 
implementing 
wildlife 
conservation in 
Taroko Park and 
other mountain 
areas? 
 Clerk of Taiwan 
High Court , Hualien 
Branch Court (N) 
1. Views of ‘the court for 
indigenous people’ 
2. Views of traditional 
practices of indigenous 
people 
 
1. Why did the 
legal system 
create the 
court for 
indigenous 
people? 
2. What is your 
attitude of 
indigenous 
practices?  
Indigenous elite Truku pastors in F 
Village (6 people) (S, 
H, T, N, L, J) 
1.Informal norms of Truku 
people 
2.Contemporary hunting 
practices 
3.Christianity and Truku 
culture 
1. What are 
informal norms 
of Truku 
community? 
2. What are your 
views about 
indigenous 
hunting? 
3. What are 
similarities and 
differences 
between 
Christianity and 
Truku traditional 
culture? 
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 Local leaders in F 
Village (3 people) (F, 
K, G) 
1.Conflicts between Truku and 
the park authorities 
2.Contemporary hunting 
practices 
1. What are 
conflicts between 
national park 
and Truku 
people? 
2. What are your 
views of 
indigenous 
hunting 
practices? 
 Youth leader in T 
Village (L) 
1.Views of establishment of 
NCESA 
2.Conflicts between villagers 
and the local government 
1. What are your 
views of the new 
scenic area in T 
village? 
2. What are 
conflicts between 
villagers and 
local 
government? 
Indigenous hunters Truku hunters in F 
Village (8 people) (L, 
C,T,G, Y, D, S, E) 
1.Informal norms of Truku 
people 
2.Contemporary hunting 
practices  
3.Attitudes toward public 
sectors and wildlife 
conservation policies 
1. What are 
traditional 
norms of the 
Truku 
community? 
2. What are your 
hunting 
practices? 
3. What are your 
views of wildlife 
conservation 
policies with 
relevant 
institutions? 
 Truku hunters in T 
Village (5 people) (D, 
K, G, U, L) 
1.Informal norms of Truku 
people 
2.Contemporary hunting 
practice  
1. What are 
traditional 
norms of Truku 
community? 
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3.Attitudes toward public 
sectors and wildlife 
conservation policies 
2. What are your 
hunting 
practices? 
3. What are your 
views of wildlife 
conservation 
policies with 
relevant 
institutions? 
Totally 52 persons    
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APPENDIX 2.  The information sheet of this study 
 
Information Sheet 
Research Project Title: 
Territoriality, Resistance, and Indigenous Development in Protected Areas: A 
Political Ecology Analysis of Truku People in Eastern Taiwan 
Invitation paragraph 
You are being invited to participate in a research project. Before you decide it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. 
Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if 
you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more 
information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for 
reading this. 
What is the project’s purpose? 
There are more and more protected areas being established by state agencies and 
non-governmental agencies for nature conservation in the world. These conservation 
acts are supposed for the common good. However, the local people living near or within 
the protected areas and their rights such as livelihoods, cultural practices and land 
ownership are possibly influenced by the conservation acts, in particular those 
indigenous communities who rely on the local resources. Thus local responses to 
protected areas are important for protected area management. To some degree these 
responses may vary depending on the attitudes of protected area authorities toward local 
communities and authorities’ specific schemes for the locals. A trend of international 
conservation is that conservation authorities pay more attention to local economic 
development and compensations by co-management schemes or other community-
based projects. In Taiwan, state agencies (central and local government) are the primary 
authorities establishing protected areas for resource protection. The primary 
stakeholders of protected areas are the powerful state agencies and the powerless local 
people. The interactions between the state authorities and the local people potentially 
affect policy implementations of protected areas. This study aims to explore the 
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interactions between the state authorities of protected areas and the local indigenous 
people. The objectives are: 1. To examine the policy implementations of protected areas 
authorities and other state agencies (in the Taroko National Park and a community 
conservation project). 2. To explore local Truku people’s responses to protected areas 
authorities, other state authorities, and conservation policies. 3. To study the social 
effects resulting from protected areas management and conservation policy 
implementations. The project starts from July 2012 and conducts fieldwork for data 
collection from September 2012 until March 2013.   
 Why have I been chosen? 
Since the main issues of this research are associated with protected area 
management and local indigenous people, the research project focuses on interviewing 
key stakeholders including officials in protected areas authorities and other 
governmental agencies, local Truku leaders, and Truku hunters with residents in order to 
access various views of them. 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part, 
you will be given this information sheet to keep (and be asked to sign a consent form) 
and you can still withdraw at any time without it affecting any benefits that you are 
entitled to in any way.  You do not have to give a reason. 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
This project conducts fieldwork from October 2012 to March 2013 for data 
collection via in-depth interviews, participant observation, and documents collection. 
Your involvement will be primarily with the in-depth interviews. 
The interviewees are intended to cover two groups. The first is relevant officials 
in public sectors in order to comprehend the conservation policies and indigenous 
development policies and policy implementations. The second is Truku leaders, hunters 
and residents in Truku villages aiming to understand firstly the social effects from 
protected areas, and conservation policies with policy implementations. Secondly the 
views and responses of Truku people toward protected areas and conservation 
implementations.  
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Interviews will be arranged at a time suitable to you and the frequency of 
interviews depends on different participants. The officials in different governmental 
agencies will participate about twice during the period. The interviewing venues will be 
often in the office buildings. As for indigenous Truku people, the participation will be 
more frequently to approximately twice of short discussions in every month during the 
fieldwork period in their homes or other places of their choice to discuss relevant 
themes. Each interview or discussion will finish within around one hour. The 
participants can offer their understanding of each theme in the interviews. This project 
will last until 2014 when the research thesis finishes.  
What do I have to do? 
Your participating does not involve any changes to your lifestyle – just for you to 
discuss your own experiences and opinions of the research topic. 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
There are no anticipated risks to taking part in the study. Individual responses 
will be confidentially recorded, and we hope that this will allow all participants to speak 
freely about this research topic. Once you find the interview topics distressing, you can 
be able to opt out at any stage, or not participate in some aspects of the research.  
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
Whilst there are no immediate benefits for those people participating in the 
project, it is hoped that this work will help diverse views of protected area management 
to be taken into consideration when making regional plans by the government, 
especially the establishment of protected areas.  
Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential? 
All the information that this project collects about you during the course of the 
research will be kept strictly confidential. The researcher will keep the collected data 
secure in the locked data file of the laptop and email back up duplications of the data to 
the university server. The real names of participants will not be able to be identified in 
any reports or publications except obtaining permission from them. 
 
 
 261 
 
What will happen to the results of the research project? 
The data collected through research methods from participants will be the base 
of PhD thesis and other relevant journal articles.  
Who is organising and funding the research? 
This research is a self-funding project organised by the primary researcher (PhD 
student). 
Who has ethically reviewed the project? 
This project has been ethically approved via Town and Regional Planning 
Department’s ethics review procedure. The University’s Research Ethics Committee 
monitors the application and delivery of the University’s Ethics Review Procedure across 
the University.  
Contact for further information 
Please contact the researcher for further information.  
PhD student: Wu-Long Jhuang 
Address: No. 1-15, Lane 405, Fu-yuan St., Songshan District, Taipei City, Taiwan 
(R.O.C.)  +886-2-27601940 +886-955-211557 
Email address: trp11wj@sheffield.ac.uk 
Supervisors: Dr. Glyn Williams:  0114 222 6179 glyn.williams@sheffield.ac.uk 
                     Dr. Janice Barry: 0114 222 6943 j.barry@sheffield.ac.uk 
Signature of Researcher: 
 
Signature of Participant: 
 
Date:  
 
(This information sheet to be kept by research participant)  
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Record of informed consent - Territoriality, Resistance, and Indigenous 
Development in Protected Areas interviewee 
 
Research participant’s name: 
 
Signature of Participant: 
 
Signature of Researcher: 
 
Date:  
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